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STEWART D. F. SALMOND, D.D.,

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GEORGE BARKER STEVENS, PH.D., D.D.
DWIGHT PROFESSOR OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY
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

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

TO

MY TEACHER COLLEAGUE AND FRIEND

GEORGE PARK FISHER, D.D., LL.D.

I DEDICATE THIS BOOK

IN GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION

PREFACE

THE aim of this volume is to set forth, in systematic form, the doctrinal contents of the New Testament according to its natural divisions. The general method pursued is that which is now common in this branch of theological science. Brief explanations of the mode of treating certain portions of the New Testament, with respect to which important critical differences exist among scholars, are given in the chapters introductory to the several parts of the work.

My indebtedness to other writers has been acknowledged by means of references to the literature of the subject in the footnotes. But all such acknowledgments must, of necessity, be very partial. I wish especially to express my obligations to the writings of my teachers in earlier years, Professors Weiss and Pfleiderer. Wendt's *Teaching of Jesus* has been very helpful, especially in its treatment of critical and historical considerations bearing upon interpretation. Beyschlag's *New Testament Theology* has been read with interest and profit. Holtzmann's *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie* is a valuable encyclopædia for the student of the subject. Its summaries of the results of critical exegesis and its copious citations from the most recent literature render it a work of great value for reference. Professor Bruce's writings have been of real service, especially his volume on the theology

of Paul. No one has written on the subject with finer insight and discrimination. The brilliant treatise of Professor Ménégoz, entitled *Le Péché et la Rédemption d'après St. Paul*, has afforded me many useful suggestions. With none of these writers, however, have I been able in all respects to agree. Especially do I dissent from the interpretations given by Wendt and Beyschlag to those portions of the New Testament which relate to the person and work of Christ, and from the presuppositions on which Holtzmann's construction and estimate of New Testament history and theology rest.

Appended to the volume will be found a select bibliography which comprises the most important recent literature of the subject. Articles and brochures on minor topics in Biblical Theology, which would be likely to interest only the specialist, have not been included. In accordance with its somewhat general purpose the list is limited to more comprehensive works. A much fuller bibliography, arranged on a different principle, is prefixed to Holtzmann's *Lehrbuch*.

As respects its aim the present work is not apologetic or controversial. It seeks to expound, not to defend. It also recognizes the boundaries between the explicit teachings of the New Testament and inferences which may be drawn from them, however natural or apparently necessary such inferences may seem to be. The limitations of space which were prescribed for the volume have rendered it necessary to bestow careful attention upon the question of proportion and to present the various subjects which are discussed as succinctly as possible. Every chapter has involved a study in condensation.

The reader will observe that while much importance is attached to the influence of current ideas upon the teaching of Christ and the apostles, I do not believe that Christianity is a mere product of the age in which it arose. I hold to the unique and distinctive originality of Jesus and to the supernatural origin of his gospel. The truths and facts which constitute this gospel are, indeed, historically conditioned, and of these historical conditions the Biblical theologian must take full and careful account. But that movement of God in human life and history which we call Christianity transcends its historical relations and limitations, and can be justly estimated only by recognizing its divine origin and singularity. This view of the Christian religion is not merely an assumption which is carried into the present study, but equally a conclusion which is established by the study itself.

GEORGE BARKER STEVENS.

YALE UNIVERSITY,
January, 1899.

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THE THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

PART I

THE TEACHING OF JESUS ACCORDING TO THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE task which lies before us in this part of our work is to present as clear a picture as possible of the teaching of Jesus on the basis of the Synoptic Gospels. The account of his teaching which is preserved in the fourth Gospel is so different in form from that contained in the Synoptics that it requires a separate treatment. In connection with the study of the fourth Gospel, the two types of tradition will be brought into frequent comparison.

Jesus did not commit his teaching to writing. He spoke his message and did his work, and left the recording of his words and deeds to those whose lives had been deeply impressed with their divine significance and value. How long a time passed before the first disciples began to make written memoranda of the Lord's life we cannot say, but, probably, several years. At first there would be no occasion to write narratives of his sayings and acts, since they were vividly photographed upon the memories of all his followers. The leading events of his life and his most characteristic sayings were preserved in oral tradition, and

were constantly rehearsed, in a more or less stereotyped form, in the preaching and teaching of the apostles. As time passed on, however, it became necessary to compose written narratives of the Lord's words and deeds. The gradual dispersion of the Christian community from Jerusalem, the addition of new members to the company who required definite instruction, and the passing away of some of the eye and ear witnesses, would be among the motives which would prompt to the writing of these narratives. The prologue of Luke's Gospel (i. 1–4) is very instructive in this connection. Luke says that before he wrote his Gospel many narratives (*διηγήσεις*) of the Lord's life had been written.[1] He implies that these were, in general, fragmentary and insufficient; that he was acquainted with some of them, and proposed to use them in constructing his own fuller account of Jesus' life. These numerous writers (*πολλοί*) of primitive Gospels, as we may call them, had written, Luke says, in accordance with the tradition of the Lord's words, which had been handed down from the beginning (of his ministry) by those who had seen and heard him (*αὐτόπται*). These earlier writers to whom Luke refers were not themselves apostles or immediate disciples, but they were acquainted, at first hand, with the primitive tradition of the Lord's words and deeds as it had been preserved among the eye and ear witnesses. That original tradition may have been oral, or written, or both; these writers had access to it, and based their narratives upon it, and Luke, in turn, had access to their work, besides possessing independent knowledge, derived from carefully tracing the course of events from the very beginning (*ἄνωθεν*) of the Master's life. Moreover, in dedicating his book to a certain Theophilus, probably a man of noble birth who had recently become a convert and who was, perhaps, the author's patron, Luke dis-

[1] The so-called *Logia of Jesus*, recently discovered in Egypt, are of interest as illustrating the existence, in the second century, of a hitherto unknown collection of reputed sayings of Jesus. Even if unauthentic, they illustrate the many, if not the earlier, efforts which were made to preserve the Lord's words in writing.

closes to us one of the first uses of the written Gospels — the instruction and confirmation in faith and certainty of those who were dependent upon the testimony of others for accurate knowledge of Jesus' teaching and work.

Have any of these primitive Gospels to which Luke refers been preserved to us? The Gospel of Mark is probably one of them. A critical comparison of Mark and Luke shows that Luke has freely used our second Gospel in the construction of his narrative. Moreover, the earliest tradition which has been preserved to us, the testimony of Papias,[1] recorded in Eusebius,[2] respecting the origin of Mark's Gospel, agrees strikingly with Luke's description of the earlier Gospels, which he knew and used. Papias testifies that Mark was known as the interpreter of Peter; that he wrote down with accuracy, but not in chronological order, the events of Jesus' life; but that he did this from information given him by Peter, because he was not himself an eye-witness.[3] This would accord exactly with what Luke says: He drew up a narrative in accordance with knowledge which had been delivered to him by an eye-witness (Peter). It is one of the best attested results of New Testament criticism that Mark's Gospel is the earliest of our three Synoptics, and that it supplied the framework on which the Gospel of Luke is constructed.

But Mark was one of the "many" to whom Luke refers. He was not an apostle nor was he a personal follower of Jesus. Does there still remain to us any specimen of the tradition which the first disciples who personally accompanied Jesus preserved? Have we any written narrative

[1] Papias was bishop of Hierapolis, in Phrygia, and died about 163. According to Irenæus (d. about 202) he was a disciple of the apostle John. *Against Heresies*, Bk. V. ch. xxxiii. 4. He composed a treatise in five books (now lost) entitled, *Interpretation of the Lord's Oracles*, λογίων κυριακῶν ἐξήγησις.

[2] *Ecclesiastical History*, III. 39.

[3] The testimony of Irenæus is to the same effect: "Mark, the disciple and interpreter of Peter, did also hand down to us in writing what had been preached by Peter." *Against Heresies*, Bk. III. ch. i. 1.

which emanates directly from an apostle or other eye-witness? Turning again to the section of Eusebius just cited, we find this quotation from Papias: "Matthew composed the Oracles (*τὰ λόγια*) in the Hebrew dialect, and each one interpreted them as he was able." Irenæus confirms this assertion.[1] If this ancient testimony is correct, we have here a trace of a primitive, apostolic, written source.

Numerous perplexing questions now arise concerning this writing which Papias calls the Oracles, or Logia, into which I cannot here enter at length. For a discussion of them I must refer the reader to treatises on New Testament Introduction. It is, at present, the general belief of scholars that this tradition is trustworthy, and that the Hebrew Logia of Matthew is the principal literary basis of our first Gospel. In my own judgment this is a second secure result of New Testament criticism. The *λόγια* of Matthew would be an example of the tradition (*παράδοσις*; *cf.* *παρέδοσαν*) of the eye-witnesses (*αὐτόπται*) upon which the many (*πολλοί*) mentioned by Luke had based their narratives (*διηγήσεις*; Lk. i. 1–4). It is probable that the Logia consisted mainly of sayings and discourses of Jesus connected together by brief historical narratives; that this writing was early translated into Greek, and incorporated into our first Gospel by another hand than that of Matthew. We thus get the elements of the "two-source theory" of the Synoptics now common among scholars. It may be stated thus: Mark, the oldest of our Synoptics in their present form, is, according to Papias, based primarily on the testimony of Peter. Other sources were probably open to him; Weiss holds that Matthew's Logia was one of these, but this view is disputed by other scholars. Mark was freely used by both the first and third evangelists. These two writers also freely used Matthew's Logia, each combining this writing with Mark in his own way. Their common, but independent, use of the Logia goes far to explain their agreement in places in which they are inde-

[1] "Matthew also issued a written Gospel among the Hebrews in their own dialect," etc. *Against Heresies*, Bk. III. ch. i. 1.

pendent of Mark. Thus Mark and the Logia are the "two sources" referred to in this theory.[1]

It cannot be said, in general, whether the first or the third evangelist has more faithfully preserved the apostolic source. Now one, now the other, gives its narratives in greater fulness or in more natural connections. From the way in which the Logia material is distributed in the first Gospel, it has happened that many sayings have fallen out because they found no point of connection with the Mark narrative, which Luke, by his method of using the former, has preserved. It is, therefore, probable that the original order of the Logia material is better preserved in Luke. In the first Gospel the sayings are more frequently grouped together on the principle of internal kinship, without regard to their original connection. On the question whether there is a direct interdependence between the first and third Gospels, specialists are divided. Holtzmann and Wendt hold that Luke knew and used one first Gospel; Weiss is of the contrary opinion.

It will thus be seen that according to the view which I adopt as probable, our first Gospel is not, in its present form, the work of the apostle Matthew. The traditional designation of it as "The Gospel according to Matthew" is, however, justified, since it is an amplification of Matthew's Logia. For convenience I shall use the name "Matthew" when I refer to the book which bears his name, in the same way as I do "Mark" and "Luke."

[1] It must, however, in fairness, be mentioned that a considerable number of scholars doubt the correctness of the Papias tradition, and call in question theories based upon the supposition of a Matthaic Logia. It may happen that the "two-source theory" will be modified by later criticism, or even supplanted. It cannot be claimed that, in itself, it presents a final solution of the Synoptic problem. It should, therefore, be held, not as a demonstrated truth, but as a working hypothesis — the best which criticism has, thus far, attained. I have used it as such. The substance of my portrayal of the teaching of Jesus would not be materially affected by its modification. I cannot doubt that the elements which entered into the formation of our Gospels were so numerous, and their combination so complicated that no theory is capable of fully explaining all the facts. The truth of such theories should be regarded as approximate, and their evidence as probable only.

These three forms of the Synoptic tradition, emanating, as they do, from three different hands and yet being, to a great extent, interdependent and based upon common documents, give rise to very perplexing questions when the narratives are treated critically and in detail. It has long been felt that the scholar's work was not done when the three narratives were adjusted to each other as ingeniously as possible and printed side by side. The striking similarities and the no less striking differences still remain to be explained. Variations of order and apparent repetitions of events need to be accounted for. These problems have given rise to the science of Gospel-criticism, or Higher Criticism as applied to the Gospels. This department of Biblical learning has been diligently cultivated in recent times, and to it such specialists as Holtzmann, Weiss, Wendt, and Resch have devoted the most painstaking and conscientious labor. It deals with the literary and historical problems to which a critical comparison of the narratives gives rise. Its work logically precedes that of exegesis, and, in many cases, has an important bearing upon interpretation. In the portrayal of the teaching of Jesus which follows I shall hope not to contravene any well-established result of criticism. Although the purpose of my work does not require me directly to discuss the questions which arise within this field, — and the limits of this volume would not permit it, — yet I shall, in the more important instances, refer the reader to works in which such problems are considered and shall indicate the bearing of the points at issue.[1]

It is a question of the utmost importance for the student of our subject, how the views of our sources at which criticism has arrived, affect the reliability of our Synoptic Gos-

[1] The first or untranslated part of Wendt's work, *Die Lehre Jesu*, I shall cite by that title. The second or translated part, originally entitled *Der Inhalt der Lehre Jesu*, I shall cite from the translation which bears the title, *The Teaching of Jesus*. For the convenience of most readers, I shall cite the translation of Weiss's *Leben Jesu* instead of the original, and so in the case of other German works of which there are translations in common use. Whenever practicable and useful, I shall also add, in parenthesis, references to the original.

pels. No one of them is the immediate product of an apostle or other eye-witness. In time and authorship they belong to the next generation after that of Jesus himself. They are, however, based upon apostolic tradition. Mark rests mainly, as we have seen, upon information derived from Peter which, through the incorporation of Mark into Matthew and Luke, is one main source of both the other Synoptics. The other principal source is an apostolic writing, the Logia of Matthew. We have, then, an apostolic basis for our first three Gospels which entitles them, in a purely historical judgment, to make a strong claim to trustworthiness. If this interdependence and use of common materials which criticism recognizes, have confused certain details and occasioned a misapprehension of some events and sayings, we can only say that this was inevitable in such a process of collation and revision as both external testimony and internal evidence prove to have taken place. The substantial truthfulness of the Synoptic picture of our Lord's life is only the more naturally and realistically attested. If criticism has been compelled to discredit those methods of argument by which the older Apologetics sought to prove that all three Synoptics really emanated from apostles, and by forced harmonizing and strained interpretation explained away differences and reconciled discrepancies, it has substituted for this claim of formal infallibility for the Gospels a valid and defensible assertion of substantial historical trustworthiness. It maintains that the Gospels rest upon reliable testimony and that they can stand upon the same grounds on which other historical narratives stand. Their authors were competent men who possessed information respecting their subject — not, indeed, complete, but yet sufficient for their purpose — and who, therefore, wrote of Christ's words and deeds with knowledge, intelligence, honesty, and sympathy. If this claim is a more modest one than that which was formerly made, it has the advantage of being the one claim which the Gospels make for themselves and the additional advantage of agreeing alike with the earliest Church tradition and with the phenomena of the Gospels themselves.

The various types of New Testament teaching have of late been studied with constant reference to their historical background. The teaching of Jesus, for example, is viewed in its connection with Old Testament thought and with the religious ideas which prevailed among the Jews in his time. To the first of these relations we shall devote a separate chapter. The relations of likeness and of difference between the popular religious teaching of the later Judaism and the teaching of Jesus form a theme too vast to admit of full discussion in this volume. Of recent writers on our present subject Wendt, in his *Teaching of Jesus*, and Holtzmann, in his *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*, have most elaborately portrayed this popular teaching and exhibited its relations to the doctrine of Jesus. To these works I shall, from time to time, refer. It will serve our present purpose, however, briefly to advert to some of the most significant points of connection between Jewish ideas and the thought of Jesus.

The later Jewish teaching and the doctrine of Jesus alike had their historical roots in the Old Testament. But the former was developed by traditional accretion and fanciful interpretations; the latter freely and independently by expanding the germs of essential spiritual truth which were implicit in the Old Testament religion. Both the scribe and Jesus held fast to the Old Testament, but they used it in the most different ways. To the scribe it was a repository of external rules and distinctions, admitting of endless subdivision and extension; to Jesus it was a provisional expression of great spiritual truths and laws which needed to be rescued from the limitations in which they had been enclosed and given their true, universal scope and validity.

In its outward form and method the teaching of Jesus was much like that which prevailed in his time. He stood or sat in the midst of a group of disciples or other hearers and explained and illustrated his thoughts. His teaching was largely embodied in pithy, pointed sayings which were designed and adapted to impress the popular mind. He taught rather by suggestion than by presenting a full and

systematic view of any subject. It is unlikely that the extended groups of didactic sayings which appear in the Gospels as if they constituted continuous discourses were, in all cases, spoken at one time. They are often collections of sayings which have been massed together, as, for example, the "Sermon on the Mount" and the group of parables in Mt. xiii.

Jesus frequently taught by the use of examples. For instance, he explained the nature of true righteousness (Mt. v. 20 *sq.*) by citing from the Old Testament and from Rabbinic teaching, maxims which were either imperfect or inadequate in themselves, or were erroneously applied by the people. Sometimes he taught by action, as when he took a child in his arms in order to emphasize the necessity of childlikeness in those who would be members of his Kingdom. But one of the most striking forms of Jesus' teaching was the parable. A parable is a narrative of some real or imaginary event in nature or in common life, which is adapted to suggest a moral or religious truth. The parable rests upon some correspondence, more or less exact, between events in nature or in human experience, and the truths of religion. Wendt distinguishes two classes of parables:[1] (1) those in which some fact in the actual world is adduced as illustrating a moral or religious principle, and (2) those in which some imagined events, or series of events, — which might naturally happen, — is narrated to illustrate a spiritual truth or process. Examples of the first sort of parables are: "They that are whole have no need of a physician, but they that are sick" (Mk. ii. 17), and the sayings about sewing a piece of undressed cloth upon an old garment (Mk. ii. 21) and about a kingdom divided against itself (Mk. iii. 24). It is the second class of parables — the parable-stories, such as those of the Sower (Mk. iv. 3 *sq.*), the Vineyard (Mt. xxi. 28 *sq.*), and the Prodigal Son (Lk. xv. 11 *sq.*), which excite the greatest interest in the student of the Bible.[2]

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, I. 117 *sq.* (orig. p. 84 *sq.*).

[2] An interesting comparison between the parable and other figurative forms of speech, such as the fable, the myth, and the allegory, will be found in R. C. Trench's *Notes on the Parables*, ch. i.

A word must here be said respecting the interpretation of this class of parables. The commonest error of interpreters is to apply the allegorical method to the parables, that is, to seek to find some special and distinct meaning in each detail of the parable-story. This method assumes that the parable is intended to present either a complete parallel at every point between the illustrative narrative employed and the religious truth to be inculcated, or even to teach a whole series of religious lessons all at once. To some parables this method can be applied without apparent violence to their intention, but this is because they are so simple and compact as to form one indivisible picture, or because the analogy used happens to be especially complete and many-sided. In most cases, however, this method breaks down entirely. Indeed, in cases where it seems successful, its apparent success is never due to its soundness as a method. There is hardly any limit to the absurdities which have been derived from the parables by trying to make every character which is introduced into them, and every incident of the parable-story, represent some particular person or symbolize some religious truth in the application.

A sound general principle for the interpretation of the parable is that it is intended to teach one single truth. The parallel between the story which embodies this truth and its spiritual counterpart may be more or less complete. The point of the teaching may lie in the whole picture which the parable presents, or it may lie in some single aspect or element of the picture. The parable of the Prodigal Son and that of the Sower are examples of parables whose significance is found in the entire picture which they present. No violence is done in these cases by assigning a didactic value in interpretation even to the details of the parable-story; indeed, we find that this is done by our Lord himself in his explanation of the parable of the Sower.[1] But in many cases the details of the parable are

[1] Weiss, *Life of Christ*, II. 206, 215 (Bk. IV. ch. ii.), regards the explanation of this parable, which is given in all the Synoptics, as an allegorizing interpretation by Mark; Holtzmann, *Hand-Comm. ad loc.*, as

only for the sake of completing the parable-narrative, in order that the one point of comparison may be set in clear relief. Who is the rich man in the parable of the Rich Man and the Steward (Lk. xvi. 1 *sq.*)? Some say, God; others, the Romans; still others, the devil; and these are but a few of the answers which have been given. Who is the steward? We find a similar variety of answers: the wealthy, the Israelites, sinners, and even Judas Iscariot. The fact is that it makes no difference who the rich man is, or who the steward is. The point of the parable does not depend upon finding a counterpart for these persons. Whom does the servant who owed ten thousand talents represent? Who is the merchant who sought goodly pearls? Who the woman who puts the leaven in the meal, or the one who sweeps the house in search of the lost piece of money? No answers are to be sought to such questions. The meaning hinges on the *action*, not on the *personnel*, of these parables. The persons introduced are merely necessary as instruments to represent the significant act or event, and have, in themselves, no significance whatever.[1]

It is necessary now to illustrate, in some important points, that popular Jewish theology which forms the background and presupposition of so much of Jesus' teaching. We will notice, first, the Jewish idea of God. The idea of God's exaltation above the world was carried so far by the Jews of Jesus' time that he was almost separated from the world. God was chiefly thought of as a judge or governor. His relations with men were conceived of in a legal, rather than in a vital, way. God was an accountant who exactly credited all good deeds, and, with equal exactness, estimated and punished all transgressions

a traditional form which the explanation had taken in the teaching of the community. Most interpreters have not hesitated, in spite of the absence of a formal and precise congruity in the explanation, to ascribe it to Jesus himself. Wendt, *Teaching*, I. 125, attributes this interpretation to Jesus, although he thinks it has been displaced from its original connection. See *Lehre Jesu*, p. 30 *sq.*

[1] In this connection I would refer to the exhaustive study of the parabolic teaching of Jesus in Jülicher's *Gleichnisreden Jesu*.

of his law. It will readily be seen how the extreme development of this idea would tend to exclude the truth of God's grace from the minds of men, for the very idea of God's grace is that he treats men better than they deserve.

This conception of God exerted a most potent influence on practical religion. The God who was far away in the heavens had made a revelation of his will in the laws and ceremonies of the Pentateuch, and religion consisted, to the mind of the Jew, in strict obedience to all the requirements of this legal system. The main emphasis was, accordingly, laid on the externals of religion as means of pleasing God and winning his favor.

There were, however, important elements of truth in the popular Jewish idea of God. The transcendence of God — his independence of the world and superiority to it — was strongly emphasized, but the complementary truth of God's constant presence in the world was correspondingly obscured. And with this transcendence were associated ideas of arbitrariness, legal strictness and harshness, rather than ideas of moral excellence or love. So perverted an idea of God's nature and relations to the world could only lead to superficial conceptions of his will and requirements. The allusions which Jesus made to the religious ideas of the Pharisees show what popular religion had become. It was a round of ceremonies and observances most of which had nothing to do with the state of the heart and life — a tithing of mint, anise, and cummin, while judgment and the love of God were forgotten.

We are thus led to the consideration of the current idea of righteousness among the Jews in contrast to that which Jesus presents. Their idea of righteousness grew out of their conception of God and of his revelation. It consisted in obedience to commandments, and these commandments were looked at in quite an external way. The rich young ruler who came to Jesus asking what he should do to inherit eternal life (Mk. x. 17 *sq.*) is a concrete illustration of the view which the Jews took of the commandments. He said that he had kept them all. He

considered that to refrain from doing such evil deeds as stealing, lying, sabbath-breaking, and the like, which the commandments forbade, was to keep the commandments perfectly. Only a superficial conception of the import and bearing of the commandments could underlie his claim that he had kept them all from his youth. The same faulty notion of the real moral requirements of the law lay at the root of the pride and self-righteousness of the Pharisees. They thought themselves righteous only because they measured themselves by an imperfect standard.

It would not be correct to suppose that all the Jews believed themselves to have kept the law perfectly. On the contrary, they invented various devices by which they thought they could make good their personal deficiencies. Specially great sufferings and meritorious works, such as almsgiving, were thought to have an atoning efficacy. The extraordinary merits of one's ancestors or friends might avail to supply defects in obedience.[1]

One of two results was quite sure to flow from this externalism in religion, either of which would be destructive of a healthy religious life. On the one hand, if one supposed himself to have done all that was required, he would easily fall a prey to spiritual pride, for had not he achieved this lofty height of goodness by his own exertions? On the other hand, if a man felt that he had failed to do the divine will and to win acceptance with God, he would naturally become hopeless and despondent. We accordingly find that the religious life of the Jewish people, to a great extent, oscillated between self-righteousness and despair. The former of these tendencies is illustrated by the hypocrisy and self-righteousness which were the common characteristics of the Pharisees; the latter by the gloom and despair of a sincere religious mind in the pre-Christian experience of the apostle Paul which is reflected in the seventh chapter of Romans.

Now when Jesus came, he presented a very different idea of the way in which men are to find acceptance with God. He taught that trust or faith was what God required.

[1] *Cf.* Weber, *Jüdische Theologie* (1897), § 63.

This teaching opens a way of salvation on which any one, however weak and sinful, may enter. It is not necessary to climb up into God's favor by meritorious works; nor is it possible, since the power of sin is so great in unrenewed human nature. In substituting faith for works Jesus gave quite a new character to religion. He opened the way to real repose of soul because in faith men do not rest upon their own achievements, but in God's mercy. They have a secure ground of hope in the goodness of God. But this faith is not a mere passive principle; it involves love and obedience. Real trust in God implies living fellowship with him. Thus faith sets man in his true relation to God because it both opens his life to the divine grace and also calls forth his own best aspiration and effort after likeness to God. Christ's teaching, therefore, replaces self-righteousness by humility, and substitutes confidence for despair. Its whole idea is that of a vital, loving relation with God.

The teaching of Jesus presents a great contrast to the Jewish ideas of his time in regard to the person and work of the Messiah. The popular Messianic idea had been formed from those prophecies which represented the Messiah as a Prince or King. These representations were taken in a political sense. The Messiah was to be another David who should restore the Jewish monarchy to power and glory, subdue hostile nations, and rule the conquered world in unsurpassed majesty. When, therefore, Jesus appeared, claiming to be the Messiah, and yet did nothing which the Jews expected the Messiah to do, it is not strange that they rejected his claim. And when he began to teach that he must suffer death, his contemporaries were more than ever offended at his claim to be the Messiah. Even his disciples found it hard to overcome their Jewish prejudices respecting Messiah's person so far as to see how their Master could be destined to suffer death. "Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall never be unto thee" (Mt. xvi. 22), exclaimed Peter when Jesus said that he must suffer many things, and be put to death, and in so doing he doubtless voiced the general feeling.

The doctrine of a suffering Messiah was not current in pre-Christian Judaism.[1] The *dolores Messiæ* of which Jewish writers speak are not the Messiah's personal sufferings, but calamities which, it was believed, would come upon Israel and the world previous to, and in connection with, Messiah's coming. The Old Testament passages which describe the suffering Servant of Jehovah, such as Isa. liii., were not applied to the person of the Messiah until Christian times. The Jewish Messianic ideal at the time when Jesus appeared was too much associated with thoughts of earthly power and glory to permit of reconciliation with the notion that the Messiah should die an ignominious death. The ideas of Jesus, therefore, stood in sharp contrast with the popular expectations of the Jews of his time respecting Messiah's work and kingdom.

The Jews of a later period believed that there was to be a preparatory Messiah, the son of Joseph, who was to die as a warrior in defending the nation. He was not conceived of as preëminently a sufferer, nor was his death regarded as atoning. He was to prepare the way for the victorious Messiah, the son of David. Preparatory sufferings of a sympathetic and disciplinary nature were sometimes attributed to him during the time preceding his entrance upon his Messianic vocation.[2]

An inevitable result of the ideas of salvation, righteousness, and the kingdom of God which we have noticed, was that the Jews regarded themselves as the special favorites of heaven. To them, as they thought, God had given his only revelation, and to them he had restricted his saving mercy. The Old Testament had presented the idea that God had bestowed peculiar privileges upon the Jews in order that they might be the bearers of true religion to the world. They, on the other hand, considered their privi-

[1] *Cf.* Stanton, *The Jewish and the Christian Messiah*, pp. 122, 123; Schürer, *Jewish People*, Div. II. § 29. 12.

[2] See Dalman, *Der leidende und der sterbende Messias der Synagoge*, who has shown that the dying Messiah, *ben Joseph*, and the suffering Messiah, *ben David*, must be kept entirely distinct. *Cf.* Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*, § 79. The contrary view is represented by Wünsche, *Die Leiden der Messias.*

leges as destined for themselves alone. The favors of heaven should stop with them and be their exclusive possession. This attitude of mind involved the great perversion of Israel's history. By failing to receive Christ and his world-wide conception of salvation, they broke with the sublime purpose of God in their own history, and failed to attain the true goal of their existence as the theocratic people.

These illustrations of Jewish ideas will serve to show how uncongenial to the spiritual truth of Jesus was the soil in which he must plant it. To the thought of his age God was afar off, his service was a round of rites and observances, righteousness was an external, and largely a non-moral, affair, and the great hope of the nation was to subdue, by divine intervention, the surrounding nations and to obtain supremacy over the world. With all these ideas and hopes the teachings of Jesus came into the sharpest collision. He aimed to show men that God was near to them and that they could live in fellowship with him. He taught that all outward rites were valueless in themselves and that God cared most about the state of the heart. For him righteousness consisted in Godlikeness; that is, in love, service, and helpfulness.

CHAPTER II

THE GOSPEL AND THE LAW

In his teaching Jesus took his stand, as we have seen, upon the Old Testament. He did not aim to introduce a wholly new religion. He clearly foresaw that some of his disciples would suppose that it was his purpose to break with the Old Testament system, and he warned them against this serious mistake by telling them that any of them who should feel themselves free to break the least commandment of the Old Testament law, and should teach others accordingly, should be called the least in the Kingdom of God (Mt. v. 19). His constant manner of speaking in regard to the Jewish religion and Scriptures shows the reverence in which he held them.[1]

There is in one of his parables a significant expression in regard to the gradual progress of his truth in the world: "First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear" (Mk. iv. 28). This statement might be fitly applied to the whole process of revelation of which the Old Testament represents the earlier stages. It would as truly describe Jesus' idea of this process as it does the growth to which he immediately applied it. The Old Testament represents the first steps in a great course of revelation and redemption which reaches its consummation in Christ himself.

While, therefore, Jesus builds upon the Jewish religious system, he also builds far above and beyond it. While

[1] On this subject I would refer the reader to the following discussions: R. Mackintosh, *Christ and the Jewish Law*, 1886; E. Schürer, *Die Predigt Jesu Christi in ihrem Verhältniss zum alten Testament und zum Judenthum*, 1882; W. Bousset, *Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judenthum*, 1892; L. Jacob, *Jesu Stellung zum mosaischen Gesetz*, 1893.

salvation, historically considered, is from the Jews, it is none the less necessary that the Jewish religion should be greatly elevated and enriched. The actual religion of the people, though embodying essential and permanent elements of true religion, is not adequate to the needs of the world; it must be further developed, supplemented, and completed at many points before it can become the universal, the absolute religion.

There were imperfections in the Jewish religion which were incidental to its character and purpose. It was in its very nature provisional and preparatory. It was adapted to an early and rude stage of human development. A convenient illustration is found in the principle of retaliation which, within certain limits, the Old Testament sanctioned. "Ye have heard," said Jesus, "that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil," etc. (Mt. v. 38, 39). Another example is found in his conversation with the Pharisees when they asked him why, if a man and wife became one in marriage, Moses commanded to give a bill of divorcement. Jesus answered, "Moses for your hardness of heart suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it hath not been so. And I say unto you," etc. (Mt. xix. 8).

Jesus, in effect, undermined the Jewish law of clean and unclean by setting forth the principle that it is not what enters into a man which defiles him, but that it is that which proceeds out of him, that is, from his heart, which defiles him (Mk. vii. 15). The Levitical system of sacrifices would not long survive among those who appreciated the force of the principle that "to love God with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the strength, and to love his neighbor as himself, is much more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices" (Mk. xii. 33). It is obvious, then, that the actual effect of the Gospel in doing away with the Jewish sacrificial and ceremonial system was a natural and logical result of the principles which Jesus laid down, and may be said to have been contemplated by him.

But the question now arises, Did Jesus intend to abrogate the whole Old Testament religious system, and, if so, by what means? This question also involves another, If he did do away with this system, how is the fact to be reconciled with his frequent assertion of its divineness? The most important passage, in its bearing on these problems, is Mt. v. 17: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil." This passage must be read in the light of the explanations and applications which follow it. Jesus proceeds to say that not a jot or tittle shall pass away from the law, — a statement which, if read by itself, would seem to indicate the perpetual validity of the whole Old Testament system, ritual, sacrifices, and all. But to the statement in question he immediately adds: "till all things be fulfilled, or accomplished." He does not, therefore, say that no part of this system shall ever pass away (as it has done, and that, too, in consequence of his own teaching), but only that no part of it shall escape the process of fulfilment; that it shall not pass away till, having served its providential purpose, it is fulfilled in the gospel. What, now, is this fulfilment which is to be accomplished for the whole law, even for its least portions?

This question is not to be answered in a single sentence or definition. The fulfilment of the old system by the new is a great historic process, the adequate understanding of which requires a careful study of the whole New Testament. Its salient features, however, may be briefly indicated. Jesus fulfils the Old Testament system by rounding out into ideal completeness what is incomplete in that system. In this process of fulfilment, all that is imperfect, provisional, temporary, or, for any reason, needless to the perfect religion, falls away of its own accord, and all that is essential and permanent is conserved and embodied in Christianity. Some of the elements of this fulfilment are as follows:

(1) Jesus fulfils the law perfectly in his own personal life. The character of Jesus was the realization of the ideal which the law contemplated. He was a perfectly

righteous person, and it was righteousness which the law demanded and aimed to secure. But it is not merely or mainly the personal fulfilment of the law's ideal to which Jesus refers in saying that he came to fulfil the law.

(2) Jesus fulfilled the law in his teaching by setting forth therein the absolute truths of religion and the universal principles of goodness. This point may best be illustrated from the context of the passage under review. Our Lord says that the true righteousness must exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees (*v.* 20). Their righteousness consisted in the punctilious observance of the bare letter of the law, quite to the neglect of its spirit. Jesus then proceeds to show the difference between such external, superficial righteousness and that which corresponds to the law's true ideal. He says (*v.* 21 *sq.*): You have in the Old Testament the commandment, Thou shalt not kill. It is commonly supposed that to refrain from the actual, overt act of murder is to keep that commandment, but I tell you that he only truly keeps it who refrains from anger and hate. In the sight of God, hate is the essence of murder. He thus finds the seat of all goodness, and of all sin in the heart, that is, in the sphere of the motives and the desires.

In like manner, he declares that the essence of adultery is in the lustful desire and the impure look. He thus makes righteousness an inward and moral affair. It depends upon the state of the heart. This truth he next illustrates by reference to a more subtle distinction (*vv.* 33–37). He cites the commandment which requires men to speak the truth, and to perform their vows unto God. It appears that under cover of this second requirement the Jews permitted themselves to make subtle distinctions between vows or oaths taken "to Jehovah," and those taken, for example, "by the heaven," or "by Jerusalem." Oaths taken in Jehovah's name were regarded as more sacred and binding than those not so taken, and thus an easy way was opened for disregarding the real sacredness of vows and promises. Jesus strikes at the root of all these hollow and dishonest distinctions, and discounte-

nances altogether the use of oaths in apparent confirmation of one's word. Such oaths, he says in effect, are either meaningless or irreverent. Let your simple word be enough. Esteem that to be as binding as if you had coupled your statement with Jehovah's name. The Jews had made the commandment of truthfulness an instrument of untruthfulness; Jesus insists upon a truthful heart which, to use a modern phrase, makes one's "word as good as his bond."

The illustrations of fulfilment thus far given are examples of the way in which Jesus penetrated in his teaching to the inner meaning of Old Testament precepts and exhibited their true ideal requirements, as against the superficial application of them which regarded them as relating to outward action only. Now, however, he takes an example of an Old Testament legal principle to which in itself he objects: "Ye have heard that it was said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth (Ex. xxi. 24); but I say unto you, Resist not him that is evil," etc. (*vv.* 38, 39). The principle here cited was a part of the Mosaic system. It was a law of retaliation which magistrates were to apply under certain restrictions in the punishment of crimes; it was popularly applied to justify personal, private revenge. Unwarranted as this application was, we cannot justly say that it was this alone to which Jesus objected. The principle which he enunciates is certainly opposed to retaliation itself, though not to retribution. The rule that the wrongdoer was to suffer the same kind of an injury which he had done to another represented a rude kind of justice which was better than none; but it did not accord with the spirit of the teaching of Jesus.[1]

As a final example of fulfilment he cited the commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" (Lev. xix. 18), and joined with it the popular addition which was derived

[1] The legal rule in question was not merely a *lex retributionis*, but a *lex talionis*. All penal legislation proportions penalty to crime, but it does not punish in kind; much less does it countenance the private redress of wrongs. The teaching of Jesus here cannot, therefore, be construed into a disapproval of civil penalties in general.

by inference from it: "and hate thine enemy" (Mt. v. 43). Jesus, on the contrary, set forth the ideal import of the commandment and illustrated and enforced the duty which it enjoins by showing that the love of God, which is the type of all true love, is not niggardly, but large and generous. He then concludes: "Ye therefore shall be perfect (that is, complete in love — generous, helpful, and forgiving), as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mt. v. 48). Luke's version of this saying — which, in the judgment of many, is the more original form of it — is: "Be ye merciful, even as your Father is merciful" (vi. 36). These are examples of the way in which Jesus fulfilled the law in his teaching, both by rescuing its true import from the perversions and exaggerations to which the scribes had subjected it, by recognizing the ethical imperfections in the law itself, and by replacing them by absolute principles of truth and right which are universally applicable.

(3) This fulfilment preserved all that was of permanent value and validity for religion in the Old Testament system. Jesus taught that this whole system, in all its parts, was involved in the process of fulfilment. He did not illustrate in detail how the fulfilment applied to the various parts of the law. We must ascertain this from the nature of the gospel and from the history and teaching which the New Testament records. Whatever there was of moral or religious significance in the various regulations of the Old Testament cultus will be found to have been conserved in the comprehensive principles of Jesus. He fulfils the prophets by realizing their highest ideals of religion no less than by accomplishing their predictions. The great fact in this connection is that Jesus fulfils the Jewish history as a whole; in him the development of revealed religion culminates; he is its realization and its goal. The aspirations and hopes of the nation had been directed for centuries to some great consummation, some wonderful expansion of the kingdom of God; this Christ came to accomplish, but into its realization the greater part of the Jewish nation, through blindness and perversity, did not enter.

(4) The process of fulfilment involves the passing away of the Old Testament system as such. As the fulfilling of the blossom by the fruit involves the passing away of the former, so does the new system replace the old. This view of the matter is abundantly recognized in the teaching of our Lord and his apostles. He described his truth as new wine which must not be put into the old bottles of Judaism (Mt. ix. 17). He said that his gospel was not merely a new patch which was to be sewed onto the old garment of the law; it was rather a new garment complete and sufficient in itself (Mt. ix. 16).

It is of interest to observe, just here, that this teaching is quite in accord with what the prophets themselves, in their highest inspirations, had discerned and intimated concerning their own religious system. They frequently recognize its inadequacy and temporary character and predict that it is to pass away by being merged into something higher.[1] What religion, besides Judaism, ever predicted its own abrogation? It is one of the most significant facts of prophecy that the loftiest spirits in the nation were led to look for the dawning of larger truth, and for a more complete form of the Kingdom of God.

But when it is said that the Old Testament system is abrogated in the new, it is of capital importance to observe that the new replaces the old, not by destruction, but by fulfilment. The new does not reject and discard the old; it preserves and embodies it, just so far as it has elements of permanent value for the world's religion. The fulfilment is therefore, an organic process; the new comes out of the old by a natural and orderly process of development. In that process what is unessential falls away of its own accord, while all that is essential and permanently useful is taken up into Christianity, more completely developed and applied, and reinforced by higher motives on the plane of broader principles.[2]

[1] See, especially, Jer. xxxi. 31–34.

[2] This subject has important practical bearings upon Christian thought and life, to which a brief reference may here be made. The Christian world has never very clearly perceived what was its relation to the Old

Christ did not fulfil a part of the law merely, but the whole of it. He did not complete the ritual part of the Old Testament alone, but all its moral parts as well. This is but to say that it was not merely the ritual element of the law which was imperfect and temporary, but the moral element also. Many a moral maxim and practice of the Old Testament, as we have seen, was below the plane of Jesus' ideal morality. If he fulfils the system in all its parts, then must the system *as such* pass away. And this is the fact in the case. On no other supposition

Testament religion. How discordant and inconsistent have been the prevailing views on this subject. Commonly some rough distinction has been made between those parts of the system which were supposed to be binding and those from which the Christian was believed to be free, but this distinction rested on no well-defined principle. The discrimination has ordinarily been perfectly arbitrary, having no better grounds than those of practical convenience. No Christians, in our time, hold that they must observe the Old Testament rules respecting meats and drinks, or suppose that they are bound to observe the sacrificial system. But this was not always so. In the apostolic Church there was a large party who held that it was necessary for the Christian even to keep the whole law of Moses in order to be saved. (See, *e.g.*, Acts xv. 1). Their view was that Christianity was a kind of addition or appendix to Judaism and that their former religion, in all its particulars, was in full force and perpetually binding. Paul had his sharpest conflicts with this party. He showed that they were quite consistent, though consistently wrong. In insisting on the necessity of a continued observance of circumcision, they logically committed themselves to the keeping of the whole law. But it was impossible that Christians should long continue to observe the whole Mosaic ritual, and the effort to do so was less and less consistently made.

In modern times we not infrequently find Christians who have conscientiously placed themselves under some part of the old system, believing that, for some special reason, it is binding upon them, while from the observance of its other regulations they readily excuse themselves. It may be the law of tithes, which is regarded as still binding, or the regulations relating to marriage or to the Jewish Sabbath — which are considered to be of perpetual obligation. But the question arises: On what principle is one requirement of the system observed while the others are neglected? Did Jesus specify those which were temporary and those which were perpetually binding? If he did not, how are they to be distinguished? It is common to make a distinction between the ceremonial and the moral parts of the law, and to suppose that, while the former are done away, the latter are still binding upon Christians. But this distinction is recognized neither in the Old Testament nor in the New; it is a modern division of the law which it is quite convenient and natural for us to make, but one of which a quite unwarrantable use is commonly made.

can the New Testament references to the subject be naturally explained; on no other view can a clear definition be given of the relation of the two Testaments.

The conclusion, then, to which we are led is, that the whole Old Testament system, in all its parts, was taken up into the process of fulfilment and that all its elements of permanent value and validity have been made part and parcel of the gospel. To the old system *as such* we have no need to go back, because the gospel is its completion, and we have no occasion to supplement Christianity by additions from Judaism. But the Old Testament has not thereby been *destroyed*, but *fulfilled*. On this distinction between destruction and fulfilment turns the true solution of the question under consideration. The fulfilment is, by its very nature, a conserving process; it rejects nothing which it can use, but embodies it in its perfect result. All the essentials of the Old Testament are preserved in the New, and it is as parts of the gospel of Christ that they are binding upon the Christian man. He is not under the Old Testament system, or, to state the case more fully, he is under only so much of it as has been taken up and incorporated into Christianity, and he is under that because it is a part of Christianity, not because it is a part of the Old Testament religion. If it is asked, Is not the Christian under the authority of the ten commandments? the reply is, In their Old Testament form and as part of that system, he is not. The essential substance of the ten commandments consists of changeless principles of righteousness, and is therefore a part of Christianity; in that sense the Christian is under the commandments, and in no other. The duty to obey parents, for example, is as urgently inculcated in the gospel as in the commandments, and is, of course, perpetually binding, but the reason by which it is enforced in the Old Testament — that by obedience one may win a long residence in the land of Canaan — is not applicable to us.

The truth which we are considering, stated on its positive side, is that Christianity is complete and sufficient in itself as a guide to faith and action. The whole philosophy of

the subject is in that most expressive figure of Jesus to which we have referred: His gospel is not a patch to be sewed on the old garment of Judaism, but a wholly new garment. We might carry out the figure a step further by saying — quite in harmony with his thought — that into the texture of that garment have been woven all the elements of Judaism which are adapted to become parts of its permanent and perfect structure.

While, then, we are not under the old system at all, it must always have the greatest value in helping us to understand historically its own fulfilment in Christianity. To speak in Paul's language, the Old Testament is glorious, but not with "the glory that surpasseth" (2 Cor. iii. 10); that is, it has its true glory in the fact that its mission was to prepare for and to usher in a more perfect system. It was glorious, not so much in itself, as in the great end which it contemplated.

In this view it will be seen that the old system could well be both temporary and divine. Its glory lay in the very fact that it was to give itself up to decay in order that from it, as from the seed, a larger life might spring. Had this truth been clearly seen by the Church of the apostolic age, many great controversies and alienations would have been avoided. It was naturally hard for those who had been reared and trained as Jews to see the sufficiency and independence of Christianity and to recognize the complementary truth that the Jewish religion had waxed old and was ready to vanish away. To this difficulty of transcending their ancestral religion and of apprehending the newness and sufficiency of the gospel, Jesus refers in the saying: "No man having drunk old wine desireth new; for he saith, the old is good" (Lk. v. 39). It required a vision to convince Peter of the largeness and newness of the gospel, and even then he did not continue consistent in his conviction. The whole dispute about circumcision which so tried the soul of the apostle Paul would have been settled in an instant if all could have seen Christ's truth of fulfilment. It was incapable of real settlement except upon Paul's bold principle that the Christian is not under the law, either in whole or in part.

CHAPTER III

THE KINGDOM OF GOD

"The Kingdom of God" is one of the phrases which we most frequently hear on the life of Jesus. We may therefore believe that it represents one of his most fundamental and characteristic ideas. According to Mark, his first announcement of the "Gospel of God" consisted in his saying, "The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe in the gospel" (i. 15). Our purpose requires us to examine the historical basis of the conception, the development of it by our Lord, and its fitness to serve the ends of his teaching and work.[1]

We observe at the outset that Matthew usually employs the phrase, "the Kingdom of heaven," instead of "the Kingdom of God." Several difficult questions arise in connection with the former term: Does it mean the same as "the Kingdom of God"? What is the force of the defining genitive "of heaven" (*τῶν οὐρανῶν*)? Was this title probably employed by Jesus himself? There is no indication in Matthew's usage that the phrase "the Kingdom of heaven" bears any different sense from its alternative designation. The two are used interchangeably in the first Gospel (cf. Mt. vi. 10, 33; xii. 28; xxi. 21, 43). It seems probable that the genitive denotes the origin and the consequent attributes of the Kingdom.[2] In contrast

[1] Several monographs on the subject have appeared within recent years, such as: E. Issel, *Die Lehre vom Reiche Gottes im neuen Testament*, 1891; O. Schmoller, *Die Lehre vom Reiche Gottes in den Schriften des neuen Testaments*, 1891; J. Weiss, *Die Predigt Christi vom Reiche Gottes*, 1892; A. Titius, *Jesu Lehre vom Reiche Gottes*, 1895; W. Lütgert, *Das Reich Gottes nach den synoptischen Evangelien*, 1895.

[2] So Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 42 (Bk. I. ch. ii. § 1). Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, I. 371 (orig. p. 299), following Schürer, maintains

to earthly kingdoms, this Kingdom is heavenly in origin and character; it is governed by heavenly, that is, spiritual and eternal, laws.[1] It emanates from heaven, and heaven is the seat of the authority which obtains within it. Its law is the will of God. It exists among men in proportion as they live in conformity with the divine will, and realize in personal and social life the purposes of God's holy love. The Kingdom of God on earth is therefore the domain in which God's holy will is done in and among men.

We must now consider its relation to Old Testament ideas. Jewish religious thought was penetrated with the idea of a coming King and Kingdom. Out of Zion the law was to go forth (Is. ii. 3); the herald of good tidings should declare, Thy God reigneth (lii. 7); a great successor of David should sit upon the throne of Israel (Jer. xxiii. 5; xxxiii. 17). In later prophecies, under the stress of foreign oppression, the idea of a coming Kingdom of God which should overthrow all opposing powers came out in even stronger relief: "In the days of those kings

that "heaven" is here a metonymy for "God." The Rabbinical use of this periphrasis, to which Wendt appeals, cannot establish this view in the face of the fact that our sources never represent Jesus as using "heaven" as a name for God (*per contra*, see Mt. v. 34). Weiss understands by "Kingdom of heaven," the Kingdom to be perfected in heaven, in contrast to the Jewish theocracy. *Bibl. Theol.*, § 138, *c.* 8.

[1] Beyschlag, I. 42 (Bk. I. ch. ii. § 1), holds that it was the title which Jesus preferred to use. Wendt, *Teaching*, I. 371 (orig. p. 299), thinks that Jesus did not use the phrase, because Luke, even where he follows the λόγια, uses "Kingdom of God," and because the first evangelist, even when incorporating Mark into his narrative, employs "Kingdom of heaven." Cf. Briggs, *Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 79. Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.*, § 138, *c.* 8, gives a wholly different reason for holding that Jesus did not speak of the "Kingdom of heaven." The term was "selected by the evangelist, because with the fall of Jerusalem the hope of a perfecting of the theocracy in Israel on earth vanished." Bruce, *Kingdom of God*, p. 59, aptly points out that while Jesus' employment of the phrase (in the sense which Weiss attaches to it) would be quite out of the question on Weiss's theory that Jesus conceived of the Kingdom as consisting merely in the realization of Jewish theocratic hopes, it is quite competent to inquire whether his use of it is not in itself quite as probable as this theory. The phrase does not seem to be used in the eschatological sense which Weiss attaches to it. In any case, the natural meaning of the title does not favor Weiss's theory of Jesus' doctrine of the Kingdom.

shall the God of heaven set up a Kingdom which shall never be destroyed, nor shall the sovereignty thereof be left to another people; but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand forever" (Dan. ii. 44). The suffering and degradation of the nation under foreign rule during the years immediately preceding Christ's appearance served to intensify, if they also served to secularize, this expectation.

The prophetic declarations concerning the coming Kingdom are rooted, in turn, in the whole Old Testament conception of the relation of God to his people. The idea of a government of God among men — a "theocracy," as Josephus happily expressed it — was absolutely fundamental in the life of the Jewish nation. It lay at the basis of the covenant-relation. As God's "peculiar treasure," Israel was to be unto him "a Kingdom of priests, and an holy nation" (Ex. xix. 5, 6). When, therefore, Jesus spoke of the Kingdom of God he spoke the language of current religious thought in Judaism. He touched a responsive chord in the heart of the nation. We may find just here the motive of Jesus in employing the term, and the fitness of it for the purposes of his teaching.

It is *a priori* probable from the dominance of the idea under consideration in Jewish thought that the phrase "Kingdom of God" was a current expression in Israel. The term is several times employed in the New Testament in such a way as to indicate that it was in common use among the people (Mk. xv. 43; Lk. xiv. 15, xvii. 20). The nation was living in constant expectation of its appearance (Lk. xix. 11; Acts i. 6). That Jesus' idea of the Kingdom was intended to have some connection with the Old Testament Messianic hope and with the expectations current in his time does not admit of reasonable doubt. The point to be determined is, How far was Jesus' conception of the Kingdom new? This question can be satisfactorily answered only after an investigation of the teaching of Jesus upon the subject. One or two general considerations, however, may here be presented.

The noblest minds in the Jewish nation, such as the great prophets, conceived it to be the destiny of Israel to bear the knowledge of God which she possessed to all mankind. The Messianic King was to have universal sway. His Kingdom was to be as wide as the world. The knowledge of Jehovah was to fill the earth. Nations should come to its light, and kings to the brightness of its rising (Is. lx. 3, 4; Jer. xxxi. 34). But to this splendid ideal the nation as a whole did not rise, and it sank farther and farther away from it as the time drew near the birth of Christ. The great coming good was more and more conceived of as a monopoly of divine favor to be enjoyed by Israel alone, and thus the Kingdom or reign of God, instead of embracing in its idea and intent the whole human family, became narrowed so as to include only the lineal descendants of Abraham. At the same time the idea of the Kingdom became more and more worldly, or political. The idea of power which, in the prophetic conception of the Kingdom had been combined with that of righteousness, became the dominant element in the Messianic hope. The Messiah was conceived of as a second David, who should reconstitute the Jewish nation in power and glory, throw off the yoke of foreign domination, and trample Israel's enemies in the dust. The later Jewish literature is permeated with this conception of the Messianic reign, and the New Testament contains unmistakable traces of its prevalence at the time of Christ.

The question now arises: Did Jesus fall into line with these Jewish conceptions or did he rise high above them even as they were cherished by the loftiest prophetic minds? Weiss has elaborated and defended the former view.[1] He holds that it was the expectation of Jesus to reconstitute the Jewish nation in freedom, prosperity, and happiness. The course of events, however, generally forced his mind away from the dream of political independence and temporal well being to the idea of founding a spiritual society composed of such as were possessed of certain qualities of heart.

[1] In his various writings, but most fully in his *Life of Christ*.

Now, while we do not deny a development in Jesus' doctrine of the Kingdom, we cannot help thinking that this is a statement of the case which the facts do not warrant. This theory does not attribute to the mind of Jesus as great a breadth and spirituality of view as the prophets themselves enjoyed. It is derogatory to the originality of Jesus. We maintain, on the contrary, that he took up the best ideals of Jewish prophecy and lifted them to even grander heights. He set aside the limitations of view in which the idea of the Kingdom of God had been apprehended in Old Testament times, and gave that idea its true universality and spirituality. The Kingdom of God was for him something larger, because more spiritual, than the Jewish state had ever been; something more spiritual than any outward organization could ever be. Jesus' idea of the Kingdom was rooted in the Old Testament, but it rose above the limited conceptions in which the Old Testament had presented the Messianic hope; much more did it rise above the popular ideals and stand in sharp contrast to them.

This view is confirmed by the very way in which Jesus appeared announcing his Kingdom. He proclaimed it as something new and distinctive. The time of preparation for it had passed; he was now to begin its establishment (Mk. i. 15). What he says of his truth in general is applicable to his doctrine of the Kingdom; it is new cloth and must not be stretched onto the old garment of Judaism; it is new wine and must not be put into old wineskins (Mk. ii. 21, 22). It was not strange that the people were astonished at his teaching (Mt. vii. 28, 29; Mk. i. 27), because there was in it a breadth of view and an elevated spirituality to which they were wholly unaccustomed.

But we have still more direct proof that Jesus' idea of the Kingdom was far removed from this notion of a prosperous political commonwealth. The Gospels narrate a series of incidents in which his view comes out in strongest contrast to that conception. What else, indeed, is the meaning of his temptation at the very beginning of his ministry? Whatever view be taken of the historical

character of that event, all our sources bear witness to the fact that on the very threshold of his public work Jesus faced the choice between the temporal and spiritual conceptions of his messiahship. The popular demand for a wonder-working leader who should achieve power and glory in the world he promptly and decisively repudiated. He chose instead the method of spiritual leadership and the way of self-sacrifice.

The same idea of the Kingdom is clearly reflected when, being asked, who is greatest in the Kingdom of God, he replies that humility is the test of greatness in that Kingdom (Mt. xviii. 4). Of similar import is his saying that he who serves most is greatest in his Kingdom (Mt. xx. 26). But even more sharply does the contrast between the political conception of the Kingdom and Jesus' idea appear when, being asked by the Pharisees when the Kingdom of God should come, he said, "The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say, Lo here! or, There! for lo, the Kingdom of God is in the midst of you" (Lk. xvii. 20, 21). In view of this contrast we are not surprised to find that after the resurrection his disciples had not entered sufficiently into his thought to suppose that the expected Kingdom had yet been established. "We hoped that it was he which should redeem Israel" (Lk. xxiv. 21), they said, but it is clear that they regarded this hope as disappointed. To the same purpose was the question which they put to him during the forty days: "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the Kingdom to Israel?" (Acts i. 6). It is obvious that by the redemption of Israel and the restoration of the Kingdom to Israel they referred to the reëstablishment of the Jewish state and the fulfilment of the nation's hopes for temporal prosperity and victory over its foes. Jesus' whole teaching and conduct during his entire ministry had not seemed to them, who had constantly heard and observed him, to have accomplished anything in this direction. From their standpoint he had done nothing which looked toward Israel's redemption. It may not be perfectly easy to explain why, on the supposition that Jesus'

view was in sharp contrast to the popular idea, his disciples had not been able to rise into fuller sympathy with his conception; but it is certainly far harder to explain why, on the supposition that his view resembled the popular expectation, the disciples, who still cherished the popular idea, should have regarded his teaching and action as standing in sharpest contrast to all their long-cherished hopes. No conclusion is warranted except this, that the teaching of Jesus concerning his Kingdom and his method of establishing it were so wholly out of line with the ambitions and expectations of the Jewish people that even his own disciples were ready, at the end of his public career, to declare his anticipated work a failure. But this conclusion may be further tested by what Jesus directly taught concerning the nature of the Kingdom and the method of its progress.

Jesus taught that membership in the Kingdom was dependent upon certain ethical and spiritual qualities. The Kingdom is composed of those who possess a certain kind of character. It cannot, therefore, be an outward organization whose members are bound together by any such bonds as common ancestry, language, self-interest, or the occupancy of a common territory. If Matthew's version of the beatitudes is followed, they contain a forcible setting forth of the spiritual qualifications for membership in the Kingdom. Humility, meekness, eager desire for righteousness, mercifulness, purity of heart, and peacemaking are the conditions of participating in the Kingdom and the characteristics of its members. It has been the more common view of interpreters that Matthew's version was more original than Luke's (vi. 20 *sq.*) which represents Jesus as offering the blessings of the Kingdom to those who are *literally*, rather than *spiritually*, poor, hungry, and sorrowing.[1] But if Luke's version is followed, the inward,

[1] So, for example, Tholuck, Meyer, and Weiss. Meyer says: "Certainly Luke has the *later* form of the tradition, which of necessity took its rise in consequence of the affliction of the persecuted Christians, etc. This, also, is especially true of the denunciations of woe, which were still unknown to the first evangelist." *Commentary, ad loc.* Lk. vi. 20.

spiritual nature of the Kingdom is clearly implied. It cannot be supposed that Jesus teaches that the physically poor, wretched, and outcast, *as such*, compose his Kingdom. He must mean (according to Luke) that the blessings of the Kingdom are a reward for hardships and sufferings voluntarily endured. The Kingdom is a compensation for distress, calamity, and want because it is a spiritual treasure. Its joys and comforts are an antidote for the miseries of earth. In this view of the original import of the beatitudes, even more than in that which Matthew has given, is the Kingdom presented as a spiritual good, a boon to the inner life. In either case, participation in it must be dependent upon inner conditions or qualities of life. Formally different as the beatitudes are in the two Gospels, both versions clearly imply the spiritual nature of the Kingdom.

One of the most significant hints respecting the nature of the Kingdom is contained in the Lord's prayer. Jesus taught his disciples to pray: "Thy Kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth" (Mt. vi. 10). The second of these petitions is an explanation and amplification of the first.[1] The Kingdom comes in proportion

Holtzmann, Wendt, and Briggs, however, hold to the greater originality of Luke's version. According to Wendt, the beatitudes originally expressed, not the conditions of participating in the salvation of the Kingdom, but the worth of this salvation: Even the poor are really rich; the sorrowful are really happy, if they possess this heavenly good. The woes are regarded as the reverse side of these blessings. *Lehre Jesu*, pp. 53–57. A similar view is taken by Briggs, who urges literary considerations in favor of the originality of Luke, and lays stress upon the voluntariness of the poverty and hardships which were the condition of sharing in the blessings of the Kingdom. *Messiah of the Gospels*, pp. 172, 173.

[1] Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, pp. 97, 98, following Luke's version (xi. 2 *sq.*) of the prayer in preference to Matthew's, treats the words: "Thy will be done," etc., as an addition by the first evangelist. No reason is given for this judgment, and it seems to involve an unwarranted impoverishment of the prayer. Weiss justly remarks that the first petition points to the preliminary condition, the third to the final purpose of the coming Kingdom, thus suggesting a logical sequence and completeness of thought. Moreover, a reminiscence of the third petition is found not only in Matthew (xxvi. 42), but in Luke (xxii. 42). "Luke," adds Weiss, "has omitted this petition, because if the second one is fully granted, it involves the fulfilment of the third; and that was sufficient for his Gentile readers. It was not without special purpose, however, that Jesus added this request.

as God's will is done among men. The Kingdom is composed of all who obey that will. The perfect doing of God's will by men would be the perfection of his Kingdom on earth. Although Jesus has nowhere explicitly defined the phrase, Kingdom of God, a clear view of its essential nature, as he conceived it, is implied in these words. They justify the conclusion that by the Kingdom of God Jesus meant "the reign of divine love exercised by God in his grace over human hearts believing in his love, and constrained thereby to yield him grateful affection and devoted service."[1]

Another prominent idea of Jesus respecting the Kingdom is that it is a growing affair. Its coming is a long historical process. Various aspects of this progress of the Kingdom in the world are set forth in a group of parables which are designed to illustrate its nature. One of the most significant of these is preserved by Mark alone (iv. 26–29). It likens the growth of the Kingdom to the slow and mysterious development of seed-grain when it is sown in the earth. It pictures the husbandman as sowing the seed and then waiting while Nature does her work. He sleeps and rises awaiting the movement of the divinely appointed process, and powerless to understand the mystery of growth. Meantime, the natural processes are going forward. "The earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear." "So is the Kingdom of God." It comes slowly, silently, mysteriously. Divine forces are operating to carry forward its development. In a rudimentary form the Kingdom of God had always been in the world; in an important sense it came when Christ came and entered upon his historic mission; but in a still wider view it keeps on coming through all the courses of human history, and

The perfect realization of the Kingdom of God will undoubtedly bring with it the fulness of all promised blessings, but the desires of the disciples were still preponderatingly directed to the external welfare of the nation." *Life of Christ*, II. 350 (Bk. IV. ch. xi.); cf. *Das Matthäusevangelium*, p. 184.

[1] Bruce, *Kingdom of God*, p. 46.

reaches its culmination only in the completion of the work of redemption.

Of the other parables which are based upon the analogy between spiritual and natural growth (Mt. xiii.) that of the Sower is designed to depict the reception with which his truth meets from various classes of hearers; that of the Mustard-seed describes the great results which flow from small beginnings — the *extension* of the Kingdom, while the parable of the Leaven depicts the tendency of the Kingdom to permeate society — the *intensive* development of the spiritual life in humanity.

The incomparable value of the Kingdom, justifying the greatest sacrifice in order to obtain it, is set forth in the parables of the Treasure hid in the field and in that of the Merchant seeking goodly pearls, while the parables of Tares and of the Drag-net set forth the idea that the outward appearance of belonging to the Kingdom will be assumed by some who are not genuine members of it; there will be counterfeit Christians whom God alone can distinguish from the true. These parables also serve, indirectly, to illustrate the nature of the Kingdom's development. It encounters constant hindrance and embarrassment arising from the insusceptibility and wickedness with which it constantly meets, and is compelled to contend.

Again, the Kingdom is universal in its design and scope. It is for all who fulfil the spiritual conditions of participating in its benefits. It knows no racial, social, or territorial limits. It is true that Christ offered himself and his Kingdom to the Jewish people. They were the people of revelation. Their history had been a special preparation for the coming of the Kingdom in its completed idea and form. To them, therefore, an economic precedence was accorded, in agreement with the providential law which Paul afterwards enunciated: "To the Jew first, and also to the Greek" (Rom. i. 16). The Jews were the "sons of the Kingdom" (Matt. viii. 12) by right and privilege, but not in such a sense that they should not be "cast forth" in case they failed to fulfil the conditions of repent-

ance, humility, and purity of heart. This the nation as a whole did. "Therefore," said Jesus, "the Kingdom of God shall be taken away from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof" (Mt. xxi. 43).

The teaching of Jesus concerning his Kingdom has everywhere the note of universality in it. It was for all men who would enter it. The most abandoned sinners might enter it, and did enter it in greater numbers than did the religious leaders of the time (Mt. xxi. 31). To say that the Kingdom is universal in idea is but to say that Christ came to save the lost. The Kingdom is a gracious boon to sinful and needy humanity. Its universality is involved in its spirituality. No external limitations can be imposed upon its destination so long as the conditions of entering it are internal. As for the apostle Paul the universality of the gospel stood connected with the inner condition of receiving it, namely, faith, so in the teaching of Jesus there is the closest connection between the spiritual conditions of entering the Kingdom and its essential universality. John the Baptist may have conceived of the Kingdom of God whose coming he heralded as consisting of a purified Israel — the "wheat" of the nation which should be left after the "chaff" had been winnowed out and consumed by the Messiah, but the conception of Jesus was vastly broader and higher. He knew that his Kingdom was not to come in the world by any quick transformation of the Jewish nation as such or by some sudden stroke of divine power — as the people expected and as even the prophets often described it as doing. He knew that it would not spring up complete in some great crisis, but that its coming would be a great and gradual movement of God in history which should go on through the ages.

It results from this conception that the Kingdom may be spoken of now as present, now as future. It was already present in its beginnings when Jesus was on earth, yet its consummation was future. He dwells now on the one, now on the other aspect of his Kingdom without speaking explicitly of the relation of the two aspects and without any consciousness of contradiction between them. That

which involves a world-historical process must be, at any given moment, in the nature of the case, both past, present, and future.

The most explicit recognition of the Kingdom as a present fact is found in such passages as: "The Kingdom of God is among you" (ἐντὸς ὑμῶν, Lk. xvii. 21); "The Kingdom of God is come upon you" (ἐφ' ὑμᾶς, Mt. xii. 28). But numerous other passages imply the same idea, as when Jesus says that from the days of John the Baptist the Kingdom of heaven was being taken by violence (Mt. xi. 12) — stormed, as it were, by the lost and perishing in their eager desire to enter it. In like manner the parables of the Sower, the Tares, the Mustard-seed, and the Leaven all rest upon the view that the Kingdom is a present force which has already begun to develop itself in the world. Jesus spoke of persons who were entering it at the time (Mt. xxi. 31; xxiii. 13), and called upon men to seek it (Mt. vi. 33), and to enter the narrow door into *life* (Mt. vii. 13), which is but a name for the blessing of the Kingdom. Moreover, the humblest member of the Kingdom of God (Mt. xi. 11), that is, the least disciple of Christ, is said to be greater than John the Baptist; that is, he enjoys greater privileges and stands upon a higher plane of revelation. This saying assumes that the Kingdom is a present reality.

And yet, entrance into the Kingdom is often spoken of as something that is to take place in the future, and the Kingdom itself described as something that is yet to come. When Jesus said, on one occasion, that some of those who heard him speak should not die till they saw the Kingdom of God come with power (Mk. ix. 1), he doubtless referred to some future epoch at which the Kingdom should advance to a new stage of its development. When, again, he spoke of the time when men should come from the east and from the west to sit down in the Kingdom of God (Lk. xiii. 29), and when, at the last supper, he referred to the repast which he should enjoy with his disciples in the Kingdom of God (Mk. xiv. 25), he seems clearly to have had in mind the consummation of the Kingdom in

heaven. He probably spoke of the Kingdom in this eschatological sense when he said to his disciples that unless their righteousness exceeded that of the scribes and Pharisees they should not enter into the Kingdom of God (Mt. v. 20). Both the present and the future aspect of the Kingdom are recognized in the words: "Whosoever shall not receive the Kingdom of God as a little child, he shall in no wise enter therein" (Mk. x. 15).

The question now arises: On what principle is this apparent inconsistency in the use of the title to be explained? Some scholars hold that, at the beginning of his ministry, Jesus did expect that his Kingdom in its heavenly perfection was to be suddenly and miraculously introduced, and that he afterwards came to perceive that the Kingdom was to be established on earth by a process of development.[1] On this view one set of expressions might be regarded as reflecting his less mature conception, and the other as disclosing a new aspect of his thought concerning the Kingdom. The capital objection to this theory is that we do not find Jesus speaking in his earlier sayings of his Kingdom as belonging to some future epoch, and supplementing this idea later by referring to it as already present, and as subject to an earthly development.[2]

Another solution is that Jesus always thought of his Kingdom as future, and the apparent references to it as already present are merely proleptic, and really refer to the course of Christian history which must precede the coming of the Kingdom. This view is frequently expressed in Meyer's *Commentary*. It seems to me to proceed upon an unnatural interpretation of many texts. It is, for example, a singular inversion of a natural sequence of ideas to suppose that the petition: "Thy Kingdom come," refers to the end of the world, and that the succeeding petition, "Thy will be done on earth," etc., refers to a condition which must be fulfilled in the life of believers before the previous petition can be realized. It is

[1] So, substantially, Beyschlag, *Leben Jesu*, and Baldensperger, *Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu*, *passim*.

[2] For a detailed critique of this theory, see Wendt, *Teaching*, I. 380 *sq.*

equally unnatural to interpret the words: "The Kingdom of God is among you," as meaning only that the Messiah, the King and bearer of the Kingdom, was in their midst (Meyer).

We conclude, therefore, that the varied language of Jesus respecting the coming of this Kingdom is best explained by supposing him to have taken a comprehensive view of its nature and progress. He conceived of the Kingdom as already present, but in its fuller development and in its final perfection it was still future. This large, free use of the term, according to which now one, now another, aspect of the Kingdom is dwelt upon, renders it impossible to define the Kingdom adequately in any single formula. It is difficult to define, not because it means nothing in particular, but because it means so much. Specific features of Christ's conception of the subject will come up for consideration as we proceed.

CHAPTER IV

THE SON OF MAN

To determine the meaning of the title "Son of man" is one of the most difficult tasks which confronts the student of the New Testament. When we carefully examine the passages in which it is used in the Synoptics we find that they naturally fall into three classes. In one group of sayings the title is used with reference to Jesus' earthly life: "The Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins" (Mk. ii. 10); "is Lord of the Sabbath" (ii. 28); "hath not where to lay his head" (Mt. viii. 20); "is come to seek and to save that which is lost" (Lk. xix. 10). In a second group the title is associated with his sufferings and death: "The Son of man must suffer many things" (Mk. viii. 31); "is delivered up into the hands of men" (Mk. ix. 31); "goeth (to death) even as it is written of him" (Mk. xiv. 21). In a third group the title is used in connection with his parousia. Examples of this usage are: "Then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven" (Mt. xxiv. 31), and "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the angels with him," etc. (Mt. xxv. 31). The second of these groups of passages emphasizes the humiliation, the third the majesty, of the Son of man. Most of the passages of the first group may be regarded as more or less akin to those of the second or the third. The question, then, may be put in this form: Does the title denote primarily humiliation, or some kindred thought, or does it suggest exaltation and majesty?

A preliminary question arises here: was "the Son of man" a current Messianic title in Jesus' time? Most

scholars have answered this question in the negative.[1] In favor of this view it is said that Jesus' use of the title perplexed the Jews, who thereby showed that they were not familiar with it: "How sayest thou, 'the Son of man' must be lifted up? Who is this, 'the Son of man'?" (Jn. xii. 34). But to this it is replied that it was the strangeness of the *new conception* of the Son of man, not the strangeness of the title itself, which perplexed the Jews. The idea that the Messianic Son of man should suffer death was what surprised and shocked them, and led them to say: "We have been taught to think that the Messiah abides forever; who is this Son of man who must suffer and die?"[2] The conclusion that the designation was not a current Messianic title has also been derived from the question which drew out Peter's confession (Mt. xvi. 13). Jesus asks: "Who do men say that the Son of man is?" Various replies are given, among them Peter's that he is the Messiah, showing that "the Son of man" in this question could not have been understood by the disciples as a synonym for the Messiah. This would be a forcible consideration but for the fact that Matthew's version of the incident is an amplification of the simpler narrative in Mark (viii. 27), where the title "Son of man" is not employed in the conversation. Moreover, it is not found in Luke's version of the narrative (ix. 18 *sq.*). No conclusion, therefore, can be drawn from this passage, although, as Professor Bruce has pointed out, it may still be claimed that "the substitution of the title for the personal pronoun by the first evangelist is significant, as showing that at the time when his Gospel was written, the name 'Son of man' was not regarded as a synonym for Christ."[3]

A much more forcible argument in favor of the supposition that "the Son of man" was not a Messianic title in

[1] So Stanton, *The Jewish and the Christian Messiah*, p. 240; Drummond, *The Jewish Messiah*, p. 284; *cf.* Ch. I. Sec. IV.; Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I. 262.

[2] So Meyer *in loco*, and Schürer, *The Jewish People*, Div. II. Vol. III. p. 69 (§ 32. 2).

[3] *The Kingdom of God*, pp. 167, 168.

current use in Jesus' day is, that although he carefully avoided making a public declaration of his messiahship, and sought to prevent such a declaration from being made by others down to the end of his Galilean ministry, he applies the name "Son of man" to himself frequently and from the first. If the title had been understood as a synonym for Messiah, this use of it would have been equivalent to a declaration of his messiahship. It is replied that Jesus used the title enigmatically, meaning by it something quite different from what it meant in popular usage.[1] But this answer is hardly sufficient, because if the phrase had been a current Messianic title, the people would have understood him by the use of it to proclaim himself as the Messiah, whatever differences there might have been between their conceptions and his of Messiah's character and work. It is easy to see how in the application to himself of a current Messianic title, he might mean more than the people meant by it, but it is not easy to see how he could have meant less than to proclaim that he *was* the Messiah. In that case how could his use of it have been really "enigmatic"? Another consideration looking towards the conclusion that the phrase was not a current Messianic title is this: "the Son of man" was a self-designation of Jesus. The evangelists have not themselves applied this name to him, and they lead us to infer that his immediate disciples did not.[2] Why should they have refrained from the use of a familiar Messianic title which he himself so freely employed? The reply is made that the fact that they refrained from its use was due to its enigmatic character;[3] but was it really enigmatic if familiar to them and to the people generally as a synonym for Messiah? These last two considerations seem to me to have a good deal of weight in favor of the view that the title was not commonly used or understood as a name for the Messiah.

[1] So R. H. Charles, *Book of Enoch;* appendix B: "The Son of Man; its Origin and Meaning," p. 317.

[2] The title is used but once in the N. T. by another than Jesus himself — by Stephen (Acts vii. 56).

[3] Charles, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

The bearing upon our inquiry of the use which is made of the phrase "Son of man," in the similitudes of the Book of Enoch (chs. xxxvii.–lxxi.), is uncertain, because their date is disputed. In those chapters the title is frequently used as a Messianic designation, as, for example: "And I asked the angel who went with me and showed me all the hidden things, concerning that Son of man, who he was, and whence he was," etc. (xlvi. 1); "For the Son of man has appeared and sits on the throne of his glory," etc. (lxix. 29). If these portions of the book are post-Christian, the passages would merely illustrate the Messianic sense which the title had in Christian usage. If, on the contrary, they are pre-Christian,[1] we should have one example (if the only one), of a Messianic use of the title to which the usage of Jesus may have attached itself. Even on this view, however, we could not be sure that Jesus was familiar with this usage, and it might have been too limited and exceptional to have influenced his own.

When these various considerations are taken together, we think that they establish the conclusion that the title was *not* in current use as a designation of the Messiah. It was not, however, an unknown term; it was found in the Old Testament. It may have been occasionally employed in a Messianic sense, but it was not current coin in the speech of the people concerning the Messiah. There was something distinctive in Jesus' use of it. Although not a new title, it received from his hand a certain stamp of originality and uniqueness.

We turn, then, to the question of its origin and connection with Old Testament language. The Hebrew use of the term "son" to denote a relation of likeness or participation in that to which sonship is predicated, is familiar, and has passed over into the New Testament. The "son of the handmaid" (Gal. iv. 30) is a servant; the "sons of the Kingdom" (Mt. viii. 12) are those who should participate in its truths and blessings. So a "son of man" may mean simply one who shares human qualities,

[1] As Schürer maintains, *Jewish People*, Div. II. Vol. III. p. 66 (§ 32. 2); Charles, *op. cit.*, p. 30, assigns the Similitudes to 95–64 B.C.

as, for example, frailty or mortality, in contrast to God, thus:—

> "What is man, that thou art mindful of him,
> And the son of man, that thou visitest him?"
>
> (Ps. viii. 4.)

In this way "Son of man" becomes an emphatic designation for man in his characteristic attributes of weakness and helplessness (Num. xxiii. 19; Job xvi. 21; xxv. 6). In this sense the title is applied about eighty times to Ezekiel as a reminder of his weakness and mortality, and as an incentive to humility in the fulfilment of his prophetic calling.

In Dan. vii. a symbolic description is given of foreign nations under the designation of "beasts." Finally, the seer beholds, in contrast to these powers whose dominion ceases, another figure coming with the clouds of heaven and establishing an everlasting Kingdom: "I saw in the night visions, and, behold, there came with the clouds of heaven one like unto a son of man, and he came even to the ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all the peoples, nations, and languages, should serve him: his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his Kingdom that which shall not be destroyed" (Dan. vii. 13, 14). This passage is commonly understood to be a picture of Israel which, in contrast to the "beasts," the foreign nations, is likened to the noble human form. That it describes the nation, rather than an individual, is rendered probable by verse 27: "And the Kingdom and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdoms under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High," etc. The phrase "one like unto a son of man" was no doubt popularly understood as referring to the person of the Messiah.[1]

[1] Some modern scholars hold this interpretation. Schultz says: "Daniel probably thinks of the Messiah as descending in the last days from heaven, where he dwells with God, and revealing himself in a heavenly form like one of the angel-princes whom the book is elsewhere accustomed to describe as 'like unto a son of man'" (Dan. viii. 15; x. 5, 16). *O. T. Theol.* II. 439, 440.

It is this passage which, without doubt, underlies the usage of the Book of Enoch.

It may be regarded as in the highest degree probable that the use of the title "Son of man" by our Lord had a point of connection with this passage. If so, the connection would suggest that "the Son of man" was a title of dignity, and that it belonged to Jesus as the founder of the imperishable Kingdom of God. The apocalyptic origin and use of the term would, moreover, accord well with Jesus' frequent use of the title in connection with his assertions concerning his parousia and the consummation of his Kingdom.

A brief survey must now be taken of the principal theories which have been common among scholars respecting the meaning which Jesus attached to this self-designation. Among these we note the following:

(1) The title meant for Jesus simply "the Messiah," and was derived directly from Dan. vii. 13. So, *e.g.*, Meyer: "Jesus means nothing else by this title than 'the Messiah'; he means nothing else than the Son of man in the prophecy of Daniel."[1] This view encounters the difficulty, already noted, that if Jesus meant by the title simply "the Messiah," he would have been proclaiming his messiahship from the beginning of his ministry, which is quite contrary to the Synoptic representation. This theory fits very well the use of the title in the apocalyptic passages, but is inadequate in view of such references as those to the ministrations and non-ascetic life of the Son of man.

(2) "Son of man" means the ideal, typical, representative man. This interpretation has been widely current since Schleiermacher. The following are typical expressions of it:

"He calls himself 'Son of man' because he had appeared as a man; because he belonged to mankind; because he had done such great things for human nature; because he was himself the realized ideal of humanity."[2]

[1] *Commentary* on Mt. viii. 20.

[2] Neander, *Life of Christ* (Bohn ed.), p. 99.

Reuss says that what is declared by the title "Son of man" is the fact of "the realization of the moral ideal in the person of him who assumed such a name."[1] Stanton says: "It is clear that Christ by his phrase represented himself as the head, the type, the ideal of the race."[2] The view advanced by Baur and others, who speak of the Son of man as one *qui humani nihil a se alienum putat*, and combine this conception with the Danielic idea of majesty, is hardly more than a variation of this theory. Examples of the way in which the theory is applied are: Since the sabbath was made *for man* (Mk. ii. 27), it falls within the province of his authority who, as the representative man, makes all human interests his care. The Son of man, although he is the ideal man, has not where to lay his head (Mt. viii. 20).

Attractive as this theory is, and true as its fundamental idea is, in itself considered, there is a serious difficulty in supposing that Jesus used the title under consideration in the sense proposed. The theory finds no point of connection between Jesus' use of the term and that which we observe in the Old Testament, unless it combines its characteristic idea, somewhat arbitrarily, with the conception in Daniel. The extra-Biblical use of the phrase lends no support to this interpretation. In fact, this explanation is too abstract and philosophical to be native to Palestinian Judaism, and bears the marks of modern reflection.

(3) The title may be regarded as connected, primarily, with the Old Testament representations which use the phrase to emphasize finite lowliness and weakness (in Ezekiel and elsewhere). The popular interpretation of Dan. vii. 13 in a Messianic sense enabled Jesus to avail himself of the phrase as a Messianic designation, although for his mind its content was derived from the Old Testament representations, which use the term "Son of man" to express creaturehood, weakness, and lowliness. For him there was no contradiction between the Messianic dignity and the human weakness, humility, and suffering

[1] *History of Christian Theology*, I. 199 (orig. I. 231).
[2] *The Jewish and Christian Messiah*, p. 246.

in which his Messianic work should be wrought. On this view we may say that the Daniel passage supplies the *form*, and the other Old Testament expressions concerning the Son of man the *content* of Jesus' idea. This view is elaborated by Wendt.[1] I must say respecting it that it does not seem natural to explain a Messianic title by reference to an Old Testament usage which was not Messianic and was not popularly supposed to be. Moreover, this explanation does not seem to accord very well with the majesty which is ascribed to the Son of man in the apocalyptic passages in our sources; nor does it seem to me that Wendt succeeds in giving a natural explanation of its use in the passages concerning forgiveness and the sabbath (Mk. ii. 7, 28).[2]

(4) Another type of explanation makes use of the Old Testament concept of the Servant of Jehovah in explaining the title. Mr. Vernon Bartlet has combined this idea with the theory which I have just explained.[3] Rev. R. H. Charles combines that idea with the notion of majesty found in Daniel, which he regards as the primal source of the designation.[4] According to this view, the notion which is given in Daniel has been influenced and developed by apocalyptic usage, such as we find in the Book of Enoch. In that book the Son of man is a supernatural Being, who sits upon God's throne and possesses universal dominion. The conception furnished by Daniel seems to have been blended with the idea of the Servant of Jehovah, found in the exilic Isaiah. Now when Jesus took up the title, he transformed the conception, as he did all popular ideas, by giving it a deeper or more spiritual significance. This transformation is best understood if we suppose that the idea of majesty derived from Daniel was modified and spiritualized by having combined with it the idea of the suffering Servant of Jehovah, as pre-

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 139 *sq.* (orig. p. 440 *sq.*).
[2] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 145 (orig. p. 445).
[3] *The Expositor*, December, 1892.
[4] *The Book of Enoch*; appendix B: "The Son of Man; its Origin and Meaning" (1893).

sented in the second Isaiah. Thus Jesus' use of the title would be analogous to the one clear example of its Messianic import in pre-Christian literature — its use in the Book of Enoch.

"These two conceptions," says Mr. Charles, "though outwardly antithetic, are, through the transformation of the former, reconciled and fulfilled in a deeper unity — in the New Testament Son of man."[1] In Jesus these two characters meet and blend. He is supernatural, majestic, and powerful, but his glory is displayed in self-renunciation and service. His greatness is his condescending and sacrificial love. He *is* greatest, but, as such, is servant of all, "If then, we bear in mind the inward synthesis of these two ideals of the past in an ideal, nay, in a Personality transcending them both, we shall find little difficulty in understanding the startling contrasts that present themselves in the New Testament in connection with this designation."[2] Accordingly it is explained that although the Son of man is homeless, yet he is Lord of the sabbath; although despised, rejected, and crucified, yet he is Judge of mankind.

While this view, no doubt, contains important elements of truth, it encounters the difficulties which we have already noticed in the supposition that "the Son of man" was a current Messianic title. The apparent combination of these two Messianic ideals of Daniel and Isaiah in the Book of Enoch gives but a very uncertain basis for the conclusion that Jesus made a similar combination of them in the title "Son of man." This conclusion must remain precarious while the date of the Similitudes remains so uncertain, and is especially so in view of the doubt that Jesus was in any case familiar with them.[3]

We have seen that, in all probability, our Lord's use of the title had some historical connection with the passage in Daniel. That may, therefore, be made the starting-point

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 315.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 316.
[3] *Cf.* Briggs, *The Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 25; Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* § 16, *a.*

in any effort to explain its meaning. We have also found good reason for believing that it was not a synonym for Messiah, but that it had for the mind of Jesus some unique and distinctive meaning. In naming himself by preference "Son of man" he did not proclaim himself as Messiah. Yet by the title he must have meant to connote qualities which were fundamental in his character.

At this point a philological consideration is brought to view which seems important for the discussion. Jesus spoke Aramaic; *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* is a Greek translation of the Aramic term *barnasha* which he used. Wellhausen says: "With emphasis Jesus uniformly used this most universal generic name (Son of man) to designate his own ego. But that name signifies *man* and nothing further; the Arameans have no other expression for the conception." [1] Wellhausen further maintains that the use of the title by Jesus has no connection with Dan. vii. 13, and that it was because the first Christians erroneously understood the title as a Messianic designation that they translated it by *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, instead of by *ὁ ἄνθρωπος*, its proper meaning. These opinions, however, are inferences which do not necessarily follow from the alleged Aramaic usage of the phrase.

It by no means follows from the fact that "Son of man" in Aramaic is a generic designation for *man* that Jesus could have meant nothing distinctive by the word. By the way in which he used it and the emphasis which he placed upon it, he would be able to impart to it a distinctive signification. Particularly would this be the case if, as is probable, the title was in some degree familiar as a designation of majesty. The Gospels show that Jesus did not avoid the use of the simple *I*. If "the Son of man" had been for him a perfectly colorless synonym for the personal pronoun *I*, he would need to have said *this* Son of man, in order to give the phrase any force as a self-designation. He must, therefore, have used the title to

[1] *Israelit. u. Jüd. Geschichte*, p. 312. A critique of Wellhausen's view by Oettli will be found in No. 6 of the *Basler Kirchenfreund* (1895). For other references, see Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I. 256.

mark in some way what was peculiar to himself.[1] The question, then, takes this form: What sort of dignity, what kind of a claim, did Jesus implicitly assert in so naming himself? It is probable that the title designated for Jesus characteristics of his personality which accorded with his peculiar life-work. We have seen that the conception which best represented his life-task was that of the Kingdom of God. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that as Son of man he conceives himself as head and founder of the Kingdom of God. The origin and use of the title, so far as we can trace them, accord with this supposition. In Daniel it is the theocratic king who is likened to a son of man. If the usage, of which that in the Book of Enoch is an illustration, influenced our Lord's employment of the term, it would quite naturally fall into line with this explanation, as the Son of man there appears as the glorious founder and head of God's Kingdom. The use of the title in our sources accords well with this view. As his Kingdom is both present and future, so, as Son of man, he has certain experiences to undergo in founding the Kingdom here on earth and a manifestation in glory awaiting him in the consummation of that Kingdom. Especially does this explanation fit the apocalyptic passages which speak of the Son of man as coming in his Kingdom. But since it is through healing, teaching, suffering, and death that Jesus is to establish his Kingdom, it is no less natural to find the Son of man described as engaged in these various works and experiences connected with his calling.

To substantially this conclusion an increasing number of scholars now adhere. Despite minor points of difference they agree in making the title in question correlative to the Kingdom of God. I will present a few illustrations: —

Weiss says: "No doubt every Israelite who believed in Scripture could, in consequence of prophecy, know of a Son of man who, because Jehovah would bring about the completion of salvation through him, had such a divine

[1] See Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 67 (Bk. I. ch. iii. § 5).

calling as no one had ever had, and as no one after him could have."[1]

The conclusion of Beyschlag is similar. After reviewing the passage, he says: "All these widely diverging utterances have one thing in common; they all treat of the official sufferings and doings of Jesus; they all speak of him in so far as he has the task of setting up the Kingdom upon earth." "The Son of man is the divinely invested bearer of the Kingdom that descends from above, that is to be founded from heaven; it is he who brings in the Kingdom of God."[2]

Holtzmann concludes his investigation thus: "Jesus is and is called Son of man, on the one hand, in every place where by forgiving and healing, teaching and suffering, he proclaims, extends, and represents the Kingdom of God; but, on the other hand, and especially where, coming on the clouds of heaven, he consummates the Kingdom."[3]

This view admits of a natural application to the passages which present the greatest difficulties for other theories. It falls within his province as the founder of the Kingdom to forgive sins (Mk. ii. 10), and to interpret the true significance and use of the sabbath (Mk. ii. 28). The living of a natural, social (non-ascetic) life (Mt. xi. 19) and the relinquishment of the comforts of home-life (Mt. viii. 20) were conditions for the fulfilment of his heavenly vocation. To speak against his person is less heinous than to deride the Holy Spirit of truth and goodness which speaks in his words and deeds (Mk. iii. 28, 29). To seek and to save the lost (Lk. xix. 10) is an essential part of his work who offers the blessings of his Kingdom to the most wretched and sinful. All these passages of the first group (see page 41) depict or allude to aspects of his work as founder of the Kingdom. The numerous passages which refer to the sufferings and death of the Son of man (Mk. viii. 31; ix. 31; Mt. ix. 12; Lk. xxiv. 7, *et al.*) simply describe an essential condition for the fulfilment of his calling, — an expe-

[1] *Bibl. Theol.* § 16, *b*. [2] *N. T. Theol.* I. 64 (Bk. I. ch. iii. § 5).
[3] *Neutest. Theol.* I. 253.

rience which he knew both from prophecy and from his own consciousness to be essential to the completion of work.

But corresponding to the rejection, suffering, and death which he is to experience is the glory with which the Son of man shall come in his Kingdom. The humiliation is offset by the exaltation. And there is no contradiction between these, since he who most humbles himself shall be most exalted (Lk. xiv. 11). The King comes to his throne by the way of the cross. Humility and majesty meet and blend in the character and experience of the Son of man.

Was the title, then, for Jesus' own mind a name for Messiah? I believe we must adopt the conclusion to which our whole investigation points, that it had Messianic significance for Jesus; that it was a veiled designation of his messiahship. We have seen that it was not in popular use as a Messianic title. Its use by our Lord would not therefore carry an explicit assertion of messiahship. His use of it involved the claim of a unique mission, a calling distinguishing him from all others. As his disciples came to know the nature of that calling, they would inevitably conclude that it veiled the claim and involved the fact that he was the Messiah. In this way the term, though not in itself an equivalent for Messiah, would easily become a Messianic title in actual usage. In the later usage which the Synoptics reflect — the apocalyptic usage — the title could only have been understood by the disciples as a practical equivalent for Messiah, or, at least, as implying messiahship. The term as used by Jesus was more generic than Messiah, and just on this account it was adapted to his use. But the head and founder of the Kingdom of God was in reality the Messiah, and the more explicit he made his claim to found and complete his Kingdom, the more naturally would "Son of man" assume the character of a Messianic title. And thus this "most unassuming name," "this title which is no title, but the avoidance of every such thing,"[1] easily came to signify what it was used to veil but no less truly implied.

[1] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 66 (Bk. I. ch. iii. § 6).

CHAPTER V

THE SON OF GOD

It is noticeable that Jesus in speaking of God to the people, or even to his own disciples, never uses the term "Our Father." He speaks of himself as God's Son, and of others as sons of God, but he does not class himself along with other men under a common term. He does not speak of God's fatherhood as if it had the same meaning for him and for them. He says: "my Father," and "your Father"; for example: "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father," etc. (Mt. xi. 27); "Your Father knoweth what things ye have need of," etc. (Mt. vi. 8). Only once, so far as our sources inform us, does Jesus use the phrase "our Father," and that is in giving a form of prayer for the use of his disciples. No example can be adduced in which he comprehends himself and them together in a single term as being in the same sense "sons of God."

We have seen that Jesus' favorite self-designation was "the Son of man." There is no passage in the Synoptic Gospels in which Jesus explicitly calls himself "Son of God." He does so, however, by very clear implication in two instances: in Mt. xi. 27, where he says "my Father," and adds: "no one knoweth *the Son*, save the *Father*," etc., where "the Son" clearly implies the complement, "of God." So, also, in Mk. xiii. 32: "Of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither *the Son*, but *the Father*." God is "the Father," "my Father"; Jesus is "the Son," *i.e.*, God's Son.

By less direct implication Jesus is twice represented as the Son of God: (1) in the parable of the Vineyard (Mk. xii. 1 *sq.*). The lord of the vineyard is Jehovah, and the

vineyard is the Jewish nation. The master sent to this people a succession of his "servants," the prophets, "that he might receive from the husbandmen of the fruits of the vineyard." The people rejected and killed them. At length he sent his own son, but he received the same shameful treatment: "He had yet one, a beloved son: he sent him last unto them, saying, They will reverence my son. But these husbandmen said among themselves, This is the heir; come, let us kill him, and the inheritance shall be ours. And they took him, and killed him, and cast him forth out of the vineyard" (*vv.* 6–8). This son is Jesus himself. (2) Somewhat less prominent is the implication of Jesus' sonship in the parable of the Marriage Feast in Mt. xxii. 2 *sq.*: "The Kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king, who made a marriage feast for his son," etc. The parable pictures under the image of a wedding festival the joys and blessings of Christ's Kingdom to which the Jews are first bidden. Upon their refusal to participate in them the messengers are sent to the heathen with the gospel-invitation.[1] We have thus but four cases in which Jesus of his own accord refers to himself by implication as the Son of God, and two of these are quite indirect and incidental. We shall see, however, that he acquiesces in the application of the title which is made to him by others.

The title under consideration is applied to Jesus by others under the most varying conditions. All the Synoptics record that a divine voice came to him out of heaven after his baptism: "Thou art my beloved Son; in thee I am well pleased" (Mk. i. 11; Lk. iii. 22; Mt. iii. 17). In somewhat varying form the same utterance is said by all (Mk. ix. 8; Lk. ix. 35; Mt. xvii. 5) to have been addressed to him at his transfiguration. In these expressions the characteristic thought seems to be that as Son of God he is the special object of the Father's good pleasure. In

[1] Difficult critical questions beset this parable. By many it is regarded as a variation of the parable of the Great Feast given in Lk. xiv. 16 *sq.* to which Matthew has given an anti-Jewish turn. Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, p. 134, regards *vv.* 11–14 as a distinct parable which naturally follows the parable as given by Luke. He thinks it had some introductory formula prefixed to it which he supplies by the conjectural use of *v.* 2.

the temptation-narrative as given by Luke and Matthew Satan addresses Jesus, hypothetically, thus: "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones become bread" (Mt. iv. 3; Lk. iv. 3). Here the Son of God is evidently the wonder-working Messiah who, if genuine, will establish his claims by startling exhibitions of arbitrary power. In all three sources the Gadarene demoniacs are said to address Jesus as Son of God (Mk. v. 7; Lk. viii. 28; Mt. viii. 29), by which the chosen of God, probably the Messiah, seems to be meant.

On one occasion (only in Mt. xiv. 33) he is worshipped by a company of disciples, who say: "Of a truth thou art the Son of God." In Matthew's version of Peter's confession the words used are: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Mt. xvi. 16), but both Mark (viii. 29) and Luke (ix. 20) have shorter forms in which the title in question is not used. In the other cases where the title is applied to Jesus it is found on the lips of his enemies. Thus the high priest addressing him at his trial, demands: "Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" (Mk. xiv. 61; *cf.* Mt. xxvi. 63). Jesus answers affirmatively. According to Matthew the multitude at the cross revile Jesus and say: "If thou art the Son of God, come down from the cross" (Mt. xxvii. 40), but in the parallel passages we have instead of the title "Son of God," "the Christ, the King of Israel" (Mk. xv. 32), and "the King of the Jews" (Lk. xxiii. 37). Once more: Mark (whom Matthew follows) ascribes to the centurion at the crucifixion the confession: "Truly this man was a Son of God" (Mk. xv. 39; Mt. xxvii. 54). If the Roman soldier used this particular title,[1] he probably understood it as meaning *hero* or *demi-god.*

Such is the usage in our sources. Before inquiring further into the import of the title it is necessary to examine its historical origin and basis in the Old Testament.

We find the title "sons of God" applied to the following persons in the Old Testament: (1) Angels. In a

[1] Luke ascribes to him the more general expression: "Certainly this was a righteous man" (xxiii. 47).

fragment of some very ancient mythology preserved in Gen. vi. 1–4, these "sons of God" are said to have united with the daughters of men, — a union from which a race of heroes was produced.[1] In Job i. 6 and ii. 1 the "sons of God" are spoken of as presenting themselves before the Lord. This may be called a poetical use of the term.

(2) Magistrates. In Ps. lxxxii. the judges are reproved for their unjust judgments and are thus addressed:

> "I said ye are gods (*elohim*),
> And all of you sons of the Most High.
> Nevertheless ye shall die like men," etc. (*vv.* 6, 7).

Cf. Ex. xxii. 28: "Thou shalt not revile *elohim* (R. V., "God"; margin, "the judges"), nor curse a ruler of thy people." The same use of *elohim* is found in xxi. 6 and xxii. 8. It is quite certain that *elohim* is here a collective name, which was employed in the oldest usage to denote the tribunal or oracle which was established to declare the divine will.[2]

(3) Individual Israelites. "Ye are sons unto Jehovah your God," etc. "For thou art an holy people unto the Lord," etc. (Deut. xiv. 1, 2). The title is applied in Hos. i. 10 to members of the northern kingdom of Israel who should become reunited with Judah in the common blessings of Jehovah's covenant: "In the place where it was said unto them, Ye are not my people, it shall be said unto them, Ye are the sons of the living God."

(4) The theocratic king: "He (David) shall build an house for my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom forever. I will be his father, and he shall be my son," etc. (2 Sam. vii. 14). *Cf.* Ps. lxxxix. 27: "I will make him (the king of Israel) my first-born, the highest of the kings of the earth." *Cf.* Ps. ii. 7: "Jeho-

[1] *Cf.* what Plato says in *Cratylus*, 33: "Do you not know that the heroes are demigods? All of them sprang either from the love of a god for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for a goddess." For an elaborate discussion and full illustration of this legend in antiquity, see Lenormant, *Beginnings of History*, ch. vii.

[2] LXX.: πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ. See the Hebrew *Lexicon* of Brown, Briggs, and Driver, under אֱלֹהִים.

vah said unto me (the anointed king), Thou art my son; this day have I begotten thee" (installed thee in thy kingly office).

(5) The nation of Israel: "Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, my firstborn," etc. (Ex. iv. 22). This relation is still more fully elaborated in the song of Moses (Deut. xxii. 6–10).[1]

From these examples it will be seen that the Old Testament idea of sonship to God is that of special nearness to him — of special endowments or privileges conferred by him. The nation, its members, especially its king, bear this name as the chosen representatives of Jehovah — the special objects of his providential favor and the agents for accomplishing his will. A "son of God" in the Old Testament sense is one uniquely loved, chosen, and endowed by God. The title is not used as a specific designation for the Messiah, although the passages cited in which the ideal theocratic king is called Jehovah's "son" and "first-born," point to the appropriateness with which the Messiah might be called *par éminence* "the Son of God." The historical basis of such a usage is undoubtedly laid in the Old Testament. If the head of the nation is in a peculiar sense God's son, with even greater propriety may the antitypical king who is to sit on David's throne forever and establish his kingdom to all generations be so designated. In this usage which we have traced, we find, no doubt, the generic sense which the title bears in its application to Jesus, although we may expect to find something distinctive in that application of it.

Among extra-canonical Jewish writings only the Book of Enoch and fourth Esdras employ the title in question. Examples of its use are as follows: (Jehovah speaks) "For I and my Son will unite with them forever in the paths of uprightness in their lives; and ye will have peace."[2] "For my Son, Messias, shall be revealed with those that are with him," etc. (4 Es. vii. 28). "And it shall come to pass after these years that my Son, Christ,

[1] See Briggs, *Messianic Prophecy*, pp. 100, 129.

[2] *Enoch*, CV. 2.

shall die," etc. (4 Es. vii. 29). The title is similarly used several times in chs. xiii and xiv.

This usage is clearly a reproduction of that found in the Old Testament, but with this distinctive feature that "my Son" is here almost a synonym for "Messiah." Since the Messiah is the special object of Jehovah's love and favor he is preëminently *his Son*. This sonship to God was inseparable from the idea of messiahship. Only one who was the Son of God in a special sense could be the Messiah. From Jewish usage, then, it appears that the title was in occasional use as an approximate synonym for "the Messiah." This same relation between the two terms seems to exist in the New Testament usage. In Matthew's version of Peter's confession the two titles are united in such a way as to indicate that they are kindred but not strictly synonymous: "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God" (Mt. xvi. 16).[1] The same correlation is found in the language of the high priest: "Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" (Mk. xiv. 61; *cf.* Mt. xxvi. 63). In both these cases the title has an official sound. It is noticeable how Jesus in speaking of himself in both connections calls himself "the Son of man." The title which was closely allied to "the Messiah" he carefully avoided, except when speaking of that intimate fellowship which he sustained with the Father. Jesus did indeed admit that the title was applicable to him in its official sense, but in his own spontaneous use of it he denoted by it rather a personal relation of fellowship and intimacy with God. "According to the Jewish idea" (which is reflected in the two passages just noticed), "the Messianic king was *also* 'Son of God'; according to Jesus' idea, 'the Son of God' *as such* was the Messianic king."[2]

We now turn to a more particular examination of Jesus' direct use of the title in its application to himself and to

[1] If the shorter forms in Mark and Luke be regarded as more original than this, we have still the significance of the first evangelist's combination of the titles to consider.

[2] Wendt, *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 133 (orig. p. 436).

others. The most significant passage is one which both Matthew and Luke have preserved from the Logia: "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him" (Mt. xi. 27; Lk. x. 22). Here Jesus asserts in connection with his sonship to God a unique and incomparable knowledge of God and intimacy with him. That the sonship of Jesus, as here asserted, has in it something distinctive as compared to the sonship of other men, cannot be doubted. Besides the affirmation of an altogether exceptional mutual knowledge between him and God, we observe that God is to him *the Father* and he is to God *the Son* in an absolute sense. In addition to these considerations it must be remembered that Jesus never elsewhere puts himself in the same category with others when speaking of God's fatherhood or men's sonship to God. Is the sonship of Jesus to God essentially different from that of other men, or is it different only in degree; different in the sense of being normal and perfect while theirs is but partially realized in fact?

This inquiry raises another question: What constitutes men "sons of God"? Glorified spirits are said to resemble the angels and so to be "sons of God, being sons of the resurrection" (Lk. xx. 36). Peacemakers are "sons of God" (Mt. v. 9), and men are required to love all men, even their enemies, in order that they may become (γένησθε) sons of their Father who is in heaven (Mt. v. 45). Thus it appears that conformity to God's will, likeness to him in moral motives and action, constitutes men sons of God. God is perfectly good; he blesses all, the unjust as well as the just. Men become sons of God by becoming like him. This likeness of men to God in its perfection would involve completeness of love (Mt. v. 48).

Now it is noticeable that other men *become* sons of God; Jesus *is* the Son of God without qualification. He does not have to attain this sonship by gradual or partial approach, but possesses it from the first. He perfectly

fulfils the divine will, absolutely conforms to the divine good pleasure. He perfectly knows God as his Father in the most intimate and unbroken fellowship. The title *Son* is for him rather personal than official; as he uses it, it emphasizes rather his relation to God than his relation to his life-work. In view of these distinctive features of Jesus' language concerning his own sonship and that of other men, our previous question recurs: Was his sonship different from that of other men in degree only or also in kind?

All will admit that his sonship is unique in the sense that its ideal is perfectly realized in him, while in others it is but partially fulfilled. Beyschlag says that there is in his sonship "a sublimity and uniqueness of his relation to God which raises him above all other sons of men."[1] He regards the sinlessness of Jesus as proving that his relation to the Father is original, perfect, and absolute, and that his sonship is thus perfect and absolute, while that of others is but partial and relative.[2] Wendt thinks that Jesus occasionally "designated himself in distinction from all others as 'the Son of God' in a preëminent sense." "He has thus regarded himself as 'the Son of God' κατ' ἐξοχήν, since he knew that this mutual relation of loving intercourse subsisted between God and himself in unique perfection."[3]

Most recent scholars also agree that the term "Son of God" as used in the Synoptics is primarily an ethical one. It emphasizes the perfect union, the absolute intimacy, and mutual knowledge which subsist between the Father and Jesus. It is, as we have seen, a personal rather than an official name. It speaks of a relation sustained to God, whether applied to Jesus or to others. The term is not used in a metaphysical sense as denoting community of essence. If the use of the title involves something more than ethical union, it must be by suggestion and implication, rather than by direct assertion. Those

[1] *N. T. Theol.* I. 71 (Bk. I. ch. iii. § 8).
[2] *Leben Jesu*, pp. 178, 179.
[3] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 125, 128 (orig. pp. 429, 432).

who hold that it implies no such significance may fairly challenge their opponents to show that it *does*. They stand upon the direct and primary reference of the title and may maintain that its import is exclusively ethical until something more is shown to be involved in it.

It is not strange that at this point there should be a dividing of the ways. Wendt, for example, holds that the language of our sources does not warrant us in ascribing to the paternal and filial relation which Jesus regarded as existing between God and himself, a character different in principle from the paternal and filial relation which, according to his teaching, exists between God and the members of his Kingdom.[1] Beyschlag, after reviewing the passage, says very emphatically: "All these facts make it so certain that the consciousness of Jesus was at bottom purely human, that only an unconquerable dogmatic prejudice, springing from scholastic tradition and misunderstanding of what religion requires, can resist the force of this testimony."[2] He maintains the sinlessness of Jesus and the absolute ethical uniqueness of his relation to God, but asserts that the notion that these facts involve a consciousness of preëxistence or any character transcending human perfection is "a very curious error," through falling into which Paul and John started the Church on a wrong path in the development of theology.

A widely different conclusion is drawn by Reuss. After discussing the title "Son of God," he concludes that the relationship which it emphasizes is, indeed, ethical. But he adds that its use necessarily gives rise to further reflection. "In other words," he continues, "this moral relation, if it is really such as we have just described, does not explain itself, nor is it explained, by any analogies supplied by the history of man. We are necessarily led to regard it as the manifestation of a metaphysical relation of a much higher order, and absolutely beyond the reach of any analogy our world can furnish."[3] Reuss

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 124 (orig. p. 429).
[2] *N. T. Theol.* I. 75 (Bk. I. ch. iii. § 10).
[3] *Hist. Christ. Theol.* I. 202 (orig. I. 234, 235).

concludes that the apostolic theology was a legitimate development from Jesus' self-testimony as given in the Synoptics.

In an elaborate article on "The Formation and Content of the Messianic Consciousness of Jesus," [1] Hermann Schmidt has discussed the view maintained by Beyschlag that the Synoptic representation does not carry us beyond an ethical human perfection in Jesus. He maintains that we cannot free ourselves thus from metaphysical considerations in treating of this subject, so long as we deal earnestly with the fact of Jesus' sinlessness. It is futile, argues Schmidt, to assert the ethical perfection of Jesus, and then leave it unexplained and inexplicable. Jesus' consciousness of his sinlessness and of the perfect realization in himself, of the moral ideal, is not accounted for unless a fundamental and permanent distinction between himself and other men is recognized. "The ethical as such is always mediated through the will; now there meets us in a race in which all others are in themselves incapable of reaching the right relation of sonship, a personality which not only can of itself *become*, but from the first *is*, what, in case of others, can only be attained through aid from without, so that the conclusion cannot be avoided that a peculiar essence, a specific nature, and, indeed, one that is not mediated through the will, lies at its basis; that is, that the life of Jesus has a distinctively metaphysical background." [2]

We must, of course, draw a line very carefully between the precise meaning of our passages as determined by exegesis and inferences, however natural, which are derived from that meaning. But we must also admit that the exegetical result, in the case before us, raises a problem respecting the person of Jesus Christ, with which the mind cannot decline to deal. As Son of God Jesus stands in a unique relation to the Father. The title involves his ethical perfection. Now we cannot simply stop short with these assertions; to do so is to decline the problem to

[1] *Studien u. Kritiken*, 1889, p. 423 *sq.*
[2] *Op. cit.*, 435.

which this uniqueness gives rise. Why was Jesus the only sinless man? Was his sinlessness an accident? Why has it never been repeated? If, as is admitted, he possessed the clear consciousness of sinlessness, what is the explanation of so exceptional and marvellous a fact? We are told that his consciousness of perfect union with God and of sinless perfection was "purely human"; if so, it still demands some explanation which the representatives of this view have not given and make no effort to furnish.

It is open to the radical theologian to say that the positing of a metaphysical union with God as the basis of the unique consciousness and character of Jesus is a subsequent explanation which Paul and John have given. But it *is* an explanation, and the mere assertion that Jesus' consciousness was "purely human" *is not*. It is, moreover, an explanation which these apostles base upon the teaching and life of Jesus as they knew them. Were they right or wrong? This is the dilemma into which the problem resolves, and beyond this we shall not follow it at present. The testimony of the fourth Gospel has but a relative historical value for Wendt, who holds that it was composed by a post-apostolic writer who merely incorporated into it Johannine memoranda. For Beyschlag, however, who holds the genuineness of this Gospel, the case stands somewhat differently. His conclusion that Jesus' sonship to God was exclusively ethical, and that his consciousness was "purely human," will be submitted to the tests of exegesis in the study of the Gospel of John.

It does not fall within the scope of my present purpose to pursue the subject into the field of doctrinal theology. I have thought it proper, however, to point out that even the language of the Logia and of Mark does raise a great problem respecting the inner consciousness of Jesus, and that theology is bound to deal with that problem. The apostles and, following them, the theology of the Church, have presented a solution of it; it is incumbent on those who deny the legitimacy of this solution to furnish another and a better one.

CHAPTER VI

THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD

THE teaching of Jesus concerning God rests upon an Old Testament basis. In contrast to the pantheistic and polytheistic systems which prevailed among ancient oriental nations, Jesus adhered to the Jewish conception of Jehovah as the one only God, the Almighty Creator and Lord of all. He emphasized the spirituality and holiness of God. The doctrine of Jesus is the ethical monotheism of Israelitish religion, elevated, enriched, and purified. There is nothing in his doctrine for which the Old Testament does not supply a beginning and basis.

It would not, however, be correct to suppose that Jesus added nothing to the Old Testament idea of God. True to his principle that he had not come to destroy, but to fulfil (Mt. v. 17), he cleared away from the foundations which had been laid in the earlier stages of revelation what was temporary and inadequate, and reared upon them a permanent structure. He illustrated the maxim which he commended to his followers when he said that the representatives of his truth and Kingdom would bring out of their treasures things new and old (Mt. xiii. 52). This fulfilling of the idea of God did not consist in supplying foreign elements, but in developing, expanding, and clarifying the germs of doctrine which the Jewish people already possessed, and especially in rescuing their idea from certain prevalent misapplications and false inferences.

It would not have accorded with the genius of Jesus' teaching for him to give any direct and formal instruction concerning the nature of God. He does not aim to define God; he rather describes how he acts. His teaching is

not abstract, but concrete. In apothegm and parable he pictures how God feels, and what God does in certain conditions. He aims to rescue the idea of God from the realm of cold and powerless abstraction, and to make it a practical, living power in the heart. Jesus sought to inspire in men an intense and constant sense of God's presence and care. Hence he did not speak of the attributes of God, but unfolded his character and set forth its relation to human life. It was not so much the terminology of Jesus which was new; it was the way in which he filled old terms with new meaning by taking them into the field of character. When, for instance, he spoke of God's fatherhood, he showed by what he said about it that it meant for him a certain disposition of God towards men — a way of feeling and acting towards them, and involved a corresponding attitude and action on man's part towards him.

In speaking of God, Jesus mainly employed two titles, King and Father. The former is but infrequently used. It is, indeed, a noticeable fact that although he spoke so often of the Kingdom of God, he seldom spoke of God as King. It is, however, quite consonant with the principles which we have just noticed, that Jesus did not discard this current Old Testament designation of Jehovah. He referred, quite in the spirit of Is. lxvi. 1, to the exaltation of God on his heavenly throne, and described Jerusalem as "the city of the great King" (Mt. v. 35). It is Jehovah in his mode of dealing with men who is pictured in the parables of the Unmerciful Servant (Mt. xviii. 23 *sq.*) and of the Marriage Feast (Mt. xxii. 2 *sq.*), both of which begin: "The Kingdom of heaven is likened unto a certain king." This quite incidental and indirect recognition of the kingship of God is to be supplemented by such recognitions of the divine power and sovereignty as are involved in the title, "Lord of heaven and earth" (Mt. xi. 25), and in the frequent ascription to God of boundless prerogative and power (Mk. x. 27; xii. 24; xiv. 36; Mt. x. 28).

But Jesus' characteristic name for God was "Father."

He not only spoke of God as his own Father, but as the Father of men. In this too he built upon the Old Testament, although greatly elevating and widening its idea. "Father" was not indeed the prevalent designation of God in Israel. It is not found, for example, in the Jews' book of devotion, the Psalms, although in one place God is there likened to a Father (Ps. ciii. 13).[1] The prevailing name for God is "King"; *e.g.*: "my King and my God" (Ps. v. 2); "The Lord of hosts is the King of glory" (Ps. xxiv. 10); and men are often described as the King's "servants" (Ps. xxvii. 9; xxxi. 16).

In the Old Testament God's fatherhood designates a special relation, which he sustains to the Jewish people. This idea finds frequent expression in the prophets. The deliverance of the nation from Egypt was the favor of a Father to a child: "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt" (Hos. xi. 1). The sin of the people is often pictured as the disobedience of children towards their Father: "I have nourished and brought up children, and they have rebelled against me" (Is. i. 2). Sometimes the idea of fatherhood is rather indirectly suggested than directly asserted, and God is compared to an earthly father in his tenderness or his severity: "The Lord thy God bare thee as a man doth bare his son" (Deut. i. 31); "As a man chasteneth his son, so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee" (Deut. viii. 5).

In general, the fatherhood of God to Israel denotes his gracious interest in the nation and the providential care which he exercises over it in making it the vehicle of his revelation and in preparing it to be his agent for ushering in the Messiah. "Is Ephraim (the northern kingdom) my dear son? is he a pleasant child? for as often as I speak against him, I do earnestly remember him still: therefore my heart is stirred for him; I will surely have mercy upon him, saith the Lord" (Jer. xxxi. 20). The exilic Isaiah lifting up a plaintive voice from the midst of the nation's disasters, dwells upon the comforting assurance that, even

[1] "Like as a Father pitieth his children,
So the Lord pitieth them that fear him."

if the people's ancestors (who are apparently regarded as a species of patron saints) should cease the care for them, Jehovah will not forget them: "For thou art our Father, though Abraham knoweth us not, and Israel doth not acknowledge us: thou, O Lord, art our Father; our Redeemer from everlasting is thy name" (Is. lxiii. 16). *Cf.* Mal. ii. 10: "Have we not all one Father?" etc.

According to this idea of God's fatherhood it was natural that Jehovah should be especially described as Father to the theocratic king, the head and representative of the nation, and the type of the Messianic King, who should be preëminently God's Son and who should reign forever. The prophet Nathan, speaking on behalf of Jehovah to David the king, tells him that a descendant of his shall build Jehovah's house, and adds: "I will be his Father, and he shall be my son" (2 Sam. vii. 14). A similar idea meets us in Ps. lxxxix. 26, 27, where the theocratic king is described as confessing Jehovah to be his Father, and Jehovah as declaring him to be his first-born son, the highest of the kings of the earth.

What we observe, then, in this Old Testament idea of fatherhood is that it was special rather than universal, and that it had not yet become the determining conception of God's character. God's attitude towards Israel was fatherly, but it was not yet seen that he is, in his very essence, fatherly love, and that all men are the objects of his care and compassion. The legal idea of God was still the dominant one. Power and transcendence were the attributes most emphasized. The recognition of these was right and important, but it was liable to a one-sided development, and such a development it received, especially in the later Judaism. The legalism and the ritualism of the later Jewish period sprang, in great measure, from the failure of the people to complement the truth of God's kingly power with the truth of his fatherly love. Legal subjection, expressing itself in rites which were thought to pay honor to God's transcendent majesty, rather than filial reverence and moral obedience, was the dominant note of Pharisaic piety.

We have already seen in examining the title "Son of God," how frequently Jesus speaks of God as his own Father, and that he appears to assume some distinction between the relation of the Father to himself and that to which he refers when he speaks of God as the Father of other men. It is with this latter relation only that we have now to do.

The first question which meets us is, whether or not Jesus represents God as the Father of all men. The answer to this question must be involved in the effort to determine in precisely what sense Jesus used the term "Father." It might be used to denote that complaisant love which God has for the obedient, but which cannot be felt towards the wilful sinner. Many have held that Jesus uses it in this sense, and that he speaks of God as Father only in relation to believers or the righteous.

It is a fact that the prevailing usage of Jesus, according to our sources, is to speak of God as the Father of his own disciples. Of this the Sermon on the Mount presents ample evidence. The discourse is indeed a collection of sayings uttered at various times and places, but it is represented as spoken to the disciples, and there is no critical ground for doubt that at least the earlier portions were so spoken. Addressing his disciples, he says: "Let your light shine, and so glorify your Father" (Mt. v. 16); "Love your enemies, that ye may be the sons of your Father" (v. 45); "Be complete in love, as your heavenly Father is" (v. 48); "Pray sincerely, and your Father will reward you" (vi. 4, 6, 8); and in this connection he teaches his disciples to pray, beginning: "Our Father"; *cf.* vi. 18, 26, 32. The usage is the same in other connections. In teaching his disciples humility, Jesus warns them against the danger of losing the spirit of equality and fraternity, and enforces the warning by saying: "For one is your Father who is in heaven" (Mt. xxiii. 9). Mark has preserved this saying, addressed to the disciples: "And whensoever ye stand praying, forgive, if ye have aught against any one: that your Father also who is in heaven may forgive you your

trespasses" (xi. 25).[1] In addition to the many examples of this usage, already cited, which the first evangelist has derived from the Logia, Luke has preserved one saying, omitted by Matthew, which bears the mark of originality: "Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the Kingdom" (xii. 32).

It must also be admitted that there is no passage in our sources in which Jesus explicitly speaks of God as the Father of all men. From this it is easy to draw the inference that the fatherhood of God is to be understood in the limited sense, and denotes God's favor towards the obedient. I believe, however, that this conclusion is quite unwarranted. The fatherhood of God in the teaching of Jesus is neither mere creatorship, nor is it merely a name for the attitude of approval or complaisance which corresponds to obedience and goodness on the part of men. It denotes rather the gracious loving attitude of God towards all men. God is Father to all men, not merely because he made all men, but because he made them for himself and kindred to himself, and because they are capable of realizing the sonship to him which corresponds to his fatherhood. His fatherhood embraces his universal benevolence. Let us test this view by reference to the passages which bear upon it.

Jesus teaches his disciples to love all men, even their enemies. In so doing they show themselves to be sons of God, that is, like God; "for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and unjust" (Mt. v. 45). Here the argument is simply this: Sonship to God consists in moral likeness to the Father; love all men, whether good or bad, for that is what the Father does. How plain it is that it is *as the Father* that God loves and blesses all; that his fatherhood is the ground and source of this boundless beneficence. Yet it is also quite clear that beneficence is not the whole meaning of fatherhood. God sustains the relation of Father only to personal, moral beings. Jesus says to his disciples:

[1] In Matthew this passage, in a slightly changed form, is appended as a comment or explanation to the Lord's prayer (vi. 14, 15).

It is *your* Father, not *theirs*, who feeds the birds (Mt. vi. 26). God's fatherhood includes a personal ethical relation, as well as the disposition of benevolence. It can exist only where the correlative sonship may also exist. God's essential self-imparting goodness and man's creation in God's moral image are the two fundamental elements of God's fatherhood, and they unite to give it the note of universality. God's universal fatherhood is grounded both in what he is and in what he has made man to be. He must be the Father of all men, because he is perfect in love (Mt. v. 48), and love is at once the sum of his inherent moral perfections, the motive of creation, and the basis of man's kinship to him.[1]

The parable of the Prodigal Son proceeds upon the truth of God's fatherhood. This significance does not depend merely upon the fact that Jesus pictures the attitude of God towards men by describing the action of a human father. In other parables God is represented by a king and by a householder. It is the *content* of the parable, rather than its *form*, which makes it a picture of God's fatherhood. Its purpose is to set forth the divine compassion towards the undeserving. The obedient son is the type of the loyal Jewish religionist; the wayward son is the type of the lost and despised sinner. The parable shows how God seeks to save the lost; how he calls, not the righteous, but sinners to repentance. He does not deal with men in mere retributive justice, but in abounding generosity. The parable is a picture of the divine grace. It uses the relations of the human family for its purpose, — the most natural and appropriate relations which it could use, — but it is the truth of God's love and pity for even the worst of men which makes it a les-

[1] An unwarranted appeal in proof of Jesus' universal conception of God's fatherhood is sometimes made to Mt. xxiii. 1-9: "Then spake Jesus to the multitudes and to his disciples, . . . One is your Father which is in heaven." But apart from the fact that "Father" (Abba) is here used in a technical sense, as a teacher's title denoting a source of authority, it is evident from the context that the words, "One is your Father" are parallel to, "One is your master, even the Christ," and were addressed to his disciples.

son in the meaning of the divine fatherhood. The same lesson is taught, however, by other analogies in other parables and in various forms of speech which are not parabolic. The divine fatherhood is the divine love seeking to bring men into that fellowship with God of which they were made capable and for which they are destined.[1]

We cannot doubt that in the thought of Jesus God is the Father of all men. Does it follow that all men are sons of God? In other words, are the terms "Father" and "son of God," used in strict correlation? We find on examination that this is not the fact. God is always loving and gracious, whatever men may be. His fatherhood cannot be impaired. He always remains, if we may so speak, what he ought to be; he always corresponds perfectly to his idea. With men, however, this is not the case. Ideally and in possibility all men are, indeed, sons of God. But men are not actually what they are ideally. The correlation between God's fatherhood and man's sonship should be perfect; but on account of sin it is not so. On man's side the true relation which "fatherhood" and "sonship" express has been impaired by sin. God *is* the Father of all men, since he, on his side, always remains what he ought to be; but men must *become* sons of God (in the true sense of moral kinship to God) because their side of the relation has been impaired, and it is by a change in *them* that this relation of fellowship and likeness must be restored. Hence our sources speak only of the obedient as sons of God in the *true* sense of sonship. Others have forfeited their proper sonship by sin, although it is still theirs by right and possibility, but they regain it only by repentance and return to God in obedience and love. In other words, Jesus does not designate as sonship the kinship of nature which all men have with God, but

[1] "Fatherhood is love, original and underived, anticipating and undeserved, forgiving and educating, communicating and drawing to its heart. Jesus felt, conceived, and revealed God as this love which — itself personal — applies to every child of man. That he really desired to characterize the eternal heart of God in this way as the prototype of the human father's heart, is shown by his own express comparison between the two" (Mt. vii. 11). Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 82 (Bk. I. ch. iv. § 2).

reserves that term to express the closer spiritual relation which is constituted by faith and obedience. This distinction underlies the language of the Synoptists as clearly as it is stated in the fourth Gospel (i. 12): "As many as *received him*, to them gave he the right (or privilege) to *become* children of God, even to them that *believe* on his name."

This same conception of God's fatherhood and of man's true sonship to God is presented in the parable of the Prodigal Son. Of both the sons God is the Father; but the younger son forfeits by disobedience and ingratitude his true filial standing. As he himself expresses it, he is "no more worthy to be called" a son. In the true moral sense he is not what a son should be. The natural relation to his Father, however, still remains as the possible basis for the reconstitution of the true relation of obedience and fellowship. He is a son in possibility still; nothing can ever make it untrue that he was born in his Father's house and that he has a right to his Father's bounty as soon as he is willing on his part to fulfil his side of the relation. If he has lost the rights and dignity of sonship, he has lost them by his own unfilial life, and they belong to him, and may be his as soon as he will "arise and go to his Father," and in penitence and obedience seek his favor and blessing. God is the Father of all men; in the sense of kinship of nature to God all men are sons of God; but, in the higher sense in which Jesus used the word, they only are sons of God who seek to fulfil their true relation to God by obedience to his will, and ethical likeness to him. The fatherhood of God and the sonship of men to God find their point of union in the fact that both terms refer to moral character, the fatherhood denoting God's perfect goodness, the sonship man's likeness to God. Both describe the correspondence of the beings to which they are applied to their *idea*. The two terms are therefore *ideally* correlative, and this ideal correlation is the basis of an actual correlation which is realized in proportion as man fulfils his true destiny.

Other terms than that of Father are used in our sources

to designate the ethical nature of God, but they point to no different conception of the divine character from that which we have reached. God is called perfect, complete (τέλειος, Mt. v. 48), but it is clear from the context that this perfection is perfection of love. God is complete in love in that he bestows his blessings generously and without partiality upon all. Men are not thus complete. Even the best of them are inclined to do good only to those who do good to them; to salute only those who salute them (Mt. v. 46, 47). Thus love becomes only a slightly enlarged selfishness. Earthly parents may, indeed, be good to their children and delight to give them good gifts, yet their interest and sympathy for others are likely to remain extremely limited. Jesus is obliged to say of them that with all their generosity and affection, they are still "evil" (πονηροὶ ὄντες, Mt. vii. 11); that is, they realize the life of love but imperfectly. The best of human love is often the operation of an impulse or instinct, rather than an intelligent choice distinctly adopted by the will, and applied to all the motives and ends of action. God, on the contrary, is complete in love. He seeks the true good of all beings. His action towards men varies with their conditions and characters, but it is always action which is best adapted to promote the ends of holy love.

God is also called good (ἀγαθός). In the narrative concerning the man who came to Jesus and said: "Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" Jesus is said to have replied: "Why callest thou me good? None is good, save one, even God" (Mk. x. 17, 18; *cf.* Lk. xviii. 18, 19; Mt. xix. 16, 17). The import of the conversation hinges on the meaning of the word *good*. The questioner had used it quite lightly, applying it to Jesus as a compliment, or, at most, as a common designation of respect.[1]

[1] In saying this I am assuming, with most critics (*e.g.* Meyer, Weiss, Wendt, Holtzmann), that the form of the question given by Mark and Luke: "Good Master, what shall I do," etc.? is the original, as against Matthew's: "What good thing shall I do," etc.? Matthew's form of the question seems very natural in view of what we know of the Jewish ideas of virtue, and it seems to lead naturally to Jesus' counter-question. On the other hand, it is quite easy to see how the more concrete form of the

Jesus takes up the word and carries it at once into a region far above that in which his questioner's mind had ever pursued it. It is as if he had said: "You use the word *good;* do you reflect what depths of meaning are in that word? it is a name for the very perfection of God." The aim of Jesus was to heighten the man's idea of goodness. It had always been for him, as the sequel showed, a round of outward actions technically called religious. Jesus would show him what the ethical ideal of perfect goodness is — the very nature of God himself. Hence Jesus himself declines the epithet. He is himself passing through the process of human development. This process can reach its perfection only in its end. Hence good in the absolute sense — in the sense which excludes all becoming — can be predicated only of God. All others become good by the increasing realization in their lives of ethical likeness to God. He alone is absolutely good, the eternally ethically perfect Being. His nature alone is the source and seat of all truth, law, and perfection.

conversation which Mark and Luke have preserved could easily be cast into the more abstract form which Matthew has. A certain abruptness in Jesus' mounting at once from a complimentary title to the concept of the divine perfection is avoided by making the "young man's" question abstract and general. This, then, is one of the cases in the field of the higher criticism where the well-known maxim of the lower criticism obtains: *Lectio difficilior principatum tenet.*

CHAPTER VII

GOOD AND EVIL SPIRITS

It would be a matter of great interest, if it were practicable, to construct in thought the world as Jesus conceived it. But we have only scanty materials for so doing. He did not discourse upon nature or history. The fields of philosophy and science lay outside the scope of his teaching and work. His references to subjects which lie within these fields are quite incidental. They are made in popular language and embody the popular conceptions which were prevalent in his time. He spoke very often of natural phenomena — of the sun rising, the clouds threatening rain, the seed sprouting; of the lily's beauty, the care of vines and trees, the culture of the soil, the habits of animals, the qualities of salt and leaven — but without intending to add anything to the popular knowledge of meteorology, botany, or agriculture. The facts of nature and of human life he used simply as means to illustrate the moral and spiritual truths which constitute the peculiar province of his life-work.

It is a fair question whether Jesus meant to commit himself to any doctrines concerning the universe or life which are not an essential part of his positive teaching as the founder and head of the Kingdom of God. Would it have been consistent with his Messianic vocation for him to have assumed the *rôle* of an expert in literary or historical criticism, any more than in astronomy or metaphysics? If Jesus in teaching a lesson concerning his own work, referred to Jonah as having been swallowed by a sea-monster (Mt. xii. 40), did he thereby mean to authenticate that narrative in the Old Testament as literal his-

tory?[1] When he spoke of the "law of Moses," and the "book of Moses," or of what "Moses wrote," did he mean to say that Moses composed the Pentateuch in its present form? Did he pronounce upon the authorship of certain Psalms by the way in which he quoted them as what "David said"? To answer these questions in the affirmative is to suppose that it was the intention of Jesus to assert the correctness of the popular ideas of his time respecting the character of Old Testament stories and the authorship of Old Testament books. On this view we must suppose that in his incidental references to such subjects, Jesus is not merely speaking the popular language and using the current conceptions of his time for the ends of his teaching, but that he is committing his authority to the scientific accuracy of the common expressions and ideas which he uses. On this supposition his allusions to Old Testament books and narratives are sometimes made a touchstone for determining critical and historical questions which were as foreign to the thought of his time as were the researches and problems of anthropology or physical science. If his assertion, "Moses wrote," discredits modern criticism, does not his affirmation that the sun rises destroy modern astronomy?[2]

[1] It should here be noticed that Matthew alone connects the Jonah-sign with Jesus' resurrection. Luke in the parallel passage (xi. 29, 30; *cf.* 32) seems to regard the "sign of Jonah" as consisting of Jonah's preaching. This interpretation of the "sign" Matthew has also preserved from the Logia (xii. 41). The additional explanation of Jonah's sign to the Ninevites as consisting in his deliverance from the belly of the monster finds no warrant in the Book of Jonah itself, nor in the context of our passage. Jonah was a sign to the Ninevites in that he was a preacher of righteousness (Jon. iii. 4). With this idea Luke agrees, and also Matthew in xii. 41, 42. The additional explanation given in verse 40 is probably the author's own, suggested by the point of likeness between the experience of Jonah and that of Jesus, mentioned in verse 40 — a three-days burial. So Holtzmann and Wendt; *per contra*, Meyer and Weiss.

[2] "If indeed the question had ever been put to our Lord, was such a passage written by such a man? then he would either have refused to answer such a question, or he would have resolved the difficulty. Had he pronounced his decision, I would have believed him. Judging, however, from his ordinary method of teaching, I should have expected that, just as he said to the man who desired him to interfere in a question of inheritance, 'Who made me a judge or a divider between you?' He would have said in reply to the question about the age or author of a pas-

We must conclude that Jesus did not regard it as falling within his province to criticise the popular beliefs of his time regarding the order of the world, or as any part of his mission to extend human information in the fields of historical fact, literary criticism, or philosophical inquiry. When, for example, he spoke of the heart, the spirit, the soul, or life of man, he spoke the language of popular speech, and his purpose was to impress religious truth, not to impart psychological knowledge. His life-work belonged to a realm which is immeasurably higher than that of human science. He saw the inner meaning of the world and of life, with whose details science is occupied. He penetrated to the heart of Old Testament truth and was oblivious of such questions as those of time, place, and date. Nature he looked upon as the revelation of the divine order and beneficence; he spoke often of her powers and processes, which were for his mind instinct with God; but he was not at all concerned to extend men's observation of natural phenomena, much less to correct the popular impressions concerning them. For him it was quite enough to teach men to see God in nature, as it was enough to show them the imperishable religious truths which formed the essential substance of Old Testament revelation.

The question now arises: Can we safely commit ourselves to the guidance of principles like these in seeking to distinguish the positive and explicit teaching of Jesus from those incidental references which he often makes to various ideas and conclusions current in popular thought? Can we, for example, derive a positive doctrine of the location of heaven or of the nature of Hades, of angels and evil spirits and Satan, from the way in which he speaks of these subjects? Or should we conclude that he did not intend to embrace such themes within the range of his positive instruction? He speaks of heaven, as men have always done, in terms of space. It is a name for the seat

sage in the Old Testament, 'Who commissioned me to resolve difficulties in historical criticism?'" Bishop Moorhouse, *The Teaching of Christ* (1892), pp. 41, 42.

of the divine majesty, where God's will is perfectly done. But at most we can call this but the form of his thought. Its essence does not consist in any local conception. If God is in heaven, he is also in earth. Heaven is often a name for divinity, or God's holy order. The prodigal son sins against heaven (Lk. xv. 18). The baptism of John was from heaven (Mk. xi. 30), that is, providentially appointed and divinely sanctioned. His faithful disciples are to receive the rewards which are stored up for them in heaven (Mt. v. 12; Lk. xii. 33), but these terms are most naturally understood as referring to spiritual benefits and blessings, not to external gifts which are hoarded up for men like earthly treasures. The real thought of Jesus concerning heaven clearly transcends the popular form of which he most naturally makes use and rises into the world of the spirit. Heaven is the ideal world; it is the perfect life, the perfect society, as God conceives and designs it; it is the true goal of this present imperfect order. A severe literalism might insist that Jesus represents heaven as a place above the earth where God sits on a throne (Mt. v. 34); a more discerning search into the aim and import of Jesus' teaching discloses his deep spiritual purpose, — to kindle in men a living sense of God, of whose perfections, holy laws, and order "heaven" is a convenient and popular symbol. In this case there is no great difficulty in distinguishing what is incidental to the popular speech of Jesus from what is central and essential in his thought when he speaks about heaven.

In the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Lk. xvi. 19 *sq.*) he makes use of the popular idea of Hades as the general abode of the dead, but with this modification of the Old Testament idea of Sheol as a dark and distinctionless realm, that it is composed of two parts separated by a great gulf, across which, however, men converse. It is obvious that no doctrine concerning Hades is meant to be taught in this parabolic use of current ideas. Paradise (Lk. xxii. 43) is apparently the place of happiness in Hades. The other references to Hades are purely figurative. Capernaum shall be cast down to Hades (Lk. x. 16),

— a symbol of abasement in contrast to heaven, a symbol of exaltation. Against the Church the "gates of Hades," the greatest opposing powers, — so called because the portals of the realm of death so securely hold all who dwell within it, — shall not prevail (Mt. xvi. 18). Does Jesus, then, sanction the Jewish views of Sheol? He is neither concerned to sanction nor to deny them. He uses them as convenient forms for teaching moral truth. His revelation of God gives him no occasion either to confirm or to reject them. The subject is not within the field of his mission.

We will next observe his language concerning angels. The Old Testament was filled with references to superhuman beings and their agency. The later Judaism greatly increased their number and functions. God was withdrawn from the world, and angels were conceived of as the mediating agents by which he accomplished his purposes among men. In this particular, Jesus did not altogether follow the thought of his time. He represented God as being in living contact with the world, and as directly operative in human affairs. He accordingly spoke less frequently of angel-mediation.

In several places, however, he seems to refer to angels in such a way as to show that he believed in their real existence. He will come "in the glory of his Father with the holy angels" (Mk. viii. 38; Mt. xvi. 27; xxv. 31); "angels in heaven" neither marry nor are given in marriage (Mk. xii. 25); of the hour of his advent not even "the angels in heaven" know (Mk. xiii. 32). Beyschlag holds that "the holy angels of the Son of man, with whom he will come again in his glory, are the rays of the divine majesty which are then to surround him with splendor; they are the divine powers with which he is to awaken the dead, to dissolve the present order of the world, and set up a new and higher order."[1] Even if the references to angels in connection with the parousia be regarded as poetical, I see no sufficient ground for understanding the other references, just cited, in this way; and it is notice-

[1] *N. T. Theol.* I. 87 (Bk. I. ch. iv. § 5).

able that Beyschlag does not mention them in his discussion of the subject. It must be admitted, however, that most of our Lord's references to angels may be understood, without violence, in a symbolic way. When he said that he might ask his Father and he would send him "more than twelve legions of angels" to protect him from the violence of his enemies (Mt. xxvi. 53), the essence of his thought certainly is that, if he chose, he might be miraculously defended against his accusers. It is not at all necessary to the clearness and force of his thought to interpret this language literally.

What, now, shall be said of Mt. xviii. 10: "See that ye despise not one of these little ones; for I say unto you, that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is heaven"? Considered merely in its form, this passage presents the idea that children (or, the humblest of believers[1]) have in heaven their guardian angels (*cf.* Acts xii. 15), who, standing in closest relation to God, represent and mediate the special solicitude of God for their welfare. This idea accords, no doubt, with the popular thought of the later Judaism that God exercised his providential care through angelic instrumentality. The question here is whether it is the intention of Jesus to confirm that idea, or whether he simply uses the conception symbolically to enforce the truth of the great value of the "little ones" in the sight of God, and of his tender care for them. We may not be justified in denying that Jesus accepted the popular Jewish idea of guardian angels, but we cannot maintain that it is in any way essential to his thought. I do not believe that he meant to assert any-

[1] For our purpose it makes no essential difference whether μικροί be understood to refer to literal children (as by Weiss, Wendt, and Holtzmann) or persons who are figuratively so called (as by Morison, Meyer, and Beyschlag). The critical difficulties connected with the passage, which is found in Matthew alone, are considerable, but *in its present form* it appears to me clearly to refer to children. It may well be, however, that this turn was given to it by our first evangelist under the influence of Mk. ix. 36. The parallel, Mk. ix. 42, and the earlier verses of our chapter (Mt. xviii. 1–6; *cf.* Mt. x. 42; Lk. xvii. 2) do not seem to refer to children, but to humble, childlike believers. *Cf.* Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, p. 154.

thing upon that subject. The doctrine which he was teaching was the guardian care of God. That teaching stands in undimmed clearness and undiminished force, whether one suppose him to have conceived of it as actually effected through guardian angels, or regard that idea simply as a convenient means of enforcing his truth upon popular apprehension.

A similar view may be taken of such expressions as these: "Him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God" (Lk. xii. 8); "There is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth" (Lk. xv. 10). Certainly the idea in the first of these passages is the same as we find in Mt. x. 32: "Him will I also confess before my Father which is in heaven." Nothing is subtracted from the positive content of Jesus' teaching if "the angels of God" in such expressions be understood as "a kind of poetic paraphrase for God himself" (Beyschlag). With even greater naturalness may the term be so understood in the parabolic description of Lazarus as being carried away after his death "by the angels into Abraham's bosom" (Lk. xvi. 22). That the teaching of Jesus presupposes the real existence of an order of superhuman and holy beings is highly probable; but his references to them are too incidental and indefinite to warrant us in holding that he intended to commit himself to any positive doctrine of their nature and functions. His language concerning them — so far as we can judge from our sources — was quite reserved; he used the popular ideas about angels to a certain extent, but always as means to some end lying beyond; hence his words which touch upon the subject are usually symbolic or pictorial; they do not readily yield themselves to a literal interpretation, but are more naturally understood in a semi-poetic sense.

Just as the popular thought of Jesus' time conceived of the activity of God in the world as mediated through good angels, so it attributed the power of evil, both natural and moral, to the agency of wicked spirits. These spirits were thought of as constituting a kingdom of evil of which

Satan is the head. These malignant powers — especially their chief — are perpetually active in bringing all manner of evils upon men. In the Old Testament Satan had been described as the accuser, adversary, or destroyer of mankind; he is employed as a minister of God for the testing and chastisement of men. In the Book of Job Satan presents himself among the sons of God, the mighty messengers of Jehovah, and to him is given permission to put Job to the severest tests in order to determine whether his service to God is genuine and disinterested or prudential and selfish. The evils which he proceeds to inflict upon Job as tests of his sincerity are what we call natural evils — sickness, loss of property and of children. The question now arises: How far does the language of Jesus recognize or attest these and kindred ideas?

Without doubt the names "Satan," "devil," and "evil one" are more prominently connected with moral than with natural evil in our sources. In the narrative of the temptation as given by Matthew (iv. 1–11) and Luke (iv. 1–13) it is Satan who presents to Jesus alluring prospects of success if he will abandon the divinely appointed path in the pursuit of his Messianic vocation and adopt methods which accord with the popular expectation. Of the origin of this highly figurative and pictorial description we cannot be certain. Not improbably its substance was communicated to the disciples by Jesus himself as a picture of the two paths which lay before him at the beginning of his ministry. What is quite certain, in any case, is that Satan here appears as the embodiment of the popular Jewish Messianic expectations. If the words τοῦ πονηροῦ in Matthew's version of the Lord's prayer are to be taken as personal ("the evil one"), then we have in the Synoptics a clear reference to Satan as the source of temptation to evil; but this conclusion is doubly doubtful because, in the first place, it is quite possible that τοῦ πονηροῦ should be taken as impersonal ("evil"),[1] and,

[1] Undoubtedly the majority of modern interpreters render τοῦ πονηροῦ, "the evil one"; so Morison, Broadus, Meyer, Holtzmann, R.V.; but many still prefer the abstract meaning, "evil," found in the A.V.; *e.g.*,

further, because the shorter form of the prayer, as given by Luke (xi. 1–4), which does not contain these words, is probably the more original.[1]

Both Matthew and Luke have preserved from the Mark-source the explanation of the parable of the Sower, in which Jesus says: "When they have heard, straightway cometh Satan, and taketh away the word which hath been sown in them" (Mk. iv. 15; Mt. xiii. 18; Lk. viii. 12). The references to Satan as "the enemy" who sows tares among the wheat (Mt. xiii. 28, 39) are to be employed less confidently because there is some reason to think that the parable of the Tares (peculiar to Matthew) is an amplification of the parable of the Growing Seed in Mk. iv. 26–29, and that its exposition (xiii. 36–43) was an interpretation emanating from the evangelist or in current use among the early disciples. It bears the marks of an allegorizing interpretation of the details of the parable and appears to conduct to a different goal, the judgment and its issues, from that which the parable itself contemplates, which is to show how his disciples must feel and act in view of the fact that there will be counterfeit Christians among them.[2] But whatever view be taken on these latter points, it is a fair question whether in these figurative discourses the references to Satan may not be as figurative as the rest of the language. When it is said that Satan snatches away the seed that is sown in the heart, it is obvious that "seed" and "heart" are figurative designations for truth and the mind which apprehends it. It is not easy to show that "Satan" in such expressions means more than the spirit of worldliness which neutralizes the power of divine truth.

Quite in accord with the representations in Job which describe Satan as the tempter who puts the devotion of

Lange, Alford, and Weiss. Professor L. S. Potwin, in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1891, has strongly defended this view on various grounds, among them this, that the Septuagint often designates evil by πονηρόν, with and without the article, but does not designate Satan by ὁ πονηρός.

[1] See Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, pp. 97, 98.

[2] *Cf.* Weiss, *Matthäusev.*, p. 352; Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, pp. 178 179; Holtzmann, *Hand com. ad loc.*

men to the test, is the language of Jesus to Peter: "Satan asked to have you, that he might sift you as wheat" (Lk. xxii. 31). Here the testing process to which Peter is exposed appears to be the stress under which he is to be placed in deciding between the higher and the lower view of Jesus' work and Kingdom. Peter is to undergo a test analogous to that to which Jesus himself was subjected in his temptation. Again, Satan is called "the prince of the demons," who, as head of a kingdom of evil spirits, may be likened to a "strong man" guarding his house. Men who have been seized by his vassals are his "spoil" and cannot be rescued except by one who is more powerful than the chief himself (Mk. iii. 22–27; Mt. xii. 25–29; Lk. xi. 17–22). In such passages the view taken of "Satan" must be involved in that which is adopted respecting demons and demoniacal possession.

We find that on an earlier occasion when Peter repudiated the idea of a suffering Messiah, Jesus rebuked him in these words: "Get thee behind me, Satan: for thou mindest not the things of God, but the things of men" (Mk. viii. 33; Mt. xvi. 23). Here "Satan" is evidently used as a symbolic name for opposer or tempter. Peter's hostility to the divinely appointed course which Jesus must pursue sprang from that ambitious and worldly spirit which was the product of popular Jewish Messianic hopes. He was acting the part of an adversary to God in protesting against the cross, as the goal of his Master's life. In this connection we should observe the striking words of Jesus to the Seventy upon their return from their mission: "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven" (Lk. x. 17). This is certainly a figurative exclamation strongly reminding one of the words in Isaiah's satirical ode against the Babylonian tyrant: "How art thou fallen from heaven, O day star, son of the morning!" (Is. xiv. 12). But whether the whole conception, including that of Satan, is figurative, or only that of the swift fall from heaven, while Satan is still thought of as an actual person, depends largely upon the view taken of the "possession" whose cure was the occasion of the exclamation. The one per-

fectly clear reference to Satan as the cause of physical infirmity is contained in the description of the deformed woman who "could in no wise lift herself up," as one "whom Satan had bound eighteen years" (Lk. xiii. 11, 16).[1] The same idea, however, is implied in the representation of the "demonized" (*δαιμονιζόμενοι*) as Satan's "spoil," so far as their "possession" is identified with physical maladies; and to that subject we must now turn.[2]

Characteristic examples of this "possession" are as follows: The man "with an unclean spirit" in the synagogue at Capernaum which, when Jesus exorcises it, tears the man and cries with a loud voice (Mk. i. 21 *sq.*; Lk. iv. 31 *sq.*); the Gerasene demoniac who dwelt among the tombs, gashed his body with stones, and could not be tamed, being inhabited by a "legion" of demons (Mk. v. 1 *sq.*; Mt. viii. 28 *sq.*; Lk. viii. 26 *sq.*); a dumb man who spake as soon as the demon which had caused his dumbness was cast out (Mt. ix. 32, 33; *cf.* Lk. xi. 14 and Mt. xii. 22); the little daughter of a Syrophœnician woman who was "grievously vexed with a demon" and who, when healed, went home and lay down upon the bed, restored to health (Mk. vii. 25 *sq.*; Mt. xv. 22 *sq.*); the epileptic boy (Mt. xvii. 15) who had a "dumb spirit" and who often fell into fire and water and rolled on the ground and frothed at the mouth when the demon seized him (Mk. ix. 17 *sq.*; Mt. xvii. 14 *sq.*; Lk. ix. 37 *sq.*). These are all the examples of "possession" which are described with any detail in our sources.[3]

[1] The idea that it is the special province of Satan to inflict sickness and other natural evils upon men appears in Paul's epistles: 1 Cor. v. 5; 2 Cor. xii. 7; 1 Thess. ii. 18; 1 Tim. i. 20.

[2] I would commend to the reader the discussion of this subject by Row in *The Supernatural in the New Testament* (1875), and the remarks by Bruce in *The Miraculous Element in the Gospels* (1895).

[3] The healings of the "blind and dumb" man (Mt. xii. 22) may be a repetition (so Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, p. 100) of the cure already related by Matthew (ix. 32, 33) in close agreement with Lk. xi. 14. The woman "whom Satan had bound" (Lk. xiii. 16) is not explicitly said to have been "possessed." If these two cases are counted, they make seven in all.

On the general subject we observe: (1) All the symptoms which are described are such as characterize one or another physical or mental malady. If the phenomena were not attributed to demoniacal possession, we should experience no difficulty in explaining all the examples as cases of disease, such as paralysis, deafness, loss of speech, epilepsy, and insanity. The argument for the reality of possession by demons must rest entirely upon the fact that this term is applied in the Gospels to these maladies, and not at all upon the nature or peculiarities of the symptoms which are described. We note, moreover, that the casting out of demons is commonly associated in our sources with the healing of the sick (Mt. x. 8; Mk. i. 34; iii. 15; Lk. xiii. 20), although it is distinguished from such healing.

(2) We find that others besides Jesus "cast out demons." Whatever these maladies were, it is certain that both Jesus and his disciples recognized the ability of exorcists to cure them in some instances. On one occasion the disciples saw one casting out demons in Jesus' name and rebuked him because he did not join their company; but Jesus said: "Forbid him not, for there is no man who can do a mighty work in my name and be able quickly to speak evil of me" (Mk. ix. 38, 39; Lk. ix. 49, 50). Again, when the Pharisees charged him with casting out demons by the aid of their prince, he replied: "If I by Beelzebub cast out demons, by whom do your sons cast them out? therefore shall they be your judges" (Lk. xi. 19; xii. 27). One of the claims which those who call Jesus *Lord* and do not obey his precepts, will make in the judgment is (according to Matthew's version) that they have by his name cast out demons (Mt. vii. 22). It is thus evident that, whatever these maladies were, there were men who, in some cases, succeeded in curing them.

(3) "Possession" is not represented in our sources as a result or an evidence of extraordinary wickedness. Weiss says: "The radical matter of fact (respecting the demoniacs) was simply this, that the sinful condition had reached a height where the man no longer had the mastery of sin, but sin of him; and when sunk in this utter

impotence, and possessing no will of his own, he yielded to the enslaving power of sin, this dominion is referred to a superhuman spiritual power which held sway over him and deprived him of all volition. . . . What was most striking about the appearance of these so-called demoniacs was the conjunction with this yielding to Satan and to the power of sin, of a state of disease, whether of psychical or bodily character, which is regarded as the result of their moral condition."[1] This view, then, is that "possession" was really special wickedness, popularly conceived as the result of the indwelling of demons in men, — wickedness which brought on various bodily and mental diseases in consequence of the "profound internal connection" between body and mind. I do not think that the first proposition of this theory finds any support in the Synoptists. The demoniacs are represented as the victims of misfortune rather than as monsters of wickedness. There is not a single case in which their "possession" is associated with special sinfulness. Frantic ravings, self-injury, irrational exclamations and loss of faculties are ascribed to these demoniacs, but never monstrous wickedness. This theory reduces *ad absurdum* in application to the little Greek girl, the nature of whose malady we can only conjecture from the fact that after her cure she lay peacefully upon the bed. Whatever "demoniacal possession" was, it is described in our sources as belonging to the sphere of natural, rather than to that of moral, evil.

(4) We observe, in one case at least, a quasi-personification of disease. Peter's mother-in-law was "holden" (*συνεχομένη*) with a great fever which Jesus "rebuked" (*ἐπετίμησεν*), and "it left her" (Lk. iv. 38, 39). In one instance the "spirit" which "possessed" the person is described by the characteristic of the malady; it was a "dumb spirit" which had entered into the frantic boy, that is, a spirit causing dumbness (Mk. ix. 17). The woman whom Satan had bound eighteen years "had a spirit of infirmity," that is, a spirit which produced her infirmity (Lk. xiii. 11). These three examples may

[1] *The Life of Christ*, II. 81 (Bk. III. ch. vi.).

be regarded as representing three stages of thought through which the mind might easily pass in an age when all sorts of evils were constantly referred to the agency of invisible powers. First, the disease is personified; then the kind of disease is ascribed to a spirit like itself — the disease and the spirit being half identified and half distinguished; and, finally, the evil spirit simply inflicts at will one or another malady upon the person. I do not mean to intimate that there was any such development of ideas in chronological order, but only that these three examples may be regarded as representing three forms of thought respecting disease which three individuals might illustrate, showing to what extent the mind of each was under the power of the idea of demoniacal possession as the explanation of severe disease. One might conceive the disease as a spirit; another as a "dumb" or "deaf" spirit, according to the nature of the malady; another as simply the malevolent cause of any given physical or mental disorder.

(5) Jesus makes a very remarkable allegorical use of the idea of demon-possession to illustrate the tendency of the Jews to relapse, after any temporary amendment, into increased wickedness (Lk. xi. 24–26; Mt. xii. 43–45). He describes an unclean spirit who has been cast out of the man whom he has inhabited, as wandering about in dry and desert regions; when he finds no habitation there, he decides to return into the man in whom he had formerly dwelt. He finds the man unoccupied by any other "spirit," like an empty house waiting for a tenant. Thereupon he associates with himself seven other spirits more evil than himself, and they all enter this man, and thereafter he is inhabited by eight demons instead of one. We may not be justified in basing any argument on this passage either for or against the reality of possession by demons, but it is difficult to resist the impression that while this apologue is appropriate and impressive if regarded as an illustrative use of current popular ideas, it seems very grotesque if understood as a description of real beings and their behavior. All must, indeed, admit that some use is here

made of popular ideas which it is no part of Jesus' purpose to sanction. Wild, uninhabited regions were commonly regarded as the special abodes of demons. But it would be preposterous to suppose that Jesus means to affirm this to be an actual fact. Does he then mean to say that a man may be tenanted by a large but definite number of evil spirits, say, for example, eight? If not, does he mean to sanction the popular notion of "possession" at all? Where shall the line be drawn between the simply natural and convenient use of popular ideas respecting subjects which he was in no way concerned to discuss, and his didactic attestation of such ideas?

I have pointed out the phenomena of spiritism which our sources describe, not with the view of advocating any theory, but in order to show what are the considerations with which we have to deal. Into the question about the scope of our Lord's knowledge respecting such subjects, I am not required to enter. Our sole inquiry is: what, if anything, did he teach respecting such subjects as good and evil spirits? That he frequently spoke of them after the manner of his time we have already seen. Is his authority as a teacher committed to the correctness of those ideas? I do not believe that it is. That Jesus believed, and in his teaching implied, that there are good beings called angels and evil beings called demons and Satan, I cannot doubt, but his language concerning them is popular and not didactic, and his authority is not committed to the prevailing ideas which obtained in regard to them, although he spoke with respect to this, as with respect to all subjects outside the scope of his special teaching, in the terms current in his age.[1] His language is pictorial, and his purpose in speaking on such topics always terminates on ethical and spiritual instruction, and not on giving information respect-

[1] "If he had denied the current theory (of demoniacal possession), he would have been giving evidence of scientific knowledge or of scientific intuition beyond the culture of his time, and this, as in countless other cases, was not in accordance with his method, which, whether we suppose it divine or human, has nowhere proved his divine mission by foreknowledge of natural science." George J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion* (1895), p. 193.

ing the acts of superhuman spirits. We have seen how Satan is portrayed in language almost wholly figurative. He appears in the pictorial narrative of the temptation, he snatches away the good seed and sows tares, sifts Peter as wheat, and bows down a woman with infirmity. Moreover, Peter is called "Satan" when he opposes divine truth. Much the same holds true of the demons. Collectively considered, they are almost synonyms with "Satan" where Jesus says that if he should cast out demons by the prince of the demons, Satan would be divided against himself (Mk. ii. 26; Mt. xii. 26; Lk. xi. 18). The dethroning of demons in men is the same as Satan falling like lightning from heaven (Lk. xiii. 32). Clear cases of maladies such as speechlessness and mania are attributed to their power.

In discussions of this subject some such dilemma as this is commonly presented: Jesus spoke of the casting out of demons by himself and by others; now he either spoke and acted according to fact, or he knowingly lent the weight of his authority to a superstition which he knew had no foundation in fact. I do not think we are shut up to any such dilemma. Whether demon-possession be in reality a fact or a superstition, the authority of Jesus cannot be fairly cited for either the one or the other view of it. The case is the same as with regard to the 110th Psalm. Jesus cites it as containing what "David said" (Mk. xii. 35–37). Many would here involve us in the dilemma: Either David must have written the 110th Psalm, or Jesus' authority is undermined. No dilemma of this sort is to be admitted. Jesus simply spoke as other people did about Psalms and all other books. He taught nothing concerning their authorship. Nor did he concerning the nature, functions, or actions of angels or demons.

CHAPTER VIII

HUMAN NATURE AND SINFULNESS

THE references which Jesus made to the true nature of man, and to the estimate which God puts upon his well-being, are so numerous and explicit that they furnish sufficient materials for the construction of a doctrine. He did not, indeed, directly discuss man's origin, nor did he speak abstractly about human nature or man's relation to God. Nevertheless, in apothegm and in parable, and, still more, in action, he showed what man in his true divine destination is, and indicated the ways in which he falls short of its realization. His teaching includes such points as the following:

(1) The life of every man, *as such*, is of priceless value. If Jesus was speaking to his disciples when he pictured God's care for each separate life by saying: "The very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows" (Mt. x. 30, 31; Lk. vi. 7), it is still certain that he did not conceive of this estimate of the value of man as applicable only to his followers. Matthew has given in epigrammatic form the substance of Jesus' reason for doing good to men on the sabbath day: "How much, then, is a man of more value than a sheep! Wherefore it is lawful to do good on the sabbath day" (Mt. xii. 12). The beneficence of Jesus presupposes the value of man, *as man*, and the divine care for his good. Regard to special institutions like the sabbath must give way when it conflicts with human interests. Man is the end to which all such institutions are means. "On man's account (*διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον*) was the sabbath made, and not man on the sabbath's account" (Mk. ii. 27).

(2) It follows that the forfeiture by any man of his true life is regarded as an unspeakable calamity. "What doth it profit a man to gain the whole world, and forfeit his life?" (Mk. viii. 37; Mt. xvi. 26; Lk. ix. 25). The life of one man in its true meaning and destination outweighs the value of the world. To lose it is to forfeit that which lends meaning and worth to human existence — knowledge, holiness, love, and truth; it is to lose one's self (Luke has: ἑαυτὸν δὲ ἀπολέσας ἢ ζημιωθείς). He who thus loses himself loses what no price is adequate to buy back (Mk. viii. 37); the loss is irreparable. But the loss of anything can be irreparable only when its value is beyond estimate. Hence Jesus taught that one might better undergo the severest self-denial and suffering than to forfeit his true spiritual life. Such is the import of the sayings: If thy hand or foot cause thee to stumble, cut them off; it is better to enter into life maimed than retaining both hands and both feet, to go into Gehenna (Mk. ix. 43 *sq.*; Mt. xviii. 8 *sq.*). The life is more important than comfort or any temporal good; it is worth more than the food which sustains it and which is but a means to its ends (Mt. vi. 25); it is more valuable than all earthly things in God's sight, since it does not consist in outward possessions (Lk. xii. 15), but in inward peace and well-being (Lk. xii. 16–21; Mt. v. 3–12).

In harmony with this view of the worth of life, Jesus taught that the humblest or most insignificant person, on whom men set no value, is precious before God. "These little ones" — be they children or humble believers; *cf.* page 81 — are not to be despised (Mt. xviii. 10). The least important person who goes astray from goodness excites the pity and solicitude of God, and he seeks him and brings him back as the shepherd, leaving his ninety-nine sheep, goes into the mountains in eager search after the one that has wandered away. "Even so," said Jesus, "it is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish" (Mt. xviii. 12–14; Lk. xv. 4–7). In the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus he pictured the diseased and neglected beggar and the

unmerciful or indifferent rich man in order to show that God does not judge men by their outward conditions in this world. Not what one *has* but what one *is* gives the true measure of a man. A beggar may stand far above a prince in his favor. The beggar whom the rich man would not notice was not beneath the notice of the All-merciful.

(3) Even the worst sinners still have worth in God's sight. Over and over again Jesus was charged with being a "friend of publicans and sinners" (Mt. xi. 19). The charge was true. He even sought out the despised and degraded in order that he might bless and save them (Mk. ii. 15; Lk. v. 30). This action was certainly not due to the pleasure which he found in their society, nor to any sudden accession of special compassion. He deliberately planned to seek after those who were farthest from the common standards of virtue, and believed that he would find among them a more ready acceptance of his truth than among the self-righteous religionists who thought that they needed no repentance or amendment of life (Mt. xxi. 31). Our sources give us no reason to ascribe any class-feeling or class-prejudice to Jesus. The publican as such was not worth more in his sight than the Pharisee. But he was more accessible; and Jesus sought, not the *publican*, but the *man*, and all the more because he was sinful and needy. The pious Jew of the period was commonly completely encased in a covering of tradition and formalism which was utterly impervious to spiritual truth. Those, however, whom he called "sinners," the social outcasts and even the positively immoral, were, in the view of Jesus, more likely to have a sense of their unworthiness and spiritual need than were those who "trusted in themselves that they were righteous and despised others" (Lk. xviii. 9). Jesus did not avoid the rich because they were rich; on the contrary, he numbered many of the prosperous among his friends. He did not pass by the Pharisees because their formal and ostentatious piety was repugnant to his own feeling; on the contrary, he was glad to draw them to himself whenever he found

in them the least susceptibility to spiritual truth. But, for the most part, he found among these classes but little response to his appeal. In general, it was only "the common people" who "heard him gladly" (Mk. xii. 37). He found none so hopeless as those who were perfectly satisfied with themselves and perfectly content to remain as they were.

Jesus openly professed it to be his special concern to care for those for whom no one else cared; to seek to save those who seemed indifferent to their own salvation. He taught that God did not estimate them as their more favored neighbors did; that although "lost" they were not irrecoverable. Hence he pictured a Pharisee and a publican praying side by side in the temple (Lk. xviii. 9 *sq.*). The former professed his own goodness; the latter confessed his sin. Jesus plainly hinted that there was more hope of the latter than of the former, because there was in him more self-knowledge and more sense of what God requires. Again, in the parables of Luke xv. he has defended his policy of seeking the outcast and lost. The Pharisees and scribes sneered at him for keeping evil company and hinted that he was like the "publicans and sinners" with whom he associated. Jesus replied in the parables of the Lost Sheep and the Lost Piece of Money (Lk. xv. 3–10). I must concern myself, he says, for that which is lost, just because it *is* lost. The shepherd may safely disregard for the time the ninety-nine sheep which are safe in the fold, in his eager search for the one which has strayed away. The prudent housewife who has lost one piece of money may safely give no concern to the pieces which are in safe keeping, while she searches the house for the missing coin. So if you Pharisees are (as you assume) safe in the fold of the divine favor, I may justly disregard you and make those the special object of my solicitude who are clearly outside that fold. "They that are whole have no need of a physician; but they that are sick. I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance" (Lk. v. 31, 32). The parables present an *argumentum ad hominem:* assuming that you are what you

think you are, and that publicans and sinners are also what you think them to be, my procedure stands justified.

The parable of the Lost Son (Lk. xv. 11–32) elaborates the same thought still more impressively. The elder son is the conscientious, scrupulous Jew who fulfils punctually his round of religious duty, taking great satisfaction in its completeness and feeling a self-complaisant disdain for those who neglect or despise their religious obligations. The younger son is the typical "sinner" who has thrown off all restraint and gives himself over to a life of sensuous indulgence. The father's solicitude for this lost son which leads him to hail with joy the first sign of his return is the divine love which does not despair of the heedless, reckless wanderer, who has not ceased to be the object of the divine compassion and yearning. The justification of Jesus' method is found alike in what God is and in what man is. The very fact that the man is *lost* — lost to his true life and destiny, yet not irrecoverably so — moves the very heart of God to its deepest depths of pity and calls into action the most powerful energies of divine love. Such is the estimate — so contrary to the common judgment of men in his time — which Jesus teaches that God puts upon even a moral outcast; such the exultant joy with which his return to his father's bounty and love is celebrated; such "joy is there in heaven over one sinner that repenteth" (Lk. xv. 7, 10).[1]

[1] "When Jesus made His own *Apologia* in the 15th chapter of St. Luke's Gospel, He also offered their apology for the people. They were not callous and hopeless sinners, only sheep that have wandered from the fold, and know not the way back; not useless and worthless human stuff, but souls that carried beneath the rust and grime the stamp of their birth, and might be put out at usury; not outcasts whose death would be a good riddance, but children loved and missed in their Father's House. This wreck, Jesus perpetually insisted, is not the man — only his lower self, ignorant, perverted, corrupt; the other self lies hidden and must be released. This is the real self, and when it is realised you come to the man. 'When he came to himself,' said Jesus of the prodigal. This was Jesus' reading of publicans and sinners, — the pariahs of that civilisation. He moved among the people with a sanguine expectation; ever demanding achievements of the most unlikely, never knowing when he might not be gladdened by a response. An unwavering and unbounded faith in humanity sustained His heart and transformed its subjects. Zacchæus,

(4) Jesus implied in his teaching that despite their sinfulness, there are good impulses and tendencies in men. He regarded the great majority of the men of his time as still susceptible to the appeal of his truth and Kingdom. As he moved about among the plain people of Galilee, he saw in them the prospect of a rich spiritual harvest if only laborers could be had to reap it (Mt. ix. 37, 38). He intimated very clearly that those who were popularly regarded as most depraved were not, in all cases, worse than others, and that there were noble spirits among the despised classes. In the striking parable in which he teaches the nature and scope of neighbor-love (Lk. x. 30–37) he, no doubt, purposely selects as his example of the absence of that love a priest, and as his illustration of its exemplification a Samaritan. All would assume that a priest would do justice and love mercy, and all would agree that nothing good need be sought in a despised Samaritan. Jesus shows how contrary to fact this judgment may be. Goodness may be found in the most unexpected quarter; a Samaritan may excel a priest in Godlike love. This is not an allegorical reading of the parable, but only a recognition of the naturalness and appropriateness of the materials out of which it is constructed.

The way in which Jesus spoke of children is not without a bearing upon his doctrine of human nature. When he wished to illustrate the qualities which should characterize the members of his Kingdom, he took a little child and set him in the midst of his hearers and said: "Except ye turn, and become as little children, ye shall in no wise enter into the Kingdom of heaven" (Mt. xviii. 3). To what but the unassuming sense of dependence and the

the hated tax-gatherer, makes a vast surrender, and shows also that he is a son of Abraham. St. Mary Magdelene, the by-word of society, has in her the passion of a saint. St. Matthew abandons a custom-house to write a Gospel. St. John leaves his nets to become the mystic of the ages. St. Peter flings off his weakness, and changes into the rock of the Church. With everything against Him, Jesus treated men as sons of God, and His optimism has had its vindication." *The Mind of the Master*, by Rev. John Watson, D.D. (1896), pp. 238, 239.

relative innocence of childhood could he have referred in so speaking? Had Jesus regarded human beings as totally depraved from the very beginning of life, had he believed that in consequence of the corrupt nature which all men inherit at birth they were "made opposite unto all that is spiritually good, and wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually,"[1] as theology has so often taught, it is difficult to see how he could have made the child-spirit the test of fitness for his Kingdom. Of such persons as little children are, that is, of those who have a childlike disposition and character, his Kingdom is said to consist (Mt. xix. 14; Mk. x. 14; Lk. xviii. 16). How could Jesus say this if he did not see natural goodness in children; if human nature as such were that utterly corrupt and odious thing in the sight of God which it has so often been described as being? Our sources warrant no such view as finding any support in the language of Jesus. This theory of human nature is the result of certain speculative considerations supported by isolated texts of Scripture which describe the dark depths of sin to which men may and often do descend. Jesus took no rose-colored view of man in his sinfulness, but he did not represent all men as being as bad as they can be and that from the very moment of birth.

Jesus saw in men a mixture of good and evil. At his side as he hung upon the cross was a robber. Yet even he was capable of a vague yearning to share in the Kingdom of truth and holiness and was promised the fellowship of Christ in paradise (Lk. xxiii. 42, 43). Zacchæus was no doubt what people called him, a "sinner," yet he evinced an eager interest in Jesus, and under the inspiration of his presence and teaching quickly responded to the requirements of the life of love and truth (Lk. xix. 1–10). There is no reason for supposing that the Roman centurion was a specially religious person. Yet he was generous; he had built a synagogue for the Jews of the town where he was stationed. He loved his servant and believed that Jesus had power to heal him. He was a

[1] *The Larger Westminster Catechism*, Q. 25.

noble Roman, modest, kind, and generous, but — so far as our source informs us — no more. Yet Jesus saw in these qualities the elements of a greater faith than he had elsewhere found in all Israel; among all the scribes, Pharisees, and priests that he had ever met he had not found a disposition so pleasing to God as that of this heathen soldier (Lk. vii. 9).

Jesus' view of mankind was not one-sided or extreme. He saw men as they were — neither wholly bad nor wholly good; ignorant, perverted, and even wilfully wicked, yet not without good desires and aspirations; lost, but not hopeless. In all their unfilial indifference and disobedience they were still, in his view, sons of God, susceptible to the appeal of a Father's love, and capable both of coming to themselves — their true, normal selves — and of returning to their Father.

(5) The hope of a future life Jesus grounds upon man's essential kinship to God. He seems not to have spoken frequently of the resurrection life. Belief in it was general in his time, and it was not necessary to insist upon it. The Sadducees, however, rejected it, and presented to Jesus a supposed case to which they thought it could not be made to apply (Mk. xii. 18 *sq.*). They said: If a woman becomes the wife of seven brothers successively, whose wife shall she be in the resurrection? The supposition was intended to exhibit the absurdity of maintaining the doctrine. Jesus' reply turns on two points. In the first place, the objection rests upon the wholly unwarranted assumption that the future life must be like this — a sensuous life subject to the same conditions and relations which obtain here. In making this assumption the objectors have utterly failed to estimate justly the resources of God. The God whom the Scriptures reveal is able to provide for mankind a mode of life to which no such conditions or limitations apply: "Ye know not the Scriptures, nor the power of God" (*v.* 24). The objection involves no proof of the absurdity of a blessed resurrection life, but is only an evidence of the limitations of the Sadducean idea of it. In the second place, Jesus turns to the "Book

of Moses," which they estimated so highly and from whose provisions they had drawn their example (*v.* 19), and points out that Jehovah is there called the God of the patriarchs, long since dead (Ex. iii. 6). The expression assumes, not merely that Jehovah *was* their God when living on earth, but that he *is* their God still: "He is not the God of the dead, but of the living" (*v.* 27). The passage, therefore, presupposes a continuing relation, a living communion between these persons and Jehovah. The argument of Jesus meets the specific difficulty by placing the whole subject upon the deepest and broadest basis — by appealing to what God is and to what man is. The hope of future blessedness is grounded on the boundless resources of the divine love, and on the kinship of man to God which fits him for communion with God.

We next observe the language of Jesus respecting human sinfulness. Our sources do not represent him as speaking of the origin of sin or as discussing its specific nature. On the contrary, he speaks of sin as a fact of common observation and experience, and discloses its nature by noting its manifestations.

His teaching assumes that sin is universal among men. All men are called upon to repent. He indeed speaks of "righteous persons who need no repentance" (Lk. xv. 7) in contrast to "sinners," but it is evident from the context that he is speaking ironically, and that the Pharisees whom he is answering are "righteous" only in their own estimation or according to the traditional but inadequate standards of righteousness which obtained at the time. He gives his disciples a universal form of prayer, containing the petition: "Forgive us our sins" (Lk. xi. 4). Even the most loving of parents, who delight to give good gifts to their children, are themselves "evil" (*πονηροί*, Mt. vii. 11), morally imperfect, sinful. Men are assailed on every side by temptation, blinded in their spiritual perceptions, perverted by worldliness. The lower life could not thus assert its power over them if it did not find a ready point of contact with their inner life; if the wills of men were not weakened and biassed towards false objects of desire

and striving. Their constant prayer needs to be: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." All men are sinful; but all men are not equally so. Jesus speaks of good men, who bring forth out of the good treasure of their hearts good things, as well as of evil men who do the opposite (Mt. xii. 35). "Good" and "evil," as applied to men, are relative terms. He assumes that the eye of the heart may be healthy and steadfastly directed to the true good, so that the whole moral being shall be filled with heavenly light and blessedness (Mt. vi. 22). Jesus' estimate of men was generous. He measured them more by what they desired and sought than by their present attainments. He laid more stress upon the direction in which men were going than upon the point of progress which they had reached.

Jesus pictured sin as having its seat in the heart, the inner life, the sphere of motive and desire. Hate is the source of murder (Mt. v. 22). Lust is the essence of adultery (Mt. v. 28). The inner life rules the outer life; the thought is father to the deed. "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" (Mt. xii. 34). The character determines the acts and words of men as a tree the quality of its fruit (Mt. vii. 17–20; xii. 33). It was because Jesus took this view of speech and action that he attached such significance to the words of men: "By thy words shalt thou be justified, and by thy words shalt thou be condemned" (Mt. xii. 37). Hence Jesus set aside the whole Levitical idea of defilement by external acts and contact as superficial. A man is defiled, he said, not by what he eats or touches, but by what he does with evil motive and intent: "That which proceedeth out of the man, that defileth the man. For from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, covetings, wickednesses, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, railing, pride, foolishness: all these proceed from within, and defile the man" (Mk. vii. 20–23). But even where the inner life is sincere and pure in purpose, men are liable to be led astray by their creaturely weakness. Hence in the trying scenes of his last days,

when he was walking in the shadow of the cross, Jesus warned his disciples to seek divine strength that their fidelity to him might not be overcome by doubt and fear, and added: "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak" (Mk. xiv. 38; Mt. xxvi. 41); in their hearts they were devoted to him, eager to encourage and support him, but the lower nature, the dread of danger, the fear of death — that was a weakness which still exposed them to the temptation to abandon him, and to desert his cause.

Sin is subject to a development, ranging all the way from ignorance and weakness to the most positive and malignant opposition to God and goodness. To such an utter moral perversion Jesus seems to have referred in what he said of the sin against the Holy Spirit: "Verily, I say unto you, All their sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and their blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme: but whosoever shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit hath never forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin: because they said, He hath an unclean spirit" (Mk. iii. 28, 29; Mt. xii. 31, 32). The occasion of this saying was the calumny of the scribes and Pharisees that Jesus cast out demons by the power of Beelzebub, the prince of the demons; that is, they attributed his benevolent works to an evil source. In reply, Jesus said that slanders against himself and contempt of his mission as the founder of the Kingdom of God, might be condoned, but that to deliberately ascribe deeds of pure and manifest benevolence to a diabolical source was to fall under the woe of those who call evil good and good evil (Is. v. 20); it indicated a radical perversion of the moral nature, or a powerful tendency towards it, in which the soul makes evil its good, and conversely. The words of Jesus evidently describe not merely a specific *act* of sin in itself considered, but an act as illustrating a *state* of complete moral obduracy, — a sin, therefore, which is "eternal" in its consequences because it springs from fixed, persistent hatred of goodness. Such a fearful goal of sinful development would involve the identification of the will with evil — supreme wickedness, culminating in hatred of the most manifest

divine goodness, and excluding the possibility of recovery by its own nature. Jesus is not represented in our sources as saying explicitly that his accusers had fully realized this extreme moral depravation, but the fact that they called his gracious alleviations of human suffering bad instead of good — thus defaming and despising the Spirit of all goodness and pity which wrought in his merciful ministry — led him to hold up before them this fearful warning, and must be regarded as showing that he considered it possible for human sinfulness to culminate in that utter moral obliquity which he describes — in a depravity so radical and complete as to preclude the possibility of recovery to holiness.

CHAPTER IX

THE TRUE RIGHTEOUSNESS

THE fundamental idea which lies at the heart of all Jesus' teaching concerning righteousness is the idea of love. Love to God and love to man — that is the basis of every obligation, the essence of the whole law (Mk. xii. 28–31; Mt. xxii. 34–40). Hence when he sets before his disciples the lofty ideal of perfection (Mt. v. 48), we easily discover that it is perfection in love of which he speaks. Love is Godlikeness, and therefore includes every specific form of goodness. It is not a particular virtue, but the inner principle of all virtues. It is just at this point that Jesus' view of goodness differed so widely from that which was current in his time. The Pharisaic righteousness was piecemeal; it was made up of a round of ceremonies and duties, which were valued for their own sake, and which possessed no inner unity. Jesus showed that all forms of real goodness may be reduced to a common principle; that all virtues are essentially one. Hence he taught that isolated acts of religion are valueless if the basal principle of all true religion is wanting. The worshipper who is coming to the altar while a wrong done his brother is still unrighted, would better leave his gift unoffered until the requirements of holy love are satisfied by requital (Mt. v. 23, 24).

A very slight attention to the words of Christ serves to show that love and righteousness are for him practically synonymous, or, at any rate, that righteousness is included in love. When he warns his hearers that, if they are to enter his Kingdom, their righteousness must exceed that of the scribes and Pharisees (Mt. v. 20), he at once proceeds to illustrate the difference by showing how the popular

theory permits anger and contempt for one's fellows, while he demands brotherly love; how the legalists condone impurity, untruthfulness, revenge, and hatred, while he demands self-control, truthfulness, generosity, and benevolence towards all (Mt. v. 21–48). When he turns to the more positive illustration of his doctrine of righteousness, he shows that almsgiving, prayer, and fasting have no value if done for their own sake, and in order to make a favorable impression upon observers, but that they are acceptable to God only when done from sincere interest in men, and in filial reverence for God (Mt. vi. 1–18). The "righteousness of God" (Mt. vi. 33) which men are to seek, means the righteousness which is pleasing to God, and the context leaves no room for doubt that it is acceptable, because it springs from love to God and man. Other passages confirm this conclusion. When "a certain lawyer" sought to put Jesus to a test by asking from him a rule for attaining eternal life, Jesus drew from him, by a counter-question, this answer to his own inquiry: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbor as thyself," and added: "Thou hast answered right: this do and thou shalt live" (Lk. x. 25–28). To the same question, when put to him on another occasion, he answered by citing the commandments (Mk. x. 17–19), whose essential substance he elsewhere defined to be love to God and man (Mt. xxii. 40).

From these considerations it is evident that Jesus placed the true righteousness not in outward actions, however excellent or useful, but in the state of the heart. He demands right conduct, but he first demands right character as its presupposition and guaranty. Righteousness is primarily right disposition. This view completely undermined the current legalism. The scribe who asked him which was the chief commandment, and to whom he replied by citing the requirement of love, discerned the radical difference between Jesus' idea and the popular idea of righteousness, as is shown by his reply: Love to God and man is, as you say, more than all our offerings and sacrifices. "And

when Jesus saw that he answered discreetly, he said unto him, Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God" (Mk. xii. 32–34). It was a long step towards the Kingdom to see the difference between a spiritual and a ritualistic conception of righteousness and to appreciate the superiority of the former. The parabolic sayings about the "new cloth" and the "new wine" (Mk. ii. 21, 22) indicate that Jesus intended his disciples to be free from the prevalent rules of a formal and legal piety. He speaks neither for nor against fasting, but gives his disciples a principle which will make them independent in their judgment and action upon all such subjects. His teaching is new cloth, and must not be stitched onto the old garment of Judaism; it is new wine, and must not be confined in the old wine-skins of ceremonialism. This is but a figurative way of saying that his religion has its own genius and must create its own externals. It is not a system of outward forms and observances, but a law of spirit and of life. A similar thought may have been veiled in the saying which his enemies made a ground of accusation against him: "I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands" (Mk. xiv. 58). This new temple is probably the spiritual sanctuary in which those offerings shall be presented which are most acceptable to him who "desires mercy and not sacrifice" (Mt. ix. 13; xii. 7). The lesson of the parable of the Royal Wedding (Mt. xxii. 1 *sq.*) points in the same direction. The wedding garment in which the guests are required to present themselves is that true righteousness which corresponds to the nature of Christ's Kingdom. Participation in the Kingdom is conditioned upon a sincere disposition to do the will of God — and this will is constantly represented as a will of holy love and as requiring in men conformity to itself in disposition and action.

The principles which emerge from the teaching thus far considered throw light upon Jesus' doctrine of fulfilment. This doctrine, in its general features, we have already considered. It remains to inquire into its application to the

observance of the ritual law which constituted the substance of righteousness for the Jewish mind. So far as we know, Jesus did not dwell directly upon the subject. He did, however, recognize a difference in the importance of various commandments (Mt. xxii. 38; *cf.* v. 19), and strongly condemned those who scrupulously observed the most trifling traditional enactments, and who "passed over judgment and the love of God" (Lk. xi. 42). Such expressions, taken in connection with those already noticed about sacrifices and ceremonial defilement, leave no doubt that Jesus set an entirely secondary value upon the ceremonial law. But this estimate of the cultus did not involve him in a hostile or destructive attitude towards it. Here as always his principle was that of fulfilment, not that of destruction.

How did he carry this out with reference to the ritual law? We are left to infer his attitude on this subject from the way in which he refers to certain acts of Old Testament piety and from his general principle of fulfilment. We find him observing the ancient customs and usages of Judaism without protest. He counsels the leper whom he cured to go to the priest and perform the rites which were prescribed by the law in such cases (Mk. i. 44; *cf.* Lk. xvii. 14). He observed the sabbath and kept the passover (Mk. xiv. 12). So far from making any protest against fasting, — the practice of which rested mainly upon tradition, rather than upon legal enactment, — he says that his disciples will fast (Mk. ii. 20), and, in contrast to the mock humility of the Pharisees, he directs his disciples to put on an aspect of cheerful sincerity when they fast (Mt. vi. 16–18). But, as we have seen, Jesus speaks of fasting as voluntary, and not as imposed, and, by parity of reasoning, the same would hold good of similar acts of devotion, while the sabbath (and, presumably, other similar institutions) took its place in subordination to the welfare of man.

The attitude of Jesus towards the various forms and institutions of his ancestral religion thus appears to have been that of respect and conformity combined with freedom.

Formally considered, these two standpoints may seem inconsistent, but they really are not. They are adjusted and harmonized by the principle of fulfilment.[1] Jesus was not bound by the letter of the law, but penetrated to its spirit. He always observed the law in its deepest meaning, its true divine idea. For his mind there was some religious idea embodied in every part of the Old Testament system. That idea he conserved and perpetuated. Hence he said that no smallest part of the law should escape the process of fulfilment (Mt. v. 18), and that his disciples must appreciate and apply this same constructive principle, and must in their teaching and work maintain the continuity of revelation — the link of connection between his gospel and the Old Testament religion (v. 19). Thus he fulfilled the ritual law by preserving and embodying in his teaching and person the essential moral and religious truths which found provisional expression in it. The sacrificial system he fulfilled by his own teaching and life of sacrificial love. The laws against ceremonial defilement he fulfilled by his law and his life of purity in heart. The practice of fasting he fulfilled by his principles of humility and penitence before God. How far men should continue to observe the outer forms which, under the Old Testament, had been the vesture of these truths, he did not say. He did not speak against such observance except where it became an obstacle to man's true good. He did not commend it except where it was adapted to promote man's well-being. On this subject he gave no formal rule, preferring to leave the application of his principles to the freedom and conscience of his disciples. And it is easy to see that this wisdom stands justified of all her children, since it is only by the exercise of such liberty that the real problems of the Christian life could be wrought out. Formal distinctions and rules, mechanically followed, would have kept the Church essentially Jewish in spirit, and would only have produced another type of scribal righteousness.

[1] A clear discussion of this adjustment will be found in Bovon's *Théol. du N. Test.* I. 390 *sq.*

Had Jesus taken this method, apostolic Christianity would, indeed, have escaped the friction and conflict which it experienced in striving to free itself from Jewish limitations and to attain to a clear consciousness of its true nature, but it could not have been the living and growing affair that it was, and, so far as we can judge, would never have called out the epistles of that apostle who was the chief exponent and defender of the freedom of the Christian from the law, and of the essential spirituality, completeness, and sufficiency of the gospel of Christ.

Recurring now to "the first and great commandment," the question arises: What did Jesus mean by supreme love to God? His meaning must be inferred from the way in which he spoke of the right attitude and action of men towards God. Perfect truthfulness and sincerity in worshipping God are certainly elements of love to him. An ostentatious piety practised, not in true reverence and gratitude to God, but to attract the notice of men, is inconsistent with love to God. In contrast to this Jesus shows that unselfish benevolence and sincere, simple devotion express the disposition which God requires. He who should possess the spirit of the prayer which Jesus gave his disciples would be fulfilling the command to love God. Love to God is the filial spirit on man's part which corresponds to God's fatherly love to man (Mt. vi. 1–18).

An essential element in love to God is humility before him — a sense of his greatness and goodness, and a corresponding sense of our weakness and sin. To this love belongs a reverent fear of him in whose hands is human destiny, and whose holy displeasure must be kindled against sin (Mt. x. 28). Hence Jesus pictured the acceptable worshipper as humbly confessing his sins before God (Lk. xviii. 13), and described God's true servants as disclaiming any special merit for doing their obvious duty (Lk. xvii. 10). He who has the true disposition towards God will thankfully and humbly recognize the divine grace, and not his own meritorious claims, as the ground of his confidence and hope.

The positive side of this reverential fear and humility is

trust in God, πίστις θεοῦ (Mk. xi. 22), an unshaken confidence in God, which is never dismayed at the changes or surprises of life. He who has this faith will not be distracted by anxious care concerning the things of this life. He will have the single eye — a clear discernment of life's true good, which will hold all his purposes in unity and concentration. He will not attempt the impossible task of serving two masters. He will make God the supreme object of his choice and service, will seek first his Kingdom and righteousness, confident that the Father, who knows all his needs, will confer the minor benefits (Mt. vi. 22–34). This confidence that God will approve and bless us in all our life if we seek *first* his Kingdom and righteousness, and seek all other things *second*, is the faith which "removes mountains" (Mk. xi. 23); it is adequate to the greatest difficulties and perplexities of life. It steadies, strengthens, and unifies all our efforts, preventing us from wasting our energies by dividing life between two inconsistent objects and from wearing our hearts out by corroding cares, needless anxieties, and unbelieving fears. There can be no doubt that Jesus would include this concentration of life upon spiritual good and the trustful spirit which it inspires, in that love to God which comprises all forms of service which we can render to him.

This aspect of love will express itself in prayer. He who seeks first God's Kingdom will desire that his Kingdom may come among men; he who makes God's holy requirements his primary interest will desire that his will be done on earth universally (Mt. vi. 10). From such considerations the meaning of supreme love to God clearly emerges. It is the choice of God as the ground and source of all true good. Such love implies a knowledge of God's perfections. These our Saviour adequately disclosed in his teaching and life. He then called upon men to seek and find their true good in God; to recognize him in their lives, to live as his true sons, to grow in moral likeness to him. To choose, reverence, and obey God as revealed by Christ — that is, to love him. To interpret human life as a reflex of the divine life and to live it in

reverent recognition of God and in conscious dependence upon him — to love that which he loves, to desire for ourselves that which he desires for us — that means to love God with all the heart, mind, soul, and strength.

Such is the first and great commandment, and the second is like it. In saying "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Mk. xii. 31; Mt. xxii. 39), Jesus assumed that men know well enough what is due to themselves. The import of the commandment is: Be as careful and discerning about your duties to others as you are about theirs to you; be as ready to confer as to receive a benefit. An amplification of the same commandment is found in the "golden rule": "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them: for this is the law and the prophets" (Mt. vii. 12). The maxim rests upon the truth that the rights of others are equal to our own; that is, upon the essential equality of all men before God. How he would apply it in practice we may see from various specific instructions.

To the term "neighbor" Jesus gave the broadest interpretation. One's neighbor is any person with whom he comes into relation. This idea is strikingly presented in the parable of the good Samaritan. It was in answer to the question "Who is my neighbor?" that Jesus told the story of the man who was travelling from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among robbers who stripped him and wounded him and left him half dead. Now it was a despised Samaritan who, by showing kindness to the unfortunate man, proved himself to be his "neighbor" (Lk. x. 29–37). Men are neighbors whenever they can serve and help one another, and they are not less so because of national or social differences or class prejudices which may exist between them. To love one's neighbor is to love all one's fellow-men without exception, and to be willing to do them good as occasion may offer.

The same view of neighbor-love is emphasized from another side in the teaching concerning love to one's enemies. One's neighbors do not consist merely of his friends, but of those who hate and persecute him. To them also men

must be ready to do good and thus prove themselves to be sons of their Father in heaven, for he blesses all, the evil as well as the good (Mt. v. 43–48). In these two sayings Jesus struck down the two great barriers to universal love and mutual helpfulness among men, class prejudice and personal enmity. Both of these passions were common and powerful in his time. For the Jew, "neighbor" was synonymous with his fellow-countryman. He had little sense of humanity. It was also common to give a private interpretation to "neighbor," and then to draw the inference that since men were commanded to love their friends only, they were free to hate their enemies. Both limitations are utterly inconsistent with the very idea of love, which is a universal principle, since it has its source and ground in the absolute goodness. To impose such arbitrary and personal limitations upon love is, indeed, natural and excusable in the heathen who do not know God. But something more than this is expected of those who know God as the All-loving and the All-bountiful. They must not stop short with a partial idea of love, but rise to the idea and realization of its completeness and universality; their ideal must be the perfect love of the God whom they know, not the prejudiced generosity and the narrow beneficence of the deities whom the heathen worship (Mt. v. 47, 48). In this way Jesus shows how the right relations of men to each other are grounded in the nature of God. Man realizes his own nature only in likeness to God. Love to God involves likeness to him, and love to men is the exercise towards them of Godlike love, and thus the second commandment is seen to be like the first, because it has in the first its logical basis and warrant.

Love to others is to be unselfish. Its benefactions are not to be bestowed with a view to receiving as much in return (Mt. v. 42; Lk. xiv. 13, 14), but from sincere goodwill. Worldly possessions are to be so used for the good of others that they shall be the means of establishing eternal friendships (Lk. xvi. 9). The value of all service rendered to God or to men lies in the love out of which it springs, and not in the outward form or measure of the

action. Hence the poor widow's two mites were greater than all the large gifts of the rich to the temple treasury, because they represented more self-sacrificing love (Mk. xii. 41–44).

Love requires an unlimited, though not an unconditional, forgiveness of those who do us injury. The forgiving spirit cannot set for itself any arbitrary limit (Mt. xviii. 21, 22). In the nature of the case, however, forgiveness cannot be effected unless the offending party sincerely repents of having done the injury (Lk. xvii. 4). The principle of Godlikeness does not require men to forgive unconditionally. God himself does not forgive without repentance and confession. Indeed, we may say that he cannot, for forgiveness is a mutual affair, and can be realized only in reconciliation. If the conditions are not fulfilled on one side, there may, indeed, be a perfect readiness to forgive on the other, but there can be no actual bestowment of forgiveness. But we must ever be ready to forgive as soon as the fulfilment of the condition of repentance makes forgiveness morally possible. In this sense it must be true that we have already forgiven (*cf.* Mt. vi. 12: ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν τοῖς ὀφειλέταις ἡμῶν) those who still owe us repentance or requital. Such willingness to forgive others conditions the divine forgiveness of us (Mt. vi. 14, 15), not because the divine forgiveness is grudgingly granted, but because the desire for Godlikeness is the essential condition on which alone men can receive spiritual blessing from God. Forgiveness is an activity of love, and if men repudiate the principle of love by refusing to forgive, they thereby close their lives to that fellowship with God which the divine forgiveness implies. Those who will not love their fellow-men banish themselves from the divine favor and fellowship. These thoughts are presented in the parable of the Unmerciful Servant (Mt. xviii. 23–35).

Another aspect of the same teaching appears in the command against judging. Those who unwarrantably and uncharitably judge their fellows show thereby their want of love, and thus expose themselves to God's unfavorable

judgment (Mt. vii. 1, 2). A censorious spirit towards others springs from a bad heart. Those who have no charity for others' faults commonly show thereby that they have no consciousness of their own. Hence, Jesus calls the man who severely criticises others, and does not correct his own faults, a hypocrite (vii. 3–5). But while love excludes hasty and censorious judging, it does not require an indiscriminating approval of all men, or a mere good-natured indifference to their actions. One who does an injury is to be rebuked as frankly as he is to be freely forgiven, upon repentance (Lk. xvii. 3; Mt. xviii. 15 *sq.*). All men are not to be treated alike. The disciples were counselled not to waste their efforts where they could do no good. Love may expend its labor in vain if it is not discriminating and wise (Mt. vii. 6; x. 16).[1]

It may be asked: Does not love to God and man involve the relinquishment of self-development? On the contrary, Jesus teaches that the opposite is the case. He that gives his life is sacrificial and serving love truly saves it. He that withholds his life in selfish isolation loses it (Mt. x. 39; Mk. viii. 35). Love is the guaranty of self-perfection. In love to God man fulfils his nature, for God is man's eternal prototype. Only through love, therefore, do men become like their Father in heaven; only through love do they realize their own perfection as sons of God. Men can neither truly love themselves nor their fellows unless they love God, because the meaning and destiny of the life of all men are grounded in the nature of God, the perfect pattern of all goodness. He who makes God the object of his supreme choice chooses the "good part" (Lk. x. 42); he finds the true worth of life, not in perishable gains, but in the imperishable treasures of moral and spiritual achievement (Mt. vi. 19, 20). Such a person becomes "rich towards God" (Lk. xii. 20), and so fulfils his destiny.

Jesus pictures the life of love as an eager and strenuous

[1] Μὴ κρίνετε — *Nolite judicare sine scientia, amore, necessitate. Tamen canis pro cane, et porcus pro porco habendus est* (Bengel, *Gnomon N. T.*, *ad loc.*, Mt. vii. 1).

one. It is represented by a narrow gate and a straitened way (Mt. vii. 13, 14). It is strict and exacting, and calls for arduous endeavor. Hence, Jesus often represented this life by parables which teach the necessity of work, watchfulness, and fidelity. "Why stand ye here all the day idle?" is the challenge of the master of the vineyard. Christ's disciples are like laborers (Mt. xx. 1 *sq.*); they are like servants who watch for the return of their lord (Lk. xii. 36 *sq.*), or who are entrusted with the use of their master's wealth (Lk. xix. 11 *sq.*; Mt. xxv. 14 *sq.*). Thus is the requirement of labor, the necessity of fidelity insisted upon. Yet it is not merely the amount of work done by which faithfulness is measured. The faithful use of one talent would be as acceptable as the faithful use of ten (Mt. xxv. 27). Those who enter the vineyard at the eleventh hour are graciously rewarded with the same wages as those who worked from the early morning (Mt. xx. 9, 15). The services which love renders cannot be quantitatively measured. They take their value from the disposition out of which they spring. Hence the reward of righteousness is not a mere *quid pro quo* payment. It is a gracious and generous recognition by the divine love of something kindred to itself. Hence a small service, done from love, is more highly estimated than the greatest deeds and achievements in which love is wanting.

Love does not involve an ascetic renunciation of the world. Jesus did not teach contempt for the world or for material possessions. He recognized the perils and temptations of riches, but taught that they might be so used as to make for one eternal friends (Lk. xvi. 9). Earthly goods are of secondary concern, but as such they are necessary, and "shall be added" by the Father to the great primary good which his children are to "seek first" (Mt. vi. 33).

The attitude of Jesus towards the world was natural, healthy, and genial. He interested himself in what we call common things, — the familiar processes of nature, the social life and employments of ordinary people. His parables are mainly constructed of materials which he

found in nature's common moods. This does not mean that Jesus lowered the tone of his mind from the sublime to the common, but that he saw the sublimity in the so-called common; that his mind ennobled nature's ordinary processes by seeing a divine meaning and beauty in them. Nature was to him the living garment in which the Eternal had robed his mysterious loveliness. Hence he saw in the descending rain, the instincts of birds, the beauty of flowers, the radiation of the sun's light and heat, emblems and suggestions of the grace and beauty of the Father. Therefore the world teemed with illustrations of his spiritual truth. The fields, the sky, and the common life of men were full of analogies to the methods of God in providing for the spiritual wants of his children, — replete with parables of the divine Father seeking his lost sons.

Jesus participated in the harmless joys of social life. He was at a feast which Levi made in his honor (Lk. v. 29) and also at the home of Simon (Lk. vii. 37), of Martha and Mary (Lk. x. 40), and of an influential Pharisee (Lk. xi. 37), probably on a sabbath.[1] He sought the company of those whom he hoped to win to the acceptance of his truth (Lk. xix. 5), and did not refuse the hospitality of the despised classes (Mk. ii. 15; Lk. vii. 29). For this his enemies called him "a glutton and a winebibber" (Lk. vii. 34). He was no gloomy ascetic, no austere despiser of life's blameless enjoyments. He favored no morbid and unnatural estimation of self-denial for its own sake.

Jesus strenuously maintained the sacredness of filial duty and of the family relation. Temple offerings might better be withheld, he said, than taken from the support of needy parents (Mk. vii. 10–13). The obligation of conjugal fidelity would exclude even the impure look (Mt. v. 27, 28); Jesus treats the marriage-bond as indissoluble. Against the appeal of the Jews to the permission of the law to give a writing of divorcement or separation (Deut. xxiv. 1) in justification of divorce at will, he declared that this regulation was a concession to a rude state of society,

[1] See Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, II. 205 (Bk. V. ch. xii.).

and he appealed in turn to the primitive divine decree at creation (Gen. i. 27; ii. 24). "From the beginning of the creation, male and female made he them. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and the twain shall become one flesh" (Mk. x. 6–8). He gives no sanction to the dissolution of the marriage-tie, but asserts its perpetual obligation (Mk. x. 9–12; Lk. xvi. 18).[1]

The institution of private property Jesus distinctly recognized. He used the relation of landowners, householders, and stewards to illustrate the truths of his Kingdom. He warned against covetousness (Lk. xii. 15) and commanded generosity (Mt. v. 40–42), but recognized the right of possession (Lk. xvi. 9–11). The demand made of the rich young man to sell all that he had and give to the poor (Mk. x. 21, 22) was evidently made in view of his special character and circumstances; no such requirement was ever made of any other person. Zacchæus retained half his property and might have retained it all (Lk. xix. 8). The institution of private property in land and in goods was established and recognized in immemorial usage; Jesus made no objection to it. But he warned men against its dangers and abuses, thereby recognizing all the more clearly its true and proper function in the moral order of society. But all one's possessions and relationships must be held subject to the supreme duties of discipleship (Lk. xiv. 26, 33).

Jesus took no part in political life. But evidence is not wanting that he felt an interest in the civil institutions into which society in his time was organized. He refused to take sides either for or against the Roman domination, but he clearly recognized civil as well as religious duty in the saying: "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Mk. xii. 17). He was a loyal and obedient citizen of the

[1] Matthew's exceptive clauses *παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας, μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ* (v. 32; xix. 9) have no parallel in Mark or Luke. See Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, p. 59; Weiss, *Life of Christ*, II. 150, 294 (Bk. III. ch. x., Bk. IV. ch. viii.).

country in which he lived. He respected its customs and obeyed its laws. When the question of the payment of tribute for the support of the temple-services arose, he recommended conformity to the recognized usage of his people (Mt. xvii. 24–27).

Thus in Jesus' idea of righteousness we observe a perfect combination of lofty ideality with a natural and genuine interest in common life and common things. For his mind there does not appear to have been any inconsistency between these. The ideality of his view did not make common things insignificant or contemptible. The ideal transfigured the common and endowed it with new significance and worth. He has shown how ideals are capable of practical application, and how common life may be lifted to the plane of ideality.

CHAPTER X

THE MESSIANIC SALVATION

THE salvation which Jesus offers to men may be defined as perfect blessedness both here and hereafter. It is a fellowship with God which guarantees security and peace in this world, and in the world to come, eternal life (Mk. x. 30). Its possession enables his disciples to endure persecutions and sufferings with patience and courage (Lk. x. 19; xii. 4). This heavenly good stands in sharp contrast with all mere earthly treasures (Mt. vi. 19), which have but a secondary value (Mk. viii. 36, 37; Lk. xii. 15–21). It consists in being "rich towards God" (*εἰς θεὸν πλουτεῖν*, Lk. xii. 21), in having "treasures in heaven" (Mt. vi. 20). These are but figurative designations for the true, eternal life (Mt. vii. 14; Mk. x. 30), which is the realization of man's proper destiny as a son of God.

The conditions on which this blessedness is obtained are variously stated in the teaching of Jesus. Repentance (*μετάνοια*) is the primary condition (Mk. i. 15; vi. 12; Mt. xi. 21; Lk. xxiv. 47). This is a change of mind or disposition, the renunciation of the sinful life, and implies as its positive aspect a turning to God (*στρέφεσθαι, ἐπιστρέφεσθαι*, Mt. xiii. 15; xviii. 3). Closely related to conversion is faith — the humble and trustful acceptance of the divine mercy. This faith is said to have as its object the gospel-message which assures men of the divine favor (Mk. i. 15), or, even more characteristically, Christ himself (Mk. ix. 42; Mt. xviii. 6). And in several passages where the expression "to believe on Christ" is not used, the idea conveyed by that phrase is clearly involved, as in confessing him before men (Mt. x. 32), or in coming to him, and taking his yoke (Mt. xi. 28–30). The signifi-

cance of faith is strikingly pictured in the scene in Simon's house, where the sinful woman anointed the feet of Jesus. Her penitence and trust secured her full forgiveness, from which flowed deep and grateful love. "Thy faith hath saved thee," said Jesus; "go in peace" (Lk. vii. 50). Here the order of thought is: penitence and faith (which are quite inseparable), the conditions of forgiveness which, in turn, gives rise to love. The forgiveness which follows penitent confession is pictorially described in the parables of the Lost Son (Lk. xv. 11 *sq.*) and of the Pharisee and the Publican (Lk. xviii. 9 *sq.*).

Salvation is also represented as participation in the Kingdom of God. To receive the Kingdom is to enter the life of obedient sonship. This one must do as a little child (Mk. x. 15); that is, in humility and trust in the divine grace. The Kingdom is described as an objective divine benefit which men may receive upon fulfilling the conditions. It is like a treasure (Mt. xiii. 44), like a costly pearl (xiii. 46), like a royal feast (xxii. 2 *sq.*). Again, salvation is realized in becoming like God, in the life of love which is the life of increasing perfection (Mt. v. 45, 48). All these representations are essentially the same in meaning. The ground of salvation is the undeserved favor of the all-loving Father; it is realized in the individual only by a corresponding acceptance of the proffered good.

Jesus also speaks of a divine calling and choice of men to participation in his saving benefits. He came to call sinners to repentance (Mk. ii. 17). He represents the divine offer of grace under the figure of a feast to which men are invited (Lk. xiv. 16–24; Mt. xxii. 1–16). But many of those who are bidden are indifferent to the invitation, or neglectful of the conditions of participating in the heavenly bounty. Hence, Jesus explains that "many are called, but few chosen" (Mt. xxii. 14). Those who were not chosen were those who "made light" of the king's invitation; the chosen were those who thankfully complied with the conditions. The election is not conceived of as arbitrary, but as prescribing the conditions on which

salvation is offered. A similar remark applies to the representation in Mark (iv. 10–12) and Luke (viii. 9, 10; *cf.* Mt. xiii. 10–16) that his instruction to the multitude is given in parables "in order that (*ἵνα*; Mt. *ὅτι*, *because*) seeing they may see and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand; lest haply they should turn again (*ἐπιστρέψωσιν*), and it should be forgiven them" (Mk. iv. 12). The passage is a free rendering of Is. vi. 9, 10, which is a picture of the increased obduracy produced by the presentation of truth to those who have no mind to receive it. It must be understood in the light of the principle: "Whosoever hath" (in the sense of receiving and using), "to him shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but whosoever hath not" (in the sense of neglecting to use), "from him shall be taken away even that which he hath" (Mk. iv. 25; Mt. xiii. 12; Lk. viii. 18). Judicial blindness is the penalty of not following the light which one has. He who, in this sense, "hath not," shall lose what he outwardly possesses. Truth can but blind the mind that refuses and despises it. That Jesus did not mean to say that his parables were directly intended to blind the minds of men to spiritual truth is evident, both from their nature and effect and from the sayings which, for example, follow: "Is the light brought to be put under the bushel, or under the bed, and not to be put on the stand?" (Mk. iv. 21 *sq.*).

The means whereby Jesus accomplishes his salvation for men are also variously expressed. He represented his teaching as possessing a saving value. "Learn of me," he said, "and ye shall find rest unto your souls" (Mt. xi. 29). A part of his Messianic work is to preach good tidings to the poor (Mt. xi. 5) and to expound the "mysteries of the Kingdom of God" to those who were fitted to receive them (Mt. xiii. 11). His preaching excelled that of Jonah, and his wisdom that of Solomon (Mt. xii. 41, 42). The saving significance of his teaching is especially enforced in the parable of the Sower (Mk. iv. 3 *sq.*). His miracles, too, were a part of his benevolent saving activity. He steadfastly refused to perform them for the mere satisfac-

tion of curiosity or to gratify the popular greed for marvels (Mt. iv. 3 *sq.*). Where there was no corresponding receptivity for his spiritual truth he could not, consistently with his divine vocation, do his mighty works (Mk. vi. 5; Mt. xiii. 58). The teaching of his heavenly truth was the one great "sign" — greater than Jonah's preaching — which he would give (Lk. xi. 29, 30). To this all other signs were secondary since they were intended to illustrate and enforce the wisdom and grace of his words (Mt. xi. 20–24).

But the saving power of the words and deeds of Jesus is grounded in what he *is*. Hence we find strong emphasis laid upon the importance of right relations to himself. He is the personal Mediator of salvation. "He that receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me" (Mt. x. 40). The attitude of men towards himself determines their relation to God (Lk. xii. 8). This decisive significance of Messiah's person is brought into clear relief in the much debated passage, Mt. xi. 25–30[1] (*cf.* Lk. x. 21–24), in which it is difficult to deny that we hear a "Johannine tone." Beyschlag, who, in general, considers that the apostolic theology unwarrantably added to Jesus' own teaching in its doctrines of his person and his death, says of this passage: "In these and like words already emerges, as Jesus' own idea, the thought which afterwards ruled the whole apostolic teaching, that the attitude of man to the person of Jesus absolutely decides his relation to God."[2]

But the principal problem which meets us in this part of our subject is, What is the saving significance of the death of the Messiah? The idea that his death was necessary

[1] "At that season Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding, and didst reveal them unto babes: yea, Father, for so it was well-pleasing in thy sight. All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal *him*. Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light."

[2] *N. T. Theol.* I. 150 (Bk. I. ch. vi. § 7).

emerges comparatively late in our sources and becomes explicit only after Peter's confession of his messiahship. In the discourse on fasting he had, indeed, expressed a presentiment of being violently taken away from his disciples: "The days will come, when the bridegroom shall be taken away (ἀπαρθῇ) from them" (Mk. ii. 20; Mt. ix. 15; Lk. v. 35). But this was hardly more than a vague intimation of his approaching fate. It was only after Peter had confessed him as the Messiah at Cæsarea Philippi that he began to teach them that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the elders, and the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again (Mk. viii. 31; Mt. xvi. 21; Lk. ix. 22). He now declared explicitly that this path of suffering was divinely appointed. Peter's protest against the Messiah's suffering and dying showed that he had only the human and not the divine idea of his Master's mission (Mk. viii. 33). Moreover, his disciples must be prepared to take up the cross of self-denying suffering and to subordinate all earthly good to the interests of the life of self-renouncing love (*vv.* 34–38).

Luke has preserved a saying in which, for the first time, Jesus intimated that his approaching death would have a powerful effect in drawing some to him, and in repelling others from him: "I came to cast fire on the earth, and what will I, if it is already kindled? But I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!" (Lk. xii. 49). His baptism of blood will furnish a mighty test of men's devotion to him. His work will prove a firebrand which will kindle both the flame of intense opposition and that of zealous devotion (*vv.* 51–53).

A still more significant saying is that which was occasioned by the ambitious request of James and John that they might sit, one on his right hand, and the other on his left, in his Kingdom (Mk. x. 37). In reply he asked them whether they were able to drink his cup of suffering, and to undergo his baptism of blood (*v.* 39); then to the whole apostolic company he expounded the principles of

his Kingdom, thus: "Ye know that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles lord it over them; and their great ones exercise authority over them. But it is not so among you; but whosoever would become great among you, shall be your minister; and whosoever would be first among you, shall be servant of all. For verily the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Mk. x. 42–45; *cf.* Mt. xx. 25–28). The law of self-denying service finds here its most striking, though not its first expression. The special importance of the passage for our present purpose turns on the phrase: "to give his life a ransom for many."

The next passage of fundamental importance for our study contains the words of Jesus relative to his death, spoken at the institution of the Lord's supper. These words are thus reported by Mark: "This is my body; ... this is my blood of the covenant which is shed for many" (xiv. 22, 24). Paul gives them thus: "This is my body which is [or, is broken[1]] for you; this do in remembrance of me. This cup is the new covenant in my blood; this do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me" (1 Cor. xi. 24, 25). These two earliest forms of the tradition agree perfectly in ascribing a saving significance to Christ's death. They differ only in the unessential point that Paul's version lays emphasis upon the memorial significance of the bread and wine. In this respect, and in general, Luke's version (xxii. 19, 20) closely resembles Paul's; but, according to the more probable text, his narrative is more explicit than Paul's (especially if κλώμενον is a gloss) in representing the death of Christ as designed to secure a benefit to his disciples; the body "is given," and the blood "poured out on your behalf" (ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν).[2] Passing by

[1] Most critics (so Tisch., W. and H., Weiss) omit κλώμενον on the ground of preponderant external evidence. Beyschlag (Bk. I. ch. vi. § 9) believes it to be genuine because otherwise the sentence is unnaturally compressed, and because if it were a gloss it would have been more natural for the copyist to have written διδόμενον from Luke.

[2] It should be pointed out that Westcott and Hort (*per contra*, most editors) bracket Lk. xxii. 19ᵇ, 20 (see their text, and for their reasons,

minor verbal differences, the one marked peculiarity in the account found in the first Gospel is that the blood is said to be "shed for many unto remission of sins" (*περὶ πολλῶν ἐκχυννόμενον εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν*, Mt. xxvi. 28).

For our present purpose it is not necessary to discuss the question to which criticism has recently devoted so much attention, whether the accounts of Paul and Luke, which represent the supper as an institution to be permanently observed in the Church, are more or less original than the narratives of Mark and Matthew, which do not contain this idea. In any case it is quite certain that the view of Paul and Luke is sustained by the earliest Christian usage which is known to us. It has been suggested that in the interviews with his disciples between his death and ascension Jesus may have "commanded the perpetual observance of the holy supper, just as he gave the apostles their commission to preach and baptize, and explained the mystery of life and death (Lk. xxiv. 25–49). Paul and Luke would then combine the words of Jesus on two different occasions, just as Paul did in his discourse in the Book of Acts (xxvi. 15–18)."[1] I will only add that it appears to me that the identification of the Lord's supper with the paschal meal by all the Synoptists makes it extremely probable that for Mark and Matthew, as well as for Paul and Luke, the supper must have had more than an occasional significance. Its association with the annual paschal festival would naturally give it the character of a Christian passover. This association would almost necessarily carry with it the idea of the periodic repetition of the supper. Of course, this consideration does not prove that the Synoptic tradition is correct in placing the supper on the evening following the 14th of Nisan, thus identifying it in time with the passover; but it does render it

Appendix on Select Readings, pp. 63, 64), which they regard as an early interpolated adaptation of Paul's language. Wendt adopts the same view, *Lehre Jesu*, p. 173. The grounds for this omission seem insufficient. The passage is wanting in but one of the more important uncials, D, and either in whole or in part, in two or three ancient versions; on the contrary, it is found in ℵ A B L X Δ 69 Memph. Pesh. Vulg. Arm. *et al.*

[1] Briggs, *The Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 123.

probable that the idea of the memorial significance of the supper was not unknown to this tradition. If, as many hold, the Synoptists are wrong in thus identifying the supper with the passover, and are to be corrected by John, who seems to place it a day earlier, it is possible to maintain with considerable plausibility that the original words of institution and the earliest thoughts of the disciples, contained no idea of its permanent observance. In that case the origin of the testimony of Paul and Luke that Jesus established a perpetual institution would have to be accounted for by some conjectural explanation.

To these words of Jesus must be added, as bearing upon our present subject, the account of his agony in Gethsemane (Mk. xiv. 32–36), and his cry upon the cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Mk. xv. 34).

The question now arises: What is the meaning of these passages? What significance did Jesus attach to his death? Upon certain points there is quite general agreement; for example, that Christ foretold his own death; that he regarded it as a necessary part of his Messianic vocation; that he attributed to it a saving significance. Wendt, for example, says that the language of Jesus ascribes a "saving significance" to his death and that the Church is quite justified in attributing "beneficial effects" to this event in his Messianic work on man's behalf.[1] Beyschlag says: "Towards the end of his life we have declarations about the saving significance of his death."[2] The chief differences among interpreters relate to the sense, or way, in which his death is held to possess saving significance. The question is, how or why is his death a part of his saving work?

The two principal expressions whose meaning is in controversy, are: "to give his life a ransom for many" (λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν), and: "my blood of the covenant which is shed for many" (ὑπὲρ or περὶ πολλῶν). To the passage which speaks of Christ's death as a ransom, Baur assigns

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. p. 235 *sq.* (orig. p. 518 *sq.*).
[2] *N. T. Theol.* I. 151 (Bk. I. ch. vi. § 8).

this meaning: "Jesus gives his life for many, that is, for all who will appropriate this benefit, hence for men in general, as the price on account of which they are redeemed, in order to free them as prisoners from a bondage which can be nothing else than the bondage of sin and death." But he held that this idea finds no confirmation elsewhere in the Synoptics except in Mt. xxvi. 28, and that on account of its singularity we must conclude either that Jesus never used the expression, or that it had, as he used it, quite a different form from that which the passage has assumed in our sources.[1] For this conclusion there are no critical grounds; the passage is found in Mark (x. 45), the earliest of the Synoptics, and its originality is beyond suspicion.

Ritschl has elaborated the view that λύτρον is the equivalent of כֹּפֶר, a protective covering. This view is based upon the use of λύτρον several times found in the Septuagint (Ex. xxi. 30; xxx. 12; Num. xxxv. 31), etc., as a translation for כֹּפֶר. On this view of the word the meaning which he derives from the passage in question is as follows: "I am come to accomplish, instead of those who would strive in vain to furnish it, the presentation, through the giving up of my life to God, of a valuable gift as a protection against death for themselves and for others; but I do it instead of those only who through faith and self-denying imitation of my person, fulfil the condition under which alone my action (in yielding up my life) can afford them the expected protection."[2] The linguistic grounds of this interpretation are acutely criticised by Wendt.[3] Its principal difficulties are: (1) The Seventy use λύτρον to translate several different Hebrew words; the word does not, therefore, consistently represent כֹּפֶר, and no presumption exists that Jesus originally used this, or a kindred, word. (2) The phrase ἀντὶ πολλῶν is capable of a more natural interpretation if λύτρον means "ransom-price" than it is if it means "protective covering"

[1] *Neutest. Theol.* pp. 100, 101.
[2] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, II. 85.
[3] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 228, 229 (orig. pp. 511–513).

(Schutzmittel). In the former case, the idea is: a ransom paid in exchange for those whose freedom is bought; in the latter: a means of protection furnished by Messiah instead of by those who were unable to furnish it for themselves. The former sense is simpler, more natural, and more accordant with the proper meaning of λύτρον.

Wendt holds that λύτρον means a ransom (Lösegeld), and, further, that the phrase contains the notion of Christ's purchasing, by giving his life, the liberation of persons from servitude to suffering and death. He finds its nearest analogy and best explanation in the passage beginning: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest" (Mt. xi. 28). His view of its meaning is thus expressed: "Through the voluntary God-consecrated giving up of his life in sufferings and death he frees many, namely, those who will learn of him, from their bondage to suffering and death; he teaches them by his example to rise inwardly, through pious humility and assurance of salvation, above death, and so to transform death for themselves from a fearful tyrant into a means of salvation."[1] In this view the death of the Messiah is regarded as a means of purchasing men's freedom from suffering and death in the sense that it is an example of supreme devotion to God, from the contemplation of which they may be led to "look upon earthly sufferings and earthly death from the standpoint of God and of the heavenly life." Wendt adds that his view comes practically to the same result as Ritschl's, but by a somewhat different interpretation of the terms.

Beyschlag's opinion is that the servitude from which Christ ransoms men is, primarily, servitude to sin. But how does Christ by his death deliver men from the bondage of sin? This author thinks that in speaking of redeeming men from sin, Christ is directly thinking of the ambitious request of James and John, which showed that his most devoted followers were still worldly and selfish, and that in the phrase under consideration "he may have expressed the hope that these ties (of selfish desire) would

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 231 (orig. p. 515).

at length be broken by his approaching death."[1] I understand this interpretation to mean that his death would put an end to such worldly ambitions as those of James and John, and, in that sense, deliver them from their sinfulness. It would "break the cords which still bound his disciples to the world, so that by means of it," to use Paul's language, "the world would be crucified unto them, and they unto the world."

I will also briefly illustrate the sense in which some recent writers hold that Jesus ascribed a "saving significance" to his death in the utterances at the supper. Wendt thinks that in speaking of the "blood of the covenant" he designated his death (after the analogy of the covenant-sacrifice, Ex. xxiv.) as "a valuable and well-pleasing offering or service to God," an example of obedience exhibiting "the conduct required by God of the members of his Kingdom." His death was thus a pledge of God's promises to the disciples, a guaranty of their salvation. It is thus "for the remission of sins," only in the sense that it is the culminating proof that he will completely establish the Kingdom of God and secure to his own its saving benefits.[2] The apostles "remodelled" this idea, by expanding the meaning of the phrase "for you" (the disciples) into the doctrine that his death had a special significance for the forgiveness of the sins of men in general. Especially did Paul make this idea "the foundation of his whole gospel." This interpretation Wendt holds to be justified in so far as the pledge of salvation given to the disciples in his death is a guaranty of God's forgiving grace which, by inference, may be extended to all men as a ground of hope in his mercy. "But," he adds, "from this application, made by the Christian Church, of the thought of Jesus, we must now, however, in our purely historical treatment of the teaching, strictly distinguish the contents of the thought expressed by Jesus himself. Jesus himself has neither in the words at the last supper nor elsewhere expressed this special relation

[1] *N. T. Theol.* I. 153 (Bk. I. ch. vi. § 8).
[2] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 237–239 (orig. pp. 519, 520).

of the saving significance of his death to the bestowment of the forgiveness of sins."[1]

Beyschlag regards Wendt's denial that the Sinaitic covenant-offering had any relation to the sin of the people as contrary to "the whole Biblical view and to all Biblical theology." Analogy, therefore, does not, in his view, favor the further denial by Wendt that the thought which Jesus expressed respecting his death at the supper had any reference to the removal of sins — a view which stands in sharp contradiction to the explanation which was already given in the apostolic time (Mt. xxvi. 28) and which all Christendom has ever since given to the words "for you." "What better," asks Beyschlag, "has Wendt to put in the place of this interpretation?" He himself finds in the words a twofold allusion, first, to the passover, in the words: "this is my body," and, second, to the covenant at Sinai in the words: "this is my blood of the covenant." Both references suggest the ideas of forgiveness and reconciliation; but how? not by securing or conditioning, but by attesting and ratifying, the divine grace. The "new covenant" was to be (Jer. xxxi. 31–34) not only a covenant of forgiveness but of regeneration. Christ's death assures, primarily, an inward transformation, the production of a new life, and, secondarily, and in connection with this, the forgiveness of sins. His death objectively abolishes, outweighs, and removes sin; it effaces it in the eyes of God, not by penal substitution, but dynamically; it also cancels sin subjectively by perfectly assuring the sinner of forgiveness. When, now, we inquire from Beyschlag how and why the death of Christ abolishes sin, the answer is, in part, the same as that given by Wendt; namely, it serves to burst the bonds of worldliness which still held his own disciples captive, and, further, it avails to assure forgiveness to all who appropriate his life by receiving him into their hearts. His death consummates his obedience to God, and thus completes the guaranty which he gives that the benefits of the Kingdom will be granted to those who desire to live the Christ-like life.[2]

[1] *Op. cit.* II. 241 (orig. p. 522).

[2] *N. T. Theol.* I. 154–159 (Bk. I. ch. vi. §§ 9, 10).

This exposition differs from Wendt's in form rather than in principle. Both make Christ's references to his death primarily a comforting assurance, addressed to the disciples who were present, that their sins were forgiven. Beyschlag thinks that they contain a similar assurance for others who may enter the Christian life; Wendt denies this, but thinks that their meaning was afterwards thus expanded by a justifiable inference. Both deny that the words have any reference to the death of Christ as a ground of forgiveness, or as, in any way, conditioning the method of its bestowment. Both admit that the apostolic Church, as well as ecclesiastical theology since, has maintained a direct relation between Christ's death and the bestowment of forgiveness, but both regard this idea as an afterthought. This position is rendered more plausible by descriptions of ecclesiastical theology which may, indeed, correspond to the most extreme forms which the doctrine of atonement has assumed, but which few orthodox scholars to-day would hold to be either apostolic or true. Wendt, for example, refers to the Church doctrine as teaching that Christ's death was necessary, "in order that God's gracious will might continue in operation" (Bestand bekommen könne),[1] and Beyschlag protests against the traditional view that "heaven was first opened by the abstract fact of Christ's death, and forgiveness rendered possible, and the angry God transformed into a heavenly Father."[2]

Respecting this subject I would make the following suggestions:

(1) It is not strange that the idea of the necessity of Christ's death emerges comparatively late in his ministry. His death was a part of his Messianic vocation. With respect to his messiahship he maintained a cautious reserve. It is natural that he should do so with reference to this most mysterious event of all, the import of which could not be understood beforehand. It may be that Jesus did not at first expect the tragic fate. His conviction of its

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 246 (orig. p. 526).
[2] *N. T. Theol.* I. 159 (Bk. I. ch. vi. § 10).

inevitableness may have grown with the increase of hostility to him. But, in any case, it is not likely that Jesus would speak frequently or explicitly of the subject in advance.

(2) It is evident that from the time of Peter's confession he did not regard the giving of his life as enforced merely, but as voluntary. He is to "give his life." He cannot complete his saving work without dying. What was the nature, what the ground of this necessity?

(3) It must be admitted that our sources give us no direct and explicit answer. Two considerations must guide us in seeking a reply: first, the natural force and suggestions of such sayings as that about giving his life as a ransom for many and that about his blood as the blood of the covenant; and, second, the interpretation given to his death by the apostolic Church.

(4) Matthew, as we have seen, sets the death of Christ in relation to the forgiveness of sins. But do not the phrases *ἀντὶ πολλῶν*, *περὶ πολλῶν*, and *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν* suggest the same meaning? What could any person familiar with the Old Testament understand by a covenant in Christ's blood, or by the giving up of his life as a ransom, except a sacrificial death? If his "blood shed for many" does not mean substantially the same as "shed for the remission of sins," we must say that the misunderstanding of the early Church was quite inevitable, for certainly no person of the time could have understood the language otherwise.[1]

(5) It is now generally agreed that the apostolic theology regards Christ's death as directly related to the forgiveness of sins. His death is a testimony to the heinousness of sin in God's sight and to God's holy displeasure against it. It thus fulfils a condition of sin's forgiveness, namely, the assertion of its desert of penalty and the vindication of the divine righteousness in its condemnation. Was this a product of the "reminiscent phantasies" of his disciples, or had it a place in the mind of Jesus himself?

(6) Luke records that after the resurrection Jesus said to his disciples: "O foolish men, and slow of heart to

[1] *Cf.* Bruce, *Kingdom of God*, pp. 246–249.

believe in all that the prophets have spoken! Behoved it not the Christ to suffer these things, and to enter into his glory? And beginning from Moses, and from all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself" (xxiv. 25–27). And, again later, he said to them: "These are my words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, how that all things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law of Moses, and the prophets, and the Psalms, concerning me. Then opened he their mind that they might understand the scriptures; and he said unto them, Thus it is written, that the Christ should suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name unto all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem" (Lk. xxiv. 44–47). What Jesus specifically said in these explanations of the import of his death, we do not know. But is it credible that the first disciples, after hearing his instruction on the subject, should proceed to build up a subjective theory of his death which had no warrant in his own teaching? Which persons are most likely to have correctly apprehended the significance which Jesus attached to his death, men like John and Peter and, I may add, Paul (who passed two weeks with Peter when this subject was uppermost in his thoughts, Gal. i. 18), or an equal number of scholars in our time, however discerning and candid, who undertake to reconstruct the thoughts of Jesus, and to disentangle them from the supposed subjective reflections of his disciples? Where is the subjectivity likely to be greatest — in the interpretations of the eye and ear witness or in the reconstructions of the moderns? Many adopt the former supposition; I cannot help preferring the latter.

(7) The reported words of Jesus in the Synoptists are not, indeed, very explicit in their bearing upon what theology calls the problem of atonement, and should not be pressed into the service of specific theories. The phrase *δοῦναι τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν* contains the idea that by his death Jesus brought back many captives from sin unto God. But the language is figurative, and we

are not told how his death contributed to secure this deliverance. If there be allusions in the words spoken at the supper both to the paschal feast and to the ratification of the covenant at Sinai, both would suggest the saving import of Christ's death, but neither would show how it availed for men's salvation. The agony of Gethsemane emphasizes the necessity, and illustrates the severity, of our Lord's suffering, but does not disclose to us its function in the divine plan for the salvation of men. The exclamation on the cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Mt. xv. 34), must not be didactically pressed into an assertion that in his death God withdrew from Christ his favor and fellowship. The Psalm from which it is quoted (xxii. 1) suggests rather the idea of abandonment to suffering than that of abandonment to desertion by God. In this view, the exclamation would be an intense expression in bitter anguish of the idea contained in the words: "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me."

For our present purpose we must rest the question here. The apostolic Church attributed to these words and events, and to such others as were then known, a sacrificial, atoning significance (in what sense we shall see). In this it has been followed by the prevailing theology of the Church of subsequent ages. It does not fall within the purpose of the present work to defend the theology of the Church. I have simply indicated the bearings of the question and what the historical presumption in the case seems to me to be. It can hardly be too much to say that the burden of proof rests upon him who holds that in its apprehension of this subject the Church has from the very first gone astray.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHRISTIAN BROTHERHOOD

WE have seen that the Kingdom of God is a spiritual commonwealth, embracing all who adopt certain principles and motives of life. The bond which unites its members is likeness in character, kinship of spirit. Very early in his ministry, however, we observe indications that Jesus intended to found a society, based upon the principle of the Kingdom, in which the members should be held together by outward and visible ties of fellowship. This society is the Church or assembly (ἐκκλησία) of his disciples. It is evident that the idea of the Kingdom is the more prominent and the more fundamental one in the mind of Jesus;[1] but it is also evident that he regarded some outward form of association and organization as essential to the most effective promotion of the Kingdom. The common spiritual life which constitutes men members of the Kingdom of God needs to be fostered by reciprocal fellowship and expressed in organized effort.

The first indication of Jesus' intention to found such a society may be discerned in the way in which he called upon men to follow him, to leave their occupations even, in order to form a company who should attend him in his journeys and labors. Especially did this purpose become clear when he set apart twelve men as his permanent associates and helpers, and named them his apostles or messengers (Mk. iii. 13–19; Lk. vi. 12–16). He warned those who proposed to enter this company that their determination to do so would involve trial and hardship, and required them to make a decisive choice between disciple-

[1] The term "Kingdom" occurs one hundred and twelve times in the gospels; the word "Church" only twice.

ship to him and all rival interests (Mt. viii. 19–22; Lk. xii. 25–27).

The duties of the Twelve were not sharply defined, but from the announcement made to Andrew and Peter that they were to become "fishers of men" (Mk. i. 17), and from Jesus' charge when he sent them all out on a tour of preaching and healing (Mk. vi. 7–13), we infer that they had a certain official relation to him and that it was his intention to make them his chief agents in the establishing of his Church. Their office, however, was characterized by special opportunity and service, rather than by exceptional prerogative or power. Two of them were distinctly told, when they sought positions of eminence, that no greatness was to be sought in his Kingdom except greatness by and for service (Mk. x. 42–44). Jesus recognized no superiority of outward rank among his disciples. They were all on a footing of fraternal equality and were instructed not to single out one or another of their number and designate him by titles of superior eminence (Mt. xxiii. 8–10). The bestowment of divine grace upon them was not conditioned upon any special functions which certain official superiors must perform on behalf of the others, or upon any particular form of organization; but where even two or three met together in his name, there he promised to be in the midst of them (Mt. xviii. 20).

It is maintained by some that the idea of establishing a society of his own, distinct from the Jewish national Church, was foreign to Jesus' original plan, and was only adopted after all hope of winning the Jewish nation to belief in his messiahship had to be abandoned. Weiss, for example, says: "It was among the people that he had desired to establish the Kingdom of God, which was nothing different from the consummation of the theocracy always looked forward to by Israel. It had never occurred to Jesus to bind his followers into an exclusive community separated from the great congregation. . . . The greatest sorrow of his life was caused by the thought of establishing such a distinct Church in the midst of the great congregation of

Israel."[1] It is true that the word *Ecclesia* appears only in the later teaching of Jesus. It is also true that Jesus would gladly have won the nation to belief in himself. But that it was his original and long-cherished idea to make the Jewish theocracy the social form in which his religion should find visible expression, is an opinion which lacks proof and which is, in my judgment, intrinsically improbable. It is refuted not so much by any passage as by the whole genius of Jesus' mission and teaching. His work could not be run into the moulds of Judaism. We detect in it from the very beginning a note of greater breadth and universality. The call of the publican, Levi or Matthew (Mk. ii. 14 *sq.*), into the company of disciples, and his subsequent confirmation as an apostle (Mk. iii. 18), is an indication that Jesus proposed to allow neither national nor social distinctions to condition membership in the community which he would found. It is quite unwarranted to assume — as criticism so often does — that Jesus had no clear ideas concerning his own person and work until the time when he first explicitly uttered them, or that up to the moment of such utterance, his ideas were the opposite of what he then expressed. The suppositions which are often put forward by critics respecting the vacillation, disappointment, and sudden transitions in Jesus' ideas of his messiahship, his Kingdom, his death, and the effect of his work in the world, would be far-fetched and unnatural in application to any person of ordinary intelligence who had a fairly definite idea of his own powers and life-work.

The first passage in which the word "Church" (*ἐκκλησία*) appears is Mt. xvi. 18: "And I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it." These words were spoken directly after Peter had made his great confession at Cæsarea Philippi. Both the time and the place are suggestive. The ministry of Jesus was now well advanced. His rejection by the nation was decisive. In the face of it, however, Peter, voicing the con-

[1] *Life of Christ*, III. 60 (Bk. V. ch. vi.).

viction of his associates, had boldly asserted his messiahship. It was at this juncture that Jesus withdrew for a time from the scene of his ordinary labors to this distant northern city. Here, for the first time, he spoke freely of his approaching death, and of the sure triumph of his cause. On a cliff at Cæsarea stood the Roman temple which Herod the Great had built in honor of Augustus. The obtrusive worship of Cæsar in a temple built by a Jewish prince can hardly have failed to shock the little company as they entered the city. It is remarkable that their declaration of his sonship to God and his own assurances of triumph should have been spoken in the presence of a shrine where divine honors were offered to the head of the Roman empire.[1]

Criticism has, indeed, called in question the genuineness of the passage. In his reconstruction of the Logia, Wendt gives this as the probably original form of the passage: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jonah; thou art Peter, and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against thee."[2] Weiss is of the opinion that verse 19, which speaks of Jesus giving to Peter the keys of the King-

[1] "These were the two religions which were shortly to contest the world — the marble temple covering the bust of an emperor, the group of exiles round the leader, whom his own people had rejected. . . . He in the temple was only an official, the temporary symbol of a great power, to-day's dispenser of its largess, who to-morrow would be succeeded by another. But the little band of fugitives outside clung to their Leader for his own eternal sake. He was the Kingdom, he was the religion; everything lay forever in his character and his love." George Adam Smith, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land* (1895), p. 478.

[2] *Lehre Jesu*, p. 180. This condensation of the passage is based upon the fact that it is found in substantially this form in the *Commentary* of Ephraem Syrus on the *Diatessaron* of Tatian (see the translation of the *Diatessaron* by J. Hamlyn Hill (1894), p. 356). But this conclusion is very precarious in view of the facts that the whole passage stands in the versions of the *Diatessaron*, which have thus far been discovered (see *op. cit.*, p. 136), that it is found entire in the Curetonian Syriac, which is believed closely to resemble the Syriac text used by Tatian, and that it was the habit of Ephraem to abbreviate passages. Dr. Briggs thinks that Luke would not have omitted this passage if it had been in the Logia, and that "Matthew must have derived it from a traditional source." He thinks it represents a form of evangelic tradition later than the early chapters of Acts. See *The Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 189.

dom and of his binding and loosing, was taken by the evangelist from another connection and applied to Peter.[1] In Mt. xviii. 18 the second part of this verse is found, addressed to the disciples in general. The fact that these passages which speak of "the Church" are found only in Matthew is certainly a check to over-confidence in dealing with them, but does not seem to me to warrant Wendt's excision of them without more adequate reasons for so doing than he has given.

Two questions here claim our attention: In what sense can the Church be built upon Peter? and: What is the meaning of binding and loosing? In the first saying addressed to Peter there is in the Greek a play on words whose force is lost in translation: *σὺ εἶ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω, κ.τ.λ.* (*v.* 18). In the Aramaic, which Jesus doubtless spoke, both *Πέτρος* and *πέτρα* would be represented by the same word (כֵּיפָא). It is quite certain, and is now generally admitted, that the words "this rock" refer, not to Christ, nor to Peter's confession or faith, but to Peter himself. It would be quite unwarranted, however, to neglect the context and to suppose that it is altogether apart from his character as the confessor of Jesus' divine sonship that Peter is to be made the foundation of the Church. Not until this moment could Peter have been called the rock-apostle on whom Christ would build his society; now for the first time can it be said that Peter has fully become what his name imports.

The connection appears to me to make it perfectly clear that it is in view of the great significance of his confession that Peter is now described as the foundation-rock of the Church. The name "Peter" had already been given him with prophetic reference to his character (Jn. i. 42); he had now made good the designation. But he had done so not by the aid of "flesh and blood," but by divine guidance and enlightenment. Moreover, Peter here merely voiced

[1] *Life of Christ*, I. 59 (Bk. V. ch. vi.). Wendt thinks that this passage (Mt. xviii. 18) is also an interpretation by the evangelist. *Lehre Jesu*, p. 156.

the common conviction of the other disciples. All three Synoptists imply that they all professed the same faith. Peter, true to his impetuous nature and to the position which he had already acquired as *primus inter pares* among the apostles, responds promptly to the questions of Jesus: "Who say ye that I am?" and in so doing voices the conviction of the whole company.

The circumstances and the language used do not, therefore, favor the idea that Jesus meant here to found an office or to confer upon Peter a special judicial authority, much less to establish a permanent individual primacy in the Church with a perpetual line of succession.[1] There is a strong presumption that Jesus meant Peter to become just what he actually did become, the foremost leader and guide of the early Church, the chief agent in founding and fostering the brotherhood of those who confessed Jesus as Lord. The New Testament does not leave us without information respecting the place and function of Peter in founding the Church; the facts of the case are better than conjectures as showing what his Master meant that Peter should become and do. To a brief consideration of these we now turn.

In immediate connection with the narrative under review stands another in which Jesus severely rebukes Peter for thinking the thoughts of men rather than those of God respecting Messiah's sufferings and death. Somewhat later, it was in answer to a question asked by Peter that Jesus said that the twelve apostles should "sit upon twelve

[1] I find the following admirable statement of what I hold to be the true meaning of the passage in Dr. Hort's *The Christian Ecclesia*, p. 16: "St. Peter himself, yet not exclusively St. Peter, but the other disciples of whom he was then the spokesman and interpreter, and should hereafter be the leader, was the rock which Christ had here in view. It was no question here of an authority given to St. Peter; some other image than that of the ground under a foundation must have been chosen if that had been meant. Still less was it a question of an authority which should be transmitted by St. Peter to others. The whole was a matter of personal or individual qualifications and personal or individual work. The outburst of keenly perceptive faith had now at last shown St. Peter, carrying with him the rest, to have the prime qualification for the task which his Lord contemplated for him."

thrones" (Mt. xix. 28)—thus assigning equal honor to all. When the question was raised: "Who is the greatest in the Kingdom of God?" Jesus gives no intimation of Peter's supremacy, but places a little child in the midst of the disciples (Mt. xviii. 1, 2). Peter was one of the "pillars" of the Palestinian Church (Gal. ii. 9), and appears to have had a certain preëminence in personal influence, but it was James, not Peter, who presided at the council at Jerusalem and announced its decision (Acts xv.). The best illustration of Peter's special calling and position is given in his own words at the council just referred to: "Brethren, ye know how a good while ago God made choice among you, that by my mouth the Gentiles should hear the word of the gospel, and believe" (Acts xv. 7). The reference is to the conversion of Cornelius (Acts x.), but when the centurion "fell down at his feet, and worshipped him, Peter raised him up, saying, Stand up; I myself also am a man" (Acts x. 25, 26). Despite this privilege providentially accorded to Peter, and despite his great popular influence, he neither claimed, nor did the other apostles in any case recognize, any special official authority as belonging to him. His fellow Jewish Christians freely criticised his action in eating with the Gentiles (Acts xi. 2, 3), and he met their censure, not by authority, but by argument. In this case Peter was in the right, but on a later occasion at Antioch, true to his impulsive nature, he made the great mistake of withdrawing from fellowship with the Gentile converts—an action for which Paul "resisted him to the face, because he stood condemned" (Gal. ii. 11). Peter's position among the Twelve, so far as the New Testament throws any light upon it, must be understood to consist in the following facts: He is first named in the account of Jesus calling men into companionship with himself (Mk. i. 16; Mt. iv. 18), and his name always heads the list of the apostles (Mk. iii. 15; Mt. x. 2; Lk. vi. 14; Acts i. 13). His personal qualities gave him a certain preëminence in the company; his eager, forthputting nature fitted him for prominence. These qualities found expression in the con-

fession which called out the ascription of eminence to him. It was as the "first Christian," expressing faith in Jesus' messiahship, that he received the assurance of his future function among the first believers. It was Peter, also, who spoke the word of the Spirit at Pentecost, an epoch-making crisis in the establishment of the Church (Acts ii.). The official status which Jesus assigned him consisted in his giving him the precedence in opening "a door of faith unto the Gentiles" (Acts xiv. 27). In this sense he was in fact the chief foundation-stone used in building the Church, although in no exclusive sense (Eph. ii. 20).

In important respects Peter was, in his personal characteristics, what his name signified. But it was only by his Messianic faith that he became the rock-apostle on which the Church could be built. Jesus' thought was that the Church should stand strong and immovable when supported by those who were thus firm in the faith of his sonship to God. It should be more than a match for the "gates of Hades," the portals which effectually close the world of the dead against their escape, — a symbol of the greatest imaginable force. This confident assertion of Jesus concerning his Church certainly rests upon these two ideas as its chief presuppositions: first, that his own person is the main guaranty of its success; and, second, that the Church is to be the principal means whereby the Kingdom of God and his righteousness are to be realized among men.

This second presupposition finds its clearest expression in the words: "I will give unto thee the keys of the Kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven" (Mt. xvi. 19). It is evident that the second part of this verse is intended to explain the first part; the power denoted by "the keys" is the same as the power to "bind and loose." We have already observed that the power to bind and loose is elsewhere committed to all Christ's disciples: "What things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be

loosed in heaven" (Mt. xviii. 18). Whether we adopt the view of Weiss that this saying belongs in this latter connection and was only applied by the evangelist to Peter, or hold that the saying was uttered in both connections, — in either case, no privilege is assigned by our Lord to Peter which was not given to other believers. It only remains to inquire to what function or work the figures of "the keys" and of "binding and loosing" naturally point.

It is well established that "binding and loosing" was a current Rabbinic term for forbidding and permitting.[1] Discipline and government must be instituted in the community of professed believers, and this duty was committed to the disciples. What was essential to fellowship must be determined and maintained as a safeguard against corruption. Jesus had given a new spiritual law; he had set forth the principles of his Kingdom which were historically connected with the Jewish religion, and yet rose above it. His disciples would have the delicate duty and the heavy responsibility of legislating for the new community to which his movement would soon give rise. Jesus had laid down no explicit code of rules; he left it to those whom he had trained to apply his principles and tests to men, and, under the divine guidance, to determine what was consistent, and what inconsistent, with citizenship in the commonwealth of his followers. His Church was to take its place amidst the prevalent corruptions of heathenism

[1] A large number of examples are given by Lightfoot, *Horæ Hebraicæ*, II. 237–240 (Oxford ed.), who says: "To this, therefore, do these words amount: When the time was come, wherein the Mosaic law, as to some part of it, was to be abolished and left off; and as to another part of it, was to be continued, and to last forever: he granted Peter here, and to the rest of the apostles, ch. xviii. 18, a power to abolish or confirm what they thought good, and as they thought good, being taught this and led by the Holy Spirit, as if he should say: 'Whatsoever ye shall *bind* in the law of Moses, that is, *forbid*, it shall be *forbidden*, the Divine authority confirming it; and whatsoever ye shall *loose*, that is, *permit*, or shall *teach* that it is *permitted* and *lawful*, shall be *lawful* and *permitted*.' Hence they *bound*, that is, *forbade*, circumcision to the believers; eating of things offered to idols, of things strangled, and of blood for a time to the Gentiles. They *loosed*, that is, *allowed*, purification to Paul, and to four other brethren," etc.

and the deadening formalism of Judaism, and to maintain the standards of a purely ethical and spiritual religion. Upon those to whom he spoke in this closing period of his ministry would rest the great responsibility of faithfully maintaining his truth, and of preserving the infant community from the invasions of error and corruption. In a real sense, those who professed adherence to him held the keys of the Kingdom; they possessed the authoritative knowledge of the conditions of participation in it; they must bind and loose, that is, declare what was forbidden and what permitted within the meaning of its heavenly laws.

The second passage in which the *Ecclesia* is mentioned is Mt. xviii. 15–20, where the proper action of the assembly towards a sinning member is described, and the promise of a divine ratification and of the presence of Messiah with them expressed. The genuineness of the passage — at least, in part — has been called in question, on the ground that it presents a more developed plan of Church discipline than we have reason to expect in the teaching of Jesus. Weiss, on the contrary, holds that the passage relates neither to Church discipline nor to excommunication, and defends its genuineness.[1] Wendt admits the genuineness of verses 15 and 16 only, and regards the remainder of the passage as an interpolation either of the evangelist or of a later writer.[2] It seems to me probable that the passage is composite. Verses 19 and 20, which speak of the agreement of "two" in prayer and of the meeting of "two or three," appear to be coupled with what is said about the offending brother in consequence of an outward resemblance to verse 16, which speaks of "two or three witnesses." Moreover, the passage in Luke (xvii. 3, 4), which is parallel to verses 15 and 16, refers only to private reconciliation, suggesting the question whether the mediation of the congregation was really spoken of in this connection. It is certainly strange that if this passage concerning the Church was in the Logia, Luke should have entirely passed it by. While, therefore,

[1] *Matthäusev.*, p. 418 *sq.* [2] *Lehre Jesu*, p. 156.

we cannot maintain the strict unity of the passage, it may fairly be said, on the other hand, that the extreme simplicity of the rule and of the conditions to which it is to apply favor the primitive character of the saying about the mediation of the Church. "The Church" here appears to denote neither a local church nor an aggregate of local churches, but the congregation of disciples conceived of as one assembly. That Jesus should have spoken of "the Church" in this sense, and should have assigned to it a function in composing differences among brethren, is in no way improbable. His disciples did constitute an ἐκκλησία — the usual Septuagint word for the congregation (קָהָל) of Israel; why should he not have spoken of them as an assembly or community, and have recognized the usefulness to the individual believer, in cases of difficulty, of their common social life and relations? The organization here presupposed is the simplest possible. It is a mere community of brethren without an official head. The "binding and loosing" is the function of all the disciples, not of the apostles only. This fact strongly favors the view that Matthew was here following some trustworthy tradition of the Lord's words, and not attributing to him by a historical prolepsis language which reflects later conditions.

In this view the passage begins by directing that in case one disciple shall do another an injustice, the injured party shall privately confer with the offender, and, by seeking to reveal to him the character of his fault, endeavor to effect a reconciliation (*v.* 15). If this purely private conference does not avail, let another be held in the presence of "two or three witnesses," who are competent to attest the reality of the offence, and to show the offender that the injured brother's judgment was not merely subjective (*v.* 16). If, now, the guilty party will not respect the judgment of the "two or three witnesses," let the case be presented to the whole congregation. If they all agree in making the same accusing judgment, already twice made, no room is left for the reply that the accusation was dictated by prejudice or passion. If the offender still re-

fuses to acknowledge his fault, "let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican" (*v.* 17); that is, let him be regarded as self-excluded, by the very nature of his action, from the fellowship of the disciples. The act of the whole united assembly in so "binding and loosing" — in so upholding the law of its very existence, and determining what is inconsistent with that law — shall be divinely ratified (*v.* 18). The Messiah himself will spiritually abide with his people, and where they meet and agree in his name — truly preserving his spirit and maintaining inviolate his heavenly law — he will sustain and reward them (*vv.* 19, 20).

We turn to the "great commission" (Mt. xxviii. 18–20). A parallel, in briefer form, is found in the early, but probably spurious, appendix to Mark's Gospel (xvi. 15, 16). No passage which can strictly be called parallel exists in Luke. It is not strange that, in these circumstances, the genuineness of the passage should be extensively questioned. The principal objections to it are as follows: (1) The difficulty which the primitive apostles found in consenting to the idea of missions to the Gentiles cannot be explained if Jesus had solemnly charged his disciples to preach the gospel to the whole world. (2) Jesus regarded his own mission as limited to Israel (Mt. xv. 24), and in sending out the Twelve, directed them to "go not into the way of the Gentiles, nor into any city of the Samaritans" (Mt. ix. 5). (3) The Trinitarian baptismal formula (*v.* 19) reflects later ecclesiastical usage since the apostles baptized, as they taught (Acts iv. 18), in the name of Jesus only (Acts ii. 38; viii. 16; x. 48; xix. 5). Weiss regards this "commission" as expressing an assurance spiritually inspired in the hearts of the disciples by the exalted Christ, and thinks that its historical basis is Mt. xviii. 20: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them."[1]

The first of the objections just enumerated somewhat misstates the case. The primitive apostles were, no doubt, affected by Jewish limitations of view in important re-

[1] *Life of Christ*, III. 421, 422 (Bk. VII. ch. xii.).

spects, but they did not entertain the idea that the gospel was for the Jews alone. At Pentecost Peter saw in the conversion of the multitude the fulfilment of the promise that the Spirit should be poured out on "all flesh" (Acts ii. 17). Early in his work he was taught that "God is no respecter of persons" (Acts x. 34), although he did not always consistently adhere to the principle. Peter was the means of converting the Roman centurion, Cornelius (Acts xi.). The mission at Antioch, which soon extended its scope to the Gentiles (Gal. ii. 12), was supervised by the Jerusalem church (Acts xi. 22 *sq.*). The apostles at Jerusalem rejoiced when they heard that the Gentiles were receiving the gospel (Acts xi. 1, 18). Their scruples concerned the conditions on which they might properly be received into the Christian community, and the adjustment of relations between the Jewish and Gentile Christians. They probably had some sympathy, at first, with the view that the heathen converts must be circumcised and observe the Mosaic law (Acts xv. 1; Gal. ii. 12–14), but, if so, that position was distinctly abandoned at the council (Acts xv. 28; Gal. ii. 6, 9, 10). The apostles did not doubt that the gospel was for the heathen; they were perplexed as to the adjustment of this fact to their inherited conviction that the observance of their law was essential to salvation.

In the light of Jesus' teaching as a whole there is no improbability, as the second objection to the genuineness of the passage alleges, that he should have charged his disciples to carry his gospel to the whole world. The idea of universality was its dominant note. He described his disciples as the salt of the earth and the light of the world (Mt. v. 13, 14). He proposed at the beginning to make his followers "fishers of men" (Mk. i. 17). What he had spoken in darkness they were to speak in the light and to proclaim from the housetops (Mt. x. 27). Although, as the Jewish Messiah, he was specially sent to his own people (Mt. xv. 24), he did not limit his ministry to them. He found and welcomed faith in the Canaanitish woman (Mt. xv. 21 *sq.*), in the Roman centurion (Mt. viii. 5–13; Lk. vii. 1–10), and in the Samaritan lepers (Lk. xvii. 11–19). He

did not confine his ministry strictly to Judaism, but travelled through Samaria (Lk. xvii. 11), to Cæsarea Philippi (Mk. viii. 27; Mt. xvi. 13), and Phœnicia (Mk. vii. 24; Mt. xv. 21), on the north, and eastward into Perea (Mk. x. 1; Mt. xix. 1). He spoke of his gospel as destined to be preached throughout the whole world (Mt. xxiv. 14; xxvi. 13; Mk. xiv. 9), and declared that many should come from the east and from the west, and sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the Kingdom of God (Mt. viii. 11; *cf.* Lk. xiii. 28–30). The universality of the "great commission" is in no way inconsistent either with the teaching and work of Jesus during his ministry, or with the apprehension of that teaching in the primitive Church. On the contrary, it is, in fact, a summary of what he taught, and expresses the ideal which the early Church was seeking, with many practical perplexities, to realize, and which was so far realized as to open the way for the work of Paul, the champion of a universal gospel.

The third objection is of minor importance. Since no expression resembling this baptismal formula is elsewhere found in our sources, and in view of the uniform usage of the primitive Church in baptizing in the name of Jesus, the question naturally arises whether this formula does not reflect a later stage of ecclesiastical usage, akin to the Trinitarian benedictions of the apostle Paul. But, if so, it merely follows that we have here a later formulation of the import of baptism and of discipleship, whose elements are already contained in Jesus' teaching. If, therefore, in all the circumstances, we may not insist upon the originality of the *ipsissima verba* of the commission, we may confidently say that, in its substance, it accords with the whole genius of our Lord's teaching and work, and well expresses what we may believe to have been the hope and purpose of Jesus in associating his disciples together for the preservation and propagation of his truth and Kingdom.

The differences which exist among scholars as to the import and purpose of the Lord's supper have already been incidentally considered in another connection. I cannot believe that it is legitimate to conclude from the

silence of Mark and Matthew that the form of tradition which we find in Paul and Luke, which represents Jesus as founding a permanent institution, is without historic foundation. This supposition, gratuitous in itself, leaves the action of Jesus on the solemn occasion described in our sources without an adequate motive. In point of time of writing, Paul's version of the event is the earliest, and was, he says, received from (*ἀπό*) the Lord, probably meaning mediately, through trustworthy tradition. Criticism has not, in my judgment, given sufficient reasons for questioning his confidence in its correctness.

Jesus founded both the rites which he sanctioned — baptism and the supper — upon practices which were in current use. The Jews were accustomed to ceremonial lustrations. In spite of doubts which have been raised, it is well settled that proselytes to the Jewish religion were baptized when they were admitted to participation in the theocratic life.[1] The forerunner had already appropriated this practice as symbolizing the inward purification which God required in preparation for the acceptance of the Messiah. Jesus accordingly made baptism a symbol of spiritual renewal — an outward sign and pledge of forgiveness for all such as repent of their sins and become his disciples. Answering to this initiatory rite is the holy supper, which symbolizes and attests to the believer the divine grace which is conferred through communion with the Saviour. Generically considered, both signify the same thing; they are pictorial words of God addressed to the eye, assuring men of spiritual blessings in Christ upon condition of their willingness to receive them. They are pictures and promises of the divine favor to men — the one portraying that grace in the inception of its work in the soul, the other typifying its continuous and progressive operation.

[1] See Schürer, *Jewish People*, II. 321 (§ 31).

CHAPTER XII

THE PAROUSIA AND THE JUDGMENT

THERE are five passages of special importance with which we have to deal in discussing the teaching of Jesus concerning his parousia. We shall consider them in order. Following the specific instructions given to the Twelve when Jesus sent them out (Mk. vi. 7–11; Mt. x. 1–15; Lk. ix. 1–5), we find in Matthew (x. 16–42) an extended discourse of a more general character. In the midst of that discourse occurs this saying: "Verily I say unto you, ye shall not have gone through the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come" (x. 23). There is no parallel to this passage in Mark or Luke. But a considerable part of the matter which immediately precedes the passage just cited is found in Mark (xiii. 9–13) and Luke (xii. 11, 12; xxi. 12–17); in other words, this paragraph which in Matthew (x. 16–23) ends with the verse in question is found almost entire in Jesus' eschatological discourse as given by Mk. xiii. and Lk. xxi. These facts alone render it impossible to suppose that Jesus really predicted his second coming before the Twelve had finished their mission. This whole discourse (Mt. x. 16–42) is demonstrably a collection of materials derived from various sources, and belonging in various connections, and verse 23, which speaks of the coming of the Son of man, is, in all probability, a reminiscence of the prediction of the parousia in the great eschatological discourse of Mk. xiii., Lk. xxi., and Mt. xxiv., and therefore requires no separate consideration.

The second passage to be noticed is found in all the Synoptics in the same connection, but in slightly varying form. In Mark the passage reads: "And he said unto

them, Verily I say unto you, There be some here of them that stand by, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the Kingdom of God come with power" (ix. 1). Corresponding to the closing words we have in Luke: "till they see the Kingdom of God" (ix. 27), and in Matthew: "till they see the Son of man coming in his Kingdom" (xvi. 28). The passage occurs at the end of a discourse following Peter's confession, in which Jesus foretells his death and resurrection. He must suffer and die and his disciples must suffer for his sake. They are required to choose between him and the world, and if they prove steadfast, he will accept them when he comes in his glory. Then he added the saying in question. The first evangelist must have understood the words to refer to the parousia. The language of Mark and Luke is general enough to apply to any crisis in the realization of the Kingdom. The former meaning would connect our passage with the reference to the "coming" in the preceding verse; the latter would connect it quite appropriately with the discourse as a whole, thus: You must suffer in my cause; renounce the world; but this you may well do since thereby you will gain my salvation; if you fail, you will be disapproved at the judgment; to such failure you will be tempted by my death and the apparent defeat of my work, but I tell you that some of you will live to see my Kingdom triumph. Considered from the standpoint of exegesis alone, I should say that the words in the form in which they appear in our sources may naturally refer to the parousia; this is especially clear in the case of Matthew. But considered from the standpoint of criticism and from that of intrinsic probability, the case is quite different. Why should Jesus declare so definitely the time of his second coming in that particular connection? Apart from the difficulty raised by the fact that he elsewhere disclaimed knowing the time of that event (Mk. xiii. 32), there is no particular motive for such a prediction here. It is certainly unwarranted to say that Jesus explicitly predicted an event connected with the consummation of his Kingdom which did not happen, unless the critical and

exegetical grounds for so doing are compelling. In this case, at least, they are not so. The language of Mark and Luke is more naturally explained as referring to some special crisis in his work or to the general triumph of his Kingdom; and this view has the advantage when our passage is considered in its relation to the discourse as a whole. I disclaim making any appeal to dogmatic considerations on such subjects, but I do not think it unwarranted to assume that the words of Jesus in their original form and meaning were probably self-consistent and that there is a strong presumption against supposing that he definitely foretold events which did not happen. My conclusion is that this passage did not refer originally to our Lord's visible return to earth.

The third passage to be considered is the great eschatological discourse (Mk. xiii.; Mt. xxiv.; Lk. xxi.). Taking Mark as a basis, the drift of this discourse is as follows: As Jesus and his disciples come out of the temple one of them calls his attention to the massive structures of the temple-area. He replies that, notwithstanding their strength, they shall be completely thrown down. Later they ask him when this overthrow will occur and what will be the sign of its accomplishment. In reply he describes certain events which they will soon observe: the appearance of pretenders, wars and tumults, earthquakes and famines, persecutions and divisions, — and warns them against supposing that these are signs of the impending catastrophe. The gospel must be preached to all nations before the destruction of the temple occurs (*vv.* 1–13). When, however, the symbols of Roman power are seen in the temple-enclosure,[1] then it will be time to prepare for the great calamities which shall accompany the destruction of the temple and city (*vv.* 14–23.) Following these calamities, portents will appear in the skies and the Son of man will come "in clouds with great power and glory." This event will happen within the lifetime of the present

[1] Such is the obvious meaning of: "the abomination of desolation standing where he ought not" (Mk. xiii. 14). *Cf.* the parallel in Luke: "When ye see Jerusalem compassed with armies" (xxi. 20).

generation, although only the Father knows the exact time (*vv.* 24–33).

It is quite clear that according to Mark nothing is said about the parousia in the first part of this discourse. That is a separate event which is to follow the destruction of the temple, but (according to the present form of the discourse) within a comparatively short time. Luke closely follows Mark, but Matthew has a number of distinctive features. He represents the disciples as asking not only about the time of the temple's overthrow, but about "the sign of his coming and of the end of the age" (xxiv. 3), as if they were either one event or inseparably connected. The idea that one and the same event, namely, "the end" (*v.* 14), is referred to in the discourse dominates Matthew's version throughout. Accordingly, he does not separate the appearance of the Roman standards from the previous events (*v.* 15), as do Mark and Luke, but connects this event immediately with those which precede it and assigns to the two no different premonitory significance. Throughout this section (*vv.* 15–28), in which the "abomination of desolation" and its attendant evils are described, it is everywhere assumed (see *v.* 27) that it is the sign of Messiah's coming, and not, as in Mark and Luke, the sign of the temple's overthrow. In keeping with this representation the coming of Christ is described as following immediately after the appearance of the Roman signals. It is evident that the difficulties of the passage, which are sufficiently great in its more primitive form, are immensely enhanced in Matthew's re-working of the material. This version of the discourse tells us that Jesus said he would personally and visibly return to earth in immediate connection with the destruction of Jerusalem, but that before this event his gospel should be preached throughout the whole world; but despite this precise prediction as to the time of his coming, that "no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but only the Father," knew the exact time; and that he solemnly added: "Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away." This construction of the dis-

course involves Jesus in a tissue of contradictions which we must not attribute to him without the most compelling reasons. We are, therefore, justified in using the first Gospel only as a secondary source of Jesus' teaching on this subject, and in employing its version of this discourse only so far as it may be useful in suggesting the motive of variations from his probable meaning.

Criticism has expended a great deal of ingenuity upon the effort to determine the sources of this discourse. By many it is thought to be a combination of genuine words of Jesus, with a short Jewish-Christian apocalypse.[1] Wendt has sought to reconstruct this apocalypse from Mk. xiii. It would read as follows: (*vv.* 7, 8) And when ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars, be not troubled: these things must needs come to pass; but the end is not yet. For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: there shall be earthquakes in divers places; there shall be famines: these things are the beginning of travail. (*vv.* 14–20) But when ye see the abomination of desolation standing where he ought not (let him that readeth understand), then let them that are in Judæa flee unto the mountains: and let him that is on the housetop not go down, nor enter in, to take anything out of his house: and let him that is in the field not return back to take his cloke. But woe unto them that are with child and to them that give suck in those days! And pray ye that it be not in the winter. For those days shall be tribulation, such as there hath not been the like from the beginning of the creation which God created until now, and never shall be. And except the Lord had shortened the days, no flesh would have been saved: but for the elect's sake, whom he chose, he shortened the days.

(*vv.* 24–27) But in those days, after that tribulation, the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her

[1] Among those who have elaborated this theory are Weiffenbach, *Der Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu*, p. 135 *sq.* (who used the theory to prove that what Jesus really predicted in the so-called parousia-discourse was his resurrection); Wendt, *Die Lehre Jesu*, pp. 9-21; and Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I. 327.

light, and the stars shall be falling from heaven, and the powers that are in the heavens shall be shaken. And then shall they see the Son of man coming in clouds with great power and glory. And then shall he send forth the angels, and shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth to the uttermost part of heaven. (*vv.* 30, 31) Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, until all these things be accomplished. Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away.

The remainder of the chapter, with a slight change of order, is held to represent the genuine words of Jesus, and would read as follows: (*vv.* 1–6) And as he went forth out of the temple, one of his disciples saith unto him, Master, behold, what manner of stones and what manner of buildings! And Jesus said unto him, Seest thou these great buildings? there shall not be left here one stone upon another, which shall not be thrown down.

And as he sat on the Mount of Olives over against the temple, Peter and James and John and Andrew asked him privately, Tell us, when shall these things be? and what shall be the sign when these things are all about to be accomplished? And Jesus began to say unto them, Take heed that no man lead you astray. Many shall come in my name, saying, I am he; and shall lead many astray.

(*vv.* 21–23) And then if any man shall say unto you, Lo, here is the Christ; or, Lo, there; believe it not: for there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall shew signs and wonders, that they may lead astray, if possible, the elect. But take ye heed: behold, I have told you all things beforehand.

(*v.* 9) But take ye heed to yourselves: for they shall deliver you up to councils; and in synagogues shall ye be beaten; and before governors and kings shall ye stand for my sake, for a testimony unto them. (*vv.* 11–13) And when they lead you to judgement, and deliver you up, be not anxious beforehand what ye shall speak: but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye: for it

is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost. And brother shall deliver up brother to death, and the father his child; and children shall rise up against parents, and cause them to be put to death. And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake: but he that endureth to the end, the same shall be saved. (*vv.* 28, 29) Now from the fig tree learn her parable: when her branch is now become tender, and putteth forth its leaves, ye know that the summer is nigh; even so ye also, when ye see these things coming to pass, know ye that he is nigh, *even* at the doors. (*vv.* 32–36) But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father. Take ye heed, watch and pray: for ye know not when the time is. It is as when a man, sojourning in another country, having left his house, and given authority to his servants, to each one his work, commanded also the porter to watch. Watch therefore: for ye know not when the lord of the house cometh, whether at even, or at midnight, or at cockcrowing, or in the morning; lest coming suddenly he find you sleeping. And what I say unto you I say unto all, Watch.

Verse 10: "And the gospel must first be preached unto all the nations," is regarded by Wendt as an addition which did not originally belong to either group.

The grounds on which the division of material is made are, briefly, these: (1) Each group forms a consistent and connected whole. The first passage speaks of the future coming of the Messiah from heaven; the second answers the question of the disciples respecting the time and sign of the temple's destruction. (2) The differences between the two groups show that they were originally separate. The woes or sorrows are different in the two passages. The "little apocalypse" opens with a description of distant wars and natural calamities which threaten to affect the Christian along with the other residents of Judea. They are general and come upon all alike (*vv.* 7, 8). In the genuine passage, however, the sufferings which are to come upon the disciples will come in consequence of their Christian faith, and will proceed from the Jews (*vv.* 9, 11–13).

The salvation to be accomplished is different. That of the apocalypse is salvation from temporal calamity — depending on a mitigation of the severity of the sufferings (*v.* 20); that of the genuine passage is salvation from eternal destruction — depending upon steadfast endurance unto death (*v.* 13). (3) The two passages have a very different value. The apocalypse deals only with external calamities, and presents no general or permanently available truth which can be applied to the Christian life apart from the immediate and special purpose of the passage. The other section is religious and Christian, and it is possible to extract from it a permanent religious significance which is independent of its particular application to the circumstances of its time.[1]

To this separation of the material of Mk. xiii. it is objected, that there is no evidence for it; that it is inherently improbable that Mark should take an independent Jewish-Christian writing (commonly supposed to emanate from Jesus), break it into three parts and interpolate them at various points into his genuine source; and that the apocalyptic elements of the discourse are sufficiently explained by the influence of Old Testament apocalyptic and prophecy which furnished the symbols in which Jesus clothed his thought.[2] It may then be urged that incongruities in the discourse may best be referred to subjective combinations and misapprehensions on the part of the early disciples. Certainly the hypothesis in question cannot be established with certainty. It merits consideration as a somewhat plausible conjecture, but cannot be shown to be

[1] Haupt, *Die eschatologischen Aussagen Jesu*, p. 21 *sq.*, expresses his dissatisfaction with the analysis of Wendt *et al.*, and holds that the discourse is a mosaic of small fragments — sayings originating at different times and on various occasions which, just because they were brought together in this way, have, in great part, taken on a sense essentially different from their original and authentic meaning.

[2] *Cf.* Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* § 33, *b*; Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 188 (Bk. I. ch. viii. § 1): "This short apocalypse is a mere production of the critical imagination"; Briggs, *Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 134: "These three sections separated by Weiffenbach are apocalyptic in character . . . because they all depend on the apocalypse of Daniel," etc. *Cf.* Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 302.

necessary to the explanation of the facts for which it seeks to account.[1]

Before considering further the probable original import of this discourse, we must notice our fourth passage, which occurs in connection with the trial of Jesus and appears in all the Synoptics: "And ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming with the clouds of heaven" (Mk. xiv. 62); "Henceforth (*ἀπ' ἄρτι*) ye shall see the Son of man sitting at the right hand of power and coming on the clouds of heaven" (Mt. xxvi. 64); "But from henceforth (*ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν*) shall the Son of man be seated at the right hand of the power of God" (Lk. xxii. 69). This statement is made in answer to the high priest's question: "Art thou the Christ?" Jesus replies that he is, and in language resembling that of Dan. vii. 13, asserts the speedy triumph of his cause. From this very time, he says, — from this moment of apparent defeat, — you will see the tokens of the triumph of my Kingdom. It appears to me impossible to refer this passage to a future advent. We are shut up to one of two suppositions: either that Jesus spoke symbolically of his coming on the clouds, meaning his glorious triumph over all hostile powers, or that tradition has cast his actual thought into that form because it was supposed that he spoke on this occasion of his second advent. It is possible to hold both that Jesus actually used the words in question, referring to the triumph of his Kingdom, and that the early disciples referred them to his parousia. The one thing that is clear is, that they did not actually refer to the parousia, whatever their original form. On this point the limitation of time involved in the words "ye shall see," the idea of a progressive coming, expressed in the phrase, "from now on," the whole situation in which the passage belongs, and the question to which it is an answer, are decisive. From this passage, then, we may confidently draw a conclusion which has already been suggested by an ex-

[1] A judicious article entitled, *The Apocalyptic Teaching of our Lord*, by the Rev. Henry Kingman, in which this theory is carefully considered, may be found in *The Biblical World*, for March, 1897.

amination of Mk. ix. 1, and the parallels, namely, that Jesus sometimes spoke of the coming of his Kingdom or of his coming in his Kingdom (probably using apocalyptic language in so doing) when he referred to the progress or triumph of his cause, and that there was a strong tendency in the minds of the early disciples to apply all such language to his visible return in glory to earth to consummate his Kingdom. This conclusion receives strong confirmation from the fourth Gospel.[1]

These considerations will be quite determining for the view which we must take of a fifth passage, Lk. xvii. 20–xviii. 8. It is difficult to suppose that this collection of sayings originally referred to a visible coming of Christ to consummate his Kingdom at the end of the world, because (1) the opening verses (20, 21) express quite a different, that is, a spiritual, idea of the Kingdom and of its coming. (2) Considerable parts of this matter (*vv.* 23, 24, 26, 27, 34–37) are found in substance in Matthew's version of the eschatological discourse (xxiv. 26, 27, 37, 39, 40, 41, 28), and we have seen that this discourse is evidently made up of diverse elements which are dominated and blended by the current expectation of the Lord's visible return to earth in close connection with the overthrow of the Jewish state. A similar expectation seems to have shaped the composition and form of this discourse. (3) The parable of the Unjust Judge (xviii. 1–8), which expressly purports to teach the certainty that prayer will be answered, is allegorized by Luke and applied to teach watchfulness in view of the Lord's second coming. We therefore see in this discourse traces of the tendency to apply to the idea of a final parousia sayings and parables whose form and content do not naturally yield themselves to such an application. In like manner, I cannot but regard it as improbable that the parable of the Pounds (Lk. xix. 11–27) or Talents (Mt. xxv. 14–29) originally referred to the parousia. It seems to have been applied allegorically to this subject because the parable-story contains the idea of *a lord returning to his servants*. This idea of the "coming" is incidental; it is

[1] See my *Johannine Theology*, pp. 329–340.

not *the point* of the parable. The same remark applies to the application of the figure of the absent householder in Lk. xii. 35–48.

A candid review of the passages appears to me to leave no room for doubt that all three Synoptists have applied to a final coming sayings of Christ which could not have been originally intended to refer to that event. Exegesis must, indeed, maintain that the passages in their present form relate to that subject, but criticism —(which is only a name for a more comprehensive estimate of the facts)— cannot regard this reference, at any rate in most instances, as the original one. On examination we find that difficulties in the way of this application are not peculiar to the relevant passages outside the great eschatological discourse. If we have sufficient reason for believing that Jesus did not predict his return within the generation living, how can we conceive him as instructing his hearers to watch and be ready for it (Mk. xiii. 37; Mt. xxv. 13)? Would not his "coming" for which they all should be ready, and at which one would be taken and the other left (Mt. xxiv. 40) be more naturally understood as the hour of death?

Such considerations undoubtedly suggest the question: Does anything, then, remain on which we can with any confidence rely as a source of Jesus' teaching concerning a second advent? May we not reduce this idea of the parousia, as some have sought to do, to that of a process or dispensation? It must be admitted that in the confused state of the materials bearing upon the subject it is possible — not, indeed, by exegesis, but by historical criticism — to maintain, with considerable plausibility, this conclusion. I cannot, however, adopt it. The confusion of our materials does not warrant us in concluding that Jesus said nothing on this subject to which his hearers overdid the application of his language. There is a wide difference between misunderstandings or mistaken combinations of his words and the independent creation by his disciples of a doctrine to which he did not refer. Moreover, his whole conception of the Kingdom of God implies the idea of its consummation, of which he might naturally speak as a

special, final self-manifestation, or parousia. Nor does it seem to me that we could reasonably explain the prominent place which the expectation of the second advent had in the mind of the early Church if Jesus had been wholly silent on the subject. That it should have been over-emphasized, that it should have been regarded as near at hand and surrounded by external signs and wonders, can be historically explained; but that it was created *ex nihilo* is an assumption which would require for its justification something more than an argument derived from the difficulty of finding a clear and consistent explanation of the perplexities connected with the passages in question.

It remains, then, to estimate the probabilities concerning the great eschatological discourse. These appear to me to be as follows:

(1) The first part of the discourse, as we have it, was concerned with the question as to the signs and the time of Jerusalem's overthrow; but with this material is blended a group of sayings, some of which probably referred to the manifestation or parousia of the Son of man at the end of the age. The general division between these two groups of sayings may be traced at Mk. xiii. 24; Mt. xxiv. 29; Lk. xxi. 25. Matthew has indeed obliterated the distinction between the two, and in Mark and Luke it is obscured.

(2) This obscuration or obliteration is due to the persistent expectation of the early disciples that the Kingdom of Christ would be speedily consummated by a great crisis. Under the power of this idea of the Kingdom and its triumph, they were naturally impelled to blend together sayings that belonged apart, and to identify prophecies of the consummation with those of impending calamities. That their conception of the Kingdom was such as to warrant this supposition is abundantly evident from the New Testament (see *e.g.*, Lk. xix. 11; xxiv. 21; Acts i. 6).

(3) Jesus spoke of various "comings," referring, as occasion required, to the progress of his Kingdom, to crises in its advance, or to its consummation. His whole doctrine of the nature of his Kingdom, as well as a critical consideration of the relevant passages, justifies this conclu-

sion. He did not conceive of his Kingdom as triumphing by a sudden and near catastrophe. It was not to come "with observation" (Lk. xvii. 20); it was to be like leaven spreading (Mt. xiii. 33), like seed growing secretly, "first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear (Mk. iv. 28). Its coming was conceived of as a great historic world-process (Mt. xxi. 43). In the very midst of words that have been shaped into a prediction of Christ's return within the generation then living, we meet with the declaration that his gospel shall first be proclaimed to the whole world (Mt. xxiv. 14). Jesus spoke of various "days of the Son of man" (Lk. xvii. 22), epochs in a great continuous process, culminating in the final manifestation, with which the first disciples more or less especially identified all others.[1]

(4) To determine precisely the form of Jesus' teaching concerning his parousia and the consummation is not possible in the present state of our sources. He probably employed symbolic language similar to that which we find in the apocalyptic parts of the Old Testament. If the first disciples commonly gave a literal interpretation to this language, we shall now do better to follow the example of Peter, who saw Joel's prophecy of dread portents in earth and sky fulfilled in the descent of the Spirit at Pentecost (Acts ii. 16 *sq.*). It would be only a popular Jewish reading of prophecy which could lead us to suppose that Jesus meant to consummate his Kingdom with an accompaniment of convulsions and catastrophes. The "logic of events," during many centuries, may safely be held to teach us something as to what Jesus meant by coming in his Kingdom. I believe the analogy of his general teaching accords with the historical facts in showing that he anticipated a great process of conquest, marked by special crises, and issuing in a final victory when he should appear as the glorious Leader and King of man-

[1] That Jesus' general doctrine of the nature and progress of his Kingdom should guide us in the effort to determine what he taught concerning its consummation, is one of the leading principles of the excellent discussion of Haupt in his work entitled *Die eschatologischen Aussagen Jesu.*

kind — the triumphant Founder and Perfecter of the Kingdom of a redeemed humanity.

The principle of judgment is repeatedly recognized in the teaching of Jesus. But in connection with this subject we encounter a difficulty analogous to that which we found when studying the parousia. The divine judgment is presented now as a process, and now as a final crisis, and it is impossible to determine with confidence to which of these certain passages were intended to refer. We shall find reasons for suspecting that the eschatological conception of this subject (as with respect to the parousia) was so dominant in the minds of the first disciples that some sayings which seem more naturally to express the principle of judgment are treated as if they referred to the "day of judgment" at the end of the present world-period.

In the passage: "Every one who is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment" (Mt. v. 22), the reference is probably to the local court, which here stands as a symbol of temporal divine judgment. The passage beginning: "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord" (Mt. vii. 21–23), is referred to the day of judgment by Matthew — an application which is rendered doubtful both by the context and by the use made of it by Luke (xiii. 25–27). The first evangelist shows the same tendency to connect all references to the principle of judgment with a final "day" as he does to refer all Christ's "comings" to a crisis at the end of the age. In reporting the discourse upon the responsibility of men for their words and deeds (xii. 33 *sq.*), he adds that for every idle word they shall give account in the day of judgment, and that by their words they shall be justified or condemned (xii. 36, 37). Luke reports the same sayings (vi. 43–45), but without this eschatological application.

Matthew has appended to the parousia-discourse which we have been considering a judgment-programme, in which all the nations are represented as appearing before the Son of man, who separates them into two classes and pronounces their doom (xxv. 31–46). Since this passage is peculiar to Matthew, and in view of his handling of escha-

tological materials which we have already observed, it is difficult to determine the probable import of this highly pictorial description. Accordingly, interpreters are much divided in their judgment of its intention. Some (*e.g.* Meyer and Weiss [1]) hold that it is a picture of the judgment of professing Christians, on the ground that those who are gathered before the Judge are spoken of as his "brethren" (*vv.* 40, 45), that is, professed disciples, and that the terms applied to the accepted ones (*vv.* 34, 37) naturally designate Christians. Others (as Bruce and Wendt [2]) maintain that it is a description of the judgment of the heathen. They understand the phrase "all the nations" (*πάντα τὰ ἔθνη*, *v.* 32), in the specific sense, "the Gentiles," and point out the fact that those who are judged are expressly distinguished from the "brethren" of Jesus, that is, from believers; and also that the significance of their good or evil acts is represented as not known to them when they performed them (*vv.* 37, 44). Those who take this view appeal to passages like Mt. x. 40–42 and Lk. x. 12–16 in confirmation of it, and point out that those who have known Christ are represented as judged by their confession or denial of him (Mt. x. 32, 33). Beyschlag holds that the passage, in its original meaning, was intended to describe a certain aspect of the divine judgment. "It is a peculiarly magnificent expression of the idea more briefly expressed in Mt. x. 42": "And whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only, in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in nowise lose his reward." [3]

The common view is that the passage describes the general judgment of mankind. The way in which the scene is connected with the coming of the Son of man and the language which is applied to both the accepted and the rejected (34 *b*, 37, 41 *b*), strongly favor this view. Indeed, Weiss, Wendt, and Beyschlag all admit that the passage was understood by the evangelist to describe the general

[1] *Commentary, in loco*, and *Bibl. Theol.* § 33, *d*, note 6.
[2] *Kingdom of God*, p. 315 *sq.*; *Lehre Jesu*, pp. 186–188.
[3] *N. T. Theol.* I. 206 (Bk. I. ch. viii. § 9).

judgment of the world at the end of time. But the difficulties of this view are very great. How can we harmonize with Jesus' general teaching the idea that the eternal destiny of all men is decided by works of charity alone? But the theories which apply the description to the judgment of a special class are hardly more satisfactory. How are the heathen, as such, to be conceived of as having had, in all cases, such relations to Christ's "brethren" as the passage presupposes? Both this explanation and that which applies it to the judgment of Christians only are compelled to suppose that the evangelist has amplified the original sayings of Christ and given them a general, instead of a special, application. In view of all the considerations which bear upon the subject, I regard it as extremely doubtful whether we can legitimately claim that this passage is more than a pictorial exposition of a principle of the divine judgment, namely, that even small deeds of service, done from love, are approved by Christ, while their neglect is condemned. In this view, it would be an impressive picture of man's relation to his deeds, emphasizing the significance of his works as showing the state of his heart and his real relations to God, as elsewhere Jesus declares the decisive import of man's words (Mt. xii. 36, 37), because they are the expression of his inner life (xii. 34, 35).

The conclusion respecting the doctrine of judgment must be similar to that which we reached in regard to that of the parousia. A principle or process of judgment is recognized, but this process is conceived of as culminating in a crisis at the end of the present world-period. This view is strongly confirmed by the representations of the fourth Gospel.[1] But a candid criticism must admit that it is almost as difficult to be sure of the exact words of Jesus respecting the "day of judgment" as it is to determine what he said concerning his second advent.

Respecting the method or issues of judgment, those will be least disposed to dogmatize who have fully considered the perplexities which a critical handling of the sources

[1] See my *Johannine Theology*, pp. 349–354.

involves. The references to the undying worm and the unquenchable fire certainly suggest the finality of the issues of the judgment, provided one feels confident that they were meant to refer to that event (see Mk. ix. 47, 48; *cf.* Mt. v. 29, 30). The most emphatic declaration of such a final issue of judgment is Mt. xxv. 46: "These shall go into eternal punishment; but the righteous into eternal life." One's view as to the probable originality of this passage will, however, depend upon the theory which he adopts respecting the primary intent of the judgment-scene as a whole.[1]

Jesus assured his disciples of a resurrection and of a blessed life in heaven. They shall be, he said, "as angels in heaven" (Mk. xii. 25); "accounted worthy to attain to that world, and the resurrection from the dead" being "sons of God, sons of the resurrection" (Lk. xx. 35, 36). Their good deeds shall be "recompensed in the resurrection of the just" (Lk. xiv. 14). From these passages many scholars infer that unbelievers are not to share, in any sense, in a resurrection;[2] but this is a precarious *argumentum e silentio* (*cf.* Mk. xii. 26; John v. 29; Acts xxiv. 15). Jesus did not think of Hades as a realm of unconsciousness, but of activity, and therefore had no special motive to touch upon the question, discussed by the Jews, whether all, or only some, should be awakened from the sleep of death. Moreover, when he speaks of the resurrection of the pious, he lays no special emphasis upon the corporeal aspect of it, but conceives of it as the perfecting of the life in all that concerns its divine destiny (Mk. xii. 24–27). That a resurrection in this sense is promised to the righteous only, does not in the least prove that others continue without bodily form, or that they abide in an unconscious existence, or cease to be.[3]

[1] Wendt, *Lehre Jesu*, p. 188, Weiss, *Matthäusev.*, p. 540, and Holtzmann, *Handcommentar*, *in loco*, regard this verse as an addition by the evangelist. It is held to be an amplification of Mt. xvi. 27, in agreement with the idea of Dan. xii. 2.

[2] So Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* § 34, *d*; Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 211 (Bk. I. ch. viii. § 11).

[3] *Cf.* Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 336 *sq.*

PART II

THE TEACHING OF JESUS ACCORDING TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

WITH respect to the authorship of the fourth Gospel three views are now current. (1) The representatives of the so-called liberal school in Germany hold that it is spurious. It is the product of a Hellenizing type of thought which was rife in the second century. It is a construction of the life and teaching of Jesus in accordance with certain forms of speculative thought, and is therefore untrustworthy as a source of historical information or of doctrinal teaching. It is a species of historical romance dominated by the neo-Platonic idea of the Logos, or Reason, which the author identifies with the preëxistent Christ. "The fourth Gospel is only estimated rightly when it is considered to be a product of philosophical poetizing, with a religious tendency, emanating from the third Christian generation. As a source for the history of Christ in the flesh it is almost worthless."[1]

(2) A series of attempts has been made to show that the Gospel, although not written by the apostle John, was mainly composed of genuine Johannine memoranda, in very much the same way as the first Gospel embodied the Logia. Weizsäcker assigned it to a disciple of John who was supposed, however, to have based his work upon apostolic traditions.[2] To this view Hase, who had long defended

[1] Jülicher, *Einleitung in d. N. T.*, pp. 258, 259.

[2] *Untersuchungen über die evangelische Geschichte*, Gotha, 1864.

the genuineness of the gospel, gave his assent in his *Geschichte Jesu* (Leipzig, 1876). The most conspicuous adherent of this mediating theory at present is Wendt who has elaborated it in detail and in a somewhat different form from his predecessors.[1] He holds that the evangelist possessed and used a series of genuine memoranda of the Lord's words, prefaced by brief historical introductions, which he edited and supplemented. These genuine Logia related mainly to the later period of Jesus' ministry, but were so distributed by the editor as to cover his whole public life. They were preceded by the prologue in substantially the form in which we have it. The principal grounds of this hypothesis are as follows: (*a*) The natural course of thought is often interrupted by parentheses which are most naturally referred to a redactor; *e.g.* i. 15 interrupts the connection between *vv.* 14 and 16; xiii. 18, 19 breaks the connection between xiii. 12–17 and xiii. 20. (*b*) The discourses and the historical framework of the gospel exhibit a different cast of ideas. The former emphasize Jesus' miracles as the "signs" of his messiahship; the latter his words and works. (*c*) Certain events are placed in the early part of his ministry which our Synoptic sources refer to its later stages, *e.g.* the cleansing of the Temple (*cf.* ii. 13 *sq.* with Mk. xi. 15 *sq.*) and the assertion of his Messianic claims. Wendt holds that this Johannine material must be separated from the later additions by a critical process, but that when this is done, it is found to "furnish a subject-matter quite in harmony with the contents of Jesus' teaching as attested by the other sources." The opponents of this view commonly urge against it two principal considerations, first, the testimony of the book itself to its production by an eye-witness (xix. 35; xxi. 24), and, second, the completeness of its literary plan and execution and its marked sameness of style throughout.

(3) The third view is the traditional one that the Gospel was written by the apostle John. I can hardly do

[1] *Die Lehre Jesu*, pp. 215–342; cf. *The Teaching of Jesus*, I. 22–28 (orig. pp. 6–10).

more than to indicate the present state of the question. For its discussion in detail I must refer the student to the standard works on New Testament Introduction, and to the many special treatises which the investigation of the problem has called forth.[1] It must suffice to point out that the objections to the genuineness of the fourth Gospel proceed mainly from theoretic and internal considerations, while the opposite view, which also appeals to internal evidence, supports its claim by reference to a line of witnesses which reaches back almost to the very verge of the apostolic age. Those who hold the apostolic authorship urge that the fourth Gospel bears every mark of a historical narrative; it is not merely interested in certain disembodied ideas; it deals in a multitude of facts and detailed narrations. In some details it seems to be more accurate than the Synoptics and to be indirectly confirmed by them. The claim that the book reflects the Gnostic controversies of the second century is not warranted by a sound exegesis of the text. It is from the same hand as 1 John, whose attestation is ample. The twenty-first chapter is probably an addition by a later writer, who in the name of a number of persons strongly attests the genuineness of the Gospel (xxi. 24). The external evidence of the apostolic authorship is abundant, and has been materially increased by the discoveries of recent years. The negative school long disputed certain alleged correspondences between the fourth Gospel and the imperfect text of the *Clementine Homilies;* but when in 1853 Dressel published a complete manuscript of these writings, which had recently been discovered in the Ottobonian library in Rome, there was found in the long lost portion an unquestionable reference to the story of the man born blind.[2] The *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*, which probably dates from the early years of the second century, seems to me to bear traces of the influence of the fourth Gospel. The same may be claimed respecting the

[1] Ample references will be found in Vincent's *Student's New Testament Handbook* (1893), pp. 61–68.

[2] *Hom.* XIX. ch. xxii.; *cf.* John ix. 2, 3.

so-called *Gospel of Peter*, which was discovered at Akhmîm in Egypt in 1886–87, and is believed to date from about 165 A.D. On this subject one of the most competent specialists who has studied it says: "The unmistakable acquaintance of the author with our four evangelists deserves a special comment. He uses and misuses each in turn. To him they all stand on an equal footing. He lends no support to the attempt which has been made to place a gulf of separation between the fourth Gospel and the rest, as regards the period or area of their acceptance as canonical."[1]

But perhaps the most notable addition which has recently been made to the external evidence for the genuineness of the Gospel is that afforded by the discovery of the *Diatessaron* of Tatian. This man was an Assyrian by birth and a hearer of Justin Martyr, and flourished about 155–170 A.D. His earlier life was spent in Rome; later, he lived in the East, especially in Syria. In his *Address to the Greeks* there were several apparent verbal coincidences with the fourth Gospel which gave rise to the conjecture that if his lost *Diatessaron*, or Harmony of the Gospels, could be discovered, it would be found to contain the fourth Gospel. A certain writer of the twelfth century, Dionysius Bar-Silibi, states that the *Diatessaron* began with the words: "In the beginning was the Word." This testimony was rejected by the negative criticism. But when at length in 1886 a complete Arabic manuscript of the *Diatessaron* was brought from Egypt to Rome, it was found that Dionysius was correct, and that the work embodied all four Gospels. This discovery shows that the fourth Gospel was accepted without question as apostolic among the Syrian churches, where Tatian spent his later life, about the year 160 or 165 A.D.[2] These are but examples of recent additions to the testimony. All things considered, the genuineness of the fourth Gospel is amply

[1] Professor J. Armitage Robinson, in his edition of the *Gospel of Peter*, p. 33.

[2] The *Diatessaron* is published in English with full introduction and notes by J. Hamlyn Hill. Edinburgh, 1894.

attested, and internal considerations favorable to the Johannine authorship may be adduced which are, to say the least, as strong as the objections which are urged on the other side.[1]

But just here there arises for the advocates of the genuineness of the Gospel a very important and difficult question: How far is it historically trustworthy? What is its value as a source of information compared with that of the Synoptic tradition? This question is forced upon us by the formal and material differences which exist between the fourth Gospel and the other three.

The Synoptic discourses are full of vivid popular imagery, striking comparisons, and sententious sayings; those of the fourth Gospel are elaborate, elevated, and subtle in style and tone, often rising to heights of sublime mystery. Nor is this difference merely one of language. There is a difference in emphasis and contents as well. The large place filled by the parables in the Synoptics is but partially taken by the allegories of John. The Christ of the Synoptics speaks less of himself; he offers his truth and Kingdom for men's acceptance. In the fourth Gospel, however, his person is presented as absolutely central; he is the Mediator between God and man, the bond which unites earth and heaven. Instead of the parousia with its accompanying signs and wonders, we read in John of the coming of the Holy Spirit after Jesus' departure from earth. The Kingdom of God is the keynote of the Synoptics; the nature and prerogatives of the Son of God the keynote in John. The first three Gospels speak more of the general fatherhood of God; the fourth speaks more of a special fatherhood, denoting a relation which God sustains to his divine and eternal Son. The thought of the fourth Gospel has, for the most part, left the lower, concrete world of Jewish speech, custom, and tradition and entered the higher world of eternal, spiritual realities.

[1] On the internal evidence, see President Dwight in Godet's *Commentary on the Gospel of John* (Am. ed.), Vol. I.; Bishop Lightfoot in *Biblical Essays*, London and New York, 1893, and Dr. A. P. Peabody in the volume entitled *The Fourth Gospel*, New York, 1892.

What are we to make of these differences? How are they to be explained? If what we have seen reason to believe respecting the origin and character of the Synoptic Gospels be true, we cannot suppose that Jesus delivered the Johannine discourses in the form in which they are preserved to us. Jesus cannot have had, at the same time, the style and method of teaching which the Synoptists describe and that which the fourth Gospel reflects. We must, therefore, attribute the language, the color, and the form of these Johannine discourses to the evangelist. The Gospel of John is a distillation of the life and teaching of Jesus from the alembic of the apostle's own mind. It is his interpretation of the meaning of Christ's words, deeds, and person, derived from intimate personal relations with him and colored and shaped by a long life of Christian thought and experience. It is, therefore, less of the nature of a mere report or chronicle than the Synoptic tradition; it is rather a version, a free rendering, a paraphrase of what Christ had imparted to one who had made his teaching so completely his own that it had become fused and blended with his own thought and life.

But it may be asked: If such a subjective element is admitted, does it not impair the historical trustworthiness of the Gospel? To this question we may reply: If it were necessary or possible to recover the very words which Jesus spoke, such an interpretation as the fourth Gospel presents would be subject to some serious disadvantages in comparison with a verbal report. But this is neither necessary nor possible. He spoke a different language from that in which our Gospels are written. We have seen good reasons for believing that the Synoptics also contain very considerable subjective elements and combinations which give rise to many perplexing problems of literary criticism. For years the words of Jesus were written only on the hearts of his disciples. The phenomena of the Synoptics justify the assumption that they have preserved to us his general style of speaking — his method and forms of thought. But the first three Gospels are not reportorial reproductions of his very words. That which our gospel

tradition, in all its forms, reproduces is what Jesus was understood to say. There is a subjective element in all testimony through which the living teacher is interpreted without the intervention of such appliances for the precise reproduction of his words as belong only to modern times.[1] The trustworthiness of testimony depends upon the degree of correctness with which the essential substance of a speaker's real meaning is apprehended.

It does not, therefore, follow that because the fourth Gospel contains a large subjective factor, it is less true or trustworthy than the Synoptics as a source for the knowledge of Christ. The apostle's reflections may have transformed some words of Jesus into something different from what they originally signified,[2] but so far as we have any means of judging, the fourth Gospel compares favorably with the Synoptics in this respect. The book is, indeed, limited by its plan, but it is penetrated by a keen historic interest, and bears all the marks of a faithful portrayal of the essence and import of our Lord's words and deeds. It does not have the tone of a romance. It is not dominated by an abstract idea of the Logos, but by the historic idea that the true Word of God had appeared among men in the person of Jesus Christ. John's version of the sayings of Christ is doubtless, verbally considered, more remote than that of the Synoptists from their original form, but it is not on that account less true to their real significance. His individuality had colored and shaped, through a long life of reflection, the form of his Master's instructions, but it had not distorted or misapplied them. His mystical and intense nature had penetrated into what was deepest in the gospel, and he presents it not in a stereotyped form, but in a living apprehension of its soul of truth. Many lessons of Christ which the disciples had not understood when they were spoken — such as his teaching concerning the

[1] "No line is possible between what has come to men and their interpretations of what has come to them." F. J. A. Hort, *The Way, the Truth, and the Life*, 1894, p. 175.

[2] In the judgment of many, examples are found in ii. 19–22 and xii. 32, 33.

true nature of the Kingdom, the destination of the gospel, and the obduracy of Israel — had now become plain. The promise of the guiding, interpreting Spirit had been more completely fulfilled than in the earlier days of the apostolic Church. The "things of Christ" had been wonderfully disclosed to the apostle, not in a mere outward way, but by such a spiritual illumination of their meaning that the outer word had become an inner word through a living appropriation. Why may not the mind and meaning of Christ be as faithfully represented by such a man and in such a way as by a formally accurate chronicle of his sayings? This method of reproduction has, of course, its limitations and its liability to errors and omissions. To what extent the apostle sharply distinguished, in his own consciousness, the teaching of Jesus from his own doctrinal reflections it is impossible to say. In any case, the objective was also for him subjective. Jesus' teaching, as he understood it, was part and parcel of his own faith and life; and thus the fourth Gospel is at once the mind of the apostle and "the heart of Christ."[1]

The problems upon which I have been commenting are questions of historical criticism, rather than of Biblical Theology; but it has been necessary to touch upon them and to indicate my view of them, because they have an important bearing not only upon one's estimate of the value of the Gospel as a source of the teaching of Jesus, but also upon the way in which its materials are to be distributed and employed in New Testament Theology. For example, Wendt's mediating view respecting the authorship of the fourth Gospel determines his peculiar use of it.[2] He regards the substance of the book, especially that of the discourses, as consisting of genuine apostolic memoranda, and therefore as a valuable secondary source for the teaching of Jesus. He accordingly uses such materials as criticism approves, appending to

[1] The view of this subject which I have here presented will be found, with variations in form and emphasis, in the writings of Weiss, Sanday, Beyschlag, Bovon *et al.*

[2] In *The Teaching of Jesus.*

the Synoptic representation of each doctrine its Johannine counterpart. This use of the materials implies, of course, an attempt at separating the genuine elements from the additions of the supposed editor.

Those who regard the Gospel as "the romance of the Logos," or, at any rate, as a creation of post-apostolic speculation, naturally treat all its contents as a product of the author's own theoretic construction of the life of Christ. On this theory no distinction will be made between the discourses and the doctrinal comments of the evangelist. All is equally the author's own. This method of treating the materials of the book does not, however, necessarily proceed upon the presuppositions which I have just mentioned. It possesses, on its own account, some important advantages and is sometimes followed by those who maintain the genuineness of the Gospel. It was adopted by Weiss,[1] and by Reuss, although the latter also sparingly used materials drawn from the Johannine discourses in his portrayal of the teaching of Jesus.[2] I pursued the same plan in an earlier treatise.[3] This method best enables one to bring out the individuality of the Johannine type of thought, and may be justified by the fact that the teaching of Jesus is so completely cast into the moulds of the writer's own thought that, in one sense, the whole book represents the conceptions of the apostle. The whole Gospel, as truly as the first Epistle, embodies the theology of John and exemplifies the Johannine style, terminology, and mode of conceiving Christian truth. Where the special study of this particular type of thought is the primary concern, this method of treating the Gospel as a whole is the most natural and useful.

The case is quite different, however, when one makes the content of Jesus' teaching his special point of departure and approaches the Gospel with a view to exhibiting, not so much a certain method of apostolic thought in and

[1] In his *Der johanneische Lehrbegriff* and his *Biblical Theology of the New Testament.*

[2] In his *History of Christian Theology in the Apostolic Age.*

[3] *The Johannine Theology*, New York, 1894.

for itself, as the teaching of Jesus as a whole and the various types of apostolic doctrine in their genetic connection with that teaching and their successive evolution. For the purposes of the theology of the New Testament in general it is necessary to separate the discourses and sayings of Jesus from the parts which emanate from the author, difficult as it is to do this in any satisfactory manner. This is the method adopted by Beyschlag[1] and by Bovon,[2] and is that which will be followed in this volume. For reasons which have already been stated, I shall not deem it necessary — as, indeed, I do not think it practicable — to try to separate completely the objective from the subjective in the fourth Gospel. The discourses, for example, may with perfect propriety be used as secondary sources for illustrating the Johannine theology, while, primarily, they will be treated as a source of the teaching of Jesus.

[1] In his *New Testament Theology*.
[2] In his *Théologie du Nouveau Testament*.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEA OF GOD

THE doctrine of God which the fourth Gospel ascribes to Jesus is in no essential respect different from that which we have found in the Synoptics. It is, indeed, expressed to a considerable extent in different words and phrases; Jesus speaks more of the special relation and intimacy between God and himself; several statements concerning God's nature and action are found which are more abstract than any which we meet with in the first three Gospels; yet even in these respects the difference is one of form and emphasis rather than of substance. In general, God is represented in John's report of our Lord's teaching, just as he is by the Synoptics, as the heavenly Father who loves and blesses all, but who confers special spiritual benefits upon the fulfilment of appropriate spiritual conditions.

The clearest reference in our source to what moderns would call the metaphysical nature of God is that word of Jesus to the Samaritan woman: "God is spirit" (πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, iv. 24). The emphatic position of πνεῦμα and the course of thought in the context show that the passage should be thus rendered, and not, as in both our English versions: "God is *a* Spirit." It is not the personality so much as the nature of God which the saying is intended to emphasize. The disputes between the Samaritans and the Jews as to the place where God ought to be worshipped proceeded as if he were a local divinity; as if his presence and power were limited or could only be fully manifested in some particular place. Jesus penetrates beneath all such inadequate ideas of God in his assertion that God can be worshipped with equal advantage anywhere because he is not limited in space — because his nature is spiritual.

Hence what is required in the worshipper is a devout and sincere heart, not resort to some special locality. The purport of the saying is strictly practical. Both the Jew and the Samaritan would theoretically admit its truth. It was the basal principle of the religion of both. But it was often obscured and practically forgotten. The aim of Jesus was to direct attention to the nature of God as a spiritual Being who is everywhere present with his sincere worshippers, in order that he might emphasize the relative unimportance of the outward form and accompaniments of divine worship in comparison with its sincerity and spirituality. While no similar saying is reported in the Synoptics, the same conception of God and of his worship underlies the expression which, in some form, he doubtless employed, that he would build a "temple made without hands," that is, set up a purely spiritual worship (Mk. xiv. 58).[1]

Since God is spirit he reveals himself in ways appropriate to his nature. He does not manifest himself to the senses; no one has seen the Father, except in the revelation which he has made of himself in his Son (vi. 46); "he that hath seen me," said Jesus, "hath seen the Father" (xiv. 9). But it is a spiritual vision of God which is thus obtained; it is an interpretation of his nature and character which is derived from the life of Christ. Those who are incapable of this spiritual perception neither truly see God in his progressive self-disclosure in Jewish history nor in his consummate revelation in Christ. The spiritually blinded Jews of our Lord's time were incapable of hearing that voice of God which had so long been speaking in their own history or of discerning the divine form which had so long been moving amidst the

[1] They were, indeed, "false witnesses" who testified that he said: "I will destroy this temple," etc., but the alleged saying doubtless had some basis of fact. The falseness might well consist in the form into which his actual saying had been cast, *e.g.* in the revolutionary assertion ascribed to him that *he himself* would destroy the temple and build another in its place. What he probably did say — that he would constitute a spiritual worship — emerges quite clearly through the false interpretation which his enemies had given to his words.

prophetic ideals of the nation; and the reason for this was that the outer word of God was not for them also an inner word. Hence they continued to search their sacred writings, vainly seeking to find eternal life in them because they had lost the key to their true meaning and power (vi. 37–39). What is this but the doctrine found in the Synoptics that men must be morally akin to God in order to know him; that it is only the pure in heart who see God (Mt. v. 8)?

In the fourth Gospel we find the same ethical monotheism which we met with in the Synoptics. Both forms of the gospel tradition have the same Old Testament basis. The God of both is the God of Israel. He is "the only God" (v. 44), "the only true God" (xvii. 3), the one Being who in reality corresponds to the true idea of God. This is the basal truth of Israel's religion on which, according to Mark (xii. 29, 30), quite in agreement with the Old Testament (Deut. vi. 4, 5), Jesus based his great commandments of love to God and man.

But in John, as in the Synoptics, the most characteristic designation of God is "Father." We saw that the content of God's fatherhood, as presented in the first three Gospels, is gracious and universal love. We saw that God's fatherhood designated, in the first instance, a unique relation to his Son, and also a special fellowship between God and the disciples of Jesus, involving a disposition of complaisance towards them on God's part corresponding to their obedience and love. But we also found that God was spoken of as being the Father of all men in the sense that he loves and blesses all men, who are by nature akin to himself. The same conceptions meet us in John. In relation to Christ, God is the Father in a unique sense. The Father's love to the Son is grounded upon an original, eternal relation. The Father loved him before the foundation of the world (xvii. 24). In consequence of that relation of love which exists between them, God has given to his Son all authority and power (iii. 35). "He showeth him all things that himself doeth" (v. 20). A historic reason is also given for this love of the Father to the Son, namely, the Son's willing-

ness to lay down his life for mankind (x. 17), and it is the archetype of Christ's own love to his disciples (xv. 9).

The complaisant love of the Father to the filial and obedient, that is, to Christ's disciples, is several times emphasized. The Father specially loves those who love Christ and keep his word (xiv. 23). He regards with particular approval those who love the Son and believe in his divine mission (xvi. 27); indeed, this special loving favor of God to the believing and obedient is likened to the love which the Father has to the Son himself (xvii. 23). This representation corresponds to the usage of the Synoptists who, when speaking of the relation between God and man, apply the terms "fatherhood" and "sonship" by preference to the fellowship which exists between God and the trustful and obedient. The relation which these words, when so used, denote is a reciprocal one, and can only be perfectly realized when man fulfils by obedience and love his side of the relation. To the numerous Synoptic passages which speak of God as the Father of Christians, correspond these Johannine references to the special love and favor with which he regards those who accept the mission and work of his Son. But neither of these representations limits his fatherhood and love to one portion of mankind. All men are still ideally his sons by virtue of their native kinship to him, and he loves all in his unceasing and boundless benevolence.

The supreme proof of God's love to the whole world is seen in his sending his Son to save it (iii. 16). If love is the essence of the divine fatherhood, then must it follow that if God loves all men, he is the Father of all. We accordingly find that Jesus designates him as "the Father" without qualification (iv. 23; xv. 16; xvi. 23). It may, indeed, be claimed that in these passages God is spoken of as "the Father" with reference to his relation to Christ himself. But it appears to me quite impossible to impose this limitation upon the title. In the first of the passages just cited Jesus is speaking of God as an object of worship by his creatures and not of God's relation to himself. The Father desires sincere and rational worship, he says. In

both the other passages Jesus is speaking of the conditions on which his disciples may secure from the Father that which they seek in prayer. Moreover, the obvious references in the first Epistle to God as the Father of men (ii. 1; iii. 1) seem to me to make it evident that the apostle understood God's fatherhood, as represented in Jesus' teaching, to be universal. If this view is correct, the fourth Gospel yields us, in the substance of its report of our Lord's doctrine, the same view of God's fatherhood as the Synoptics. God is the Father of all men because he made and loves all; still he is more commonly designated by the title of Father in his relation to believers, because their attitude towards him makes it possible for him to feel and act towards them as he is indeed disposed to do towards all, that is, to show them that favor and complaisance which correspond to their obedience and love to him. In like manner, all men are his sons in what may be called the natural sense, but they become his true children in the higher spiritual sense, corresponding to his perfect love, only by an ethical transformation and development.[1]

In entire agreement with these ideas of God's boundless love and universal fatherhood he is described as unceasingly engaged in the bestowment of blessing upon his creatures. Jesus represented his beneficent works as having their ground and spring in the beneficence of the Father who had sent him on his mission of mercy to earth. In accomplishing this mission his life was but keyed to harmony with the Father's nature. "My Father worketh even until now, and I work," he said (v. 17).

[1] Jn. viii. 41–44, especially the words: "Ye are of your father the devil," are sometimes adduced, as by Professor C. M. Mead, *Am. Jour. of Theol.*, July, 1898, to show that Christ's application of the term "Father" is "not as broad as the whole human race," "is not universal," and even as an "explicit declaration that God is not the Father of all men" (pp. 591, 592). But what Jesus is here asserting is that some men are not true sons of God; they are not like him, but are like the devil. He no more asserts that God is not the Father even of those men than in saying: "If Abraham were your Father," he denied that the persons addressed were Abraham's descendants. The passage is not concerned with teaching any doctrine about God, but only with describing the moral character of the men in question.

The Father is a perpetual worker in all the methods which are known to his wisdom and love by which he can bless mankind. To this truth Jesus made his appeal when he was reproached for healing the sick on the sabbath. His answer was: The nature of God is my justification; his benevolence does not cease on the sabbath, nor should mine.

This incident furnished the keynote for the whole discourse which followed (v. 19 *sq.*). The whole work of Jesus is grounded in the Father's nature; he does nothing but what he sees the Father doing. God delights to bestow spiritual life and blessing, and he has sent his Son to earth for this very purpose (*v.* 21). And this, continued Jesus, is the hour of spiritual quickening for all who will hear the divine voice which summons them forth from the stupor of self-satisfaction and sin (*v.* 25 *sq.*). At this point (*v.* 28) the passage, as it lies before us in our source, seems to pass over into the thought of the consummation of the life-giving process in the resurrection at the end of the current age. The Father, then, as the absolute Source of spiritual life, has made the Son also the bearer of the same life to all who will receive him (*v.* 26). God is the absolutely living One (*ὁ ζῶν πατήρ*, vi. 57), and he imparts spiritual life to the world through the Son who lives because of the Father (*διὰ τὸν πατέρα*, vi. 57); that is, the Son is made the dispenser of life because of his unique and essential relation to the Father. The work of Christ for men is thus wholly in the sphere of the spirit; it concerns man's higher life in which he is kindred to God; it occupies itself not with what is outward and incidental, but with what is essential to man's true nature and destiny (vi. 63). Thus it appears how his vocation expresses the nature of God as the all-merciful and the all-pervading Spirit, in fellowship with whom man fulfils his destiny. These mystical descriptions are the Johannine counterpart of the Synoptic teaching concerning God's boundless and universal love and the possible sonship of man to God which he realizes in a life of love like that of God, which is the type of all moral perfection (Mt. v. 48).

As the loving Father, God desires not to condemn but to save men (v. 22) Hence he sent his Son, not to judge the world, but "that the world should be saved through him" (iii. 17). Hence Jesus assured men that the aim of his coming to earth was not to judge them (viii. 15; xii. 47). A process of judgment is, however, inseparable from his saving mission. Truth, like light, necessarily judges everything which it touches. Jesus' disclosures of truth to men, and his very efforts to save them, involve their judgment if they spurn his truth and reject his salvation. Hence he says that his truth cannot but test men; his word will judge them and the reason why it will do so is that it is not his mere personal word, but the divine truth which he has received from the Father (xii. 48–50). His primary function is not that of Judge, but that of Saviour; yet his work judges men, and that because he is not alone, but stands in living and perfect fellowship with God, and must deal with men in a way which corresponds with God's own perfect ethical nature. God reveals himself for men's salvation, but it will depend upon their attitude towards his gracious revelation whether it will involve their salvation or their judgment. In this way the teaching and work of Christ — God's consummate self-manifestation — become the test of men. To Christ God has committed the work of salvation; but with that is inseparably connected a work of judgment, because he that honors the Son honors the Father, and he that honors not the Son, honors not the Father who sent him (v. 22, 23).

This teaching but exhibits in clear light the reverse side of the benevolence of God. It lays the strongest emphasis on the divine willingness to bless and save, but shows how that disposition must be affected by the attitude which men take up towards it. God cannot approve or bless with his favor those who scorn his mercy. Salvation implies conditions which must be fulfilled by those to whom it is offered. This truth is brought out in the Synoptic teaching in a less general form, in connection with the divine forgiveness. It is insisted upon that God cannot unconditionally forgive (Mt. vi. 15). He must maintain

the attitude of disapproval or condemnation towards those who will not fulfil the conditions on which alone his grace can be offered or bestowed. This is the idea which is elaborated in more generic form in the teaching of the Johannine discourses concerning the divine judgment. God is essentially gracious, but he manifests his grace in accordance with the demands of his total perfection. Being what he is, he must judge, and men are therefore approved or rejected by him according as they fulfil or refuse to fulfil the essential moral conditions which belong to the very nature of the filial and obedient life of fellowship with God.

In entire accord with this idea the discourses speak of God as righteous and holy. These references (xvii. 11, 25) are, indeed, quite incidental, but they are not on that account less significant. The terms are used in the intercessory prayer of Jesus as appellatives of the Father. Their connection shows that they do not designate specifically the judicial aspect of the divine nature, but refer to what we may call the divine equitableness or self-consistency. To the "holy Father" Jesus appeals to keep or guard his disciples. The implication of the petition is that the holy, the perfectly good and just, Father will not forsake those who have believed on his Son (xvii. 11). The second petition (xvii. 25) is similar: "O righteous Father, the world knew thee not, but I knew thee," etc. It is an appeal to God as the righteous One to regard the disciples with that tender love and protecting care which are correlative to their believing acceptance of Christ. The righteousness of God seems to be conceived of as the guaranty that God will bestow special regard upon those who have heard and obeyed the voice with which he has spoken in his Son. It is the uprightness or rectitude of God which, on the one hand, necessitates his judgment of unbelief and sin, and, on the other, assures his favor to humble trust and devout acceptance of his truth. It is but an outcropping of the idea which is found in the Old Testament, and which underlay Jesus' teaching, that righteousness, self-consistency or self-respect, and benevo-

lence, mercy or self-imparting goodness, meet and blend in the perfect love of God.

It remains to consider the conditions on which God is to be known. The most instructive single passage, in this connection, is xvii. 3: "And this is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." Interpreters are divided on the question whether this statement is intended to define the nature of eternal life[1] or is to be understood as an assertion of the condition on which eternal life is obtained.[2] While I adopt the latter view of the passage, I would maintain a very close and vital connection between the knowledge of God and eternal life. To possess the former, in the sense in which the words are used in our passage, is to possess the latter. This is but to say that the knowledge of God is no merely intellectual affair; it is a spiritual intuition, and is founded on ethical likeness and fellowship of life. He knows God who obeys and loves him. The knowledge of God is the consent of the whole being to the divine will, the sympathy of the whole nature with God's perfections and requirements. This knowledge of God is impossible, except by a transformation whereby man becomes conformed to God in thought, will, and action. A purity of heart and purpose, whereby one comes into an inner likeness to God, is the necessary organ of this knowledge. Here again we meet with the same truth which we found in the Synoptic version of our Lord's teaching: The pure in heart see God, for the pure heart is the eye (Mt. v. 8).

Accordingly Jesus teaches that to know him — to apprehend the real significance of his person, teaching, and work — is to know God: "If ye had known me, ye would have known my Father also" (xiv. 7). The sinful world knows neither him nor the Father who sent him (xvi. 3). Those, however, who recover their spiritual vision so as to see him in his true significance and character, see also the Father who speaks and works through him (xiv. 9).

[1] So Weiss and Westcott.

[2] So Lücke, Meyer, Wendt, and Beyschlag.

Those who are born from above, that is, those who receive a divine impartation of life and light from God, see his Kingdom — apprehend and consent to its heavenly truths and laws; and what is this but entering into the knowledge of God as he discloses his nature and purposes in human history? God does indeed reveal himself to man in historic action; but this outward revelation only becomes a real possession through the soul's appropriation of it according to its true meaning and power. The light of God came into the world in Christ, but it illuminates only those who open their hearts to it. God can dwell only with him who loves that which is Godlike. Love is therefore the essence of the knowledge of God (xiv. 21–23). Love is the true bond between the soul and God; it alone can open the way to the realization of eternal life. Here again we are brought back to the Synoptic teaching that love is the sum of all God's requirements (Mk. xii. 28–31; Mt. xxii. 35–40), the indispensable condition of all growth in the life and likeness of God (Mt. v. 43–48).

CHAPTER III

THE SINFUL WORLD

"THE world" is spoken of in the fourth Gospel in three distinguishable senses. It sometimes means creation in general, as when Jesus speaks of the fellowship which he had with the Father "before the world was" (xvii. 5), or "before the foundation of the world" (xvii. 24). Sometimes it denotes humanity — the present world considered as a realm of rational and moral action. In this sense Christ came into the world as its light (iii. 19); that is, he came to man and entered into his life that he might bring to him the blessings of salvation (xi. 27; xvi. 28). This idea of the world easily passes over into that which is characteristic of our source, namely, the idea of the world as a sphere of evil — the world as alienated from God by sin. Hence Christ came to "save the world" (xii. 46, 47). It was in danger of perishing in consequence of its sinfulness; but God in his love sent his Son to save it (iii. 16). In this sense "the world" means mankind as it is by nature — sinful man exposed to the divine judgment and needing the divine mercy.

The world, then, in this sense is mankind as the subject of redemption and includes all men so far as they still fall short of the true life of fellowship with God or of likeness to him. Hence the contrariety between Christ's Kingdom and the world (xviii. 36). The people of his time for the most part illustrated the spirit of the world which is alienated from God. The world, he declares, did not know God (xvii. 25); hates his disciples (xvii. 14); cannot receive the Spirit of truth (xiv. 17), and is in bondage to Satan as its prince (xii. 31; xiv. 30). Jesus was the champion of a spiritual life and a spiritual Kingdom; the

people of his time were mainly given over to religious formalism and selfish ambition. Between him and them there was little common ground. Without a marked change of standpoint and temper they could never appreciate his truth. They were from beneath, he was from above; they were of this world, he was not of this world (viii. 23). Jesus described their state as one of bondage (viii. 33–36). It was a bondage, however, which they had imposed upon themselves by sin. From this servitude he offered them freedom through the acceptance of the truth as it was embodied in his own person. The true life of love — life according to its perfect pattern, the nature of God himself — was open to them. But most were too blind to see it, lacking in the very capacity to desire it. They had become willing captives to the world of self-seeking ambition — bondslaves of sin (viii. 34). Steeped in self-satisfaction the people were insensible to their own need and folly. Though really blind, they persisted in saying: "We see" (ix. 41). Here was a double fault. To be spiritually blind through wilful self-perversion were, indeed, bad enough; but how radical must be the moral depravity of those who are not even conscious of their blindness, who have extirpated the very capacity to desire the spiritual life.

In the Johannine discourses sin is represented as darkness, while truth and holiness are analogous to light. Darkness is the symbol of ignorance, evil, and death. The sinful world loves the darkness rather than the light, and hence rejects him who brings to it the truth and the life. This is, indeed, the world's judgment that it prefers its own folly to the heavenly wisdom which Christ offers (iii. 19–21). He is the light of the world and offers the light of life to those who are walking in darkness (viii. 12; xii. 35, 46). By this analogy, drawn from the natural world, the evil of sin is set in contrast to the joy and blessedness of goodness. Light suggests every attribute of goodness — its purity, its beneficence, its perfect accord with man's true nature, its divineness. On this white background is set the deformity, the misery, the wicked

folly of sin. Sin is the eclipse of the soul; the obscuration of man's sense of his divine origin and destiny. It is failure, perversion, moral death. It is a defacing of the image of God in man; the forfeiture of man's true life as a son of God.

The Synoptists also represent Jesus as making use of the figure of light and darkness in his teaching concerning holiness and sin. There, too, light is the symbol of the blessedness of the spiritual life. As the light fills the world with brightness and beauty when the eye which is adapted to it is healthy, so God fills the spiritual world with supreme attraction and interest when the soul is freely open to his heavenly truth (Mt. vi. 22–24). Light is a name for man's true and normal life as a son of God. The resulting doctrine is the same as we have found in John. To refuse the light is to become "full of darkness." It is to forfeit one's true life and to renounce his divine destiny. It is, so far, to lose one's own self (Lk. ix. 25). Sin is thus that which is abnormal in the moral life of man. It is discord in a world which is divinely attuned to harmony; rupture in a world which is made for unity; a shadow which obscures to human eyes the very purpose of the Eternal, spreads its fatal blight over all the relations of life, and darkens the brightest dreams of human happiness and achievement.

The contrast of flesh and spirit is also found in our source: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (iii. 6). This passage is a part of Jesus' teaching concerning the "birth from above." It rests upon the idea that there are two orders, — the order of nature and the order of spirit. Our natural birth pertains to the former; by it we are ushered into the realm of personal, independent activity. But if we are to fulfil our supreme destiny, we must experience another birth — birth into the world of spiritual interests and realities. To both these realms we are related; it is not enough to fulfil our relation to one, and not to the other and higher. Jesus does not here represent the natural life as essentially sinful, but only as something lower

than man's proper destiny. He must live the spiritual life, the life of God's Kingdom, if he is to attain his divinely destined goal. The inference is inevitable, however, that if the lower life is made supreme and sufficient, the sinful perversion which has been described under other terms must follow. The outward, the incidental, the mere husk of existence, is not inherently evil, although it is comparatively valueless (vi. 63). But it may become an occasion of evil if chosen and estimated as supreme. Then the lower becomes the enemy of the higher. This false estimate Jesus seeks to prevent by leading men to esteem as highest that which is truly highest, by placing first that which is really supreme — the spiritual life of love in fellowship with God, a primary interest in the highest things.

We find essentially the same contrast and the same resulting doctrine in the Synoptic version of Jesus' teaching. "Flesh and blood" has not revealed Jesus' messiahship to Peter (Mt. xvi. 17); he did not derive the knowledge of it from any outward or natural source of information, but by spiritual discernment. He had spiritually perceived what Jesus was by that living apprehension, that vital affinity of life with him, which is fittingly described as an inspiration from God. This higher spiritual nature of Peter, this eager interest and devoted attachment to his Master's person, was very strong in him; the spirit was willing, but on the dark night of Jesus' sorrow and betrayal, it was temporarily overcome, because the flesh was weak. The lower nature — the natural fears and aversion to danger — asserted themselves, calling forth the mild rebuke: "Couldst thou not watch one hour?" (Mt. xiv. 38). The lesson running through both forms of teaching is: Subordinate the lower to the higher; place that first which *is* first; make the spiritual life primary; seek God's Kingdom and righteousness *first* (Mt. vi. 33), and let every other legitimate object of desire be sought *second*.

There is no formal definition of sin in the Johannine discourses. It is, however, described as an enslaving power (viii. 34), a perverting principle which gains sway

over the lives of men (viii. 21). Jesus recognizes the sin or sinfulness of men as something more than the sum of specific acts of sin. There is such a thing as sinful character — a state of sin of which sinful acts are the evidence and expression. He also speaks of "sins" (viii. 24; xx. 23) which he evidently regards as having their root in sinful habit and propensity. This is especially manifest in the way in which he is represented as speaking of habitual sinning and of committing acts of sin: "Every one that committeth sin (*πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*) is the bondservant of sin," (viii. 34); that is, every one who habitually sins, who lives the sinful life, is in a moral bondage to evil, a bondage of will which springs out of the sinful character which he has developed. But "to sin" sometimes refers rather to the commission of sinful acts, as in the conversation in which the disciples asked Jesus concerning the man who was born blind: "Rabbi, who did sin (*τίς ἥμαρτεν*), this man, or his parents, that he should be born blind?" (ix. 2). Their idea apparently was that *some one* must have committed a great act of sin of which the man's blindness was the consequence. Jesus set aside this assumption on which their question rested and said, in effect: His blindness is not the result of an act of sin on the part of any one.

In the apostle's own development of the doctrine of sin some important discriminations turn on this distinction between doing acts of sin and living the habitually sinful life.[1] It is obvious that while they are to be distinguished, the former tends to pass into the latter. This tendency, however, is rather implied than explicitly expressed in the discourses. But the recognition of sin as an inner principle or power, reminds one of the Synoptic teaching which pictures sin as having its seat in the inner life (Mt. v. 22; xii. 34; Mk. vii. 20–23). As the fruit of a tree is the expression of its nature (Mt. vii. 16–18), so the words and acts of men are the expression of their characters (Mt. xii. 35–37). In its substance, this is the same teaching as that found in John. The heart determines the conduct. The

[1] *Cf.* my *Johannine Theology*, pp. 137, 138.

man who gives his life over to sin comes under the power of a moral necessity of expressing his evil propensities in action. He must act as he is. Moreover, his bondage to evil is cumulative. By a sinful life he welds the fetters of evil more and more strongly upon his soul. The view taken of the nature and practical effect of evil is the same in both forms of the evangelical tradition, although its operation is more graphically pictured, and with a greater variety of illustration, in the Synoptics than in John.

Like the Synoptics the Johannine tradition represents Jesus as assuming that all men are sinful. He describes the work of the Spirit as including the convincing of the world "concerning sin"; that is, making the world conscious of the sinfulness involved in its unwillingness to receive Christ. While this is not an explicit assertion of the absolute universality of sin, it clearly reflects the consciousness on the part of Jesus that the world of his time was mainly against him. More explicit are the sayings in which he declares that he is come to save the world (iii. 17; xii. 46, 47), especially the *locus classicus*: "For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life" (iii. 16). If salvation is for the whole world, the whole world must stand in need of it; all men must be regarded as sinful. We found this same presupposition running through the Synoptic teaching. No exceptions from the requirement of repentance were recognized. Even kind and generous parents were spoken of as "evil," that is, sinful (Mt. vii. 11). Even Jesus' own disciples whose lives were under the inspiring power of his own, and whom he would unquestionably class with "good" men (Mt. xii. 35), must ask to have their sins forgiven and their hearts more completely delivered from evil desires and passions (Lk. xi. 4; Mt. vi. 12–15). The goodness of the best of men is but relative. Evil pervades human life as a subtle atmosphere. Man can be delivered from it only in proportion as he puts his life under the conquering might of goodness and becomes the bondslave

of righteousness — a good tree which brings forth fruit "after its kind" by a necessity which is founded in the law of life that what a man chooses, says, and does is essentially determined by what he is (Mt. xii. 33–37).

The phenomena of "demoniacal possession," which are so vividly described in the Synoptics, do not appear in the fourth Gospel. The only "possession" which is there recognized is that which his enemies maliciously ascribed to Jesus himself. Several times they charged him with having "a demon" (vii. 20; viii. 48; x. 20). The context of these passages shows that this possession which they attributed to him was thought of as a form of madness. When he solemnly asked the Jews why they were seeking to kill him, they replied by the taunt: "Thou hast a demon: who seeketh to kill thee?" (vii. 20). The third passage (x. 20) describes a dispute as to his sanity. Some said: "He hath a demon, and is mad; why hear ye him?" The second passage expresses the charge of madness leading to absurd and irreverent presumption. The Jews say: "Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a demon" (viii. 48); and when he still asserts his divine mission and his power to bestow life, they return the charge more vehemently: "Now we know that thou hast a demon" (viii. 52). From these passages we see that "possession" by demons was popularly regarded, according to the fourth Gospel, as the explanation of aggravated forms of mania which led its subjects into wild and irrational ideas and actions.

We note here the same fact which we observed in the Synoptic representations, namely, that "possession" is not associated with special wickedness. The fourth Gospel strongly confirms the conclusion to which we were led by an examination of the Synoptic passages, — that all the symptoms which are ascribed to demoniacal possession are characteristic of various forms of disease, especially of mental disease; and no one would experience any difficulty in explaining them as such if the language of the Gospels did not attribute them to possession by demons. We find no idea of the subject in the fourth Gospel which is not explicable in the same way. Possession is mania;

and its relation to special wickedness, if it exists, is mediate and indirect. In the language which the fourth Gospel ascribes to Jesus, there is no reference whatever to the possession of men by demons. This source, therefore, reflects only the popular idea of it, and does not represent Jesus himself as making any reference to the subject. The phenomena of "possession," therefore, yield us no data for the doctrine of sin which we are seeking to derive from the Johannine memoranda of the Lord's words.

The same cannot be said, however, with respect to the idea of Satan. The reality and power of the devil as a source of wickedness in men are clearly recognized in the discourses under review. It is true that we find a somewhat broad and loose use of the term "devil," according to which it may be applied to an evil man. Judas is called a "devil" (διάβολος, vi. 70), that is, diabolical in nature, hostile to Christ. This reminds us of the application of the epithet "Satan" to Peter (Mk. viii. 34; Mt. xvi. 23). In the other cases (of which there are but two: viii. 44; xiii. 2) "the devil" means the prince of evil. The first of these is the more explicit. Jesus is rebuking the Jews for their insensibility to his truth and their hostility to his work. In the midst of this denunciation he cries out: "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father it is your will to do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and stood not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof" (viii. 44).

This sonship to Satan is here set in contrast to the sonship to God which the Jews claimed for themselves. In both instances an ethical kinship is referred to. The Jews show that they are not truly sons of God, because in accusing and opposing Jesus they evince their unlikeness to God and their antipathy to his supreme self-revelation in his Son. Nor are they, in this deeper ethical sense, sons of Abraham. In disposition and action they are totally unlike him (viii. 40). Abraham read the mind and will of God in his revelations; they, on the contrary, are blind to the meaning of the plainest words of God. Jesus then

plainly asserts their real kinship to the devil whose evil desires they are disposed to obey.

In what follows we have the fullest characterization of Satan to be found in our source. He is described (1) as a murderer from the beginning, (2) as not standing in the truth, and (3) as a liar and the father of lying. I shall briefly consider the meaning of each of these characterizations. Interpreters are divided in their judgment respecting the meaning of the phrase "a murderer from the beginning" (*ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*). Some suppose it to refer to an agency of Satan in inciting Cain to kill his brother. On this view the meaning of the words would be that from the infancy of the race Satan has been inciting men to murderous thoughts and deeds. The principal objection to this view is that in the Old Testament narrative (Gen. iv. 3 *sq.*) the murder of Abel by Cain is not attributed to Satan's instigation. Nor does this interpretation seem to yield an idea which quite matches the other elements of the description. Others would take *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* absolutely — a view which would imply either that God had created Satan evil from the beginning of his existence, or that an evil being had always existed alongside of the eternally good Deity. Still others explain *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* as meaning from Satan's beginning *as Satan*, that is, from the time of his fall from holiness. The former of these two interpretations is contrary to the nature of the dualism which is recognized in John, as we shall see a little later on; the latter does not accord well with the natural meaning of the word "murderer" which, it would seem, limits *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* to the field of human life and experience. Moreover, this view finds no support in the Johannine writings elsewhere since they make no allusion to a fall of Satan.

The phrase is most naturally understood as a reference to the temptation in which Satan, in the form of a serpent (Gen. iii. 1 *sq.*), is represented as causing the fall of man. In this case, the words would describe Satan as having been an agent of man's moral destruction, a foe to God's beneficent designs from the beginning of the human race. It is quite in this spirit of Satan that the Jews are

now seeking to destroy Jesus and to thwart his work for mankind. This portion of our passage certainly presupposes the real existence of a spirit of evil who acts a great part in the drama of human history, but contains no suggestions respecting Satan's origin or fall.

The meaning of the phrase, "stood not in the truth," etc. (*ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐκ ἕστηκεν*), is, at least, slightly affected by the way in which *εστηκεν* is punctuated. If written *ἕστηκεν*, as by Westcott and Hort, the verb would be the imperfect of the late and inferior verb *στήκω*, and should be rendered as in the Revised Version, "stood not," did not remain firm or steadfast, in the truth. If, however, with Tischendorf, Meyer, Weiss, and Holtzmann, we punctuate it with the rough breathing, *ἕστηκεν*, we have then the perfect of *ἵστημι* with the force of the present, and the meaning is, "he does not stand in the truth," the realm of truth is foreign to his life. With the former punctuation it is possible to regard the phrase as most patristic and Roman Catholic interpreters do, as referring to a fall of Satan. In my judgment, the reading *ἕστηκεν* is decidedly to be preferred, both on the ground of usage[1] and of suitability of meaning to the context. This phrase, then, simply asserts the utter falseness of Satan.

Respecting the third phrase, "for he is a liar and the father thereof" (*ὅτι ψεύστης ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ*), the view has been taken by some modern interpreters[2] that *αὐτοῦ* relates specifically to *ψεύστης*, and that *ὁ πατήρ* is not in apposition to *ψεύστης*, but refers to another person. In this case the meaning would be: He (Satan) is a liar, and so is his father. This same idea of the father of the devil is also found at the beginning of the verse, where *ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστέ* is rendered: Ye are from the father of the devil. Grammatically considered, both these renderings are possible. The contention of those who adopt this interpretation is that we have here

[1] The imperfect *ἕστηκεν* is nowhere else found, unless it be (so W. and H.) in Rev. xii. 4, where all other editors, so far as I have been able to ascertain, punctuate *ἕστηκεν*. Here, too, the Revisers follow W. and H.

[2] *E.g.* Volkmar, Hilgenfeld, O. Holtzmann.

a reflection of the Gnostic demonology which represents the Demiurge, the inferior God of the Jews, as really the father of the devil. This is an item in the proof of the late origin and speculative character of the fourth Gospel. But the monstrous idea which this interpretation finds here is absolutely foreign to our Gospel and to the whole Bible. It finds no confirmation in the context. Αὐτοῦ should be understood as referring to ψεύστης generically conceived: The father of the liar, whoever he may be, — or to the idea of ψεῦδος, previously expressed, and implied in ψεύστης.[1] H. J. Holtzmann aptly says: "We owe to a carelessness of style this interesting discovery of a father of the devil, very much as we owe to an oversight of the compiler of the hymn-book the idea of the devil's widow."[2] The phrase in question is to be understood simply as a more particular explanation of the general statement, made just before, that Satan does not live in the element of truth, but in that of falsehood.

We have already seen that in the Synoptic report of Jesus' teaching Satan is several times spoken of. He appears at the beginning of our Lord's ministry, and seeks to divert him from his Messianic calling (Mt. iv. 1–11). He catches away the good seed (Mk. iv. 15), and desires to test Peter (Lk. xxii. 31). We saw that while such passages recognize Satan's existence and activity, they are more figurative, that is, less definite and didactic, than is commonly supposed. He is even pictorially described as falling "like lightning from heaven" (Lk. x. 17). But from neither form of the gospel tradition can we derive more than the idea of a causative agency of Satan in the sinfulness of mankind. Sin is presented as alliance with Satan, as kinship of spirit with him. Beyond this general idea no explanation of the origin and development of sin is offered in the tradition of our Lord's words.

Sin is always represented in the Johannine discourses as

[1] A similar construction is found in ix. 31, where αὐτοῦ refers, not to θεοσεβής, but to the θεός in the previous phrase.

[2] *Hand-Commentar, in loco.* See the *Autobiography* of F. W. Krummacher (Eng. trans., New York, 1869), pp. 303, 304.

a voluntary affair. Whatever may have been the temptations inciting to sin from without, it is considered as caused by him who commits it. There is a dualism of light and darkness in the world, but the darkness is chosen by those who walk in it (iii. 19). God is the source of the light only, not of the darkness. Men would possess and enjoy the light if they loved and followed it. It is light and not darkness which is primary and fundamental in the universe. Sin is never represented as an essential or eternal principle. Sin is a perversion due to free personal action. No duality of good and evil as coeternal powers is recognized in our sources. The dualism of these discourses, as of John's own teaching, is ethical, not metaphysical. It is a conflict of opposing moral principles and powers. The sons of light are those who choose and pursue love, truth, and goodness; those who walk in darkness do so freely and with full responsibility. The world is a realm of freedom; its good is praiseworthy; its evil is equally blameworthy. Sin is not viewed in the teaching of Jesus as due to the action of an evil deity as original and powerful as God himself, or as consisting in a metaphysical imperfection inhering in the very constitution of the universe, but as a wilful and guilty disobedience of the supreme law of righteousness, a violation of man's true nature, and a forfeiture of his divine destiny.

CHAPTER IV

JESUS' TESTIMONY TO HIMSELF

THE titles "Son of man" and "Son of God" which we have studied in the Synoptics are both of frequent occurrence in the fourth Gospel. We will here consider the way in which these terms are used in the sayings of Jesus. To Nathaniel he says that heaven will be opened and that angels will descend upon the Son of man (i. 51) — evidently a figurative way of saying, with an allusion to Gen. xxviii. 12, that in him communication between heaven and earth is established. He speaks of himself as the Son of man who descended from heaven and who is now in heaven (iii. 13), that is, belongs to heaven as his native sphere.[1] The Son of man is the dispenser of eternal life (vi. 27, 53), must be lifted up on the cross (iii. 14; viii. 28), shall ascend to heaven where he was before (vi. 62; xii. 23; xiii. 31), and shall judge the world (v. 27).

We observe that here, as in the Synoptics, the title is used by Jesus only. It evidently designates for his mind something that is characteristic and unique in his personality and mission. The use of it accords well with the conclusion which we reached when studying the Synoptic passages in which it is employed, namely, that it is a name for the founder and head of the Kingdom of God and thus a veiled designation of the Messiah. The Johannine description of the Son of man as bestowing eternal life

[1] Attention should, however, be called to the fact that preponderating external authority (including ℵBL) is against the genuineness of the words: *ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ*. W. and H. regarded the phrase as a Western gloss, perhaps suggested by i. 18. It is retained by Tischendorf, Meyer, Weiss, and Beyschlag (*per contra*, Wendt). Weiss regards *ὁ ὤν* as equivalent to *ὃς ἦν* — "who was with the Father" before the incarnation. But on this view the words would be almost identical in meaning with the previous clause: *ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς*.

(vi. 27) corresponds to the Synoptic representation that the Son of man forgives sins (Mk. ii. 10) and seeks and saves that which is lost (Lk. xix. 10). Eating the flesh and drinking the blood of the Son of man seems to be a mystical way of depicting the believing acceptance and appropriation of Christ in heart and life which the Synoptic discourses so often emphasize (*e.g.* in Mt. xi. 28–30). The lifting up of the Son of man on the cross (iii. 14; viii. 28) is the Johannine counterpart of the second group of passages (see p. 41) in which the Synoptists describe the necessity of his sufferings and death (*e.g.* Mk. viii. 31; ix. 31; xiv. 21). In the Synoptics we found the correlative of this doctrine of the suffering and dying Messiah in the teaching concerning his majesty. After his death he should be exalted to the throne of power and glory in heaven whence he would come to judge the world (Mt. xxiv. 31; xxv. 31). The analogue to this idea also is found in the fourth Gospel where Jesus speaks of his ascension to heaven, of his glorification at the Father's side (xii. 23; xvii. 5), and of his authority to execute judgment "because he is the Son [or, a Son] of man" (*υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου*; v. 27). As the One who founds the Kingdom of heaven upon earth, who presents eternal life to men by bringing to them a living revelation of God in human form, the Son of man must judge men; his truth must test them and determine their place in the scale of moral being. Thus our source reflects the same contrast between the humiliation and the dignity of the Son of man, and suggests the same method of reconciling the apparent contradiction. The life of lowliest condescension proves to be the life of supreme exaltation. The way of the cross is the way to the throne of the world. The seeming inconsistency disappears in a higher unity. The testimony of Jesus concerning himself which stands connected with the title "Son of man" is thus in substance the same in both forms of our gospel tradition.

The doctrine of Jesus' sonship to God is most fully set forth in three of his discourses: (1) that of which the conversation with Nicodemus was the occasion (iii. 16–21);

(2) that in which he justified his healing a man on the sabbath, and further explained and defended his divine mission (v. 16–47); and (3) the discourse on the bread of life (vi. 32–58). Several briefer passages are also important (*e.g.* viii. 56–58; x. 30, 38; xiv. 11; xvii. 5). We will review these discourses in order.

In the first discourse the main idea is that the Son is the bearer of salvation to the world, the light which shines in its darkness, thereby testing men and determining their divine acceptance or rejection according to the attitude which they assume towards himself. The Son is the Saviour; belief on him secures eternal life; rejection of him entails condemnation at the bar of the divine judgment. Whatever be the relation between the Son and the Father underlying these representations, it is certain that the Son is the representative of God, the embodiment of the divine light and love in such a sense that the attitude of men towards him involves their attitude towards God (*cf.* v. 23) and is decisive of the favor or disfavor of heaven. Twice the intimacy of this relation between the Son and the Father is emphasized by the application to the former of the term "only begotten" (μονογενής).[1] This word is in all cases applied to the incarnate Son of God and accentuates the uniqueness of his sonship. "The only begotten Son" cannot imply less than that Jesus Christ is the Son of God in a different sense from that in which men become sons of God. It distinguishes him as One who, in the meaning of the title "Son of God" as applied to him, has no brethren. Whatever the nature of his sonship, it is unique and incomparable; it is shared by no other.[2]

In the next discourse (v. 16–47) Jesus asserts the per-

[1] This term is used by John in three other passages in application to Christ: i. 14, 18; I. iv. 9. This use of the word to characterize Christ's sonship is peculiar to John's writings.

[2] Even Wendt (*Teaching of Jesus*, II. 151 *sq.*; orig. p. 450 *sq.*) and Beyschlag (*N. T. Theol.* I. 242, 243; Bk. II. ch. iii. § 3) admit that Jesus is described in our source as Son of God in a unique and preëminent sense. This they explain, however, as involving only a preëminent human perfection and a unique mission.

fect accord of his work with the Father's will and nature. The work of the Father and that of the Son are essentially one. The Son doeth nothing from (*ἀπό*) himself; "for the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth" (*v.* 20). Then follows a description of the work of the Son. It includes the bestowment of spiritual life (*v.* 21), the execution of judgment (*vv.* 22–24), and the resurrection of the dead (*vv.* 25–29). The remainder of the discourse (*vv.* 30–47) enforces the divine attestation of his mission from God.

The discourse on the bread of life (vi. 32–58) was occasioned by the miracle of the loaves (vi. 1–14). When a multitude followed him in the hope of securing a further supply, Jesus urged them to seek from him rather the spiritual food which he had come to bestow. To their question as to what he meant that they should do, he replied that they should believe on him whom God had sent (*v.* 29). They then called for the credentials of his divine mission — some sign which should authenticate his claim as the giving of manna attested the providential leadership of Moses (*vv.* 30, 31.) To this request the discourse in question is the reply. Jesus begins by contrasting the manna which supplied only the physical wants of the present with the heavenly bread of life which he gives and which meets the deep and permanent needs of the soul. The true bread from heaven God is now giving them; it is himself. Those who eat this bread, that is, those who inwardly appropriate him in their hearts, shall have life spiritual and eternal. When the Jews murmured at these sayings, he explained that those only who had a predisposition to spiritual things would appreciate his truth or receive him; those only whose spiritual natures had been quickened — who had some kinship of spirit to God — would welcome him who came from God and perfectly represented the divine will and nature (*vv.* 44–46). The rest of the discourse (*vv.* 52–58) contains that mystical description of the appropriation of Christ under the figures of eating his flesh and drinking his blood whose meaning may best be considered in another connection.

The uniqueness of Jesus' relation to the Father is strongly asserted in his address to the Jews recorded in the eighth chapter of the Gospel. He here declares that he came forth from God (*v.* 42) and knows him (*v.* 55); he maintains his sinlessness (*v.* 46), and concludes by saying that his own being antedates the birth of Abraham (*v.* 58). On another occasion in a similar disputation with his critics he affirms that he and the Father are one (x. 30); that is, they coöperate perfectly in all that concerns the salvation of men. A perfect fellowship of life, purpose, and work exists between them. He is in the Father, and the Father in him (x. 38; xiv. 11), so that he who has seen the Son has seen the Father also (xiv. 9), because the Son perfectly embodies and reveals the Father's will. In the intercessory prayer he again refers to this perfect ethical union between the Father and himself as the true type of the union which should exist among his disciples (xvii. 21), although he also refers to the glory which he possessed in fellowship with the Father before the world was (xvii. 5). This passage seems clearly to involve an incomparable relation which he sustained to the Father, since no similar language is anywhere applied to any other person.

In reviewing the Synoptic teaching concerning Jesus' sonship to God we saw that his preferred self-designation was "Son of man" and that the title "Son of God" was chiefly applied to him by others. But we also saw that he did recognize the latter title as applicable to himself by the way in which he spoke of God as "the Father," and especially by the correlation of "the Son" with "the Father" in the passages, Mt. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22) and Mk. xiii. 32. A noticeable point of difference in this respect is that in the Johannine discourses Jesus frequently applies this title to himself. The title "Son of man" is used only by himself, as in the Synoptics, but it is relatively less used; the title "Son of God" is applied to him both by himself[1] and by others, but, according to John, is much more freely used

[1] This he sometimes does by implication, and in other instances he uses only the shortened form "the Son."

by him than the Synoptists would lead us to suppose. This fact may be due to John's reproducing more fully the implications of Jesus' self-testimony. There is, no doubt, a difference of emphasis upon the sonship of Jesus to God in the two forms of our gospel tradition. John's version of our Lord's teaching brings into stronger relief the unique and inscrutable relation of Christ as Son to the Father. But there is no essential difference in meaning between his sonship as represented in John and that which the Synoptists recognize.

We observed that in the first three Gospels there is no passage in which Jesus classes himself along with other men as a Son of God in the same sense in which they are sons of God, and that, accordingly, he uses the terms "my Father," "your Father," not "our Father," in referring to the divine fatherhood. The same care in the use of words is observed in the fourth Gospel. The two sources are thus perfectly at one in ascribing a unique sonship to Jesus. God's fatherhood, in its relation to him, meant something more than it meant in its relation to others. God was his Father, and God was their Father, but not in the same sense. The fourth Gospel accents this distinction by naming Christ the "only begotten" Son, but in so doing it merely designates by a special word a peculiarity of Christ's person and relation to God which the language of the Synoptics is also scrupulously careful to recognize.

In both forms of the evangelical tradition the title retains its historical basis. It denotes one who is the special object of God's complaisant love. The relation to God which it emphasizes is not primarily ontological, but ethical. It denotes a reciprocal and dynamic fellowship. The title, though not a common synonym for "Messiah" among the Jews, was peculiarly appropriate for the Messianic King, the Founder of the divine Kingdom on earth. Accordingly, in John, we find his sonship to God most emphasized in those discourses in which he is explaining and defending his saving mission to earth. As "eternal life" may be called the Johannine counterpart of the Synoptic "Kingdom of God," so we find that in the fourth Gospel

Christ's sonship is most closely correlated with the bestowment of eternal life, as in the Synoptics it is most associated with his Messianic mission as the Founder of the Kingdom. But while the title has thus a certain kinship to "Messiah," it appears to have been rather a personal than an official title. His messiahship was grounded in his sonship to God. The former term describes the mission to which he was appointed; the latter his fitness for that mission. He could be the Messiah because he was the Son of God *par éminence*. Hence, when in our source he emphasizes his sonship to God in connection with his work, it is because that work for men is grounded in what he *is;* his saving work as Son of God is always conceived of as being possible because of that inscrutable personal relation to God which his sonship involves.

When, therefore, we trace the roots of this idea of sonship and observe the marked peculiarities of emphasis and language which the Gospels exhibit in the presentation of it, we are constrained to conclude that it expresses not so much a historic function or vocation as a nature or character which is fundamental in the personality of Christ.

Before pursuing further the inquiry into the nature of Jesus' sonship to God, we must consider the import of the passages which speak of his preëxistence. Those which are of most importance are vi. 62: "What then if ye should behold the Son of man ascending where he was before?" viii. 58: "Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was born, I am" (*πρὶν Ἀβραάμ γενέσθαι ἐγὼ εἰμί*); xvii. 5: "And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self (*παρὰ σεαυτῷ*, at thy side) with the glory which I had with thee before the world was," and xvii. 24: "For thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world." A number of recent writers have advocated the opinion that these passages refer not to an actual but to an ideal existence of Christ with God before his earthly life. Some seek to justify this conclusion by exegesis, some by general historical considerations, and still others by a combination of the two.[1] Wendt and

[1] For a sketch of the views of Harnack, Baldensperger, and Bornemann, see Orr's *Christian View of God and the World*, 1893, pp. 508–510.

Beyschlag approach the subject from the standpoint of Biblical Theology, and I will therefore select their discussions for a brief description and review.

Wendt thinks that Jesus "came forth from God" (xvi. 28) only in a figurative sense, as his disciples were not "from this world" (xv. 19) and as the Jews were "from the devil" (viii. 44). Believers are also described as being from God (I. iv. 4) or as born from above (iii. 7). Jesus' claim to have been sent forth from God means, on this view, that he was chosen by God for a special work. The preëxistence asserted in viii. 58 was an ideal pre-existence only. As Abraham's vision of Messiah's day was only ideal, so the existence of Messiah at the time was only in the plan or purpose of God. The saying in the intercessory prayer (xvii. 5) Wendt explains after the analogy of those passages which represent rewards as stored up for men in heaven (Mt. v. 12; vi. 20, etc.). Such rewards have no real, but only an ideal, existence; they exist in the divine mind or intention. In like manner the Son existed before his earthly life began in the divine destination only. The glory which he had with the Father was an ideal glory which the Father destined for him. Wendt admits that this language could not have this meaning as we moderns use words. For us the terms would signify real preëxistence, but not according to a method of thinking and speaking which is current in the New Testament. "According to the mode of speech and conception prevalent in the New Testament, a heavenly good, and so also a heavenly glory, can be conceived and spoken of as existing with God and belonging to a person, not because this person already exists and is invested with glory, but because the glory of God is in some way deposited and preserved for this person in heaven."[1]

To this interpretation I would present the following objections:[2] (1) The language which Jesus applies to

[1] *Teaching of Jesus*, II. 169 (orig. p. 465).

[2] I have more fully reviewed Wendt's arguments in *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 115–122.

himself is entirely unique. In saying that others are "from the world" or "from God" he refers, as the connection clearly shows, to ethical likeness. But he never says of any other than himself that he abode at the Father's side before the world existed, sharing his glory, and that the Father sent him into the world. Nor is there any indication in the context of any of the relevant passages that their language is figurative. (2) Wendt's interpretation of viii. 58 does not suit the connection of thought in which it stands. To the assertion of Jesus that Abraham saw his day (*v.* 56), the Jews reply that Abraham lived centuries ago, while he is not yet fifty years old (*v.* 57). They would thus involve him in what was to them the absurdity of claiming that he coexisted with Abraham. Jesus meets the objection squarely by asserting not only that he existed when Abraham lived, but that he existed before Abraham was born. Nothing but a reference to real personal preëxistence in the answer of Jesus fits the meaning of the objection which called it forth. (3) The supposed analogy between xvii. 5 and passages like Mt. v. 12 and vi. 20 is very remote. In the latter Jesus speaks of the rewards of his disciples as existing in advance in heaven, but he does not speak of the disciples themselves as preëxisting. In the former he does not merely speak of his glory as stored up for him in heaven, but of himself as already possessing that glory at the Father's side before the world was. If he had said that his disciples preëxisted in the enjoyment of heavenly bliss, he would have said something analogous to xvii. 5. In order to have furnished the analogy which Wendt seeks to find, Jesus should either have said in this passage that his glory preëxisted, or in the other passages that his disciples preëxisted. (4) The argument from the alleged prevalence in antiquity of the idea of preëxistence is precarious, and would often prove too much. The New Testament writers exhibit no tendency to overwork that idea. Unless this be an example, they exhibit no confusion in their language between ideal and real preëxistence. The idea of God's purpose was indeed strong among the

Jews. The careers and characters of men are often spoken of in the New Testament as divinely purposed, but the writers do not therefore speak of the preëxistence of the persons in question, or show that they confused the totally different conceptions of real and ideal existence. The destinies of men may be conceived as existing ideally in God's purpose, but I know of no instance in which this idea is confounded with that of the personal, much less the eternal, preëxistence of the men themselves. Who ever imagined that the author of Hebrews (viii. 5) supposed the tabernacle to have really existed in heaven before it was constructed on earth? Jesus doubtless spoke of his perfected Kingdom as already prepared for his disciples in God's purpose (Mt. xxv. 34); yet he did not say: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom in which you have participated from the foundation of the world."

Beyschlag has adopted a somewhat different method in the effort to establish a conclusion similar to that of Wendt. The expressions of Jesus which seem to assert his preëxistence were all spoken in "very agitated moments" of his life. Jesus was under the spell of the current idea of preëxistence. How natural that he should think of himself as preëxisting in God's purpose, just as the tabernacle and the Kingdom of God preëxisted. Especially would he so express himself in "excited moments" when he attained the most vivid vision of his divine calling. But does not the language of Jesus in the Johannine discourses speak of a real, and not merely of an ideal, preexistence? Beyschlag gives a twofold answer: (1) We cannot assume that John has given a *verbatim* report of Jesus' actual language; (2) the distinction between ideal and real existence is a modern one, and is not applicable in the interpretation of Biblical language. Our author then takes up the passages. When Jesus speaks of the Son of man ascending up where he was before (vi. 62), he implies that he preëxisted as the Son of man. Now the Messiah could preëxist *as such* only ideally. The passage "Before Abraham was born, I am" (viii. 58) may be interpreted,

says Beyschlag, according to any preconception which one brings to it. The real meaning of it (when it is interpreted without any preconception) is: Before God thought of the birth of Abraham, he purposed my mission. Respecting xvii. 5 the argument is: If Jesus had here referred to a glory possessed by him in heaven before his incarnation, he could not now ask it back as a reward of his work, as he does. What one possesses by nature he cannot receive as a reward. This "glory" was not an eternal possession, but the reward of his life-work which the theory of real preëxistence absurdly condemns as an "empty phantasmagoria." Respecting xvii. 24 our author says that it would have astonished the Biblical writers to be told that God can love only a real person. Does not Jeremiah (i. 5) speak of God's knowing people before their birth, and Paul (Eph. i. 5) of his choosing men before the foundation of the world? The meaning is that God eternally loved Jesus by anticipation; that he loved the idea of him to which he proposed to give reality in due time by his creation.[1]

This exposition encounters the same general difficulties as that of Wendt. I will, however, offer the following additional observations in regard to it: (1) It would require no special appeal to "agitated" or "excited moments" of Jesus' life to explain his conviction that his life-work was the realization of a divine ideal. That conception underlay the whole life of Jesus. Paul entertained a similar conviction respecting his own life even when under no special stress of excitement. (2) The two answers of Beyschlag to the question: Do the relevant passages refer to a real preëxistence? would lead to two very different solutions of the problem. The first would lead to the view that Jesus did not speak of a real preexistence at all, though John has represented him as doing so. The second would involve the idea that even if Jesus did use the language attributed to him by John, he did not intend by means of it to describe real preëxistence. The conclusion first suggested is that Jesus did not even

[1] *N. T. Theol.* I. 250–255 (Bk. II. ch. iii. §§ 6, 7, 8).

seem to speak of his real preëxistence; that next suggested is that he did seem to do so, but really did not. Beyschlag wants to avail himself of the advantages of these two entirely different suggestions. If one will not break the force of the interpretation which derives the idea of personal preëxistence from the passages in question, perhaps the other will. And yet he speaks with emphatic disapproval of those who bring dogmatic prepossessions to the interpretation of these passages. (3) When the doctrine of real preëxistence is to be disproved, Beyschlag favors treating the language of John in the freest and loosest manner; but when occasion requires it for the establishment of the opposite view, it must be construed with the strictest literal severity. The statements that Christ existed before Abraham was born, shared the Father's glory, and was the object of his love before the world was created, are only loose expressions for the notion that God had eternally in his mind an idea of bringing such a person as Jesus Christ into existence; but when he speaks of the preëxistence of the Son of man we must have no loose handling of words. It was *as Son of man* that he preëxisted; but that could only be in an ideal sense. There is nothing like popular speech or accommodation in these passages so far as they favor one conclusion; there is nothing else in them — not even a consciousness of the "modern" distinction between the ideal and the real — so far as they favor another. The strict construction which Beyschlag proposes for vi. 62 would hopelessly ruin his whole case if applied to viii. 58, xvii. 5, and xvii. 24. It should hardly need be said that the passage which speaks of the Son of man ascending where he was before, implies only the continuity and preexistence of his personality, not the perpetuity of his historic calling as Son of man. If Jesus had said in so many words: The Messiah preëxisted, who (except Beyschlag) would ever have argued that this could only mean that he preëxisted as the Messiah of the Jewish people.[1] (4) The

[1] If I say: Professor Dr. Beyschlag studied theology in Bonn and Berlin from 1840 to 1844, and was court-preacher in Karlsruhe from 1857 to

considerations which Beyschlag advances as determining the interpretation of xvii. 5 and 24 consist, in the first instance, of a dogmatic inference,[1] and, in the second, of an argument from analogy. Since, on Beyschlag's own principles, dogmatic considerations are to be ruled out, and since the analogies adduced to support the idealistic interpretation of xvii. 24 are not parallels, I am content to set the plain words of these verses over against Beyschlag's inference and alleged analogies and join with him in appealing the question to the reader's candor. I will also join in his protest against dogmatic bias in exegesis; but while he warns against "traditional" prejudice, I will ask to file a *caveat* against "critical" prejudgment. The position of those who hold that the fourth Gospel attributes to Jesus a doctrine of his preëxistence which he probably did not hold, or which, in any case, is not true,[2] appears to me to be much more straightforward than the exegetical ingenuities of writers like Wendt and Beyschlag.

When we compare the doctrine of Christ's sonship as found in the fourth Gospel with that which is presented in the first three, we observe both difference and likeness. The preëxistence of the Son is not asserted in the Synoptic discourses. The title of Son is less frequently heard on the lips of Jesus himself, and his references to his sonship are much less explicit than in John. The more frequent use of the title by others in the Synoptic narratives does not enable us to form a very definite idea of Jesus' own conception of its meaning. From an examination of the Old Testament roots of the conception and of the Synoptic use of the title, we conclude that its generic idea was that of one uniquely loved or chosen by God. I think the same notion underlies the usage of the fourth Gospel. Jesus claims for himself a unique ethical sonship to God — an incomparable fellowship with the Father. The Johannine

1860, who would insist that it was *as Professor Dr. Beyschlag* that he so studied and preached?

[1] "Die Frage nach dem Verlhätniss der neuanzutretenden Herrlichkeit zu der früheren (betont von Beyschlag, I. 254; Bk. II. ch. iii. § 8) thut hier nichts zur Sache." (Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II. 403.)

[2] See Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II. 401–404.

idea is the same as that of the Synoptic passage whose "Johannine tone" has been already remarked: "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father; and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal him" (Mt. xi. 27; Lk. x. 22). The relation of Jesus to God which this sonship denotes is, according to both forms of teaching, absolutely unique; it can be predicated of no other. This uniqueness the fourth Gospel sets in strong relief by its doctrine of eternal preëxistence. Christ does not *become* a son of God; he *is* the Son of God.

At this point our inquiries bring us again face to face with the great problem of doctrinal theology respecting the person of Christ. That problem is, whether this altogether exceptional intimacy between the Father and the Son, taken in connection with the sinless perfection of Christ and his explicit assertions of an eternal fellowship with God, does not force us beyond the limits of humanity for the explanation of his person, and require us to posit an ontological relation as its only adequate ground. A negative answer to this question can only be justified by explaining away the testimonies of Jesus to his preëxistence and by showing that neither his sinlessness nor his unique fellowship with God requires for its explanation any fundamental difference between him and other men. All this is easily accomplished by those who discredit the Gospels at the outset; but the efforts of those who seek to reach the same conclusion on the assumption of the substantial trustworthiness of the Gospels and the genuineness of the fourth, are not, in my judgment, successful. Those who are convinced that the consciousness of Jesus was "purely human," would do far better to seek the confirmation of their conclusion in some other field than that of exegesis. As against this conclusion the apostolic Church and, for the most part, the Church of all subsequent ages have held that the self-testimony of Jesus as presented in the New Testament compels the inference that he eternally partakes in the nature of Deity. I hold that this conclusion is correct.

CHAPTER V

THE HOLY SPIRIT

THE teaching of Jesus concerning the Holy Spirit is, in a sense, the counterpart of the Synoptic teaching regarding the parousia. It is found wrought into those discourses which were uttered towards the close of his earthly life, and the purpose of which was to comfort his disciples in view of his approaching departure from them. He assures them that, although they will be bereft of his bodily presence, he will still be with them in the gift and presence of the Spirit.

To this "Holy Spirit" (xiv. 26), or "Spirit of truth" (xiv. 17; xv. 26), these discourses apply by preference the name "Paraclete" (*παράκλητος*). In most English translations of the Bible this word has been rendered "Comforter," that is, one who strengthens. In the one place, however, where the word occurs outside of the discourses in question (1 Jn. ii. 1), it is rendered "Advocate." The word *παράκλητος* means one who is called in to the side of another, and was commonly applied to an advocate at law, especially the advocate for the defence. Practically, therefore, it means an advocate, counsellor, or helper. The word "Comforter," in the sense of supporter, represents very well the essential import of *παράκλητος*, although Advocate or Helper would have been a more accurate rendering and one which could have been consistently adopted in all the passages. Since in xiv. 16 the Holy Spirit is called *ἄλλος παράκλητος*, — that is, since the term *παράκλητος* is by implication applied both to Christ and the Spirit and in the same sense, — it is evidently desirable to assign the same

meaning to παράκλητος in the discourses and in 1 Jn. ii. 1. The Spirit is the Christian's divine Helper.

Various functions are ascribed to the Holy Spirit. He will teach the disciples (xiv. 26), declare Christ's truth (xvi. 14), guide the disciples into all the truth of Christ (xvi. 13), bring his teaching home to the recollection of his followers (xiv. 26), glorify Christ and bear testimony concerning him (xvi. 14; xv. 26), and convict the world concerning sin, righteousness, and judgment (xvi. 8). He will hold constant fellowship with the disciples (xiv. 16), will continually abide at their side and dwell within them as a source of inspiration (xiv. 17). This description of the Spirit's activities shows in what sense he is called "the Spirit of truth." He is the bearer and mediator of the truth which Jesus embodied in his revealing, saving work. The world of the Spirit's activity is the same as that of Christ. He is the continuator of the redemptive process in the world; he makes real and effective in human life the truth which the earthly mission of Christ revealed. Hence the Spirit of truth interprets those divine realities which constitute the inner meaning of the life of Jesus and fosters in men the spiritual life which accords with them. In this way he leads men into all the truth, that is, into the ever fuller realization of the true import and purpose of Christ's work; into the increasing fulfilment of the life of love and fellowship with God. Thus the Spirit's work is the same in kind with that of Christ. It is a method or aspect of God's redemptive action in bringing men to a saving knowledge of himself. It is not so much an addition to the intellectual possessions of men which this teaching of the Spirit contemplates, as a translation of the motives and principles which reigned in the life of Christ into their conduct and characters.

It is necessary now to consider the questions whether in these discourses the Spirit is conceived of as a self distinct from Christ, or is a name for an impersonal principle, or for the continued spiritual presence of Christ himself with his disciples after his departure from earth. I regard the use of pronouns which refer to the Spirit as important

in its bearing on this question. Since the word πνεῦμα is grammatically neuter, all pronouns which have πνεῦμα for their immediate antecedent must, of course, be neuter also (xiv. 17, 26; xv. 26). It is obvious that the use of neuter pronouns in these circumstances can have no bearing on the question of the personality of the Spirit. It is a noticeable fact, however, that pronouns referring to the Spirit which do not have πνεῦμα for their immediate antecedent are, in all cases, masculine, that is, the Spirit is described by personal designations except where grammatical necessity compels the use of neuter words. For example, in xiv. 26, we read: "The Holy Spirit which (ὅ) the Father will send in my name, he (ἐκεῖνος) shall teach you all things." The same peculiarity of language is observed in xv. 26: "The Spirit of truth which (ὅ) proceedeth from the Father, he (ἐκεῖνος) shall bear witness of me." In xvi. 13 this usage is still more pronounced since the Spirit is designated by ἐκεῖνος, although the neuter τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας stands in immediate apposition with it. If the use of masculine pronouns in xvi. 7, 8 might seem to be due to the presence of the masculine noun παράκλητος, this certainly cannot be the case in *vv.* 13 and 14 where παράκλητος is not used. The conclusion which these facts justify is that our sources, with the utmost possible uniformity refer to the Spirit in terms implying personality.

The view that the Holy Spirit is a name for the glorified Christ himself by which he described his spiritual presence with his disciples, is supported by appeal to the following considerations. In xiv. 17, 18 the Spirit's coming and his own coming to his disciples seem to be identical: "He (the Spirit) abideth with you, and shall be in you. I will not leave you desolate: I come to you." In connection with the promise of the Spirit Jesus assures his followers that they shall soon behold him again: "A little while, and ye behold me no more; and again a little while, and ye shall see me" (xvi. 16; *cf.* xiv. 19). This is understood to mean that although he will soon be withdrawn from their physical sight, he will still be spiritually present with them and they shall see him with the eye of the spirit. In

both manifestations he is the same; the name "Holy Spirit" is but a personification of the invisible relation which he will sustain to them after his ascension.[1] The same identification of Christ and the Spirit is found in the words of Jesus after his resurrection when he breathed on his disciples and said: "Receive ye the Holy Spirit" (xx. 22). This, it is said, was a symbolical action in which Jesus imparted to his followers a power from himself; the Spirit which he bestowed was the blessing of his own inspiring and sanctifying spiritual presence. Thus it appears that the name "Holy Spirit" represents only a hypostatizing of the thought of Jesus' continued invisible presence with his disciples. In reality, the Spirit is identical with himself. The ascription of personal activities and the striking application of personal pronouns to the Spirit which we have observed would be explained as natural and appropriate on this view, since the Holy Spirit is a person in the sense of being identical with the glorified Redeemer. The Holy Spirit is regarded as Christ's continued life, and this life is personal.

Alongside of the passages which seem capable of this explanation, we must now place another group of sayings which explicitly distinguish the Holy Spirit from Christ. The Spirit is called "another Advocate" (ἄλλος παράκλητος, xiv. 16). Christ was an Advocate or Helper; the Spirit will be another. Here the two Helpers are plainly distinguished by the word ἄλλος as personally different. The Spirit is another besides Christ. The same distinction is sharply marked in xiv. 26: "But the Comforter, even the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you." It is difficult to conceive of Jesus as saying that the Father would send the Spirit in his name and that he would quicken the memory and

[1] So Reuss, *Hist. Christ. Theol.* II. 469 *sq.* (orig. II. 524 *sq.*). *Cf.* Bovon, *Théologie du Nouveau Testament*, I. 521, who holds that the fourth Gospel, with its practical and religious tendency, gives no indication towards solving the question whether the Holy Spirit denotes a force or a person. The author evidently inclines strongly to the former idea.

apprehension of his teaching in the minds of his disciples, if he had meant no more than that he himself would be spiritually present with them. Jesus distinguishes himself very explicitly from the Spirit, when, in xv. 26, he says that he will send to his disciples the Spirit of truth and that he shall bear witness concerning himself. The Spirit shall glorify Christ and shall take Christ's truth and declare it to his disciples (xvi. 14, 15). Again he says: "It is expedient for you that I go away; for if I go not away, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him unto you" (xvi. 7). On the interpretation under review these passages would mean: I will send you influences from myself; my presence in another form of its manifestation shall be with you; I will teach you concerning myself; in my spiritual form of existence I will glorify my historic mission; it is necessary that my bodily presence be withdrawn from you in order that my invisible presence may be realized.

It is, indeed, conceivable that Jesus should have said all this. But do the passages in question represent him as saying it? It appears to me impossible to sustain this view by exegesis. The Johannine discourses represent the Spirit as a self distinct from Christ. Even Reuss admits that this is the exegetical result which the passages yield.[1] His claim is that this is a case where the problem respecting the real meaning of Jesus lies behind exegesis. The text embodies a misconception. It makes a distinction where there is no difference. It treats a twofold manifestation of Christ as if two different personalities were involved. He thinks that in the passages in which Christ and the Spirit are identified we have the clew to the real meaning of all the others; that as we have on the surface of the discourses two divergent representations, one describing identity, the other difference, we must decide which is the more rational and make that determining for the explanation of the other. Applying this test, Reuss concludes that the distinguishing of the Spirit from Christ is due to a speculative motive, and

[1] *Hist. Christ. Theol.* II. 472 (orig. II. 527).

that the original meaning of the teaching concerning the sending of the Spirit was that Jesus would manifest his own invisible presence to his disciples by spiritual influences.

The legitimacy of such a conclusion should not be denied on merely theoretical grounds. The question is whether there are ascertainable facts which require or justify it. If there is a real inconsistency between the terms which describe the nature and coming of the Spirit in some passages and those used in others, we must, no doubt, determine which conception of the subject is the more probably original and correct, and so decide between them. Something like this we were compelled to do in view of the divergent representations in the Synoptic accounts of the parousia. Let us then more closely compare the description of the Spirit as a distinct person with that which is believed to yield the opposite idea and test their alleged inconsistency.

When in connection with the promise of the Spirit Jesus speaks of himself as coming to his disciples and of their seeing him (xiv. 18, 19), there is some difficulty in determining to what sort of a *coming* he refers. Three views have been held, not to mention combinations of these. Some refer the words to the second advent; others to his appearance to his disciples after the resurrection; and others to the work of the Spirit. On either of the first two interpretations the passage would have no bearing upon our present inquiry. I regard the third interpretation, however, as more probably correct. The context seems to make it clear that by his coming he here means his coming in the gift and work of the Spirit, and that by their beholding him he means the clearer spiritual vision of him which the illumination of the Spirit will make possible. Assuming the correctness of this interpretation, does the passage identify the Spirit with the glorified Christ? I think not. The uniform representation of these discourses is that the Spirit continues Christ's work in the world, interpreting and applying his truth, and fostering in the disciples the spiritual life. He may there-

fore fitly say that he comes to men in the coming and power of the Spirit. The work of the Spirit is done in his name. It is built upon his revealing, redeeming work. His object in affirming that he will come to them is to assure them that they will not be left desolate; the loss of his bodily presence will not involve their abandonment; they will still be divinely guided and strengthened. In a true sense the whole teaching respecting the Spirit implies the continued presence of Christ with his disciples as over against their desertion. But the emphasis in such an assertion does not lie on the distinctionless identity of Christ and the Spirit, but on the certainty that they will still spiritually see and know him. The same may be said of xvi. 16: "A little while, and ye behold me no more; and again a little while and ye shall see me," and xvi. 22. "But I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice," — passages which I would also refer to the coming and work of the Spirit. Nor can the conclusion in question be legitimately drawn from the words of Jesus when he breathed on his disciples, and said: "Receive ye the Holy Spirit" (xx. 22). This saying is as easily construed in accordance with the view which makes a distinction between Christ and the Spirit as it is in accordance with that which supposes that "Holy Spirit" is here a name for Christ's own spirit, subjectively considered. If a distinction is clearly recognized elsewhere, the application of it here does no violence to the language. It is only by a misplaced emphasis that these passages can be regarded as excluding a distinction between Christ and the Spirit. That Christ reveals himself and continues his work in the world through the Spirit, no more excludes a distinction between himself and the Spirit than the presence and activity of God in the work of salvation wrought through Christ involves the absolute identity of the Father and the Son.[1]

[1] The passage "I come again, and will receive you unto myself" (xiv. 3), is not brought into consideration here because I hold that it refers not to the coming of the Spirit, but either to the coming of Christ at the death of his disciples (so Tholuck, Lange, Holtzmann), or to the

The Spirit is sent in Christ's name (xiv. 26), that is, the Spirit's work lies in that realm of truth and life which the "name" of Christ symbolizes and comprehends. He is the interpreter of Christ. The revealing, saving activity of Jesus is a disclosure in terms of human life of those eternal spiritual truths and powers which the work of the Spirit will make real and effective in the hearts of men. The life and teaching of Jesus supplies, as it were, the materials, in forms which men can apprehend, upon which the Spirit works. He opened the Kingdom of heaven, he disclosed the nature of God, the meaning of life, and the way to peace with God. The Spirit does not bestow any new or different revelation, but rather opens the eyes of men to see ever deeper meanings in what Jesus Christ has revealed in his teaching and life. The connection, therefore, between Christ's historic action and the Spirit's work is a very close one. It is of him that the Spirit will bear witness (xv. 26); it is his truth into which the Spirit will guide the disciples. The Spirit's work is the invisible continually operative counterpart of the historic action of God in Christ. It is the perpetual action of divine love in carrying forward the work of salvation. The historic action of Christ was temporal; it began and it ceased. The Spirit's work goes on perpetually accomplishing the fulfilment of the great saving process. For this invisible but potent operation Jesus regarded his historic appearance as a preparation; hence he said: "It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him unto you" (xvi. 7).

More closely considered, the work of the Spirit is to foster the spiritual life in the individual. The faith and love of the first believers were largely sustained by the visible presence of Jesus with them. During his earthly life he was always leading their minds away from dependence upon his miracles and from mere attachment to his

parousia (so Lechler, Meyer, Weiss), — more probably to the former, at any rate, in its original intention. Reuss does not appeal to this passage in support of his view of the identity of the Spirit with Christ.

visible personality to a deeper apprehension of what he said and was. He sought to ground their faith upon deeper reasons than those which appeared so largely to the senses and would be quickly weakened when he should have disappeared from their sight. Only as faith penetrated into the heart of his spiritual truth and struck its roots into the life of God, could its persistence and growth be assured. Hence he said to Thomas: "Because thou hast seen me thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed" (xx. 29). This is the beatitude of those who have not seen Christ in the flesh, but who have seen him with the eye of the spirit and who have discerned in him the revelation of God and of the meaning and goal of life. It was only by such a deepening of faith that the spiritual vision of the first disciples could be gradually enlarged and clarified. Gradually their inherited prejudices gave way. They saw the work of Christ and the meaning of his Kingdom in a new light. Their own faith found broader and more secure foundations. That all this might happen it was necessary, he said, that he should withdraw from them his bodily presence. The veil of sense must be rent; the aid of sight must be surrendered in order that his disciples might walk by faith alone. The inner treasures of the gospel must be opened by the Spirit; its hidden depths must be fathomed; its lofty heights must be ascended. His followers must cease to know him after the flesh, for the lower easily becomes a hindrance to the higher. Under the guidance of the Spirit faith must assert its true power, realize its own true nature, adjust itself to that spiritual world to which it belongs, and go forth on its world-conquering mission.

It remains to consider the work of the Spirit on the unbelieving world. It is described in the following passage: "And he (the Paraclete), when he is come, will convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgement: in respect of sin, because they believe not on me; of righteousness, because I go to the Father, and ye behold me no more; of judgement, because the prince of

this world hath been judged" (xvi. 8–11). The Spirit is here described by judicial analogies as appearing as an advocate against the unbelieving world which has rejected Christ. In respect to the matters of sin, righteousness, and judgment the Spirit will convict the world of being in the wrong and will pronounce upon it the verdict of *guilty*. There are three counts in the indictment against the world, and the causal clauses which are added to the statement of them give the reasons why on each of them the world stands condemned.

With respect to the matter of sin the Spirit will convict the world by showing that it was in the wrong in not welcoming and believing on Jesus Christ as its Saviour. The sinfulness of men in rejecting him will more and more plainly appear. The Spirit will demonstrate the sinfulness of opposition to Christ. The next element in the verdict is kindred to this. With regard to righteousness the Spirit will convict the world of its false position, because Jesus is going to the Father, and his disciples will see him no more. The righteousness which is here in question is probably the personal righteousness of Christ. The world has deemed him unrighteous, and has crucified him as such. The Spirit will accuse and convict the world of being in the wrong in its estimate of Christ. It will reverse the world's verdict by appealing to his ascension and glorification. When he ascends to heaven and exerts his rightful spiritual authority over the world, it will be seen that the world has misjudged him. The third element in the Spirit's conviction of the world is in respect to judgment. In the matter of judgment the Spirit will put the world in the wrong because he will show that the prince of the world stands condemned. The result of the Spirit's work will be a victory over Satan. This result is seen as already on the point of being accomplished. "Now shall the prince of this world be cast out" (xii. 31). The Spirit will procure the verdict of history which will vindicate Christ and condemn the spirit of opposition to him. It is probable that this work of the Spirit is conceived of as wrought mediately

through the testimony and teaching of believers in whom he dwells.[1]

This form of teaching concerning the Spirit is mainly peculiar to the fourth Gospel. The Synoptists speak of the Spirit of God as descending upon Jesus at his baptism (Mk. i. 10), as driving him into the wilderness to be tempted (Mk. i. 12), as speaking in his disciples (Mt. x. 20), and as pervading his life-work (Lk. iv. 18). But these expressions hardly carry us beyond the Old Testament idea of "the Spirit" as a name for the power or presence of God. The elaboration of the doctrine of the Spirit's personal nature and of his offices in redemption is characteristic of that form of Jesus' teaching which the fourth Gospel presents. It is the Johannine counterpart of that aspect of the Synoptic teaching concerning the parousia which is expressed in the words of Jesus: "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world" (Mt. xxviii. 20).

[1] The foregoing points are elaborated with more exegetical detail in my *Johannine Theology*, ch. viii.

CHAPTER VI

ETERNAL LIFE

THE phrase "eternal life" holds a place of prominence in the fourth Gospel similar to that which is occupied by the title "Kingdom of God" in the Synoptics. Their meaning is also essentially similar. To "see" or "enter into" the Kingdom of God (iii. 3, 5) is the same as to "have eternal life" (*vv.* 15, 16). Both terms express the realization of salvation — the appropriation of the saving benefits which Christ came to bestow. Our present purpose requires us to discuss the provision for the bestowment of eternal life through Christ, the method of its appropriation, and its essential nature and characteristics.

Jesus represents himself as the bread of life of which, if a man eat, he shall live forever — the spiritual nourishment for the permanent satisfaction of the soul (vi. 35, 50). When pressed for an explanation of these strange words, he said that men should obtain eternal life by eating his flesh and drinking his blood (*vv.* 51–56). What was his meaning? The interpretation which was adopted by many of the Church fathers and which obtains in the Roman Catholic church is that he referred to the impartation of his body and blood to the communicant in the eucharist. A considerable number of modern Protestant scholars apply the words to the Lord's supper.[1] The diffi-

[1] Briggs, *The Messiah of the Gospels*, p. 281, maintains this view on the ground that the discourse is predictive and that Jesus is speaking symbolically of his death and resurrection. If this is the case, it would more naturally lead to the interpretation given by Augustine and preferred by most Protestant scholars, that the reference is to the propitiatory death of Christ rather than specifically to the Lord's supper. The alleged "predictive element," however, is that which requires to be proved. Jesus

culties which confront this explanation appear to me to be very great. Jesus is discussing his mission with his enemies. That he should assert in reply to their criticisms that it is necessary for men to partake of a memorial supper which was to be founded some time afterwards, seems almost incredible. If that were the meaning of the discourse, it is difficult to see how it could have been in the slightest degree understood by those to whom he spoke. Moreover, the whole discourse appears to speak of a present gift of eternal life which is available for men by a believing reception of himself. It does not purport to speak of future events; it refers to what men may now do and, in consequence, have eternal life. Hence the great majority of recent interpreters[1] — correctly, as I believe — reject this application of the discourse.

Almost equally difficult, however, is the prevailing Protestant interpretation that Jesus here spoke specifically of his death. The giving of his flesh for the life of the world (*v.* 51) does not seem to denote a giving up of his body to death, but a continuous offering of himself to men as the living bread from heaven. The two expressions — to give his flesh to be eaten, and to offer himself as the bread of life — appear to be perfectly synonymous; but I do not see how the latter is capable of any specific application to his death. Moreover, it is almost as difficult to suppose that in a disputation with hostile Jews, Jesus would dwell so long in advance upon the saving significance of his death as it is to suppose that he would offer them a mystical exposition of the import of the eucharist. In view of these difficulties there is a strong tendency among recent interpreters to abandon these explanations and to seek an interpretation more in accord with the historic situation of the discourse, and with the natural meaning of the figure of "the bread of life," which underlies this whole description of his saving mission.

says that the Father is now giving (*δίδωσιν*, *v.* 32) the true bread from heaven, which is his flesh (*v.* 51).

[1] So, *e.g.* Lücke, Meyer, Weiss, Beyschlag, Wendt, Westcott, and Godet.

To me it seems more natural to interpret the language of the discourse in a symbolic or mystical sense, as expressing the idea of the appropriation of Christ himself in faith and love. This explanation yields a natural meaning for the figures of eating and drinking, and agrees well with the historic circumstances in which the discourse was spoken. The Jews demanded a "sign" from him: "What, then, doest thou for a sign, that we may see and believe thee? What workest thou?" (*v.* 30). The substance of Jesus' reply was that he would give no "sign" except himself. He offers himself to the faith and love of men. His own person and work, when they are truly understood, constitute the true sign from heaven. To receive and appropriate him in heart and life is the true "work of God" (*v.* 29). This explanation also corresponds to the current use among the Jews of the figures of eating and drinking. Lightfoot has given abundant examples of this usage.[1] It also agrees in substance with the answer of Jesus to the demand for a sign, as recorded by the Synoptists. No sign, he said, should be given except the "sign of Jonah," that is, his own presentation of divine truth in his person and teaching (Mt. xvi. 4; xii. 39; Lk. xi. 29). "For as Jonah became a sign unto the Ninevites" (by bearing to them a divine message and promise), "so shall also the Son of man be to this generation" (Lk. xi. 29).[2] Whatever, therefore, be the exact meaning of "flesh" and of "blood" in our passage, and whatever may be the distinction between them, the discourse as a whole directly relates neither to the eucharist, nor to the death of Jesus, but to his person as the medium of the supreme self-revelation of God, from which his teaching is, of course, quite inseparable. Those who spiritually receive him as the bread of their souls, enter

[1] *Horæ Hebraicæ*, by John Lightfoot, D.D. (Oxford tr.), III. 307–309.

[2] Our passage furnishes incidental confirmation of the view that the "sign of Jonah" was Jesus' teaching or revelation of God, as represented in Luke, and not an experience analogous to Jonah's being three days in the belly of a sea-monster, as the first Gospel explains it (in xii. 39, though not in xvi. 4).

into loving fellowship with him and make him their guide and inspiration, thereby attain eternal life.[1]

Elsewhere Jesus refers to his death on behalf of (ὑπέρ) men, that is, in order to secure their salvation. "The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep" (x. 11, 15). Here the import of the allegory would suggest that, as the shepherd is ready to make great personal sacrifice to protect his sheep from danger, so Jesus undergoes a self-denying death for those whom he loves. To derive the expiatory idea from this passage, as Meyer does, by explaining the words "lays down his life" as meaning, "pays down his life as a ransom-price," appears to me exegetically untenable.[2] The death of Christ is here regarded as the supreme proof of self-renouncing love, as in the words: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (xv. 13). In what specific way the death of Jesus avails to secure the eternal life of men, these passages do not tell us. They rest upon analogies drawn from human experience. They are general and indefinite; yet they clearly speak of some unique service of love which Jesus discharges to the world by his death, to which they attribute a special saving significance and value.

Jesus described his work for men as involving a perfect self-giving which stopped not short of the yielding up of his life for them. "For their sakes," he said, "I sanctify myself, that they themselves also may be sanctified in truth" (xvii. 19). He consecrated himself absolutely to his saving mission in order to secure an analogous consecration to truth and duty on the part of his followers.[3] That Jesus regarded his death as an essential element in this self-devotion to his mission is evident from the saying: "Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth by itself alone; but if it die, it beareth much fruit" (xii. 24). But it is clear from the context of this

[1] *Cf.* my *Johannine Theology*, pp. 158–164.

[2] For a fuller discussion, see *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 172–175.

[3] On the interpretation which assigns a specifically sacrificial sense to "sanctify" (ἁγιάζειν) here, see *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 178, 179.

passage that the dying which is spoken of is regarded as the culmination of service and self-giving. Jesus here formulates the law of serving love to which his disciples, as well as himself, are subject. They are to follow him in the life of self-renunciation and thus to win their true, eternal life (*vv.* 25, 26). Twice he refers to his being lifted up on the cross (iii. 14, 15; xii. 34). This is spoken of as necessary and as a means whereby men will be drawn to him and will obtain eternal life. It is probable that in the second of these passages the lifting up from the earth refers not only to the death on the cross, as John explains it (xii. 33), but to the consequent exaltation, after the analogy of Phil. ii. 8, 9. In any case the death of Christ is presented as the consummation of his work of love and the chief source of his matchless power in the world. Further than this the words of Jesus, as John reproduces them, do not carry us towards any philosophy of the relation between his death and the bestowment of eternal life. The fact of such a relation they do clearly presuppose.

The subjective factor in the procurement of eternal life is faith. This condition is emphasized in the discourse on the bread of life where believing on Christ, coming to him, and eating of the heavenly bread, are evidently equivalent phrases. Hence we find the concise formula: "He that believeth hath eternal life" (vi. 47). The sum of God's requirements is that men believe on Christ (vi. 29). What, then, is faith that it should be the gateway into eternal life? It is clear that it is something more than mere intellectual assent. The belief which was the result of some temporary impression Jesus did not highly esteem. Hence he said to certain Jews, which had believed him: "If ye abide in my word, then are ye truly my disciples" (viii. 31). Again, we are told that he did not yield his confidence to those who were chiefly influenced to believe on him by the miracles which he did (ii. 23, 24). A true, saving faith will rest upon more spiritual grounds, and will imply a more adequate appreciation of the deeper significance of his person and work. Hence he regarded faith as a growing thing. It may rest at first upon super-

ficial reasons, but if it is sincere, it is capable of such expansion and enrichment that it will find for itself a new and deeper basis. Hence it is said that after the miracle at Cana, in Galilee, in which Jesus "manifested his glory," "his disciples believed on him" (ii. 11), that is, entered on a new stage of faith in consequence of their clearer apprehension of his divine power and glory.

As I have already intimated, faith in the deeper sense of the word involves life-union with Christ. It is spiritual fellowship with the Redeemer.[1] To believe in this true sense is to come to Christ (vi. 35), and so to enter into the realization of eternal life (*v.* 47). Faith, therefore, involves one's whole spiritual attitude towards the divine truth and love which are supremely revealed in Christ. The condition of appropriating eternal life, which in so many places is called faith, is elsewhere described as abiding in Christ. The allegory of the Vine and the Branches (xv. 1–9) contains the most striking representation of this idea. As the branch obtains life only by remaining connected with the stock and root, so the disciple receives spiritual life and is enabled to bear its fruits only by abiding in Christ. The realization of this oneness with Christ is the life of faith; it is that impartation of spiritual life from God which makes one a participant in the Kingdom of God (iii. 3) and a possessor of eternal life.

The view which has just been expressed respecting the mystical significance of faith is confirmed by the passage: "And this is eternal life, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ" (xvii. 3). Whether we regard this statement as intended to define the essence of eternal life, or as stating the condition of attaining it, the words imply a close connection between eternal life and the knowledge of God and Christ. The practical difference between these views is not very great, since on the former interpretation it would hardly be maintained that the two terms in question are absolutely synonymous, but only that the knowl-

[1] Illustrations of this view and of the anti-mystical views of Weiss and Wendt are given in my *Johannine Theology*, pp. 228–232.

edge of God and of Christ is the root or subjective principle of eternal life. This explanation would closely resemble the view that the knowledge spoken of is the condition of sharing in the eternal life. The passage is probably to be explained after the analogy of such sayings as these: "I am the resurrection and the life" (xi. 25), that is, the means whereby these are secured, and: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (xiv. 6), that is, the one who guides men into the way, the truth, and the life. In like manner the knowledge of God and of Christ, that is, fellowship and sympathy with them, is the condition of realizing the eternal life. It is not an arbitrary condition, but one which is prescribed by the very nature of eternal life. That life is the realization of man's destiny as a son of God; it is the Godlike life and must therefore be realized in fellowship with God, involving love and obedience to him. The knowledge of God is communion with God; eternal life is the blessedness, the increasing perfection, which flows from that communion. Eternal life is a gift, a bestowment of God; the knowledge of God is the subjective appropriation, the entrance of man into that relation of obedience and receptivity which makes the realization of eternal life possible. They are related as faith to salvation; as conversion to regeneration. They are thus distinguishable but not separable.

The knowledge of which our passage speaks is a vital, spiritual apprehension of God as he is revealed in Christ. It is not a mere theoretic knowledge, but a knowledge which carries the whole nature with it so that God becomes the supreme object and the ruling power in the life. Its meaning is set in clear light by those passages which speak of those who do not possess it. The enemies of Jesus did not know God (viii. 55), that is, they were without appreciation of his nature and revelation and destitute of ethical likeness to him; "but I know him," said Jesus, meaning that he was in sympathetic intimacy with God. "If ye had known me," he said again, "ye would have known my Father also" (xiv. 7); that is, if they had truly appreciated the meaning of his person and work and

had put themselves under their power, they would have found him the way of entrance into fellowship with God.

But what is such a knowledge of God which involves the consent of the total man but the love of God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength which the Synoptic discourses (Mk. xii. 30, 31; Mt. xxii. 37, 38) designate as the first and great commandment? In a characteristic Scriptural use of words, to know is to love. "Every one that loveth knoweth" (1 Jn. iv. 7). The various terms by which the conditions of salvation are described meet and blend into perfect harmony and unity. Faith is trust in God; the knowledge of God means fellowship with him; love to God includes devotion, obedience, and service to him. Fundamentally considered, they are all the same. No doubt the greatest of all such terms is love; but there could be no love to God which did not embrace what we mean by faith in God and the knowledge of him. Eternal life is simply *the life*, — the life which is truly such, — life after the divine ideal. It is realized by coming into right relations to God. Entrance into these relations and the maintenance of them may be called by various terms, such as faith, obedience, fellowship, love. They all mean the same thing, or various aspects of the same thing. Salvation is a spiritual life; the conditions of its realization are spiritual. It is an eternal life. It has nothing to do with time or place. It is realized in this world, or in any world, where its spiritual conditions are fulfilled.

"Eternal life," as used in our source, represents an ethical or qualitative conception. It stands in contrast to perishing (iii. 16; x. 28), that is, to the ethical destruction of the soul, the forfeiture of man's true destiny as a son of God. This blessed life which is realized in fellowship with God is eternal, not merely in the sense of imperishable or endless, but in the higher sense of the true Godlike life, which by reason of its kinship to God is raised above all limits of time and place. It is life as opposed to the moral death of sin (v. 21, 25). "He that heareth my word," said Jesus, "and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of

the death (ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου, the death which is really such) into *the* life (εἰς τὴν ζωήν, the life which is truly life)." While, therefore, the eternal life is by its very nature continuous, the emphasis of the phrase lies upon the source and nature of the life rather than upon its continuance. Eternal life is life like that of God, who is its source. The version of Jesus' teaching concerning God which we have in the fourth Gospel lays its main stress, not upon the perpetuity of God's existence, but upon his ethical nature. The life which consists in likeness to him is therefore correspondingly ethical. So far, then, as there is any "time-element" in the word "eternal," as used in these discourses, it seems to be this, that the true, spiritual, divine life, being grounded in the very nature of God, is independent of all limitations of time or place. Hence it is often called simply "life," or "the life" (*e.g.* iii. 36; v. 24; vi. 33; x. 10 *et al.*), as if it had a certain absolute character.

Whatever be the exact import of the word "eternal," or the philosophy of its meaning, it is a noticeable fact that it is generally described as a present, rather than a future, possession of believers. In the Synoptics, on the contrary, the phrase has a future reference. It stands in contrast to "this time" (Lk. xviii. 30), and designates the promised blessedness of the "coming age" (Mk. x. 30). The two representations are to be understood and explained in the same way as are the two pictures of the Kingdom of God, as present and as future. Eternal life already belongs to him who fulfils the conditions of its realization, but it looks forward to the future for its completion. The present and the future aspects are combined in such words as these: "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day" (vi. 54). In this respect, as in others, the doctrine of eternal life proves itself to be the counterpart of the Synoptic doctrine of the Kingdom of God. Both illustrate the principle that salvation is not a matter of time and place, but of spiritual attitude and relation to God. It is unaffected by the change which we call death. "If a man keep my word, he shall never taste of death" (viii. 52); he shall

pass through physical death unharmed; "though he die, yet shall he live" (xi. 25). Eternal life is fulness and richness of being, the realization of the divinely appointed goal of existence through union with God and likeness to Christ.

Eternal life is the life whose essence is love. It is the life from which all true fellowship springs. It is the basis of all true unity, harmony, and sympathy. Hence the chief requirement of the dispenser of life is that men should love one another as he loved them (xv. 12). Only on the principles of the eternal life can human society ever be perfected. No true social fellowship can exist except where mutual service and helpfulness, which spring out of love, are the law of action. Men realize the eternal life in proportion as they love one another as Christ has loved them. Redemption is accomplished in the degree in which men are brought into likeness to him whose very nature, as love, is the absolute norm of all goodness.

CHAPTER VII

ESCHATOLOGY

JOHN has not preserved to us any of those sayings of Jesus concerning the overthrow of Jerusalem and the end of the age which the Synoptists have apparently combined together in the "great eschatological discourse" (Mk. xiii.; Mt. xxiv.; Lk. xxi.). The language of our sources concerning Messiah's second advent is far less perplexing than is that of the Synoptics, even if it is by no means always easy of interpretation. The principal exegetical difficulty connected with the eschatological sayings of the fourth Gospel arises not from the apparent mingling of logia relating to different subjects, but from a blending of the physical and the spiritual. In general, however, we shall find a larger spiritual or symbolical element than appears on the surface of the Synoptics. This fact will have a bearing upon the validity of the conclusions which we adopted concerning the doctrine of the parousia in the Synoptic discourses.

One of the most striking sayings concerning Christ's coming is: "And if I go and prepare a place for you, I come again, and will receive you unto myself" (xiv. 3). The context seems to favor the view that this *coming* is the second advent. Jesus has just spoken of going away, and his return to take them to the place which he is to prepare would seem to be the parousia.[1] But it must be admitted that the meaning is more congruous with the situation if the words are understood to refer to Christ's coming at death to the believer and taking him to his heavenly abode.[2] It is not easy to refer the promise to an

[1] So Ewald, Meyer, Luthardt, Weiss.

[2] So Tholuck, Lange, Reuss, Holtzmann.

eschatological event, unless it be assumed that Jesus believed that his second advent would occur within the lifetime of those to whom he was speaking. Considered as a word of comfort to the disciples whom he is about to leave, the passage seems most apposite and forcible if it is understood as describing the blissful death of believers. I, therefore, incline to the view that this was probably its original intention, although it must remain doubtful whether the words as reported were not understood by the evangelist as applying to the parousia. The theory of a composite meaning, and that which refers it to a spiritual coming to the disciples, are more difficult to reconcile with the context.[1]

In xiv. 18 we read: "I will not leave you desolate (orphans): I come to you." In the immediate connection Jesus is speaking of the coming of the Spirit, and it is highly probable that to this coming the passage in question refers. It is equally probable that a spiritual coming of some kind is meant in verse 23 where he says that the Father and himself will come to the disciples, and also in verse 28 where he says: "Ye heard how I said to you, I go away and I come again to you." Since elsewhere (xvi. 7) his departure from them and the coming of the Comforter are presented as counterparts, it is probable that the coming to them here spoken of is his coming in the gift of the Spirit. These passages certainly give the impression that, according to John, Jesus spoke mainly of his coming in a spiritual sense; or, at any rate, that he spoke of it in other meanings than that which prevails in the Synoptics — a visible return to earth at the end of the present world-period.

In chapter xvi. Jesus speaks of his disciples and himself as seeing each other after his departure from earth: "A little while and ye behold me no more; and again a little while, and ye shall see me" (xvi. 16). "Ye therefore now have sorrow: but I will see you again and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no one taketh from you" (xvi. 22). It is possible that these sayings refer to his

[1] *Cf.* my *Johannine Theology*, p. 332.

appearances to his disciples after the resurrection, and, indeed, this is the meaning which they at first most naturally suggest; but if they are considered in analogy with xiv. 18, it becomes probable that they also refer to some kind of spiritual fellowship which should continue and compensate for the withdrawal of his bodily presence. In the passage just cited the present physical sight (*θεωρεῖτε*) of him by "the world" is set in contrast to the spiritual vision of him (*ὄψεσθε*) by his disciples. The passages in in chapter xvi. are therefore best understood as affirming a continuance of that mutual knowledge and communion which stands in contrast to the mere outward perception of him by others, which is soon to cease. The whole description, in the context, of the living relations which he will continue to sustain to them after his departure (*vv.* 23–26), seems to me strongly to reënforce this interpretation. Moreover, the promise of such a permanent fellowship would be far more adequate to comfort them in view of his approaching departure than would the assurance of a few temporary appearances to them in bodily form after the resurrection. I would therefore class these passages with those which refer to a spiritual mode of manifestation to his disciples, and would regard them as additional evidence that Jesus spoke of his future *coming* in manifold forms.[1]

Another saying of no little difficulty is that which Jesus addressed to Peter concerning John: "If I will that he tarry (*μένειν*) till I come, what is that to thee? Follow thou me" (xxi. 22). Jesus has just charged Peter to feed his sheep (*v.* 17). He then speaks to him of the martyr-death which he is to experience in his old age, and adds: "Follow me" (*v.* 19). Peter thereupon sees the beloved disciple following, and at once inquires of Jesus what his fate shall be. The passage cited is Jesus' reply. The point to be determined is: What is the meaning of the phrase, "till I come"? To me it seems clear that the writer understood the words to refer to the second advent.

[1] The spiritual interpretation of the word "see" in these passages is adopted by Lücke, Meyer, Reuss, Godet, Dwight, and Plummer.

Peter is told that he is to suffer a violent death before the parousia. He then asks the fate of John. Jesus replies that he need not concern himself about that question; if it should be his will that John live on till his second coming, that can make no difference with his (Peter's) divinely appointed course. Yet Jesus did not say that John should survive the parousia, and therefore the saying which went abroad, that the beloved disciple should not die (*v.* 23), was based upon an unwarranted inference. Jesus used the hypothetical statement with reference to John only to emphasize for Peter the truth that he need not concern himself about others, but only about his own calling and duty.[1] The explanation which applies the words "till I come" to John's natural death yields a less forcible and appropriate sense. It would represent Jesus as coming to John in death, but not to Peter; or else it would be the mere tautology of saying: "If I will that John live till he dies."[2] It is probable, then, that this passage is to be added to xiv. 3 as illustrating the idea of an eschatological coming of Christ in the Johannine memoranda of the Lord's words. But it must be frankly admitted that the original import of neither of these references is perfectly clear. All that can be confidently affirmed is that they seem to be treated by the tradition as references to a personal second coming. We are by no means warranted, however, in asserting, as Reuss does, that "the current eschatological ideas of primitive Christianity are not found in the Gospel of John,"[3] especially in view of the numerous references to resurrection at the "last day" (vi. 39, 40, 44, 54; xi. 24; xii. 48), which can be no other than "the day of judgment" (1 Jn. iv. 17), that is, the day of Christ's consummate self-manifestation or parousia.

But the spiritual conception of Christ's coming stands out in much clearer relief in our discourses, and is entitled to be considered the characteristic idea of the

[1] So Lücke, DeWette, Meyer, Weiss, Holtzmann.

[2] Still other explanations are referred to in my *Johannine Theology*, pp. 337, 338.

[3] *Hist. Christ. Theol.* II. 498 (orig. ii. 556).

fourth Gospel on the subject. In our examination of the Synoptic teaching we found reasons for believing that Jesus spoke of different "comings" or "days" of his manifestation — various epochs or stages in the progressive triumph of his Kingdom on earth. The language of the fourth Gospel accords with this view. The idea of the coming of Christ is mainly associated with the dispensation of the Spirit, and finds its chief fulfilment in that enlightenment and enrichment of the spiritual life which is to follow his ascension to heaven. And what is this but the meaning of Jesus' saying at his trial that from that time onward they would see him coming in triumph (Mk. xiv. 62; Mt. xxvi. 64; Lk. xxii. 69)? His mission was to be vindicated in the dispensation of the Spirit (xvi. 8–11; xvii. 1, 2), and his victory was to be assured. His enemies thought that when they lifted him up on the cross, they had defeated his cause; but Jesus saw that it was from that very event that his real triumph should begin. From that cross he would draw all men unto him (xii. 32). The way of the cross was to be the way to his glory and his crown. From the time when the world condemned and rejected him, the world's conviction of its sin began. From that hour, and more and more as time advanced, Jesus was seen to be sitting on the real throne of power. Thus he comes perpetually in his Kingdom on the clouds of heaven — a symbolic way of describing the majesty which is seen to belong to him, according to the vindication of the Spirit and the verdict of history.

The resurrection of the believer from the state of death is treated as a part of the bestowment of eternal life. "I will raise him up at the last day" is the refrain which we hear throughout the discourse on the bread of life (vi. 39, 40, 44, 54). The same subject is dwelt upon in the discourse which was called out by the sabbath-question (v. 19 *sq.*). Here the resurrection appears to be viewed, now as referring to the present realization of spiritual life, now as pertaining to the future consummation. As the Father quickens men from the death of sin, so the Son also quickens whom he will (*v.* 21). The believer who

now possesses eternal life is already victor over death. He belongs not to death but to life (*v.* 24). Already for such the hour is present when they hear the voice of the Son of God summoning them to the immortal life (*v.* 25). It is difficult to decide whether these sayings are purely figurative, referring entirely to an ethical resurrection, a spiritual quickening, or whether they refer to a future resurrection from death considered as guaranteed and as already realized by anticipation through the secure possession of eternal life. Verses 28 and 29 are quite certainly eschatological: "Marvel not at this: for the hour cometh, in which all that are in the tombs shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done ill, unto the resurrection of judgment." The probability therefore is that to this resurrection or triumph over death the previous verses also refer. But the present possession of eternal life is regarded as including life from the dead because the eternal life completely transcends the relation of present and future. He who has received the gift of the life that is truly such is already in the secure possession of all which that life involves. He is already victor over death. Whatever particular experience or transformation may await him in the future, it is certain that the forces of life will triumph. He cannot, indeed, be exempt from the common lot of physical death, but for him physical death is only transition. Life is not thereby extinguished or impeded. "Though he die, yet shall he live" (xi. 25). Life triumphs over death by its very nature. Its victory may be marked by future events, but the larger truth is that it triumphs because of what it is —the true, the eternal life.

With this close correlation between the ideas of resurrection and eternal life agree the words of Jesus to Martha concerning the resurrection of Lazarus. Jesus had said to her: "Thy brother shall rise again" (xi. 23). She replied: "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day" (*v.* 24); to which Jesus answered: "I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth on

me, though he die, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth on me shall never die" (*vv.* 25, 26). It is evident that Martha's idea of the resurrection was that of a future eschatological event. Jesus expressed no objection to this idea, but gave to it its true setting and basis. He did not call in question her belief in a physical resurrection at the last day, but placed before her the more inclusive truth that he is the giver of life; that faith should be fixed upon him rather than upon some distant event; that the life which he bestows involves a present victory over death. Martha's thought was directed to one future crisis in which life should conquer death. Jesus declared that life wins a present and perpetual victory over death; that for the believer death is robbed of its significance and its power. It is as if Jesus had said: The truth is not merely that in some future æon thy brother shall rise from the state of death and attain immortality; I tell you that he is already death's conqueror; that at every stage of his existence and through all changes and transformations the eternal life shall triumph. It is possible that the saying of Jesus: "I am the resurrection," etc., was intended to point forward to the raising of Lazarus which followed. But if so, the larger meaning of his words is not thereby restricted. Such a resurrection would be but a special example of his life-giving power, illustrating the truth that the hope of future life should centre in him and in the gift of life which he bestows rather than in any single future event.

If this is the general import of the sayings under review, what then is the meaning of death and what the nature of the future resurrection "at the last day" which is not excluded by the language of Jesus on the subject? Since the life which conquers death is qualitative or ethical, it is probable that death bears a predominantly ethical character. As life is much more than the prolongation of existence, so death must be more than physical decay and dissolution. Death must be viewed in these discourses as including the forfeiture of the true ends of existence; as that state of deprivation, evil, and loss in which the per-

sonality in some way falls short of its true perfection. Resurrection, contemplated as a future event, is therefore more than a resuscitation or recovery of a body for the soul; it is the recovery of the total personality from the state of death. Under what form this state of death is conceived the language of the discourses does not inform us; but if it is conceived (as by Paul) after the manner of the Jewish doctrine of Sheol, then we should say that resurrection means primarily deliverance from the underworld. But there is no trace of these *local* conceptions in our sources. All is qualitative. Death is a state, and life is a character. Accordingly, resurrection, whatever else it involves, is primarily triumph over the defeat and evil of death through the realization of the destiny which is involved in eternal life. From this conception the narrowest idea of resurrection, as meaning the endowment of the soul with a suitable embodiment, is not excluded, but included, as the less is included in the greater. From these qualitative conceptions of life, death, and resurrection, it might seem natural to conclude that there could be no resurrection in any sense for unbelievers. We do not, however, find this conclusion confirmed by the language of the discourses, which speak of a resurrection of judgment or condemnation as well as of a resurrection of life (v. 29). We can only say, therefore, that while a resurrection, in some sense, of those who have "done ill" is affirmed, it must have a widely different meaning from that which is associated with the realization of eternal life. The elements of the "resurrection of life" we can conjecture with considerable plausibility from the nature of "life" and of "death" as described in our sources; but what meaning resurrection can have for those who have not the life we are not told and can only infer by subtracting from the idea of resurrection elements which belong to the very nature of eternal life. We certainly cannot conclude that there would be nothing left. At least the notions of a prolongation of existence and of a corporeal embodiment of the soul might remain.

In the doctrine of judgment we observe the same com-

bination of present and future, of continuous process and final crisis, which we have noticed in the study of the parousia and the resurrection. But the former aspect receives the greater emphasis. The future judgment seems to be regarded as the culmination of a process whereby divine light and truth are testing and separating men. Jesus speaks of judging men while he lived among them on earth (v. 30; viii. 16, 29; ix. 39). The principle which underlies this moral testing of men is most clearly expressed in the words: "This is the judgement, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their works were evil" (iii. 19). Light tests all things by revealing them in their true character. Truth judges by its very nature, and its discriminations are in perfect accord with reality. In this sense of judgment it was an essential part of Christ's work to judge men (ix. 39). He divided men into those who accepted and those who rejected his truth. In this sense he occasioned separation and division, even among friends, as the Synoptic discourses assert (Lk. xii. 51–53; Mt. x. 34, 35).

Christ came to save men, but he could not save without judging. Salvation involves the application of tests and standards; conformity to these implies approbation as failure and refusal involve disapproval. He must condemn the evil of the world in seeking to lift men out of that evil and in bringing them into the realization of the good. Jesus sees the world saved only as he sees it tested and sifted and its evil repudiated. "Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out" (xii. 31). But this process by which the world is tested, its good approved and fostered and its evil condemned, by no means excludes the idea of a future final judgment. On the contrary, it requires it as any process implies a fulfilment, a consummation. Hence we read of a judgment which takes place "in the last day" (xii. 49) and of a "resurrection of judgment" (v. 29) which doubtless means, either a resurrection which issues in a condemnatory judgment, or a resurrection which results from the judgment which is

already outstanding against those who have rejected Christ (iii. 18). The final judgment is evidently regarded as the climax and issue of the process of testing which is continually going on through the operation of the truth upon the minds of men. The future is already implicit in the present; eternal life is already begun here, and by it the "resurrection of life" is already assured; God is already judging the world through Christ; those who refuse his truth are already disapproved, and the future judgment is viewed as the end of a process which is going forward constantly in the life of every man.

There is an apparent contradiction between two groups of sayings one of which represents Christ as asserting that he does not judge men; the other as stating that he does judge them: "I judge no man" (viii. 15); "If a man hear my sayings and keep them not, I judge him not: for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world" (xii. 47). Yet he says: "If I judge, my judgment is true" (viii. 16), and even: "For judgment came I into this world" (ix. 39). The discrepancy is partly resolved by distinguishing between Christ's primary object in coming into the world and an object which was secondary and incidental to that. His primary object was salvation, not judgment; to rescue, not to condemn. But in saving Christ was compelled to judge, that is, to test and to separate men, approving the good and condemning the evil in them. A further distinction which it is often useful to observe is that between judging in the neutral sense of testing, and judging in the sense of condemning. When, for example, in ix. 39, he says: "For judgement came I into this world," the context explains that he means for the purpose of testing men by requiring them to take up a definite attitude towards the divine truth which he had brought to them. To those who are willing to be led, he will give divine light and guidance which he will withhold from the spiritually proud and self-sufficient. He did not come to condemn but to save men. But since saving involves testing, and since testing necessitates moral approval and disapproval according as men stand the test, it is evident that indirectly and

incidentally Jesus is compelled to judge in a condemnatory sense those who wilfully refuse the truth. Hence the saying: "I judge no man. Yea and if I judge, my judgement is true" (viii. 15, 16).

Although the Son is primarily Saviour and not Judge, yet when the relations between salvation and judgment are considered, we are not surprised to read that all judgment has been committed to the Son (v. 22), and that just because he is the Son of man (v. 27). Judgment is inseparably bound up with his Messianic mission. He brings truth to men in definite, concrete form; he makes God apprehensible to men, so that their attitude towards him becomes one of definite obedience or disobedience. Yet, in spite of these sayings, it is still true that there is a sense in which Christ does not judge men. It is rather his word, his truth, which is represented as pronouncing the judgment of condemnation upon the disobedient. "If any man hear my sayings and keep them not, I judge him not; the word that I spake, the same shall judge him in the last day" (xii. 47, 48). In one sense the Son does not judge men; his attitude ever remains that of Saviour. It is his truth which judges them; in other words, their attitude towards his truth itself involves their judgment. This is only another form of stating the distinction between the primary and the secondary aspects of his mission. He comes to save; but he brings to men an absolute standard of truth and goodness. By that they are tested. In that sense he judges men. If they repudiate that standard, he must disapprove and reject them. In that sense, also, his saving work involves a judgment; but as this judgment is inherent in men's attitude towards the truth, it might be said that it is the truth itself which judges them. Thus, despite the verbal variations with which the matter is presented, a consistent doctrine of judgment emerges from the passages.

PART III

THE PRIMITIVE APOSTOLIC TEACHING

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

It will be our aim in this part of our work to present a brief sketch of the earlier and simpler forms of teaching which obtained in the Church of the apostolic age. But no sooner is this task undertaken than we find ourselves in the midst of the most divergent views respecting the materials to be employed. The questions at issue chiefly concern the epistles which bear the names of James and Peter. It is well known that, even in the early Church, the genuineness of 2 Peter was widely doubted, and this doubt has been shared, in modern times, by many critics of all schools. The Epistle of James and 1 Peter, on the contrary, have, until recent times, been regarded by most scholars as genuine. The Tübingen school denied the genuineness of both these writings, and referred them to the second century. The former was regarded as an illustration of a spiritualized Judaism, which aimed to avoid certain practical consequences of Paul's doctrine of justification by faith; the latter, as the work of a Pauline Christian who was seeking to compromise the Gentile and the Jewish tendencies of thought in the Church. Although these views have been largely modified by the successors of this school, these scholars still regard both these epistles as spurious, and as illustrating the later, rather than the primitive, teaching of the early Church. Harnack regards the Epistle of James as a compilation made about 130 A.D.,

and refers 1 Peter to the reign of Domitian (81–96), although he admits that it may have been written a decade or two earlier. He believes that it was written either by Paul or by one who had been strongly influenced by him.[1]

Scholars who maintain the genuineness of both these writings are divided in opinion with respect to their relation to the Pauline epistles. In regard to James the principal question is, whether his discussion of faith and works presupposes Paul's teaching on those subjects or is independent of it. Certain coincidences are observable between 1 Peter and Paul's doctrinal letters. The question is, did Peter's language influence Paul's, or *vice versa?* Or, are these coincidences such as to establish any direct interdependence? Respecting the Epistle of James, the more usual opinion is that it is pre-Pauline. The more common view refers the first Epistle of Peter to the apostle's later life (60–67). Opinion is divided on the question, whether it is, in any proper sense, dependent upon Paul's writings.

It is outside the plan of the present work to enter at length into the discussion of these vexed and difficult questions. For such discussion I must refer the reader to the standard treatises on New Testament Introduction and the History of the Apostolic Age. The position of the more radical scholars of Germany will be found presented (not without important variations of view) in such works as Weizsäcker's *Apostolic Age*, Pfleiderer's *Das Urchristenthum*, the *Einleitungen* of Holtzmann and Jülicher, and the *Chronologie* of Harnack. Conclusions more in accord with tradition are maintained by Weiss, Salmon, Gloag, and Zahn in their Introductions. I would especially commend for its thoroughness the elaborate Introduction to the Epistle of James by Mayor, in his *Commentary*, in which he assigns to it an early date (40–50). Ramsay's discussion of the date of 1 Peter (about 80, as he believes), in his *Church in the Roman Empire* (pp. 279–294), presents the subject in a new light and is of special historical interest. This date would, indeed, preclude the genuine-

[1] *Chronologie*, pp. 451 *sq.*; 485 *sq.*

ness of the epistle if the tradition that Peter suffered martyrdom at Rome during the Neronian persecution (*ca.* 67, 68) be correct. But the traditions respecting Peter's residence at Rome are obscure and conflicting, and, in his opinion, some of the patristic statements respecting it would require us to suppose that he lived on to a much later time than that of Nero. On this supposition, the first Epistle might still be genuine, even if written so late as the year 80 A.D.

In view of these disputed questions, writers on the Theology of the New Testament differ considerably in their judgment respecting the sources of the teaching of the primitive Church which are available for their use. Those who adopt the conclusions of the radical school, as Immer and Holtzmann, find very scanty materials in the New Testament for the study of Christian teaching during the period between the life of Jesus and the epistles of Paul. The ideas which obtained among the early Christians during the first two decades after Christ (*ca.* 29–52) must be gathered from the early chapters of Acts (with generous allowances for later influences even here) and by inferences from writings which were composed long after this period. As compared with Paul, the other New Testament writings are relatively still further removed from the time of Jesus by Harnack and McGiffert, who date Paul's epistles four or five years earlier than the common view, assigning the great doctrinal letters to the years 52 or 53, instead of 57 or 58. Bovon uses only the narratives in Acts as sources for the knowledge of primitive Christianity.[1]

Most English writers on the New Testament, and some of the ablest German scholars also, hold that we have in James and in 1 Peter, at any rate, examples of the earlier and more primitive types of apostolic teaching. Reuss and Lechler regard James as pre-Pauline, while Weiss,

[1] Dr. McGiffert thinks that the Epistle of James was written by some Hellenistic Jew, "where or by whom we do not know," and that 1 Peter was written by a Paulinist, possibly Barnabas. *Apos. Age*, pp. 579 *sq.*; 593 *sq.*

Beyschlag, and Zahn treat both James and 1 Peter as examples of primitive, apostolic doctrine. This use of these epistles does not necessarily involve the view that they were written before Paul wrote, but only that they represent the earlier and simpler form of teaching which prevailed among the first Christians before the content of Christian belief was subjected to analysis and argument, as in the writings of Paul and John, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

The Biblical theologian is confronted with the question how to proceed in view of this uncertainty respecting his sources. Desirable as it is that the points at issue should be determined, we must candidly admit that in the present state of our knowledge they cannot be decided with certainty. Meantime, it is necessary that the Biblical theologian should adopt a working hypothesis for his construction of the apostolic theology. He must follow that view of the literature which seems to him most probable until historical and critical research can reach conclusions which shall be entitled to take rank as assured results of science. To secure these results is the task of historical criticism. It is upon the literary critic and the historian of the apostolic period, primarily, that the difficulty presses. While the Biblical theologian is embarrassed by uncertainty on such questions, his embarrassment chiefly concerns the arrangement of his materials. His primary task is, not to trace the development of thought within the New Testament period (although every aid for so doing will be of great service to him), but to expound in systematic form the contents of the New Testament books. The doctrinal content of an epistle, for example, may be correctly and adequately exhibited, whatever view be held respecting its author or its date. It makes no essential difference for our purpose whether the Epistles of James and Peter are pre-Pauline or post-Pauline. What they teach must be depicted in substantially the same way, whether it be done in an earlier or a later part of our work. Indeed, the mere chronological relation of books is of comparatively small importance for Biblical theology. Of much greater

moment is the logical order — the order which may be supposed to represent the development of religious ideas from the more simple and elementary to their more elaborate and reasoned forms.

The Tübingen criticism looked upon the Book of Acts as a Paulinist production designed to harmonize the views of Peter and Paul, and assigned it to the second century. Their successors, however, have ceased to ascribe this doctrinal "tendency" to the book, and the drift of criticism has been moving steadily towards the recognition of an earlier date. Jülicher scouts the denial that the book was written by the author of the third Gospel, and dates it from about 100–105. Harnack rejects the "tendency" theory of the book, ascribes it to one who was familiar with Paul's teaching, and assigns it to the period 80–93. Ramsay favors a date not far from 81; Sanday gives 80.[1] The view that the Acts is a "tendency" writing, full of artificial combinations and studied exaggerations, irreconcilable with the Pauline letters and generally untrustworthy as a source of history or theology in the apostolic age, is now so generally abandoned that one needs make no defence of his use of the book as presenting a substantially correct account of the events which it professes to record. Like the third Gospel, the Acts is, no doubt, based upon such documents and memoranda as were available for the author's purpose. Just now critical scholarship is eagerly engaged in the pursuit of hypotheses respecting these sources, but our present task need not concern itself with them. I shall sketch the doctrinal contents of the "Petrine" portions of the Book of Acts (chs. i.–viii. and certain passages in x.–xv.) in this part of the volume, and occasionally refer to the narratives of Paul's experiences and missionary teaching in connection with the study of the Pauline theology.

It must be admitted that the authorship of the Epistle of James is involved in some doubt. Eusebius places it among the *Antilegomena*. He says: "It is considered spurious; nevertheless it is used in most of the churches."[2]

[1] *Cf.* his remarks on the general subject, *Inspiration*, pp. 318–330.
[2] *Ecc. Hist.* II. 23.

Jerome speaks of it as having gradually obtained authority. It appears not to have gained general acceptance until about the year 400 A.D. It is not in the Muratorian canon, nor is it quoted by Tertullian. On the other hand, there are apparent traces of an acquaintance with the epistle on the part of Clement of Rome, the *Didaché* and *Hermas*,[1] and Irenæus quite certainly alludes to it when he writes: "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness; and he was called the friend of God" (*cf.* Jas. ii. 23).[2] The epistle is contained in the ancient Syriac version (*ca.* 150) and is quoted by the Syrian Church fathers. Origen is the first who refers to the name of the author: "For though it be called faith, if it be without works, it is dead as we read in the epistle current as that of James."[3] Jerome ascribed it to James, the Lord's "brother," that is, in his view, his cousin, James the son of Alphæus.

At the Reformation doubts concerning its canonicity were revived. On account of the supposed divergence of its teaching from that of Paul respecting justification by faith, Luther pronounced it an epistle of straw, that is, worthless in comparison with those of Peter, Paul, and John. Erasmus, Grotius, and others formed a similar estimate of the epistle. To the views of the German radical school reference has already been made.

The question of authorship is also complicated by the well-known dispute as to the meaning of "the brethren" of Jesus in the Gospels. On that subject I adopt the so-called Helvidian theory that they were real brothers of Jesus, younger children of Joseph and Mary. I therefore hold that, according to the probabilities of the case, our epistle was written by James, the Lord's brother, mentioned in Gal. i. 19 and 1 Cor. xv. 7, and known in ecclesiastical tradition as the Bishop of the Church in Jerusalem and as James "the just." What we know from the New Testament of his prominence in the Jewish branch of the Church,

[1] *Cf.* Mayor, *Commentary*, p. l. *sq.*
[2] *Against Heresies*, IV. 16. 2.
[3] *Comm. in Johan. Opp.* IV. p. 306.

and from tradition respecting his life and character, would accord with this supposition. I think that the language and thought of the epistle also agrees well with the same conclusion.

No data exist for deciding the question whether the epistle was written with or without reference to Paul's discussion of justification by faith. An early date (within the period from about 45 to 50), involving independence of Paul, is maintained by such scholars as Ritschl, Weiss, Beyschlag, Mayor, and Zahn. Professor Sanday thinks the epistle should be put as late as possible (*ca.* 61), because, as he thinks, it implies a settled state of things in the churches addressed. He agrees, however, with Bishop Lightfoot, that James wrote without direct reference to Paul's arguments. His references to justification are thought to be sufficiently accounted for by the currency of questions on the subject in the Jewish schools.[1] Dr. Hort holds a similar view of the date, but thinks that the passage, ii. 14–26, must have had in view some misuse or misunderstanding of Paul's teaching.[2] To my mind the mere question of date is of minor interest. The one point which seems to me clear is that there is no polemic on either side between James and Paul. I quite agree with Sanday when he says: "If we suppose direct polemics between the two apostles, then both seem strangely to miss the mark. Each would be arguing against something which the other did not hold."[3] The earlier date, however, seems to me to be favored by such considerations as the following: (*a*) The Jewish Christians of the dispersion who are addressed are still within Judaism. The church is still called a synagogue (ii. 2). (*b*) There is no reference to circumcision, the law, etc., — themes which became prominent and widely discussed within the decade 50–60. (*c*) What is said of faith and works so completely avoids the point of Paul's discussions that it is difficult to believe it to have been written with the knowledge of them. (*d*) The earlier

[1] *Inspiration*, p. 345.
[2] *Judaistic Christianity*, pp. 147–149.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 345.

date is favored by the Judaic tone of the epistle ; by the absence of any reference to the destruction of Jerusalem and its consequences, or to any of the questions which were rife from about the middle of the first century onwards concerning Gentile Christians.[1] Sanday's argument for a late date, to the effect that James would not be likely to write a doctrinal epistle unless influenced to do so by the example of Paul, seems to me to be of doubtful force. Even if we insist upon calling the writing in question a letter, and not, as many do, a practical treatise on Christian duties, there is no apparent reason why the relation of the "pillar" apostle James to the Jewish-Christian churches might not have been such as to make the writing to them of a message of comfort and instruction quite natural. I cannot see that the writing of a doctrinal epistle within the first generation of Christians is a fact which specially "needs to be accounted for," provided the relations between James and the Jewish Christians were such as we have reason to believe them to have been.[2]

The external evidence for the genuineness of 1 Peter is abundant. Renan justly says that this epistle is "one of the writings of the New Testament which are the most anciently and most unanimously cited as authentic." It is found in the most ancient versions, is cited as a *Homologoumenon* by Eusebius, and attested by the Church fathers from Papias and Polycarp onwards. With respect to the time of its composition most scholars hold that it exhibits a knowledge of Paul's epistles, especially of Romans and Ephesians. Weiss stands alone in assigning to it a date as early as 53 or 54. Most scholars who hold its genuineness have placed it between the years 60 and 67. Zahn in his *Einleitung*, p. 92, assigns it to 63 or 64. The argument of Ramsay, for a late date (*ca.* 80) already alluded to, which is derived from the supposed correspondence between the references to persecution in the epistle and the policy of the Flavian emperors towards the Church, is forcibly answered by Sanday, who adduces sufficient evidence that the methods

[1] *Cf.* Mayor, *Commentary*, p. cxx. *sq.*
[2] *Cf.* Sanday, *Inspiration*, p. 344.

and grounds of persecution presupposed in the epistle already obtained in the time of Nero, and that, so far as such considerations are concerned, the letter might have been written as early as 66.[1]

To me the proof of a literary dependence of our epistle upon the Paulines seems quite inadequate. The supposed coincidences are mostly slight, the agreements extending only to a word or two. Several of the parallels may be explained by a common use of the Septuagint. There are no marked doctrinal correspondences with respect to such subjects, for example, as justification or the parousia. The "dogmatic watchwords" of Paul are entirely wanting in our epistle. So far as such considerations go, they leave the date as uncertain as are the place of writing and the nationality of the persons addressed.[2] The one point about which we may feel a high degree of confidence — and happily it is the only one of great importance for our present purpose — is that the epistle is genuine, and exhibits to us the more primitive type of apostolic teaching which preceded and, to some extent, continued to exist contemporaneously with the more developed theology of Paul.

Between the Epistle of Jude and 2 Peter there is obviously some kind of interdependence. It is therefore proper, for our purpose, to treat these two epistles together. The data for deciding the questions of their authorship, date, and purpose are peculiarly scanty. The former has been ascribed to each one of the Judes mentioned in the New Testament, — to the Jude of the apostolic list (Lk. vi. 15; Acts i. 13), who in Mark, and also in Matthew according to the more probable text, is called Thaddæus; to "Judas called Barsabbas," who was sent with Silas to Antioch (Acts xv. 22, 27, 32); but much more commonly to Judas the brother of Jesus (Mk. vi. 3; Mt. xiii. 55). The only reference to the author in the epistle itself is in verse 1, where he calls himself a brother

[1] *The Expositor*, June, 1893, pp. 406–412.

[2] To me it seems probable that the epistle was addressed to mixed congregations, in which Gentile converts predominated. See i. 14; ii. 10; iii. 6; iv. 3. So Lechler, Beyschlag, Farrar, Salmon.

of James. No argument favoring the writing of the letter by a primitive apostle can be drawn from combining this expression with Luke's designation Ἰούδας Ἰακώβου, since by that name is probably meant Judas the *son*, and not the *brother*, of James, that is, of a James otherwise unknown to us. If the writing of the Epistle of James by the Lord's natural brother be regarded as probable, then the most natural supposition is that our epistle was written by another brother. The prominence of James in the early Church might, not unnaturally, lead Jude to authenticate and commend his letter by naming himself as "the brother of James."

That the book is not mentioned by the earlier ecclesiastical writers may be due, in part, to its minor importance. It was included in the ancient Latin version, but omitted from the Peshito. Eusebius classed it among the disputed books, although he mentions its wide recognition. It is attested by the Muratorian fragment, by Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian. Jerome tells us that objections were felt to it on account of its references to apocryphal writings. Similar scruples were entertained by Luther and Calvin. The Tübingen school held that the heresies which it opposes were those of second century Gnosticism and regarded it as a late Judaizing writing. Its apostolic authorship (in any sense) is denied by most German critics. Pfleiderer says it cannot be earlier than 150 A.D. Jülicher suggests the period 100–180 A.D.; Harnack, 100–130 A.D. Von Soden expresses doubts respecting its authorship, but says that the possibility that a younger brother of Jesus, whose missionary labors had led him into Gentile-Christian circles, may have written the letter about 80–90, cannot be disproved. Among recent writers who are favorable to the genuineness of our epistle are Weiss, Beyschlag, Salmon, Plummer, and Sanday.

It is well known that 2 Peter is the most weakly attested of all the New Testament books. No clear recognition of its canonicity before Origen has been made out, and he mentions the fact that its genuineness was

doubted. Eusebius says that the epistle was not generally embodied among the sacred books; but since it appeared useful to many, it was studiously read with the other Scriptures.[1] The councils of Laodicea and Carthage (363 and 397 A.D.) adopted the epistle into their lists, and from about that period we may date its general reception.

It would lead me too far to rehearse the arguments which are employed in the controversy over the genuineness of the epistle. They are briefly summarized by Dr. Sanday in his lectures on Inspiration, pp. 382–385. Two points to which prominence has recently been given may be noticed. Dr. Edwin A. Abbott[2] and Canon Farrar[3] have sought to show that the author borrowed from the *Antiquities* of Josephus (published 93 A.D.) — a supposition which would be fatal to its genuineness. This contention has been ably answered by Warfield[4] and Salmon,[5] who show that the coincidences are in words rather than in ideas, and in not very unusual words, and that they are not found in brief compass or in the same sequence or connection. It has been pointed out that between the recently discovered *Apocalypse of Peter* and 2 Peter there were noticeable resemblances. The suggestion lies near to hand that they are by the same author. Dr. Sanday inclines to this supposition.

The obvious interdependence between 2 Peter and Jude has more commonly been explained by supposing the priority of the latter. Spitta, however, elaborately defends the contrary view.[6] In either case the interdependence is not necessarily inconsistent with the apostolic authorship of both writings. It is not impossible that the apostle might appropriate, with adaptations, the language of the shorter epistle as fitly describing the false teachers whom he wishes to rebuke. The suggestion of Jerome is

[1] *Ecc. Hist.* iii. 3.
[2] *The Expositor*, 1882, p. 49.
[3] *The Early Days of Christianity*, Bk. ii. ch. ix.
[4] *Southern Presb. Review*, 1883.
[5] *Int. to N. T.* Lect. xxv.
[6] *Der zweite Brief d. Petrus u. der Brief Judas*, 1885.

an interesting one, that in view of Peter's probable deficiency in the knowledge of Greek, the differences between his two epistles are to be explained by his employment in their composition of different interpreters. The most recent German writers pronounce almost unanimously against its genuineness. Among other recent scholars who incline to the same conclusion are Hatch, Sanday, and Ramsay. The genuineness is defended by Plumptre, Lumby, Plummer, Salmon, and Spitta. Huther, Weiss, and Farrar remain undecided. For my part, I find the difficulties in the way of belief in its genuineness quite insurmountable. They are such as these: The author quotes the errorists as referring to the first generation of Christians as "the fathers" (iii. 4), thereby betraying the late date of the epistle, since such a mode of expression could not have been in use within the lifetime of Peter. He also betrays the late date of his writing by reckoning Paul's epistles among the γραφαί, thus placing them upon a level with the Old Testament (iii. 15, 16). He refers to widespread doubt respecting the near return of Christ as existing in his time (iii. 3, 4). He describes the heresies which he rebukes, now as if already present, and now as if future (*cf.* iii. 3 with iii. 4, 5), as though he was really living in the midst of them, but was trying to place himself back in thought into the apostolic age and to speak of them as future. It is extremely difficult to imagine Peter using the language of this epistle on any of these subjects. The marked difference in style and ideas between this epistle and 1 Peter also creates a very considerable difficulty.

As I have already intimated, the Biblical theologian cannot help feeling somewhat embarrassed in his work by the existing uncertainty respecting the authorship and date of some of the books which constitute his material. He can only follow what seems to him to be the probabilities and adopt a working hypothesis. He can, at least, expound the contents of the books themselves, although he may feel restricted in drawing confident conclusions in regard to certain points of history and comparative the-

ology in the early Church. I shall accordingly summarize the teaching of the books which I have noticed in this chapter as representing, at least approximately, the primitive apostolic teaching. The writings may not all be so early as the traditional view supposes. It is possible that some of them fall outside the apostolic age. In any case, they are the principal sources of our knowledge of the simpler and less elaborated style of teaching which the New Testament presents and which must, on that account, stand in a certain contrast with the other apostolic writings.

CHAPTER II

THE DISCOURSES IN THE ACTS

THE material of which we have now to take account consists mainly of fragmentary reports of certain discourses and defences of the apostle Peter. To these must be added a prayer of the congregation (iii. 24 *sq.*), Philip's conversation with the Ethiopian chamberlain (viii. 30 *sq.*), and the defence of the almoner Stephen before the Sanhedrin (ch. vii.). Of importance for our purpose also are the forms and customs of the first Christians and, especially, the differences which arose over the terms on which Gentile converts should be admitted to the Church, and the deliberations of the apostolic convention at which those differences were adjusted. The first part of the Book of Acts is the principal source of our knowledge of the life and teaching of the early Church, and, while these chapters do not tell us all that we should like to know, they do furnish us a clear idea of the relations of the earliest Christians to their ancestral religion and of the principal points which they emphasized in their efforts to win men to belief in the messiahship of Jesus.

We have seen, in our study of the Gospels, that the immediate disciples of Christ did not suppose that in becoming Christians they had ceased to be adherents of the Jewish religion. They continued their attendance upon the worship of the synagogue and temple and their conformity, in general, to the requirements of the Jewish law. Their Master had, indeed, taught them the minor importance of all ceremonial observances, but he had not required them to discontinue the practice of Jewish rites. He had given them principles — such as that of the fulfilment of the law in the gospel — which were destined to

lead to the discontinuance of their practice of the Jewish ceremonial; but he preferred that this result should be accomplished gradually through the processes of their own growth and experience. He did not wish the old customs and forms to be destroyed except by being replaced by more adequate beliefs and practices.

It was impossible, however, for the disciples to continue indefinitely in the attitude which they at first assumed. They had adopted the belief that Jesus was the Messiah. This belief made the difference between Christians and Jews and would be certain to compel their ultimate separation from Judaism. The natural development of their Christian faith, and the course of events which was certain to issue from it, would make it inevitable that they must either go forward and carry out the principles of Christ to their logical issue, or go backward and imperil their allegiance to Christ by adhering to the legal system. And such proved to be the logic of events. One of the most interesting points in the history of the primitive Church is the development of the Church's consciousness of its Christian genius; the gradual realization of what its relation to Christ and his salvation involved and required. It was inevitable that the emergence from Judaism into Christianity, in its full import, should be slow, and attended by many perplexities. Some would accomplish it more readily than others; some would seek to maintain the two inconsistent standpoints. The great historical interest attaching to the early chapters of Acts arises from the fact that they enable us to trace the steps of this process by which the Church developed its Christian consciousness.

We learn from the Gospels that the two principal points in which the disciples failed to understand their Master's mission were, first, the nature of his Kingdom, and, second, the necessity of his death. Their difficulties in regard to both were largely due to their Jewish training. They had grown up in the belief that the Messianic Kingdom was to be an emancipated and triumphant Israel, and that the Messiah who should found it was to be a mighty King. The idea that he should suffer and die was contrary to all

their inherited beliefs. Hence we find the first disciples, notwithstanding their belief in Jesus' messiahship, protesting against his death, and wondering when the time would come when his real kingly power should be manifested in the restitution of the nation. The representations of Acts on this subject accord entirely with the description given in the Gospels, and enable us to see how the Christian community gradually came to apprehend the principles of Jesus concerning his work and Kingdom.

The time soon came when the death of Jesus at the hands of the Jewish authorities put an end to all doubt and protest on the part of his followers. It was to them a bewildering and disheartening event. Up to the last they had continued to hope that the Messianic kingship lay veiled under the meek and quiet appearance of their Master, and would, on a sudden, assert itself and vanquish their enemies. But when the rulers, without hindrance, and almost without protest, put him to death, their hearts were struck with dismay. At first they considered his death to be also the death of all their hopes and the failure of the promised redemption of Israel (Lk. xxiv. 19, 20). While they brooded over their disappointment, they learned that he had risen from the grave. To one and another, and even to assembled companies of his disciples, he "manifested himself after his passion by many proofs" (Acts i. 3). It was the resurrection which rescued them from despair and kindled hope again in their hearts. There might still be a possibility of Israel's redemption, now that he had appeared as victor over death. In some way the expected Messianic deliverance might yet be accomplished. Perhaps his death was, after all, a part of the divine plan. Luke records how, after his resurrection, Jesus assured them that the Old Testament picture of Messiah represented him as suffering and dying (Lk. xxiv. 26, 27, 44–46), and describes the attempts which the disciples made to find a place for this idea of Messiah's experience in the prophetic descriptions of his work (Acts ii. 25–28, 34, 35). These passages exhibit the first efforts which — so far as we know — the disciples made to adjust their minds to the

view that the Messiah's death was necessary and divinely ordained, though we shall soon see that the idea was by no means clear to them, or free from perplexing difficulties. To adopt it as a fact, however, was an important step. It meant the surrender of their earlier conviction that the Messiah should not, must not, die. The way was now open for the recognition of Messiah's sufferings and death as an integral part of his saving work. The early apostolic discourses enable us to see this changed view of Jesus' death in process of formation. But before pursuing this subject further, we must note the effect of the death and resurrection of Jesus upon the first disciples' idea of the Kingdom of God.

In his life on earth Jesus had failed to establish his Kingdom as his disciples conceived it. His resurrection and ascension were events which were certainly adapted to suggest to them higher and more spiritual views of his work than they had been cherishing. They knew him now as belonging to a higher world — as exalted to the right hand of God. Their thoughts turned to the promise of the Spirit, of whose presence and power he had assured them. Here, certainly, are the elements of a new and higher view of the Kingdom. Yet we find that this conception was but slowly realized. Especially persistent in the minds of the early disciples was the idea that his visible presence was essential to the consummation of his work. Hence the expectation which had formerly been directed to the reconstruction of the nation was now turned towards his return to earth. He had, indeed, as they thought, left his Messianic work unfinished, but he would soon return to earth to complete it. Hence Luke's narrative aptly pictures the company as intently gazing after him into the skies, and as receiving the assurance that he would visibly return to them (Acts i. 10, 11). The gospels make it very clear that the idea of the Lord's speedy return to earth had received among the first disciples a great development, and that his teaching about the future progress of his Kingdom had been chiefly understood to refer to that event. The Book of Acts confirms

this view of the matter, and enables us to trace with greater confidence the genesis and growth of the parousia-expectation. It was rooted in a Jewish view of the Kingdom, while its more immediate occasion was the disappointment produced by Jesus' death, on the one hand, and, on the other, the living hope which was begotten in their hearts by his resurrection. The whole development of the disciples' thoughts on the subject is perfectly natural, and, when the facts are impartially viewed, admits of a most reasonable explanation.

There can be no doubt that the idea of the Lord's speedy return to consummate his work operated as a check upon the development of the true doctrine of the Kingdom. So long as the thought of the community was concentrated upon the early restoration of the Kingdom to Israel, no very large conception of the mission and extent of the Kingdom in the world would be likely to obtain. Yet, in spite of this limitation, the view of the Kingdom gradually enlarged under the logic of events and the guidance of the Spirit until, at length, a Paul could entertain the idea of the gospel for the world and strive heroically for its realization, notwithstanding the fact that he looked for the crisis of human history in his own lifetime. A certain measure of inconsistency is inseparable from a process of transition from one standpoint to another. We are not surprised, therefore, to find that the early Church remained in part entangled in its inherited Jewish ideas and in the interpretations of Christianity which were shaped by those ideas, while, at the same time, in other respects, it grasped the characteristic truths of its new faith with clearness and force. The first disciples were at least sure of the messiahship of Jesus, of his resurrection and glorified life in heaven, and of the reality of their relations with him. These convictions were certain ultimately to carry with themselves everything else which was an essential part of the gospel.

The picture which the Acts furnishes of the life of the primitive Christian community is an interesting and graphic one, despite its fragmentary character. We find the dis-

ciples collected in Jerusalem. They early choose a new apostle to take the place of Judas. At the feast of Pentecost, a few days after the departure of Jesus, occurred an event whose main significance is clear, notwithstanding the peculiar difficulties which attend the explanation of the accompanying phenomena described in the narrative (ch. ii.). It was a signal realization of the promise of the Spirit in the confirmation of the faith of the disciples and the increase of their number. It was attended with ecstatic excitement and prophetic utterances, which were understood, on the one hand, as the wild ravings of drunken men, and, on the other, as a speaking in various languages. In a powerful discourse Peter declared that the experience was a fulfilment of the Old Testament predictions of the Messianic blessing. The occasion formed an epoch in the life of the infant community, not only on account of its powerful effect on the original disciples, but because a large number, from various countries, was added to their company.

This primitive community had no formal organization. The apostles were, of course, its natural leaders, and Peter, especially, is represented as the spokesman of the assembly. At first the company resided together in an upper chamber (Acts i. 13), but this arrangement must soon have become impracticable. They frequently met together — or, when the community became larger, probably in groups — for prayer, mutual encouragement and instruction, and "the breaking of bread" (Acts i. 14; ii. 42, 46), that is, the celebration of the Lord's supper in the form of a common meal. A certain community of property also existed among them. None counted what he possessed to be his own, but held it subject to the needs of his fellow-Christians. Some expressions in Acts, taken by themselves, would lead us to suppose that all the disciples contributed their entire property to a common fund (i. 44; iv. 34, 35); but it is evident from certain circumstances which are mentioned that the arrangement did not involve the general abolition of private possessions. Ananias is said to have been perfectly free to retain the full price of his property

without thereby giving offence to the community (v. 4). Mary the mother of Mark continued to possess her own house in Jerusalem (xii. 12). If a universal community of goods had prevailed, it would be strange that the act of Barnabas in selling his field and delivering up the price to the apostles should be singled out for special mention (iv. 36, 37). Moreover, had there been a common purse and a corporate, instead of an individual, administration of all property, it is almost inconceivable that we should hear nothing of it in the New Testament outside the early chapters of Acts. We must conclude that no actual communistic system was adopted, but that all held their possessions subject to the needs of their brethren. It was a fraternal sharing together, born of generosity and love, a moral and not a legal communism. The immediate occasion of the arrangement was the extreme poverty of most of the Jerusalem Christians, to which Paul's epistles also bear witness. Doubtless the expectation that the parousia was near, may have had its influence. At any rate, this primitive method of sharing seems not to have been of long duration — probably in consequence of the increasing poverty of the Judæan Christians, which made it necessary for them to look to the Gentile churches for aid. The custom is an interesting example of the fruit of Christian love — as is also the willingness with which the Gentile churches afterwards sent their contributions to the mother congregation.

It was in connection with this distribution of gifts to the poor that the first Church officers were chosen. Among the primitive Christians were certain Greek-speaking Jews. They complained that "their widows were neglected in the daily ministration" (vi. 1). Whether this complaint was just or not we are not told; but it is not impossible that the prejudice which existed against foreign Jews may have made itself felt even within the Christian congregation. Up to this time the alms seem not to have been officially administered. The apostles could not well assume the labor involved, and they therefore recommended the appointment of seven almoners who should have charge of the distri-

bution of alms. This committee has generally been regarded as the germ of the later diaconate. It is quite certain that the Church did not yet possess a board of elders. The Church offices sprang out of practical necessities, and were not determined by any preconceived plan of organization.

These circumstances, which are recounted in the early chapters of Acts, afford us a very realistic picture of the life of the early Church. Everywhere we note the power of its intense and vital convictions and hopes. Ardently attached to the person of Jesus, and sincerely believing in his presence and guidance, the first Christians contended with extreme poverty, braved the contempt and persecution of their countrymen, and searched the Old Testament, the arsenal of Judaism, for weapons of defence with which to meet their opponents in argument. The picture which is thus furnished us in these fragmentary narratives bears all the marks of a sketch from life.

We now turn to the doctrine of Jesus' messiahship as presented in our sources. Here, too, as in the Gospels, it is Peter who is the chief confessor and who continues to prove himself the rock of the Church. The belief that God had anointed Jesus with special power (iv. 27; x. 38) now gave rise to the compound name Jesus Christ, while the term ὁ Χριστός continued to be used, as in the Gospels, as a title and not as a proper name (ii. 38). Respecting his person the principal declarations are as follows: He was divinely attested as the Messiah by his miracles, resurrection, and exaltation (ii. 22–24, 33). He is the living power which works in his followers (iii. 16; iv. 10), and he will come to set right all conditions and relations which stand connected with the realization of the divine ideal of the Kingdom (iii. 21). He is the divine Messenger of peace, is specially anointed with the Holy Ghost, and is ordained to be the Judge of all (x. 36, 38, 42). In addition to being named the Christ, he is called Lord (κύριος, ii. 36), God's holy Servant (παῖς, iii. 13; iv. 27, 30), — a reference to the "Servant of Jehovah" in Second Isaiah, — the holy and righteous One, the Prince (ἀρχη-

γός) of life (iii. 14, 15), a Prince and Saviour (v. 31), and the great Prophet, like unto Moses, whom God had promised to raise up (Deut. xviii. 15–19).

This is a very simple Christology. It pictures Jesus as the holy Prophet of God, the Messenger of the divine mercy to Israel, the innocent sufferer whose experiences were divinely appointed, and who is now the exalted bearer of salvation. The term "Son of man" occurs but once in our sources (vii. 56), and the term "Son of God" not at all.[1] Nor is anything said in these discourses of the preexistence of Christ. In fact, there is no explicit teaching here respecting his inner nature or essential relation to God. It is therefore easy to remark how little is said here, and to conclude, as Beyschlag does, that the primitive Church conceived the relation of Jesus to God as that of a purely human dependence.[2]

It was certainly quite beyond the purpose of these discourses, and equally foreign to the thoughts of the first disciples, to enter upon any speculative consideration of their Master's inner relation to God. We must not credit them with a theory of the mystery of his person. The question at this point is not, Did the primitive apostles believe in the preëxistence or essential divineness of Jesus? but, What view of his person is *for us* naturally involved in the *facts* which they believed and asserted? If Jesus is not called Son of God in our sources, he is clothed with Messianic dignity, and is described as seated at the right hand of God, participating in the divine glory, and sharing the government of the world (v. 31; x. 36, 42). If his preëxistence is not here mentioned, his lordship over all things is repeatedly asserted (ii. 20, 25, 35; iv. 26; x. 36, etc.). In view of the Septuagint use of κύριος as a name for Jehovah, it is difficult to see how a Jewish mind could attach to the κυριότης which is ascribed to Jesus any meaning not implying his superhuman character.[3] To these representations must be added the strong

[1] viii. 37 is spurious. [2] *N. T. Theol.* I. 309 (Bk. III. ch. ii. § 2).

[3] In his effort to break the force of this consideration Beyschlag (I. 309, Bk. III. ch. ii. § 2) notices but one passage (ii. 34), neglecting all the

assertion of his sinless holiness (iii. 14; iv. 27) and the teaching that he is the true object of faith (iii. 16; x. 43), the giver of salvation (iv. 12; v. 31; x. 43), and the Judge of the world (x. 42).

In the teaching which we are reviewing the primitive apostles were dwelling on the historical facts of which they were cognizant, and their practical significance. No general theory of Christ's person in explanation of these facts could, as yet, have been clearly developed in their minds. The absence of any traces of such a theory from these early chapters of Acts is one of the marks of veri-similitude which they exhibit. But the descriptions which they give of Christ's absolutely unique character and work appear to me to be quite irreconcilable with the humanitarian theory of his person. If they did not yet hold a definite supernatural view of his person, it is quite certain that they did not hold the humanitarian view, and to me it seems almost equally certain that they could never have derived it from the facts which they allege or harmonize it with them. We know that as a matter of fact the apostolic theology early developed a definite doctrine of the preëxistence and essential divinity of Christ. I leave it to the reader to judge whether this doctrine is a legitimate deduction from such ideas as his sinlessness, exaltation to lordship over all things, and sole function as Saviour and Judge or a groundless speculation unwarranted by these conceptions. I believe that the true conclusion is that to which we were led in the study of the self-testimony of Jesus, namely, that the facts of his teaching and life, as his immediate disciples knew them, warrant the doctrine of his essential divinity which was early developed in the apostolic Church. If this doctrine did not exist in the primitive Church, it was not because the elements of it are not found in the testimony of the first preachers. The expressions, bearing upon the idea of

rest. His argument is: Jesus *is made* Lord by his exaltation, therefore must be a temporal being. But does this conclusion follow? Compare Paul's doctrine of Christ's exaltation with his emphatic assertion of his divine form of existence and equality with God (Phil. ii. 5–9).

Christ's person which are used, are not less, but more, significant for being incidental. They show that if no effort had yet been made to define his person, it was at least assumed by his followers to be absolutely unique. I therefore agree with Weiss when he says: "The Messiah who is exalted to this κυριότης must certainly be a divine Being. But we do not thereby mean that there was any occasion for the earliest preaching to reflect upon the question how far such exaltation was grounded in the original nature of his person." [1]

We have seen that the assertion which stood in the forefront of the apostles' earliest preaching was that Jesus was the Messiah. This they steadfastly maintained in the face of the nation which had rejected him. But they were now confronted with a perplexing question: How could the death of Jesus, which was so contrary to their own inherited ideas of Messiah's experience and work, be shown to be a part of the divine plan? Jesus had completely failed to realize the nation's expectation. Could the disciples show that he did, nevertheless, fulfil the true prophetic ideal of the Messiah, and that his death, so far from being inconsistent with his messiahship, was the culmination of his Messianic mission?

The earliest references to the death of Jesus in our sources speak of it as a great crime on the part of the Jewish people (ii. 22, 23; iii. 13–15). The Jews tried to destroy Jesus, but God thwarted their effort by raising him from the dead (ii. 24; iii. 15). By his resurrection he was shown to be the Messiah (ii. 25–32). But this cannot be the whole truth. It is not sufficient simply to maintain that, although his death is an obstacle to belief in his messiahship, his resurrection overbears the force of that objection. The death itself must be a part of his Messianic work. In this connection the apostles must have recalled words of Jesus about the necessity of his death and the conformity of it to the Scriptural picture of Messiah's experience (Mk. viii. 31 and parallels; Lk.

[1] *N. T. Theol.* §40, *c.*

xxiv. 26, 27). Such words would now shine in a new light. The apostles now began to search the Scriptures in order to see whether the prophetic view of Messiah contemplated his death. In these efforts to show from Scripture that Messiah's death was a part of the divine plan, we see the beginnings of the apostolic doctrine of the redemptive significance of his death. No inconsistency was felt to exist between this idea and the idea that his death was a great crime on the part of the Jews on account of which they were to be urgently exhorted to repent. The two conceptions are found side by side (ii. 23; iii. 13–15, 18). It is true that their guilt was somewhat mitigated by their ignorance of the real nature of their action (iii. 17), but this fact would furnish no means of harmonizing the two ideas. How the apostles adjusted them we are not told, but we may well suppose that the action of the Jews — which was a sin from the standpoint of its motive — was held to have served the purposes of the divine counsel, and thus regarded as subordinate to God's redemptive plan. As time goes on the event is less and less contemplated from the former point of view and is more exclusively regarded as a part of his Messianic work. Thus we see that the burden of the apostles' earliest preaching to their countrymen was this: You killed the Messiah, but God thwarted your purpose to destroy him by raising him from the dead; indeed, your very act fulfilled his counsel. Yet you did it from hatred and your sin remains. Repent now while the divine mercy waits. Soon Christ will come to judgment. Become his friends that his coming may be to you a day of gladness and not of doom (ii. 13–21; iv. 10, 11, 27, 28; v. 30, 31; x. 36–43).

But here a further question arises: If the primitive apostles clearly recognized the death of Jesus as a part of the Messianic idea, did they have any view of its significance as such? In other words, could they believe that it was necessary, as a part of Messiah's work, that he should die without attaching a redemptive meaning to his death? His death as a part of the divine plan must have meant

something to the first disciples. What could it have meant?

When we turn to our sources we find no explicit teaching respecting the purpose or object of Messiah's death in the divine economy. It is certainly not presented as an atonement for sin — a fact of which Beyschlag eagerly avails himself as a makeweight against that idea.[1] But it is just as certain that it is not presented as a moral example — a fact which, on Beyschlag's method of argument, would be available against his view of the meaning of the event. The *argumentum e silentio* is as precarious as it is convenient.

One will search these discourses in vain for any answer to the question: Why was it necessary that Jesus should die? The historical relations only, and not the inner significance of the event, are dwelt upon. It is possible to hold that the apostles had not yet arrived at any view of that significance. But this supposition is not without serious difficulties. We have seen that the apostles, most probably, recalled the words of Christ respecting the necessity of his death. Would they not be as likely to recall those which related to its significance? He had spoken of giving his life as a ransom for many (Mk. x. 45), and of his blood of the covenant which is shed for many (xiv. 24). Is it natural to suppose that the explanations of the Scriptures which Jesus gave to his disciples after his resurrection, to the effect "that the Christ should suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day, and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name unto all the nations, beginning from Jerusalem" (Lk. xxiv. 46, 47), — however little they may have been understood at the time, — should not now be recalled as suggesting that his death and resurrection were a part of his saving work? There is a further consideration. Paul says that among the primary points (ἐν πρώτοις) embodied in the tradition which he received (from the primitive apostles) was the fact "that Christ died on behalf of our sins according to the Scriptures" (1 Cor. xv. 3).

[1] *N. T. Theol.* I. 312, 313 (Bk. III. ch. ii. § 3).

Here the apostle distinctly testifies to the recognition by the primitive Christian community of the saving significance of Christ's death as a cardinal point of doctrine.[1]

As the Messiah Jesus is the sole bearer of the Messianic salvation (iv. 12). This salvation is conceived of as both national and personal, and as including both spiritual and temporal good. The condition of its appropriation is repentance. It is not too late for the nation to realize its divine destiny as foretold in prophecy. They may now repent, accept the Messiah, and be saved. The promise to them and to their children still holds good (ii. 38, 39; v. 31). If the Jewish people fulfil this condition, they will realize the Messianic blessedness at the return of the Lord (iii. 19–21). But if they reject this final opportunity, their destiny is sealed (iii. 23). It is evident from these representations that the consummation of the Kingdom of God and the realization of salvation are predominantly thought of as future; yet not to the exclusion of a present bestowment of forgiveness and blessedness. The gift of the Spirit is already available; forgiveness of sin may be received at once; yet we note, as in the Gospels, the prominence of eschatological expectations (iii. 19–21).

It is a mooted question whether the earliest discourses contemplate the extension of the Messianic salvation beyond the limits of Judaism. To me it seems clear that

[1] Cf. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I. 366: "Zum Sichersten, was wir wissen, gehört, dass nach 1 Kor. xv. 3 schon die Urgemeinde den Tod Jesu in Beziehung zur Sünde gesetzt hat." So also Weizsäcker, *Apos. Age*, I. 130 (Eng. tr.): "The primitive Church already taught, and proved from Scripture, that the death of Jesus exerted a saving influence in the forgiveness of sins." Beyschlag's interpretation (*N. T. Theol.* I. 313), that what Paul received (*παρέλαβον*) was simply the *fact* that Christ died, to which he added *ex suis* a religious significance, seems singularly arbitrary. Its statement is its sufficient refutation. It involves the supposition that when Paul wrote: *ὃ καὶ παρέλαβον, ὅτι Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν κατὰ τὰς γραφάς*, his thought of what he had received ceased with *ἀπέθανεν*, and with *ὑπέρ* began the statement of his own interpretation of the fact. It would have been fairer, and quite as plausible, for Beyschlag to have maintained that Paul claimed to have received from the first disciples an interpretation of Jesus' death as possessing redemptive significance, but that in this he had mistaken his personal belief for historical information.

this question is to be answered affirmatively.[1] Peter understands the divine promise as relating not only to Israel, but to "all that are afar off," — outside the limits of theocracy, — that is, to the heathen (ii. 39). He sees in the outpouring of the Spirit upon men "from every nation under heaven" (ii. 5) the fulfilment of the prophet's words that "whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved" (ii. 21). Through the Jewish nation all peoples of the earth are to be blessed (iii. 25). To the Jews, indeed, is salvation first (*πρῶτον*) offered (iii. 26), but this *first* implies a *second*, so that we have here the sense of Paul's maxim: "To the Jew first and also to the Greek" (Rom. i. 16). These indications of a universal gospel in the earliest discourses are confirmed by subsequent events such as the conversion of the Ethiopian, of Cornelius and many other Gentiles (viii. 26 *sq.*; x. 1 *sq.*; x. 45), and by the testimony of Paul in Galatians to the effect that the "pillar" apostles approved his mission to the Gentiles, and that Peter himself recognized the heathen converts, and commonly associated with them at meals without scruple (Gal. ii. 9, 12; *cf.* Acts xi. 3).

But sooner or later the question must arise: Are the forms of the Jewish religion to be preserved under Christianity? Is Christianity simply a species of Judaism, or is it to replace the law? The almoner Stephen seems to have been the first definitely to face and answer this question. He declared that the temple-worship and the Mosaic law were to be done away. They were, indeed, false witnesses who said that he expressed himself blasphemously against the temple and the law (vi. 11–14), but from his address it is evident that he had entered into the meaning of the teaching of Jesus about the fulfilment of the law and the cessation of the ceremonial system.

The speech of Stephen was spoken before the Sanhedrin

[1] It is a maxim with the radical school that any recognition by the Judeo-Christian apostles of the idea of the gospel for the world must be unhistorical. They therefore ascribe all statements of such a recognition to the dogmatic bias of the author of Acts. See, *e.g.* Cone, *The Gospel and its Earliest Transformations*, ch. ii.

in answer to the charge of blasphemy. He shows, in the first place, by a recital of the events of Israel's history, how, in rejecting the Prophet whom Moses foretold, they are but repeating their earlier action in refusing the messengers of God and disobeying the divine voice which had spoken to the nation. This is a kind of counter-accusation. Then more directly answering the charge against himself, he shows that the idea of the cessation of the temple-cultus is not blasphemous. "The Most High dwelleth not in houses made with hands" (vi. 48). God dwelt with his people when they wandered in the wilderness; he revealed his presence in the tabernacle, which was carried from place to place. His presence is not confined to one locality, but is spiritual. The speaker had grasped the thought of Jesus, that because God is spirit, his worship should be in spirit and in truth, and may be offered anywhere. He insisted that in so teaching he was but reaffirming the deepest lesson of their own history, and that in refusing Jesus and his spiritual truth, they were but persisting in their preference for the formal and external in their religion, to the neglect of its spiritual essence. We have here a partial anticipation of Paul's doctrine, that Christ is the end of the law, although we have no trace of that form of argument by which the apostle deduces this conclusion. To the mind of Stephen it seemed to follow simply from the nature of God's revelation and the essential spirituality of all true worship.

There was no question among the primitive apostles about the right of the Gentiles to the blessings of the gospel. But what should be required of them in the way of observance of the Jewish ceremonial was a point over which there was sure to be sharp difference of opinion. So long as there was no large number of conversions from heathenism, the question was not raised, although we early see it foreshadowed in the complaint of some of the Jerusalem Christians that Peter had freely associated with the uncircumcised converts (xi. 2, 3). When, however, in consequence of persecution, the Christians were scattered, and some of them began a flourishing mission at

Antioch, which soon resulted in the conversion of many Gentiles, certain Jewish Christians came and demanded the circumcision of these converts as necessary to their salvation (xv. 1). For our present purpose it is sufficient to observe that the primitive apostles did not sustain this demand. The narratives in Acts xv. and in Gal. ii. agree perfectly in asserting that the Jerusalem convention, which met to pronounce upon this question, refused to sanction any such requirement. Peter declared that faith in Christ was the sufficient condition of salvation (xv. 9–11). James repudiated the demand of the Judaizers, and conselled laying no burden of requirement upon the Gentile Christians, except abstinence from certain practices into which heathen converts might be especially liable to fall, and which were naturally and justly abhorrent to Jewish feeling (xv. 24, 28, 29). According to Paul, James, Peter, and John approved the work of himself and Barnabas, gave them the right hand of fellowship, disclaimed all desire to modify or supplement their teaching and practice, and stipulated only that they should procure collections for the poor Judean Christians (Gal. ii. 6–10). Thus a great gain was made for the doctrine of the sufficiency and adequacy of Christianity, and a long step taken towards the realization by the Church of her freedom from the Jewish law.

This whole course of events which we have thus briefly traced is of the greatest importance for Biblical Theology. It is an outline history of the emancipation of the infant Church from the prejudices and practices of Judaism. The wonder is not that the Church's progress was slow and gradual, but that it was so sure and continuous. It was a long way from the perplexity and dismay occasioned by the death of Jesus, to the conviction that the acceptance of him and his spiritual truth was the whole of religion. Men who had been so long used to the old wine of Judaism would not straightway desire the new wine of a free, spiritual gospel (Lk. v. 39). The principal steps in the transition from the old to the new may be recapitulated thus: (1) Jesus is the Messiah who has

triumphed over death and now lives and reigns in the glory of the Father. (2) His death, maliciously accomplished by the Jews, must have a place in the divine plan and be a part of his saving work. The Old Testament justifies this claim. (3) Men are to be urged to repent and to believe in him for salvation. (4) These conditions may be fulfilled irrespective of one's nationality. The Messianic salvation is available for all. (5) If repentance and faith are the terms of salvation, then no ritual requirements, such as circumcision, can be necessary in addition to them. (6) Hence the gospel is for all men on equal terms, and those terms are purely spiritual.

To this conclusion the thoughts of the primitive apostles and the course of events described in Acts inevitably tended. But it was reserved for the apostle Paul to be the champion of this principle and to elaborate the ethical and historical grounds on which it rests.

CHAPTER III

THE EPISTLE OF JAMES

THIS epistle is addressed to the Jewish Christians of the Dispersion (i. 1). It is evident from the author's language that his readers were composed of the poorer and humbler classes (ii. 5) who were, most of them, in the employ of their richer fellow-countrymen. They were subject to oppression and injustice at the hands of their non-Christian employers (ii. 6; v. 4). The writer echoes the thought of Jesus (Lk. vi. 20; vii. 22; xiv. 21), that the poor are more receptive of his truth than the rich, although he shows no enmity to the rich as such. He insists upon the perishableness of riches (i. 10, 11), but assumes that the rich man may live the life of humility and love (i. 10). That life supplies the true ground of harmony between the two classes, elevating the poor to a sense of their spiritual riches, despite their hard outward conditions, and humbling the rich by teaching them the vanity of worldly wealth and the sole permanency of moral and spiritual good (i. 9–11).

In the situation which the epistle contemplates it was not strange that the Christians were tempted to court the favor of the rich. If a rich man came into the Christian assembly, it would be natural to show him special favor; to treat him with a fawning partiality as compared with a poor man who might enter (ii. 1–3). Such an attitude James discountenances on the ground that it is inconsistent with the real equality of all men before God and with the principle that only spiritual good has real worth in his sight. A faith which is combined with such partiality would be sadly adulterated with worldliness. It would be the faith of a double-minded man (i. 8) who is no longer

clear in his consent to Christ's idea that riches do not avail before God, and who has partially given himself over to false reasonings respecting the honor due the rich and to servile behavior in their presence (ii. 1, 4).

The author breaks out in severe denunciation of the injustice which his readers were suffering at the hands of their employers (v. 1–6). He predicts their impending doom. He sees their wealth consumed by rust and their rich vestments by moths. The day of the Messianic judgment hastens. The wages of the poor laborers whom they have defrauded cries out for vengeance upon them. They have lived in selfish ease, like animals, fattening themselves, but doing it for the slaughter. The righteous have suffered without resistance, but their cries have been heard by the Lord of Hosts, and the day of vengeance is hastening on. "The judge standeth before the doors" (v. 9).

The evils which the author rebukes, or warns his readers to avoid, and the virtues which he commends are chiefly such as are especially appropriate to the situation which has just been sketched. The readers were subject to severe trials (*πειρασμοί*) arising from their circumstances. These trials would naturally operate as discouragements to faith and zeal. It would be hard to maintain a belief in the messiahship of Jesus and to preserve a certain separateness from Judaism when to do so involved the disfavor and contempt of their fellow-countrymen. Hence the burden of James's message is an exhortation to patience and steadfastness. He urges that the process of testing to which they are subject, if heroically endured, will result, not in the weakening, but in the strengthening of faith. The testing process will but confirm them in their steadfast adherence to their faith and contribute to their completeness in the Christian life (i. 2–4). But if the sufferings of their present lot are to have this effect, faith must be preserved unalloyed. The man who wavers between the principles of Christ and the favor of the selfish world need not expect any such blessing. He must seek the true wisdom to guide him—the wisdom of Jesus, who placed the true good in the inner life. His faith

must not be weakened by a half-hearted devotion to spiritual truth. He must not doubt or be divided in his allegiance, half consenting to the wisdom of Jesus and half to the wisdom of the world. If he does, he will be "like the surge of the sea driven by the wind and tossed" (i. 6). His life will be divided and will lose its unity, its concentration, and its true reward (i. 5–8). We seem to hear in these words an echo of the teaching of Jesus about the distraction of life through anxiety for the things of the world and the impossibility of serving two masters (Mt. vi. 24, 25).

In addition to the evil of sycophancy towards their rich employers, the readers would inevitably be tempted to hate their oppressors. Hence they are urged to be "slow to wrath," for although God cherishes a righteous indignation against wicked men, "the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God" (i. 19, 20). Man's methods of taking vengeance are not the same as God's, and God does not delegate his judgment to man. Hence the readers are exhorted to obey the "royal law" of love (ii. 8), and to wait in patience for the day of divine judgment, as the husbandman waits on the processes of nature (v. 7–9).

Another evil to which these Christians were liable was an excessive eagerness to assume the *rôle* of teachers. They had become a relatively separate community. So far as we can judge from the epistle their assembly was not yet organized. They were not subject to precedent or the restraining power of an established *régime* in the conduct of their meetings. Under these conditions an undesirable liberty would easily develop itself. Such seems to have been the fact. Many were not "slow to speak" (i. 19), and their speech often lacked the "meekness of wisdom." This excessive liberty seems to have led to many abuses. It gave rise to an exaggerated emphasis upon speaking and hearing as compared with practice (i. 22). In some cases it ministered to pride and contention. The author thinks that among his readers too many are aspiring to be teachers, and reminds them of the solemn responsibility which teachers assume and of the

heavier judgment to which they are subject if they fail in their work. "In many things we all stumble," he says, and adds that there is nothing in which one is so liable to stumble as in speech. How difficult and how responsible, then, is the work of a teacher (iii. 1, 2)! This reflection leads him off into a general description of the difficulty and importance of controlling the tongue.

Such considerations as the foregoing put us in possession of the general situation which the epistle presupposes. It contains an extremely practical message, adapted to the trying circumstances of its readers. It is simple and straightforward and without any formal logical structure. The two peculiarities of the epistle which strike one most forcibly are the Old Testament form, of its thoughts and the resemblance of many of the ideas to those of Jesus. It reads like a Jewish sapiential book, but the wisdom which is commended is the wisdom of Jesus. From these general comments I advance to a more particular consideration of the doctrinal contents of the epistle.

After the manner of the Old Testament, James's favorite name for God is ὁ κύριος (iv. 15; v. 11, 12). He is also called "Lord of Sabaoth" (v. 4). Three times the term "Father" is applied to God. He is "our God and Father" (i. 27), "the Lord and Father" (iii. 9), and "the Father of lights" (i. 17), that is, the Creator of the heavenly bodies, and figuratively called their Father, because they are thought of as sources of light and blessing, and as kindred to him in this respect. James pictures the goodness of God in various forms. He is the bountiful giver of wisdom who does not, like a reluctant benefactor, chide those who apply to him (i. 5). He is himself the absolutely good, and gives only good gifts to men. All moral evil is completely foreign to his nature. He cannot be enticed to evil, nor can he entice men into sin. He is the pure and perpetual fountain of goodness. There is with him "no variation, neither shadow cast by turning." Unlike the sun and moon, his light suffers no eclipse. He bestows the spiritual life by sowing the word of truth in the heart (i. 13–18).

The Old Testament ideas of the "jealousy" of God and of the divine judgment are prominent in our epistle. To become a "friend of the world" — that is, to give oneself up to sinful pleasures and passions — is to become, so far, hostile to God; and God wants no divided or partial allegiance. The spirit which he implants in men yearns over them enviously, that is, God is anthropopathically represented as begrudging the partial transfer of men's devotion to another than himself. Hence such faithlessness is represented, as in the Old Testament, as adultery. God requires an undivided heart (iv. 1–5). He will severely judge oppression and injustice, yet towards the humble and patient "the Lord is full of pity and merciful" (v. 11). To me it seems evident that we have here a clear reflection of Jesus' idea of God as the bountiful and ungrudging giver of all good, the heavenly Father who is perfect (τέλειος) in love (Mt. v. 43–48), the εἷς ἀγαθός whose goodness is absolute and therefore excludes all becoming good (Mk. x. 18). Here we see the God of the Old Covenant clothed in the qualities which distinguish Jesus' conception of the Father in heaven.

As in the Old Testament, man is described as made in the image of God (iii. 9). It is obvious from the context that all men, despite their sinfulness, are regarded as still bearing the divine likeness. The argument is: Do not curse your enemies; reverence man as man, because he is made in the image of God. This idea is the key to all that our author says concerning mankind. As in Genesis, man, whom God has made for himself, is subjected to temptation to forfeit his true relation to his Maker. The world makes its appeal to his heart, and claims at least a part of his interest and devotion. The term "world" is not defined, but its use makes it evident that it bears an ethical sense. The readers are bidden to "keep themselves unspotted from the world" (i. 27). The tongue is identified with the "world of iniquity" in the body (iii. 6), the idea apparently being that the tongue is the organ of the world of evil in man. "The friendship of the world is enmity with God" (iv. 4). The world is moral evil, without or

within. It may be our environment, so far as that supplies occasion and furnishes stimulus to evil appetites and passions. It may be — and in the last analysis must be — the subject-matter of our own thoughts. Now this evil world enters, as it were, into competition with God for the possession of the soul of man. The division of the life between the world and God results in that instability and distraction which the author likens to the restless motion of the sea (i. 6). It is this division which makes the "doubting" (*διακρινόμενος*) man — the "two-minded" (*δίψυχος*) man, who is "unstable in all his ways" (i. 6–8). As I have already intimated, we have here a probable echo of Jesus' teaching upon the single purpose and supreme choice of life (Mt. vi. 19 *sq.*).

To be "unspotted from the world" is certainly akin to the life of merciful ministration which is cited as illustrating the nature of "pure and undefiled religion" (i. 27). The opposite of this piety (*θρησκεία*) is seen from the context to be a self-assertive ambition, a greed for prominence which leads to an extravagant freedom of speech — a reckless use of the tongue either in wrathful denunciation or in self-assumed authority and importance. The passage i. 19–27 would yield us this idea as illustrating what James means by that worldliness which imperils faith and breaks up the unity and concentration of the religious life. The passage on the wrong use of the tongue (iii. 1–12) yields a similar idea. When the tongue is made the organ of wrathful or impure passion, the whole evil world in the heart of man is roused to utter itself by it. To allow such free expression to evil thoughts is to make friends with the "world of iniquity" and to put oneself under its overmastering power. To do this is the dictate of a base and not of a true wisdom (iii. 13–18). Such a life of unrestrained passion will be likely to give rise to every kind of evil deeds, and thus to lead on to the full result of that "friendship of the world" which is "enmity with God" — a faithlessness to his love from which he yearns to win back those whose supreme devotion he craves (iv. 4, 5).

These considerations disclose to us the author's conception of sin. God and the world compete for the affections of man. Faith — devotion to God and to the world of spiritual and eternal reality — is the root of goodness. Surrender to the enticements of evil is sin. The nearest approach to a philosophy of sin is found in the passage: "Each man is tempted, when he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed. Then the lust, when it hath conceived, beareth sin: and the sin, when it is fullgrown, bringeth forth death" (i. 14, 15). Evil desire (ἐπιθυμία) is the principle of sin. Forsaking devotion to God man transfers his allegiance to the courtesan ἐπιθυμία, and of this union sin is born. "Thus sin is an unlawful child of the desire and the will" (Beyschlag). When it is fullgrown sin produces death, the moral death of the soul. In this description the author seems to have in mind the warning of Gen. ii. 17: "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die;" but he attaches to death an ethical rather than a physical meaning (*cf.* v. 20).[1] It does not follow from the figure which is here used that James places sin in sensuous passion alone. He speaks of perverted desire in general including all the ends and aims which are inconsistent with supreme love to God. Hence it follows that he really places sin in a perversion of the will and the affections. Formally considered, sin is a false choice.

What now is the material principle of sin? What is the object of this false choice? Although James gives us no explicit answer to this question, we need not go wrong in inferring the answer which is implied in his language. Here, as elsewhere in the New Testament, sin is selfish-

[1] The context of these passages, especially that of v. 20, seems to show that θάνατος has for James primarily an ethical meaning. Still it is not to be forgotten that, according to the Biblical idea, death is the opposite of life in the largest sense of that term, and that the elements which constitute fulness of life are not so sharply distinguished in Scripture as in modern thought. The term "death" may be used, now in a narrower, now in a wider, sense, and may emphasize now one, now another, phase of the forfeiture of life. See Ernesti, *Ursprung der Sünde, u. s. w.* p. 180; Schmidt, *Lehrgehalt des Jacobus-Briefes*, pp. 86, 87.

ness. By James, as by Paul, the natural bodily appetites and passions are emphasized as the seat and occasion of sin. Sinful actions spring from the "pleasures which strive for conquest in the members" (iv. 1). Sensuous passion is a powerful incentive to sin, but sin is not identical with sensuousness. The physical impulses become sinful only when they are perverted by the consent of the will. Moreover, James has much more to say of spiritual than of physical sins. The only sins on which he dwells at length are servile obsequiousness towards the rich — having its root in selfish worldliness — and the unbridled use of the tongue. Both these forms of evil are more due to pride, the subtlest form of selfishness, than to sensuousness. The author particularly specifies hatred, wrath, envy, and rivalry (ἐριθεία) (i. 19, 20; iv. 9, 14, 16). Even failure to do one's duty is sin, since it springs from selfish indifference. Examples of such "sins of omission" would be an idle hearing of the word without corresponding action (i. 22–24), a cold and half-hearted recognition of God and spiritual good without deeds of benevolent service (ii. 14–26), and, in general, the failure to try to fulfil in action one's own knowledge of what he ought to do: "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin" (iv. 17).

All these types of sin are forms of selfish desire. In sensuous sin man seeks the gratification of his lower nature; in pride, envy, and wrath he yields to the impulses of selfish ambition and of a false self-assertion; in indifference to the needs of others he falls into a selfish love of ease, in which his own personal enjoyment is treated as the only good. There is thus a real philosophy underlying our author's treatment of sin. It is based upon an inner law or principle, that of selfish prudence, and is called a base and earthly "wisdom" (iii. 15). It stands over against the true wisdom of a good life which seeks after chastity, instead of sensual indulgence; after peace, instead of envy, rivalry, and hatred; after the rewards of forbearance, gentleness, and compassion, instead of the fruits of anger, hate, and covetousness (iii.

17). This false wisdom is earthly (ἐπίγειος), as opposed to heavenly or divine — it partakes the nature of this lower, passing, evil world; it is psychical (ψυχική) or natural, that is, it consists in giving chief place to man's lower nature (ψυχή), especially his animal appetites and passions, instead of laying chief stress upon the higher nature (πνεῦμα) in which man is most nearly kindred to God, and it is "demoniacal" (δαιμονιώδης), as partaking the nature of the "unclean spirits," who in the Gospels are represented as possessing the souls of men and driving them to madness (iii. 15). This spurious wisdom of the selfish life gives rise to egotism, boasting, cursing, and every blind and stormy passion. It destroys the social life of man. It is the fruitful mother of confusion (ἀκαταστασία) and of every evil deed (iii. 16).

Nothing is said of the origin of sin, or of its consequences, beyond the mention of death — the moral deterioration or loss of the soul — as its result (i. 15; v. 20). In one place only is Satan spoken of (iv. 7): "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you." Here Satan is quite certainly thought of as inciting men to hatred and discord, and his flight from him who victoriously resists his solicitations is, not improbably, conceived of according to the picture of Jesus' conflict with the devil in the wilderness. Our author was familiar with the conception of "demoniacal possession" which meets us in the Synoptics. The statement that the "demons believe, and shudder" (ii. 19) in the presence of God, is probably a reminiscence of the belief and terror of the demoniacs in the presence of Christ, which the Gospels describe (Lk. iv. 41; Mt. viii. 29).

As the absolutely good, God demands goodness in man. He reveals his own purity and its requirements in his law. This law is for James the Mosaic law, as is shown by the examples of it which he gives from the Decalogue (ii. 11). But it is not conceived after the manner of Rabbinism, but as a spiritual unity. Its essence is love, which is the "royal law" (ii. 8). In that principle its specific requirements are so comprehended that a violation of any one

commandment is, at the same time, an infraction of the one indissoluble law (ii. 10). James thus unifies and spiritualizes the legal system. It has become for him a "perfect law" (*νόμος τέλειος*, i. 25), a law fulfilled and perfected by Jesus. It is a "law of liberty" (*νόμος τῆς ἐλευθερίας*, i. 25; ii. 12), that is, a law which is not merely felt as a constraining force from without, but as an inspiration within. It is a law which the heart freely obeys. It cannot be fulfilled by mere outward compliance, as many human laws can be, but the duties which it enjoins must be freely chosen. Its essence is in the spirit or principle which underlies it. That principle is love. Hence men will be "judged by the law of liberty" (ii. 12) which regards the motive as well as the deed. The rule of life is not merely an outer word; it is an inner word engrafted in the heart (*λόγος ἔμφυτος*, i. 21) and bringing forth fruit in the life.

Here, then, we have the doctrine of righteousness set forth in Old Testament terms, but in unmistakable agreement with the ethical and spiritual teaching of Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. The Old Testament law is still thought of as binding upon the Christian, but the author has penetrated to its essence and spirit and makes the true obedience to consist in the motives which rule the inner life. What is this but the righteousness which Jesus demanded? The way in which this righteousness is to be distinguished from the Old Testament system *as such* is not yet discerned. Christianity is still in the green ear. But the principle — namely, that of the free inner life — has been apprehended, and that principle will at length set the gospel free from Judaism. In our epistle also, God appears, quite in Jewish fashion, as the strict lawgiver and judge (iv. 12); yet it is evident that he is not conceived of as rewarding men in strict equivalence for their sins, since he is "full of pity and merciful" (v. 11). Where men fulfil the moral conditions on which God can bless and save them, "mercy boasts itself superior to judgment" (ii. 13), that is, triumphs over all fear of judgment. Although God is not a mere merciless accountant in his

dealings with men, he does require the fulfilment of appropriate conditions in order that men may be recipients of his mercy. "Judgment is without mercy to him that hath showed no mercy" (ii. 13). This is the principle of Jesus: "The merciful shall obtain mercy" (Mt. v. 7; *cf.* Mt. vi. 14 and vii. 1). God is benevolent and generous (i. 5; v. 11). No adjustment of the judicial and the benevolent aspects of the divine character is attempted. There is no reason to suppose that the problem of making such an adjustment was present to the mind of the author.

These considerations open the way to a right understanding of our author's view of salvation. The provision for salvation is grounded in the gracious will of God: "Of his own will (*βουληθείς*) he brought us forth by the word of truth" (i. 18). God chose them that are "poor as to this world to be rich in faith" (ii. 5). This choice is not conceived of as an eternal decree, but as a historical action. His gracious action is in accord with his goodness as the giver of all good gifts (i. 17), and his choice of the poor is presented in contrast to the servility to the rich which he is reproving. The whole epistle shows that it was chiefly the poor in the communities in question who were susceptible to the gospel-call. The rich were proud, hard, and self-sufficient.

James teaches the doctrine of spiritual renewal. God brings men forth into a new life by means of "the word of truth" (i. 18), which is elsewhere described as the word that is implanted (*ἔμφυτος*) in the heart (i. 21). This is the truth of the Kingdom which Jesus described as sown upon the different soils, and as growing or perishing according to the reception with which it met. The figure of i. 18 (*βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν*) reminds us of the phrase, "begotten of God" (Jn. i. 13), and of Jesus' words to Nicodemus respecting the new birth (Jn. iii. 3–5). The salvation thus bestowed is a present fact. The readers are described as a "kind of first fruits of God's creatures" (i. 18), that is, as an especial possession of God. The new life is to be lived and enjoyed here and now in faith and action (i. 22 *sq.*; ii. 14 *sq.*). Still, the future

aspect of salvation is also strongly emphasized. The contrast between this world of suffering and the coming Kingdom of blessedness is strongly marked. The great comfort which is offered the readers is that they are "heirs of the kingdom which God promised to those that love him" (ii. 5), and that after they have faithfully endured the trials to which they are subject in this world, they shall "receive the crown of life, which the Lord promised to them that love him" (i. 12). It is evident that this consummation is associated in the mind of James with the Lord's second coming, for which the readers are exhorted patiently to wait (v. 7), and which is declared to be near (v. 8). With the apostolic Church in general our author believes that he is living "in the last days" (v. 3). "The judge standeth before the doors" (v. 9).

Not much is explicitly said respecting the person of Christ in our epistle, yet much is implied. Not only is the title Lord (*κύριος, ὁ κύριος*) applied to him (i. 1; ii. 1), but the author designates himself as "a servant (*δοῦλος*) of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ" (i. 1) in such a way as to imply that his relation to Christ is like his relation to God. Moreover, Jesus the Messiah is the true object of faith (ii. 1) and "the Lord of glory." Whether the defining *τῆς δόξης* means that he personally shares the divine glory, or is now exalted to a heavenly sphere, or will reappear in glory at his parousia, it certainly attributes to Jesus a superhuman character. His is "the honorable name" (*τὸ καλὸν ὄνομα*, ii. 7) which was named over the readers in baptism. He is the Mediator of salvation. The "word of truth," "the implanted word" (i. 18, 21), which the Christian readers have received, has come to them through Christ, who by his life and teaching has transformed the outer law into an inner law, and made it a law which rules in the heart and is obeyed in freedom and with delight. If God is called judge (iv. 12), so also is Christ (v. 9), from which we must deduce the idea that God is to judge the world through Christ by the law of liberty (ii. 12), because what one freely chooses

and does is the measure of what he is. It is a sufficient explanation of the meagreness of this Christology to say that neither the circumstances of his readers nor the purpose of the writer called for any developed doctrine of Christ's person. Probably the author possessed no elaborate doctrine. But this much he possessed: Jesus is the exalted Messiah, the author of salvation, and the judge of the world. These ideas are not dwelt upon at length, but they underlie the whole purpose of the epistle, and give point and force to all its arguments and exhortations. Can it fairly be said in view of these elements of doctrine that for James "Christ had not yet become the central point of doctrinal thought"?[1]

But it is the passage on justification (ii. 14–26) which has occasioned the liveliest interest and the widest differences of opinion which are to be observed in the treatment of our epistle. We can best represent its general drift in a free paraphrase. The argument runs thus: We have seen that the mere hearing of the truth is valueless without obedience to it (i. 22 *sq.*) What God requires is a life of unselfish love and helpfulness. Now it is equally profitless for a man to possess a faith which does not manifest itself in works of mercy and love. Such a faith can have no saving value (14). Suppose a Christian should declare that he possessed the sentiments of benevolence and pity, and yet when he met with a fellow-Christian naked and hungry, should merely express the wish that his need might be supplied, and do nothing at all for the relief of the person. What a valueless philanthropy that would be (15, 16)! Equally valueless is a faith which does not express itself in deeds and services. Such a faith is "dead in itself" (*νεκρὰ καθ' ἑαυτήν*); it has within it no principle of life or movement (17). Let us put the matter very clearly. Suppose that one who is not a party to any dispute about "faith and works" should meet the question under consideration. Suppose him to encounter a man such as I have described (*v.* 14) who professes "faith" alone, and suppose this outsider,

[1] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 354 (Bk. III. ii. ch. iii. § 3).

in turn, to take up the claim to possess "works." How, now, will he be likely to view the relation of the two principles? Will he not say: You claim to have faith; give me a proof that you possess it *apart from works*, if you can. I, on the other hand, will prove *by my works* that I possess faith also (18). The result will be that a faith which does not utter itself in deeds will be found unable even to prove its own existence. Christian acts and services are the necessary expression of a true and vital faith. The imaginary party whom we introduced might pursue his argument further, thus: You who profess to have faith would probably quote as an example of it your belief that God is one. It is a correct opinion; but I would remind you that the demons also hold the same opinion and are not the better for it (19).

What folly, then (James continues), to claim that any so-called faith which does not lead to action and express itself in deeds of mercy and love, is useful or saving. True faith leads to works (20). Take the typical Old Testament example of faith, that of Abraham. He is described, not merely as believing, but also as doing a great act of self-sacrifice, which was the fruit of his faith. For this act he was as really approved of God as for his faith, out of which the action sprang. God requires, not only a right disposition of mind and heart towards himself, but also the appropriate conduct to which such a disposition should lead. This conduct is, indeed, proof of the right disposition and is inseparable from it. Where the conduct is wanting, it will be found that the inner disposition fails to fill out the true idea of religious faith (21–24). The example of Rahab also shows that the faith which God approves is an active principle (25). Thus we reach the conclusion that a faith which does not lead to a good life is "the mere corpse of religion" (Mayor) (26).

It is evident that "works" are here conceived, not as meritorious deeds of legal obedience (*ἔργα νόμου*), but as acts of Christian mercy and love. Nor are they set over against faith as a conceivable rival condition of God's approval. On the contrary, they are regarded as the evi-

dence and fruit of true faith — its natural and necessary expression. Faith and works do not, therefore, represent two independent principles. They are related to each other as the tree is to its fruit. The spurious or "dead" faith which James describes may be likened to a barren tree. Only in "works" does faith fulfil its true nature. Where they are wanting, faith must be so rudimentary that it no longer answers to its true idea. "By works is faith made perfect" (ii. 22); faith is never its true and complete self except when it is a principle of life and action leading to the deeds and services which are its natural fruitage.

What, then, was James's conception of faith? Some scholars have urged the necessity of seeking a definition of the subject which is large enough to accommodate all the allusions to faith which are made in the epistle. As a result of such an effort Beyschlag says that the notion of faith in James is the same as that found in Heb. xi. 1: "The conviction of the reality of supersensuous facts and blessings."[1] This view seems to attribute to James a more abstract mode of thought than his epistle illustrates, and to overlook the fact that faith is a large idea and has many sides and phases. When, for example, James is opposing faith to doubting or wavering (i. 6), he seems to be thinking of faith as a firm conviction of the superior value of spiritual good. When he exhorts his readers not to join with their faith in Christ partiality to the rich (ii. 1), he appears to be thinking of the warnings which Jesus gave respecting the dangers of a love of riches, and to mean that Christian faith involves fidelity to the principles which Jesus had enunciated on that subject. In the section on justification (ii. 14–26), however, a different aspect of faith comes into view. The barren or dead faith is mere belief or opinion, while the true faith is a full consent of the will to the principles of Christ who enjoins a life of service Even the former is really faith in the sense that it is an element of faith; yet it falls far short of being faith in its full meaning and true nature. To me it seems natural to

[1] *N. T. Theol.* I. 359 (Bk. III. ii. ch. iv. § 2).

suppose that the shading of thought in the use of the word "faith" varies according to the phase of the subject under consideration and the special aim of the writer in the different passages. It is wholly unnecessary to suppose that James possessed some abstract definition of the subject which was general enough to include both the false and true faith of ii. 14–26. True faith is the living and active spirit of serving love; dead faith is a mere theoretic assent of the mind which does not move the will or shape the conduct.

The question which James is answering in our passage is: What are the conditions, on man's part, of obtaining the divine approval? What does God require of men? His answer is substantially that of the prophet (Micah, vi. 8): God requires a good life. He understands and insists that this life is an inner, as well as an outer, life. He lays no exaggerated emphasis upon outward conduct. A true faith is the root of the religious life, but if it is a true faith, it will express itself in action. There is no conflict of ideas between the teachings of James and of Paul. Both hold that God accepts men on condition of a true faith. The active faith of James is the faith that worketh by love (Gal. v. 6), of which Paul speaks. James insists that a dead faith — a mere holding of things for time — cannot save. There is not a word in Paul's writings which is contrary to this position. With Paul true faith is vital union with Christ, and he shows at length how it involves the holy life upon which James insists. When Paul declares that men are not saved "by works," he means that they are not saved by deeds of obedience to the Mosaic law considered as so inherently meritorious that they can found a claim to salvation. His aim is to exalt the mercy of God as the ground of salvation. There is not a word in the Epistle of James which is in the least inconsistent with this doctrine. When Paul says: "No salvation by works," and James says: "Justified by works," the term "works" is used with entirely different associations. To Paul it means: deeds of obedience to the law considered as inherently meritorious and saving;

to James it means a good life, the fruit of faith. When Paul says: "Salvation is by faith," and James says: "Faith cannot save," Paul means that a true faith is the condition of salvation, and James means that a false faith ("that faith," i. 14 — the meagre, barren faith under consideration) is not. The two apostles also use "justification" differently. With Paul it relates to the acceptance of the sinner. With James it is used comprehensively of God's approval of men. Paul is discussing the initiative of salvation, and faith is the door to the Kingdom of God's grace. James is asking what God in general requires of men — what are the nature and demands of true religion. Naturally, therefore, Paul dwells on faith, which stands logically first, while James insists upon the consequences and fruit of faith. But James does not more strenuously urge the necessity of a good life than does Paul in Rom. v.–viii. The discrepancies between them are purely verbal, and are readily resolved when one penetrates to the real meaning of each.

Our epistle inculcates the virtues of purity (i. 21), humility, and kindness (iv. 9–11). The Christian should recognize the uncertainty of life (iv. 14–17), confess his faults to his brethren (v. 16), seek to reclaim the wandering (v. 20), and commit his cares and interests to God in prayer (v. 13–15). The Christianity of our epistle is the religion of meekness and quietness, of submission and of trust in God. Its view of the religious life is simple and undogmatic, but it has much of the depth of the wisdom of Jesus which it often echoes. Its ideal of the wise and understanding man is that he should "show by his good life his works in meekness of wisdom" (iii. 13).

CHAPTER IV

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER

We have seen that the Epistle of James conceives of the gospel as a spiritualized law. 1 Peter regards it rather as a fulfilment of prophecy. This conception underlies the Petrine discourses in the Acts, and is further elaborated in our epistle. Like the Epistle of James, 1 Peter is a practical letter, designed to cheer and strengthen its readers in the endurance of persecution. Both writers seek the edification of their readers in the Christian life rather than their instruction in doctrine. Hence the dogmatic elements of both letters are incidental, and are introduced for a purely practical purpose. The subjects of justification, the Jewish law, and circumcision are not touched upon in our epistle. In a greater degree than James, Peter dwells upon the sufferings, resurrection, and exaltation of Christ, but he regards these chiefly as furnishing an example and as a motive of amendment. These are the marks of an earlier and simpler theology which befits the primitive apostolic age.

The epistle bears throughout an Old Testament impress. The religion of Christ is the realization of the hope of Israel. The Saviour is the fulfilment of the prophetic visions. Hence the writer's thought is largely cast into Jewish forms. Christ is the spotless lamb (i. 19); the corner-stone of God's spiritual house (ii. 6–8). Christians are the true elect race (ii. 9); they are living stones built up into a holy temple (ii. 4, 5); they are a royal priesthood, a peculiar possession of God (ii. 9, 10). But our author is well aware of the real separation between Judaism and Christianity. To the former, Christ has become a "stone of stumbling and a rock of offence"

(ii. 8). The theocratic people have forfeited their birthright, and those "who in time past were no people" (ii. 10), the Gentiles, have through faith and obedience inherited the promised blessing. We hear in such references to the disobedience of the Jewish nation an echo of Peter's discourses in the Acts, in which he charges upon the people the guilt of rejecting the Messiah.

As has been intimated, the primary purpose of 1 Peter was the same as that of the Epistle of James, to comfort the readers in their sufferings for Christ's sake. The allusions to these heavy trials form the dark background on which the author paints the bright hope of the gospel. The two key-words of the letter are *suffering* and *hope*. Present trials are to be patiently endured (i. 6; ii. 19; iii. 14; iv. 12 *sq.*); a glorious deliverance awaits those who suffer unjustly, because of their loyalty to Christ (i. 7, 13; ii. 21; iv. 13, 14). This thought furnishes the occasion for the various doctrinal allusions in the letter, especially those to the sufferings of Christ and the glories which followed them (i. 11). The resurrection, which is strongly emphasized, is regarded, as in the discourses, as a ground of comfort and hope (i. 3; iii. 21). The glorious appearing of Christ is presented, as before, as the object of the believer's eager expectation — the event in which his hope of salvation shall be realized (i. 5, 13; iv. 13; v. 4).

It has been remarked that the idea of the Messianic glory remained throughout his Christian life the central thought of the apostle Peter.[1] The relation of that glory to suffering was the principal problem with which his mind sought to deal. In the first period of his life, represented by the Gospels, it was impossible for him to reconcile the two ideas. The Messiah must not suffer. "Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall never be unto thee," he exclaimed (Mt. xvi. 22) when Jesus had predicted his death; and when, later, he entered the shadow of the cross, he denied his Lord and fled. In the second period, represented by the discourses in Acts, he has made an

[1] See Lechler, *Das apos. u. nachapos. Zeitalter*, pp. 442, 443.

effort to combine the two ideas. The Old Testament foretells Messiah's sufferings. It must have been a part of the divine plan that he should suffer. But the two things are rather externally combined. They must somehow belong together, but the inner ground of their unity is not yet apparent. In the third period, represented by our epistle, the two conceptions are no longer regarded as incompatible. The way of the cross is the way of light and blessedness, — *via crucis, via lucis*. Suffering is a part of that testing process, without which no moral destiny can be complete. The path of humiliation was the way to the Messiah's true glory and crown, and he has left us an example that we should follow his steps (ii. 21).

Peter grounds the work of salvation in the gracious purpose of God. Here, again, his mode of thought and expression is quite Jewish. The "elect" are, however, no longer the Jewish people only, but include men of many nations (i. 1, 2; ii. 4, 9). The appearance of Christ in history (i. 20), and the bestowment of an inheritance of blessedness through him (i. 4), were contemplated in the eternal plan of God. Of this idea of the divine foreknowledge Peter makes a purely practical use. The saving work of Christ, and the extension of God's mercy beyond Israel, were no after-thought. They had their place in the counsels of divine love.

In three passages the name "Father" is applied to God. He is called "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (i. 3). Peter also speaks of the Christians calling on God "as Father" (i. 17), that is, in distinction from others, recognizing his paternal character. He is also called "the Father" (i. 2), without further definition, in connection with his gracious purpose of salvation, so that we recognize here the idea of Jesus that fatherhood is a name for God's ethical character — his universal and holy love. Strong emphasis is laid in our epistle upon the moral perfections of God. As in the Old Testament, God is holy, and his holiness is the prototype of all goodness in man (i. 15, 16). He is the impartial judge of men who does not estimate or treat them according to

any external standard (i. 17). But the complementary attribute of mercy is even more strongly emphasized. This mercy is the source of hope and salvation (i. 3). God is "the God of all grace" (v. 10). All the blessings of the gospel are the gifts of the "varied grace (*ποικίλη χάρις*) of God" (iv. 10). These blessings are the product and expression of his "virtues" (*ἀρεταί*, ii. 9). Holy love best summarizes Peter's doctrine of God.

His doctrine of salvation is also expressed in Old Testament terms. It is an "inheritance" (i. 4), the fulfilment of a hope which had been divinely discerned and partially expressed by the prophets (i. 10–12). This *κληρονομία* corresponds to the "Kingdom of God" in the Synoptics, and to "eternal life" in the fourth Gospel — terms which are not found in our epistle.[1] Our author describes, mainly in Old Testament language, the refusal of their birthright by the Jews. They have rejected the Messiah, the chief corner-stone on which God would build his spiritual temple (ii. 4–8). He had dwelt on the same fact in one of his discourses, and had described it in the same Old Testament words (Acts iv. 11, 12). He does not discuss the problems to which this lapse of the nation gives rise, as Paul does (Rom. ix.–xi.). He only says that the Jews, being disobedient, "were appointed" (*ἐτέθησαν*) unto stumbling. The reference is to the prophetic description (Is. viii. 14, 15) of many taking offence at God's word, and of their consequent confusion. The meaning seems to be that their stumbling is the penalty which God has attached to their disobedience. Peter's view is the same as Paul's, that Israel lost his place as the elect race by unbelief (Rom. xi. 20). Not descent from Jewish stock, but faithfulness to God is the condition on which participation in the election is assured. The prophetic word still holds good: "To him that believeth" (Is. xxviii. 16). With Peter as with Paul (Gal. iii. 8), it is the believing who are the true sons of Abraham. There is no respect of persons with God (*cf.* Acts x. 34, 35). Men of any nation who will heed his word and receive his

[1] He once (iii. 7) uses *ζωή* as a designation of salvation.

Son may become part of the elect race, the royal priesthood, the holy nation (ii. 9). Thus Jews and Gentiles have, to a great extent, changed places. The despised heathen, the "no people" (ii. 10), have obtained the Messianic blessing which the "peculiar people" of God by disobedience forfeited. These passages express the conclusion to which the apostle was driven by his experience as an *ἀπόστολος τῆς περιτομῆς* (Gal. ii. 9). They are in entire accord with the course of events in Peter's career as described in Acts, and with the references made by Paul in Galatians to Peter's customary attitude and action in regard to the extension of the gospel to the Gentiles.

The references to sin in our epistle are chiefly made in connection with the description of the pre-Christian condition of the Gentile readers. As with James and Paul, strong emphasis is laid upon the flesh as a source and seat of sin. The author beseeches his readers to "abstain from fleshly lusts (*σαρκικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι*), which war against the soul" (ii. 11), and describes their former manner of life as a living in the flesh (*ἐν σαρκὶ βιῶσαι*) when they "walked in lasciviousness, lusts, winebibbings, revellings, carousings, and abominable idolatries" (iv. 2, 3). But sensuous sins are not the only ones of which our author speaks. He cautions against malice, deceit, hypocrisy, envy, and malignant speech (ii. 1). It does not seem to me that *σάρξ* is used, in our epistle, in that wider ethical sense which it bears in Paul "as the real ground of all sin."[1] Only in ii. 11 and iv. 2 is *σάρξ* spoken of as a source of sin, and there only sensuous sins are mentioned. In all the other passages where *σάρξ* occurs (i. 24; iii. 18, 21; iv. 1, 6) it is used, in a non-ethical sense, to denote the material of the body. Here, then, we find a different usage from that of Paul, as we do also (quite in accord with the usage in the Synoptics, Mt. x. 28; Mk. viii. 35, 36) in the employment of *ψυχή* to denote the higher life in which man is akin to God (ii. 11), where Paul would have employed *πνεῦμα* or *ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*.

Much more is said of the person and work of Christ in

[1] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 388 (Bk. III. iii. ch. ii. § 3).

our epistle than in that of James. As in James, so here, Χριστός has ceased to be a title and has become a proper name. It is appended to the name "Jesus" without the article (i. 2, 3, 7, 13; ii. 5; iii. 21; iv. 11), but is much more commonly used alone (i. 11, 19; ii. 21; iii. 15, 18; iv. 1 *et al.*). As in the discourses of Acts and in James, the title κύριος is several times applied to him (i. 3; ii. 13; iii. 15). Christ is the bearer of salvation, the chief cornerstone of God's spiritual temple, the Shepherd and Bishop of souls (i. 2; ii. 4 *sq.*, 25; v. 4). He is sinless. He "did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth" (ii. 22). He is the "Lamb without blemish and without spot" (i. 19); the "righteous" who died "on behalf of the unrighteous" (iii. 18). He is not directly called Son of God, but his sonship is certainly implied when God is spoken of as "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" (i. 3). In the view of our epistle, Jesus is Messiah, Lord, the sinless author of salvation, and Son of God. Do not these predicates involve the ascription to him of a superhuman character?

Two other passages must be more particularly considered in their bearing upon this question. They are i. 11 and i. 20. In the first passage the author is describing the glorious salvation which has been provided in Christ. It surpassed, he says, the brightest visions of prophets. They but partially discerned its greatness. They groped, as it were, after its meaning, "searching what time or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them (τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ) did point unto, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glories that should follow them" (i. 11). In the second passage the writer, after mentioning the moral value of Christ's death and his sinless perfection, adds: "Who was foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world (προεγνωσμένου πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου), but was manifested at the end of the times for your sake" (i. 20). The question to be considered is whether these passages imply a real, or only an ideal, preëxistence of Christ.[1] I will summarize

[1] Among writers on Biblical Theology who find the idea of real preëxistence in these passages are Lechler, Gloag, Pfleiderer, Bovon, and Holtz-

the principal arguments in favor of the theory of ideal preëxistence. They are as follows: (1) "Foreknown" (*προεγνωσμένου*), in i. 20, cannot imply a real preëxistence of Christ, because, in i. 2, Christians are also said to have been "foreknown" (*ἐκλεκτοὶ κατὰ πρόγνωσιν θεοῦ πατρός*). (2) The contrast between "foreknown" and "manifested" (*φανερωθέντος*) does not favor the idea of real preëxistence, because "manifested" refers to Christ's "becoming known in the world" (*das In der Welt kundwerden*[1]) — "the manifestation of Christ in his significance as Messianic Redeemer, . . . and this manifestation is contrasted with the concealment of that significance in the divine decree."[2] No reference is, then, to be found here to an appearance of Christ in the world from a state of pre-temporal existence. (3) The phrase "Spirit of Christ," in i. 11, does not refer to Christ as preëxistent, because the name "Christ" is used in the same verse (*τὰ εἰς Χριστὸν παθήματα*) in the historic sense. Weiss admits that, since *Χριστός* is used in our epistle as a proper name, it could with perfect propriety be applied to the preëxistent Christ, but thinks it would be surprising if it were used in the same sentence of the preëxistent and of the historical Christ. He concludes that "this Spirit is none other than the eternal Spirit of God, in which the decree relating to the Messianic salvation was formed from eternity."[3]

The arguments *per contra* are as follows: (1) The correlation of "foreknown" and "manifested" in i. 20 most naturally implies real preëxistence. Both participles are predicated of the same subject, and, since the latter is predicated of a real subject, it follows that the former also is. Moreover, when it is said that anything is "manifested," the only natural meaning is that it *existed* before its manifestation, but in a state of concealment. Our author says that Christ was "manifested" as the Redeemer, and

mann. The opposite view is taken by Schmid, Weiss, Beyschlag, and Briggs.

[1] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 393 (Bk. III. iii. ch. iii. § 1).

[2] Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* § 48, *a*.

[3] *Op. cit.* § 48, *b*.

that before such manifestation he was "foreknown." Both the implications of the word "manifested," and its correlation with "foreknown," therefore, strongly favor the idea of personal preëxistence. (2) The word "foreknown," in itself considered, might indeed refer to ideal preëxistence only. Christians are, by implication, spoken of as foreknown by God. But nothing resembling the statement that believers are first "foreknown before the foundation of the world," and then "manifested," is found either in verse 2, or in our epistle elsewhere, or in the New Testament anywhere. (3) The objection that Χριστοῦ would not be used of the preëxistent and of the historical Christ (i. 11) in the same connection is without force. If Peter had the idea of Christ's pre-temporal existence, his language here would involve no incongruity. The word Χριστοῦ would be applied to the same person in both cases; in the former to him before, in the latter to him after, his historical appearance. On this view, the use of Χριστοῦ is more congruous than on the other interpretation, which understands πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ to mean the divine Spirit, which, at the time of its operation in the prophets, was *not yet* the Spirit of Christ, but became such by its bestowment upon him in his human life, while παθήματα Χριστοῦ bears a purely historic sense. It is far more natural to take Χριστοῦ as referring in both cases ("Spirit of Christ"; "sufferings of Christ") to the personal Christ. In the first phrase, it refers to the person whose spirit inspired the prophets; in the second, to the same person who suffered. If this is the meaning, there could have been no occasion to indicate that the preexistent Christ was referred to in the first case, and the historic Christ in the second. The language of the verse as a whole already makes that plain enough.[1] The question involved in these passages is not capable of a decisive solution, but to me this second interpretation seems more

[1] Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 423, and Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II. 311, who adopt this view of the passages, see in them an evidence of the dependence of our epistle upon Paul, and a proof that it is not an example of primitive apostolic teaching. In this view the idea of Christ's

probably correct. If so, we must recognize in our epistle a distinct advance upon the theology of the Petrine discourses in Acts.

The sufferings of Christ are represented as furnishing to Christians an example of the patient endurance of hardships (ii. 21; iv. 1, 13). The readers are exhorted to see to it that the sufferings which they are enduring are not deserved. There is no blessing in suffering for those who suffer in consequence of crimes; but "if one suffers as a Christian, let him not be ashamed" (iv. 16). If men partake of Christ's sufferings (iv. 13); if they suffer wrongfully, and yet do not return evil for evil (ii. 19, 20), they are then imitating Christ's example and may rejoice in the very midst of their hardships. But this is not, for the mind of Peter, the whole significance of Christ's suffering and death. He died "on account of sins" (*περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν*), "that he might bring us to God" (iii. 18). Our epistle distinctly presents the idea that Christ's death was redemptive; that, in some way, it procured or conditioned the bestowment of divine grace. The blood of Christ is contemplated as a means of cleansing (i. 2); as a precious ransom-price whereby the readers' spiritual liberty was procured. In the visions of the prophets the sufferings of Christ were seen as a part of his saving mission (i. 11). The apostle designates himself as one who testifies concerning the sufferings of Christ (v. 1) — a designation which most naturally includes testimony to their meaning as well as to their occurrence. To this meaning he refers when he says (probably in allusion to the picture of the suffering Servant in Is. liii.) that Christ "bare our sins in his own body upon the tree" (ii. 24), "the righteous on behalf of the unrighteous" (*δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων*, iii. 18), and that "by his stripes we are healed" (ii. 24; *cf.* Is. liii. 5, 11).

It is noticeable that Peter no longer speaks of the

preëxistence was developed as a means of Christianizing the Old Testament by taking back into it the Christian revelation. Pfleiderer finds parallels to the doctrine of preëxistence in our epistle in the Epistles of Clement of Rome and of Barnabas. *Urchristenthum*, pp. 648, 659, 668.

death of Jesus, as in Acts, as the crime of the Jewish people. That mode of viewing the subject has disappeared, and the redemptive significance of the event, after which he is seen in the discourses in Acts to be uncertainly groping, comes out into clear expression. It is also to be observed that the death of Christ is set in relation to moral cleansing, rather than to a legal acquittal from guilt. That his death is a means to the salvation of men is explicitly asserted. He bore the sins of men; he died on behalf of unrighteous men that he might bring them to God. He redeems men by his blood. But these are, after all, indefinite expressions. We are not told in what sense he bore the sins of men, or how his blood avails to redeem them. He suffered to deliver men from sin; but how does his suffering accomplish that deliverance? Some reply that since this suffering is elsewhere represented as an example (ii. 21; iv. 1), the answer is that Christ's sufferings save men by their becoming "partakers" of them (iv. 13), that is, by their imitating his patient endurance.[1] But few scholars support this view. Those who hold[2] that our author's view of redemption is an echo of that of Paul, must, of course, regard such an interpretation as quite inadequate.[3] But apart from that view, it seems to me extremely doubtful if our author's reference to the prophetic prevision of Messiah's sufferings (i. 11), to the lamb of Old Testament sacrifice[4] (i. 19), and to Christ's blood as a ransom (i. 18),

[1] So Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* I. 396 (Bk. III. iii. ch. iii. § 2): "This moral deliverance is mediated through the moral impression of Jesus' sufferings and death. The suffering of Christ can only work as an example by means of the moral impression which it makes, and only for those who resign themselves to this impression."

[2] As Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* I. 312, and Bovon, *Théologie du N. T.* II. 473.

[3] Pfleiderer, however, thinks that our epistle illustrates a weakened, popular Paulinism and interprets it in a way resembling Beyschlag's. *Urchristenthum*, p. 657 *sq.*

[4] The reference in the words "a lamb without blemish and without spot" (i. 19) seems to me to be to the necessary qualities of the sacrificial lamb in general (Lev. xxii. 20, 21), rather than to the paschal lamb specifically. So Weiss, Lechler, Holtzmann. *Per contra*, Ritschl and Beyschlag.

offered once for all (ἅπαξ, iii. 18) on behalf of sinners, can be satisfied by the theory of redemption by example. To pursue the question further would carry us too far into the field of inference. The temptation is strong to derive from these simple words a theory of atonement — either Paul's, or, even more naturally, one's own. If we steadfastly refuse to do this, we shall, I think, abide by the conclusion that, to the mind of Peter, the sufferings of Christ were a means of salvation, but that no theory or philosophy of this fact is offered us. If the references to these sufferings as an example suggest the view that he saves men by inciting them to do as he did, the Old Testament language and the correlation of his death with sin constrain us to assume that he also had in mind something more than this.

Our epistle places strong emphasis upon the resurrection of Jesus as a ground of faith and hope. It was the resurrection which had made the readers confident of obtaining the heavenly inheritance to be bestowed at the parousia (i. 3–5). The resurrection was a saving deed in the sense that it furnished a powerful motive to faith. "God raised him from the dead and gave him glory so that your faith and hope might be in God" (i. 21). The resurrection not only assured the disciples of Christ's continued life, but attested his divine mission and directed the thoughts of his followers to the heavenly world to which he now belonged. The resurrection implies the ascension of Christ to the throne of power and glory (iii. 22), and is thus a guaranty of the authority and dominion of Christ and of the completion of the work of salvation. To this heavenly world where Christ is, his followers also belong. Here they are "sojourners and pilgrims" (i. 1, 17; ii. 11), living by hope and travelling on to the goal of heavenly blessedness. We note here the same emphasis upon the saving value of the resurrection as we observed in the Petrine discourses in Acts, but with a deeper view of its significance. In the discourses the resurrection is chiefly viewed as an act of power by which the purpose of the Jews was thwarted

and the messiahship of Jesus attested. In our epistle it is more closely correlated with the religious life as a ground of hope, on the one hand, and with the import of Jesus' person as the ever-living and glorious Redeemer, on the other.

The epistle refers to another phase or effect of Christ's saving work, which has given rise to much perplexity and wide differences of opinion among exegetes and theologians. I refer to the preaching "to the spirits in prison" (iii. 18–20) or "to the dead" (iv. 6). One thing is clear: It is the aim of both these passages to magnify the grace of redemption. They read thus: "Because Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that he might bring us to God; being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit; in which also he went and preached unto the spirits in prison, which aforetime were disobedient, when the longsuffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing, wherein few, that is, eight souls, were saved through water" (iii. 18–20). "For unto this end was the gospel preached even to the dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but live according to God in the spirit" (iv. 6).

The first passage stands connected with the description of the great mercy of Christ in suffering for men, "the righteous for the unrighteous," and, in the second passage, it is stated that the final purpose of the preaching to the dead was "that they might live according to God in the spirit." There are three principal theories of the meaning of these verses: (1) Christ preached in and through Noah, "a preacher of righteousness" (2 Pet. ii. 5), to the men of Noah's time. The "spirits in prison," "the dead," to whom he preached are *now* dead, but were living when he preached to them. (2) In the interval between his death and resurrection Christ went to the realm of the dead and presented the offer of salvation to the men of Noah's time, who are called "spirits in prison." (3) By the "spirits in prison" are here meant the sinful angels, the "sons of God" of Gen. vi. 1 *sq.*, who had

seduced the daughters of men, whom God had cast down to Tartarus (2 Pet. ii. 4), and to whom Christ went and preached, that is, proclaimed their judgment. I will briefly summarize the arguments which are urged for and against each of these views.

In favor of the first view the following considerations are urged: (*a*) The idea of a preaching in Hades is unsupported elsewhere in Scripture. (*b*) The historical references in the passage are all adapted to carry the mind back to the "days of Noah" as the time which is in the apostle's mind, *e.g.* "the longsuffering of God," "the building of the ark," "the saving of a few."[1] (*c*) The absence of the article before ἀπειθήσασι ("disobeyed," iii. 19) shows that the participle is not attributive or definitive, but predicative or circumstantial, and hence should be translated, not "which aforetime were disobedient" (as if it were τοῖς ἀπειθήσασι), but "when once they disobeyed." Thus the whole sentence would mean: Christ preached to those who are now spirits in prison when once they disobeyed, that is, in Noah's time.[2] (*d*) The phrases "in the flesh" and "in the spirit" (σαρκί, πνεύματι) most naturally designate two aspects of Christ's being (*cf.* Rom. i. 3, 4), and thus the latter points, not to a *post mortem* activity of Christ, but simply to his activity in a spiritual form of existence (*cf.* i. 11). (*e*) In the second passage Peter is speaking of the coming of Christ to judgment. He transports himself in thought to the time of his parousia, and speaks of "living and dead" from the standpoint of that future time. The dead to whom Christ will have preached are now living, but will be dead at the second advent.[3] The considerations which are advanced in favor of other views are partly of the nature of replies to these arguments. The question respecting the force of the participle ἀπειθήσασι requires special notice. Most commentators and New Testament grammarians do not sup-

[1] So Salmond, *Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 460.

[2] So Dr. S. C. Bartlett in the *New Englander* for October, 1872, and Dr. Salmond, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

[3] So Bovon, *Théologie du N. T.* ii. 465.

port the contention just mentioned respecting the force of the anarthrous ἀπειθήσασι, but hold that the participle may quite well have a definitive force. Referring to the argument given above, Huther says: "This is not the case (that the absence of the article necessarily makes the participle predicative), since the participle, added with adjectival force to a substantive, is often enough joined to the latter without an article."[1]

The second view is that "Christ in the spirit, according to which he had been made alive, preached to the spirits in prison" (Huther); that "Christ went down to Hades ἐν πνεύματι in order to bring the message of salvation to the spirits which were found there in prison" (Weiss). The chief arguments for this interpretation are as follows: (*a*) The correspondence of πνεύματι and πνεύμασιν. He was quickened and went *in the spirit*, and preached *to the spirits*. The correlation of θανατωθείς ("put to death"—which can only refer to his crucifixion) and ζωοποιηθείς ("quickened") requires that the latter should refer to some experience which was the counterpart of his crucifixion. It was in connection with that experience *in a spiritual state* that he went and preached *to spirits*. (*b*) It is natural to take πορευθείς before ἐκήρυξεν in verse 19 ("he *went* and preached") in the same sense as in verse 22 ("*having gone* into heaven"). The latter denotes his ascension to heaven; the former his descent *ad inferos*. The whole passage (*vv.* 18–22) describes his death and the events which followed, culminating in the ascension (*v.* 22). (*c*) The advent ποτέ ("aforetime") stands with ἀπειθήσασι ("disobedient") and not with ἐκήρυξεν ("preached"). The statement made is that Christ preached to those who *formerly disobeyed*, not that he *formerly* or *once preached* to the disobedient. If the writer was thinking of a vicarious preaching through Noah, he might easily have made it apparent by writing ποτέ with ἐκήρυξεν.

[1] The *Meyer-Commentary*, *in loco*. This view is sustained by De Wette, Alford, Ellicott, and Dwight and the *N. T. Grammars* of Winer and Buttmann. The case is strongly advocated and amply illustrated, on this side, by Dr. W. W. Patton in the *New Englander* for July, 1882.

(*d*) Πνεύματι ("in the spirit") cannot denote the divine nature of the preëxistent Logos, because it is the correlative of σαρκί ("in the flesh"). The first statement is that he was put to death as respects the material element of his personality; the next statement can only naturally mean that, as the counterpart of his death, *flesh-wise*, he was quickened into life as respects his immaterial part, *spirit-wise*. The spirit is the imperishable element of the person who, as respects his flesh, died on the cross. In this element of his being he continued to live and act. (*e*) It is natural to take the aorists θανατωθείς, ζωοποιηθείς, πορευθείς, and ἐκήρυξεν as denoting a series of successive actions. It is, in the highest degree, unnatural to suppose that at ζωοποιηθείς or πορευθείς the thought springs suddenly back into antediluvian times.[1] The principal difficulties which have been found in this view are connected, not so much with the language as with the thought. It was the difficulty of adjusting the idea of a preaching of Christ in Hades to his doctrinal system which led Augustine, after long hesitation, to pronounce in favor of the theory which refers the preaching in question to the time of Noah.[2] A similar difficulty, together with that arising from the silence of Scripture elsewhere concerning a redemptive activity of Christ in Hades, is still widely felt, and has operated to perpetuate the explanation which Augustine did so much to establish in the Church.[3]

The principal arguments for the third view — that by "spirits in prison" sinful angels are meant, and that after

[1] Among modern scholars who adopt this general interpretation of the passages are De Wette, Alford, Plumptre, Farrar, Cook, Reuss, Huther, Weiss, Lechler, Pfleiderer, Beyschlag, and Holtzmann. A very clear and concise summary of this view will be found in Lechler's *Das apos. u. nachapos. Zeitalter*, pp. 428–433.

[2] See his *Letter to Evodius*, No. CLXIV. in the Am. ed. of Augustine's *Prolegomena, Confessions, and Letters.*

[3] I have not taken account of the theory, widely held in the post-Reformation era, which explained the passages as teaching a preaching in Hades, but held that it was a proclamation of condemnation only. The New Testament use of κηρύσσειν is decisive against this view. The theories of Baur and Spitta, to be noticed presently, resemble the theory of a *predicatio damnatoria*.

his death Christ proclaimed their judgment to them in Tartarus (2 Pet. ii. 4) are as follows: (*a*) The peculiar ideas of iii. 18–20 resemble those which are found in the references to sinful angels in the Book of Enoch. (*b*) The phrase "spirits which were disobedient" naturally implies that they were "spirits" *when they disobeyed.* (*c*) "Spirits" is not a natural designation for the souls of departed men, and "prison" is nowhere used in the Bible as a name for Hades. On this view of iii. 18–20 it is held that iv. 6 has nothing to do with the passage in question, but means that Christ preached during their lifetime to those who are now dead.[1] To this explanation it is objected, in general, that it is supported by very inadequate proof. Hebrews xii. 23, which speaks of "the spirits of just men made perfect," is adduced to show that departed men may be spoken of as πνεύματα. It is further urged that the language is inapplicable to superhuman beings. The contrast between the eight souls that were saved and the disobedient clearly shows that they were spirits of men who disobeyed, and not angels. To these alone the "waiting" of the divine "longsuffering in the days of Noah," would be applicable.[2]

[1] To this view Baur committed himself in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1856, and *Neutest. Theol.*, p. 291 *sq.* The theory has never gained any general currency. Gunkel, *Die Wirkungen d. heil. Geistes*, p. 50, adopts it. Spitta, in an elaborate essay on our passage, *Christi Predigt an die Geister*, assents to it in part, and defends the view that πνεύματα designates fallen angels (Gen. vi. 1 *sq.*), but denies that Christ is conceived of as preaching to them in Tartarus. He combines his view of πνεύματα (derived from the Book of Enoch) with the view common since Augustine, which locates the preaching in antediluvian times, and thinks the passage means that the preëxistent Christ, through the righteous Enoch, "proclaimed the judgment to those sinful spirits who corrupted the earth and its inhabitants" (p. 68). With Baur, Spitta holds that iv. 6 has no reference to the subject of iii. 18–20, but refers to the preaching of the gospel to those *who are now dead* (*cf. v.* 5 ζῶντες καὶ νεκροί). Baur's view has been fully explained and illustrated by Professor F. C. Porter in the *New Englander* for August, 1888.

[2] So, *e.g.* Lechler, *Das apos. u. nachapos. Zeitalter*, p. 429, and Huther, *Comm., in loco.* Most writers make no reference to this view, evidently regarding it as quite fanciful. I find no allusion to it in the treatises of Bovon, Pfleiderer, and Holtzmann. Weiss passes it with the remark that "it requires no refutation."

The arguments for the first and third explanations are mainly general and theoretic. The second alone rests upon strictly exegetical considerations. It therefore seems to me to have the balance of probability in its favor. But if this conclusion be adopted respecting the general import of the passages, several perplexing questions still remain, *e.g.*: Why does the author refer specifically to the sinners of Noah's time? To what judgment does κριθῶσι, in iv. 6, refer? How did the author conceive of the nature and effect of the preaching to the dead? To the first question, the probable answer is that the men who are described in the Old Testament as perishing in the flood are thought of as specially great sinners, and a proclamation of the gospel to them as a specially great illustration of the redeeming mercy of God. It is probable, also, that the analogy between baptism and the flood (*v.* 21), of which the author makes use, was in his mind and carried his thoughts back to the days of Noah. Of κριθῶσι (iv. 6), two explanations are possible: (1) It may be subordinate and parenthetical, as related to ζῶσι, having the force of a participle, thus: "In order that they, after the flesh, indeed, judged by death, may live according to the spirit." For this view it is urged that κριθῶσι is aorist while ζῶσι is present, and that the action of the former thus naturally precedes that of the latter; also that, on this view, σαρκί and πνεύματι are taken in the same sense as in iii. 18. (2) On the other view, κριθῶσι is coördinate with ζῶσι: Christ preached to the dead in order that they might be judged on the same basis and in the same manner as other men, but live according to God in the spirit. On this view it is much more difficult to explain σαρκί, which must be taken to mean that lower nature in which they had sinned. This remains a doubtful point. The only thing which is clear respecting the purpose of the preaching is that it was an offer of salvation. It was done in order that those to whom it came "might live according to God in the spirit." The words κηρύσσειν and εὐαγγελίζειν also imply a preaching of salvation. The scope of νεκροί, however, is doubt-

ful. Some would limit it to a certain class, in view of iii. 18–20 and iv. 4, but to me it seems probable that if any such limitation had been in the author's mind he would have indicated it. Its natural meaning is, the dead in general. No intimation is given in the passage respecting the effect of the preaching to the dead. Nor has the author indicated how he would correlate this idea with other elements of the current eschatology. We can only say that, if this general interpretation be regarded as correct, he has used the idea to illustrate the scope of God's redeeming grace.

Peter's doctrine of the new life, like that of James, reminds us of certain words of Jesus. He has the idea of a new birth through the planting of the "incorruptible seed" of the gospel in the heart (i. 23). But growth must follow birth. The readers are exhorted to desire that spiritual nourishment whereby they may grow into the full maturity of the Christian life (ii. 1, 2). Those who preached the gospel to them did so in the power of the Holy Spirit sent forth from heaven (i. 12), and by that Spirit they are sanctified (i. 2). Their baptism, the initial rite of the Christian life, signifies "the request (directed) towards God (ἐπερώτημα εἰς θεόν) for a good conscience" (iii. 21), and has its saving significance "through the resurrection of Jesus Christ"; that is, it denotes the new relation of communion with the risen Christ into which the Christian is introduced at his conversion. Faith, hope, and obedience are for our author the great qualities of the Christian life. Faith is trust in Christ, and salvation is the goal towards which it looks (i. 8). It is tested by "manifold trials" and, if genuine, will come out of them all the purer, as gold is refined in the fire (i. 7). Hope denotes more specifically the attitude of the Christian's mind to the future: "Hope perfectly (τελείως) for the grace which is to be brought unto you at the revelation of Jesus Christ" (i. 13). Obedience to Christ is the law of the Christian life. That law requires holiness, Godlikeness, love (i. 14, 15, 22). The Christian must "live unto righteousness" (ii.

24). What the ideal of that true righteousness is Jesus has shown in his own life (ii. 23; iii. 17, 18; iv. 1). Its essence is self-denying love. Love must be the ethical nature of God, since likeness to him consists in such forms and fruits of love as compassion, tenderness, humility, and helpfulness (iii. 8, 9; iv. 11). What is this but Jesus' doctrine of true righteousness as consisting in sonship to God, that is, ethical likeness to him who blesses all and the completion of which would be a perfection in love like that of the Father in heaven (Mt. v. 43–48)?

CHAPTER V

THE EPISTLE OF JUDE AND SECOND PETER

SINCE there is an obvious interdependence between these two epistles, it will be convenient to treat them together. Jude is probably the basis of 2 Peter, and I shall therefore summarize first the thoughts of the shorter letter. Both epistles are chiefly concerned with the denunciation of errors and corruptions which appear to have arisen, in part, from a perversion of certain truths of the gospel and, in part, from the adoption by their exponents of Gnostic ideas. The elements of positive teaching in both epistles are incidentally presented in the course of the polemic. Neither has any formal logical structure. It will therefore be most natural to trace the thought of each from the beginning without reference to doctrinal divisions.

Jude designates himself as a bondman of Jesus Christ and a brother of James (*v.* 1). He was probably a natural brother of Jesus, and wishes to give weight to his letter with his Jewish fellow-Christians by reminding them of his relation to James, the overseer of the Jerusalem church. He writes to the faithful and steadfast believers (*v.* 2) concerning the salvation in which he and they alike share (*v.* 3), and in order that the fruits of that salvation may not be hindered by perverse and false teachings and practices. The keynote of his epistle is the exhortation to his readers to "contend earnestly for the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints" (*v.* 3). By "the faith" is here meant, not primarily doctrine, but the steadfast confidence of the Christian considered as a gift of God. This sense of πίστις stands midway between its usual meaning of trust and its later use to denote the doctrinal contents of

faith—the truth which is believed. Intent upon warning his readers of the dangers which threaten them, he enters at once upon a description of the perverse and corrupt errorists who have "privily crept" into the Christian community, and who, though professing the name of Christ, are really denying him in their teaching and life (*v.* 4). The key to the whole description of these impious men is in the phrase: "turning the grace of our God into lasciviousness" (*v.* 4). They were men who had adopted the maxim: Let us sin because we are not under the law, but under grace (*cf.* Rom. vi. 1). They had taken up the principle of Paul: "All things are lawful" (1 Cor. vi. 12), but had treated it as an excuse for license. They were libertines who were defending their sins under the guise of the Christian "law of liberty."

Jude points his warning by reminding his readers of the punishments which God in former times has visited upon sin, the implication being that similar penalties await those who yield to the influence of these godless men. His first illustration is drawn from the destruction in the wilderness of the unfaithful Israelites (*v.* 5; *cf.* Num. xiv. 28–30). The second example is the punishment of the fallen angels whom God "hath kept in everlasting bonds under darkness unto the judgment of the great day" (*v.* 6). This illustration is taken from the popular traditions of the time which had been developed on the basis of the description of the sinful "sons of God" in Gen. vi. 1 *sq.* It is probable that the passage is a reminiscence of such descriptions in the Book of Enoch as the following: "These are the angels who descended to the earth, and revealed what was hidden to the children of men and seduced the children of men into committing sin." "Bind Azazel hand and foot, and place him in the darkness; . . . and place upon him rough and jagged rocks, and cover him with darkness, and let him abide there forever, and cover his face that he may not see the light. And on the great day of judgment he shall be cast into the fire."[1]

[1] *Enoch*, lxiv. 2; x. 4–6; *cf.* xv. 2, 3; x. 12, 13. I have cited the edition of R. H. Charles.

The third illustration is the destruction of the "cities of the plain" (*v.* 7; *cf.* Gen. xix.).

With verse 8 begins the comparison between the "ungodly men" and the great sinners whose punishments have been described. Like the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, they have given themselves over to sensual imaginations and practices and to a consequent disregard of divine authority. They "set at naught dominion and rail at dignities." It is difficult to determine the exact force of "dominion" (*κυριότης*) and "dignities" or "glories" (*δόξαι*); but the context seems to require that they be regarded as designating, respectively, the lordship of God or of Christ and the heavenly angel-powers who are the agents of the divine will. The heinousness of the contempt for superior power and authority which is shown by these antinomians is further illustrated by a popular tradition respecting the action of Michael the archangel, who, when contending with Satan for the possession of the body of Moses, would not bring even against him a railing judgment, but said, "The Lord rebuke thee" (*v.* 9). Origen states that this dispute was described in the apocryphal *Ascension* or *Assumption of Moses* (Ἀνάληψις Μωυσέως).[1] The force of the argument is: The archangel would not utter a scornful and contemptuous judgment (*κρίσις βλασφημίας*) against the evil power, Satan; but these men do not scruple to despise even the divine powers and authority: "These men blaspheme the things which they do not know, whatever they are;" they would as readily rail at good beings as at evil; "but the things which, like unreasoning animals, they do in a natural way understand"—the things which they know only too well, their perverted carnal desires—these are the means of their destruction (*v.* 10). The presumptuous free-thinkers are next compared to Cain, to Balaam, and to Korah, and are vividly described in the aorist as having already run their evil course and met their doom (*v.* 11). What is the

[1] *De Prin.* III. ii. 1. The portion of the *Ascensio Mosis* which was found in an old Latin version in the Ambrosian Library at Milan, and published in 1861, did not contain the description in question.

point of these comparisons? They "went in the way of Cain," either because they were guilty of murderous hate (Gen. iv. 5 *sq.*), or because Cain was regarded in the later Judaism as the type of scepticism respecting spiritual and divine things (*v.* 10 *a*). "They plunged into the error of Balaam for reward" (Num. xxxi.); they disregarded the requirements of God and sought to lead others into disregard of them for the "reward" of sensuous indulgence (*v.* 10 *b*). They have imitated Korah (Num. xvi.) in their proud contempt for all authority (*v.* 8).

After these historical comparisons a new set of figures (*v.* 12 *sq.*) is introduced to further describe the libertines. "They are σπιλάδες in your love-feasts" (ἀγάπαι). This word can mean either "rocks" or "spots." In the former case, the statement means that the errorists are like hidden rocks on which the love-feasts are wrecked (so R. V.); in the latter, it means that the love-feasts are defiled by their presence (R. V., marg.). The use in 2 Pet. ii. 13 of σπῖλοι (sometimes accented σπίλοι) in conjunction with μῶμοι ("blemishes"), as well as the context, shows that the writer of that epistle has taken σπιλάδες in this latter sense. The libertines are further described as boldly aiming to derive selfish advantage from their influence among the faithful, like false shepherds seeking their own indulgence, and not the welfare of those whom they can lead. They are "waterless clouds, driven along by winds," that is, they are empty; no good comes from them. They are like trees in autumn, which are not only without fruit, but are also doubly dead and plucked up by the roots, that is, they are utterly and hopelessly barren of any spiritual fruit (*v.* 12). They are like the sea in violent agitation such is the restless surging of their evil passions. They are like meteors, which flash out brightly for a little and then disappear in eternal darkness (*v.* 13). Thus does our author draw upon common life and upon nature for imagery by which to picture the wickedness and destiny of these men. He closes the indictment by applying to them a passage from the Book of Enoch, which, as in the popular speech of the time, is cited as containing the words of

Enoch himself (*v.* 14). The passage and its original are as follows:

Revised Version	Book of Enoch
And to these also Enoch, the seventh from Adam, prophesied, saying, Behold, the Lord came with ten thousands of his holy ones, to execute judgement upon all, and to convict all the ungodly of all their works of ungodliness which they have ungodly wrought, and of all the hard things which ungodly sinners have spoken against him (*vv.* 14, 15).	And lo! He comes with ten thousands of (his) holy ones to execute judgment upon them, and he will destroy the ungodly, and will convict all flesh of all that the sinners and ungodly have wrought and ungodly committed against him.[1]

"These are complainers, finding fault with fate," adds the writer, "walking according to their own lusts (and their mouth speaks swelling words), admiring persons for the sake of their own advantage" (*v.* 16); they are fault-finding pessimists, sensuous and arrogant flatterers, whose favor is only a cloak for their selfishness.

Over against the errors and corruptions of the antinomians, the author places "the words which have been spoken before by the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ" (*v.* 17). These men are but fulfilling the prophecies uttered by the apostles, that in the last days ungodly and wicked men should appear and seek to lead the faithful astray (*v.* 18). Passages like Paul's description of the "man of sin" and the "mystery of lawlessness" (2 Thess. ii. 1–12), or words of some apostle resembling those which are found in Acts xx. 29; 1 Tim. iv. 1; 2 Tim. iii. 2, may have been in the writer's mind. And now he gives a final touch to the

[1] Charles's ed. i. 9; *cf.* v. 4; xxvii. 2. We have no means of comparing the Greek text of the passage with its original in detail, since the part of the Book of Enoch from which it is taken exists only in an Ethiopic version.

dark picture of the impious men. They make separations, or separate themselves, by assuming a knowledge superior to that possessed by others; they are "psychical," not having the Holy Spirit; they are given up to the unrestrained power of the lower nature (*v.* 19). The author then exhorts his readers to build themselves upon their most holy faith, that is, to make their confidence in Christ and his truth their secure foundation. Here we note a semi-objective use of πίστις similar to that found in verse 3. He further counsels the duty of prayer, of cultivating a sense of the love of God to them and of hoping in the mercy of Christ, to be shown in the bestowment of eternal life at the approaching judgment (*vv.* 20, 21). One point remains: How are the faithful to treat those who have fallen under the baleful influence of the errorists? The author distinguishes three classes of such persons, according to the degree to which they have been corrupted, and indicates the proper treatment of each (*vv.* 22, 23). (*a*) Those who are perplexed and wavering are to be treated with special consideration and tenderness.[1] (*b*) Others, who have gone further in error and sin, should be snatched by eager efforts as brands from the burning. (*c*) A third class is composed of those who have already plunged deep into corruption, and whose lives excite loathing. Yet even towards these a merciful feeling must be cherished, though it must be accompanied by alarm at their seemingly hopeless situation. The epistle closes with an elaborate doxology, which attributes to God the power to keep the readers from the frightful corruptions which have been described. God is their Saviour through Jesus Christ, to whom the author ascribes "glory, majesty, dominion, and power" in all past time, now, and forever (*vv.* 24, 25).

The theological contents of the epistle may be expressed in few words. There is one God and Father (*v.* 1) who

[1] I follow here the reading ἐλεᾶτε (R.V.; W. and H.), instead of ἐλέγχετε (Tisch.). On the latter reading the phrase would probably mean: "Confute them when they dispute with you." This reading makes a less natural climax.

saves through Jesus Christ (*v.* 25), the lordship of whom is the principal doctrinal assumption of the letter (*vv.* 1, 4, 21, 25). Faith is one of the gifts of God's grace, and is the basis on which the Christian character is to be built (*v.* 20), and is "most holy" because its possession implies the consecration of the soul to God (*vv.* 3, 4, 20). The Holy Spirit is the divine principle of the Christian life (*vv.* 19, 21). Christians must be holy and blameless, free from the sins which are denounced (*vv.* 3, 24). Christ is to be the judge of men, and the believer hopes for the gift of his nercy, eternal life, at the last day (*v.* 21). Here are certainly the elements of the apostolic theology. We note here, briefly expressed, the principles of grace and faith; of salvation through Christ and by the aid of the Spirit; of a holy Christian life, and of the hope of salvation to be realized at the day of judgment.

Like the Epistle of Jude, 2 Peter was written to warn the readers against error. The author evidently regarded the language of Jude as adapted to furnish a correct description of the false teachers whom he wishes to describe; he accordingly paraphrases it and adopts it, in substance, for his own use. The epistle is not, however, a mere reproduction of Jude. It is introduced by a description of the Christian salvation in which Christianity is strikingly pictured as the fulfilment of prophecy (ch. i.). Then follows the picture of the errorists, painted in colors taken from the Epistle of Jude (ch. ii.); and in ch. iii. the author traces the error in question in its bearings upon the hope of the parousia, and meets it by a counter argument. Unlike 1 Peter the key-word here is not hope, but knowledge (*γνῶσις; ἐπιγνῶσις*, i. 3, 8; ii. 20). There is no reference, as in 1 Peter, to the connection between suffering and glory. The thought of the eternal kingdom, to be ushered in at the second advent, is prominent (i. 11, 16; iii. 13). Accordingly, Christianity is contemplated as prophecy which will be realized at the parousia (i. 16–21). Redemption through Christ is but once alluded to, in ii. 1, where the false teachers are said to "deny the Master that bought them."

The author writes in the name of the apostle Peter, and seems to be addressing some circle of Jewish-Christian readers in the Diaspora as those who have obtained the same faith in Christ which the primitive apostles and Jewish-Christians possess. This common faith they now have "in the righteousness of God and the Saviour Jesus Christ," that is, because God has through Christ put Jews and Gentiles upon a plane of equality (i. 1). He then wishes his readers an increased knowledge of God and of Jesus the Lord (i. 2). It is seen that this knowledge is a practical, religious knowledge, including "all things that pertain to life and godliness." It is a knowledge which involves fellowship with God who calls men "through his own glory and virtue" (*ἀρετῇ*, *cf.* 1 Pet. ii. 9) — whose perfections constitute the ideal of the Christian life, and are a perpetual challenge to a holy endeavor (i. 3). In accordance with these perfections God has given his "precious and exceeding great promises," whose realization should be a sharing of the divine life and a consequent escape from the sinful corruption of the world (i. 4). Then follows a list of Christian virtues which are to be blended with that trust in Christ which is the foundation of the Christian life. In faith the element of moral courage or energy (*ἀρετῇ*) must not be wanting. And, in turn, this quality needs knowledge to guide its action. But knowledge will not be wise unless there be associated with it self-control. To such self-control patient endurance (*ὑπομονῇ*) is needful, while with this must be blended reverence, or piety, which gives to all moral efforts their highest worth. With piety must mingle love to one's fellow-Christians, and with this, in turn, love to all without distinction (i. 5–7). We are not to seek in these verses any subtle psychological analysis of the development of the various virtues, but a practical presentation of the manysidedness of the Christian life. Those who cultivate these virtues will abound in the true knowledge of Christ (i. 8). Those who do not will fail in moral discernment, and will lapse back into the old sinful life (i. 9). In view of this danger the

readers are exhorted to diligent effort to "make their calling and election sure." To this higher life they have been called; but it rests with them whether they will be faithful to its demands. They may stumble and fall short of it, but if they cultivate the virtues in question they will secure the coveted salvation and enter (at the parousia) the eternal Kingdom. It is noticeable that salvation here includes both a present knowledge of God and of Christ and a corresponding holy life, and a future consummation at the Lord's coming. "Calling and election" here denote, respectively, the offer of salvation through Christ and acceptance into the Kingdom of God. But these blessings may be forfeited by disobedience, or, "made more sure," by striving after Christian virtue.

Against the loss of the heavenly good the author solemnly warns his readers — the more so since he is living in the near prospect of death. But he hopes that after his decease his readers will recall his warnings and encouragements (i. 12–15). For, he continues, we were not following myths invented by human fancy (perhaps an allusion to the current vagaries rife at the time) when we assured you that the Lord would come in power and glory. The glory of the transfiguration is a pledge and prophecy of the greater glory to be revealed at the advent (i. 16–18). He appeals also to the Messianic visions of the Old Testament prophets. They illumine the present darkness with hope, and encourage us to expect the dawning of the Messianic day. And this confidence is not misplaced, because prophecy is not merely a subjective production or interpretation of the prophet's own, but is the product of the divine inspiration (i. 19–21).

There are several difficult points of exegesis in this passage. I can notice only one of them: What is the meaning of the statement that "no prophecy of Scripture is of private interpretation" (ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως)? Opinion is divided on the question whether ἐπίλυσις here means "dissolution" or "interpretation." Spitta elaborately defends the former meaning,[1] and renders: "No prophecy

[1] *Der zweite Brief des Petrus, u. s. w., in loco.*

of Scripture is of such a kind that it can be destroyed" (*cf.* καταλῦσαι, Mt. v. 17; οὐ δύναται λυθῆναι, ἡ γραφή, Jn. x. 35). Most interpreters adopt the other meaning, in better accord with the context. The divine meaning of prophecy is the prominent thought; man cannot fully apprehend or explain it. But does ἰδίας refer (*a*) to the prophecies, or (*b*) to those to whom they are addressed, or (*c*) to the prophets? On the first view (*a*) the meaning would be that no prophecy yields its own explanation; only future experience makes its meaning clear; it receives its interpretation when its fulfilment comes.[1] On the second view (*b*) the statement would mean that only the Holy Spirit who inspired the prophecies can enable those to whom they come to understand them; only God who inspires prophecy can give its explanation.[2] But if (*c*) ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως means the prophet's own explanation, then the passage would present a thought kindred to that of 1 Pet. 1. 10–12, namely, that the prophet did not fully appreciate the import of his own sayings. I think this is the correct explanation, and that the saying means that no prophecy is a matter of the prophet's own interpretation of the facts with which he is dealing, but that, on the contrary, his insight is divinely given.[3] This explanation seems most congruous with verse 21, which gives the reason for saying that no prophecy is of private interpretation, namely, that prophecy is not produced by a man's (that is, the prophet's) own will, but is uttered in the power of the Spirit: "Men spake from God, being borne along (impelled thereto, φερόμενοι) by the Holy Spirit."

This description of the true knowledge of God and of Christ, which was foreshadowed in prophecy and attested by the life of Jesus, is intended as introductory to the arraignment of the false gnosis which is described in chapter ii. in language largely borrowed and adapted from Jude. In our epistle the errorists appear as false teachers who deny

[1] So, *e.g.* Holtzmann, Weiss.
[2] So, *e.g.* Luther, Grimm-Thayer Lex., von Soden.
[3] So Huther, Dwight, and Plumptre.

Christ not merely (as in Jude) by an immoral life, but by bringing in "destructive heresies." They are pernicious in teaching and life, and acquire influence over unsuspecting believers only to abuse it for their evil ends. But their judgment is at hand (ii. 1–3). The author omits Jude's illustration from the punishment of the unbelieving by death in the wilderness, and appropriates the examples of the evil angels (ii. 4), of Sodom and Gomorrah (ii. 6–8), and of Balaam (ii. 15, 16). These are adduced in the same order as in Jude; but after the first example the punishment of the ungodly by the flood (not in Jude) is cited (in apparent allusion to 1 Pet. iii. 20). The description given in Jude of the wickedness of Sodom and Gomorrah is considerably amplified, and Lot is introduced as vexing his righteous soul over the sins of their inhabitants. He then resumes the description of the presumptuous irreverence of the libertines in "railing at dignities" (δόξαι) and "despising dominion" (κυριότης). By δόξαι 2 Peter quite certainly designates evil beings. In Jude the word seems to denote good angel-powers. He says that even (good) angels, although they are greater than men, and might, with less presumption, do so, do not bring a contemptuous judgment against these principalities (ii. 11). Our author omits the concrete example of Michael refraining from bringing against Satan a railing judgment when contending with him about the body of Moses. From verse 12 the description of Jude is again more closely followed. The free-thinkers are "creatures without reason," blindly following their evil instincts. Omitting the comparison with Cain, the writer describes them, as Jude had done, as "following the way of Balaam" for selfish advantage. This illustration is amplified (ii. 15, 16), and the following reference to Korah is omitted. The most striking passage in Jude (*vv.* 12, 13) is now appropriated in a weakened form by our author (ii. 17). One of its elements — the description of the libertines as defiling the love-feasts — had already been employed (ii. 13). The prophecy of judgment from the Book of Enoch is omitted, and the description ends with a free paraphrase (ii. 18, 19) of the

concluding words of Jude's description (*vv.* 15, 16) to which our author appends the conclusion that their last state has become worse than their first (ii. 20–22).

The writer then echoes the reminder of Jude (*vv.* 17, 18) that the apostles had warned them that "in the last days mockers should come with mockery, walking after their own lusts" (iii. 2, 3); but he amplifies this apostolic warning by extending the import of it as given in Jude. Our author says that the holy prophets and apostles represented the mockers as doubting the second advent and contemptuously saying: "Where is the promise of his coming?" These sceptics have now appeared in the apostates who have been described. This connection between the errors and sins of the false teachers and the denial of the parousia is, as we have seen, a distinctive feature of 2 Peter as compared with Jude, and a point of special interest in itself considered. Their argument was that, since the death of "the fathers," that is, the first generation of Christians, the world had continued the same as it had been from the creation, and that no catastrophe seemed likely to occur in the future (iii. 4). This consideration the writer meets by pointing to the flood, by which "the world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished" (iii. 5, 6). He argues that a like destruction, only by fire instead of water, awaits the present world (iii. 7). He offers a second argument against the doubters. Although the parousia seems long delayed, it is to be remembered that the Lord does not count time as men do. A period which seems to us long is not so to him. Moreover, he may be delaying the final crisis in order to give the greater opportunity for repentance (iii. 8, 9). But, whenever the day of the Lord comes, it will come suddenly; then this present world shall be destroyed by fire, and from the wreck shall emerge "new heavens and a new earth in which dwelleth righteousness" (iii. 10–13).

In view of this impending judgment and destruction, the author exhorts his readers to pure and holy living and to a patient endurance of suffering (iii. 14, 15). This exhortation he enforces by appeal to the instructions given

by Paul in his epistles which he ranks with the sacred Scriptures of the Old Testament. But he intimates that these writings of Paul, in which he insists so strongly upon a holy life, have been treated by the false teachers as furnishing an encouragement to license (iii. 16). Here we find the key to the libertinism in question. It was, at least in part, a perverted and degenerate Paulinism in which Paul's doctrine of grace and freedom was transformed into a justification of sinful indulgence. The errorists had drawn from Paul's doctrine the conclusion against which he had protested, namely: Let us sin because we are not under law, but under grace (Rom. vi. 15–23). Against this perversion the readers are again warned and counselled to avoid "the error of the wicked" and to grow in the grace and knowledge of Christ (iii. 17, 18).

PART IV

THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

In the study of Paul's teaching we have the advantage of a good degree of agreement among critics respecting the sources. The view of F. C. Baur, which admitted the genuineness of the four great doctrinal letters only, has been greatly modified by more recent scholarship. The radical criticism of a Dutch school and of Steck, which denies that we possess any genuine epistles of Paul, has met with no favor among German scholars, and has found some of its most energetic opponents among the more radical German critics. Starting with the genuineness of the four *Hauptbriefe*, criticism has steadily advanced in the recognition of the other Paulines until now only the Pastorals are subject to widespread and serious doubt. A few illustrations of this tendency may here be adduced. Hilgenfeld who, in general, was an ardent adherent of the Tübingen school, admitted the genuineness of 1 Thessalonians, Philippians, and Philemon. Strong objection has sometimes been made to 2 Thessalonians, but its genuineness is maintained without qualification by Klöpper and Jülicher. Pfleiderer maintains the genuineness of 1 Thessalonians and Philippians, regards the evidence as nearly balanced in the case of Colossians and Philemon, as preponderating against 2 Thessalonians and Ephesians, and as decisive against the Pastorals. Ménégoz expresses doubts about 1 and 2 Thessalonians, but is confident of the

genuineness of Colossians, Philemon, Ephesians, and Philippians. He thinks that the Pastorals are in the main genuine, but that they have been interpolated by copyists. Holtzmann says that Paul's theology may be derived with confidence from 1 Thessalonians, Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, Philippians, and, in a measure also, from 2 Thessalonians and Colossians, and that elements of Pauline doctrine may be found even in Ephesians. While some critics thus continue to express doubt about Colossians and Ephesians, von Soden and Jülicher declare for the genuineness of the former, and Jülicher admits that the genuineness of the latter is not disproved. Harnack maintains the genuineness of 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon (besides the *Hauptbriefe*), and expresses himself favorably in regard to Ephesians [1] He holds that even the Pastorals are, in part, Pauline, and that a large portion of 2 Timothy and nearly a third of Titus are composed of genuine fragments. In 1 Timothy there are Pauline elements, although no single passage can be pronounced genuine as it stands.[2]

The present state of criticism is reassuring to the Biblical theologian. In any case he will derive his material for the construction of the Pauline theology

[1] Respecting Ephesians Harnack says: "If one is convinced of the genuineness of Colossians, a great part of the objection to the genuineness of Ephesians thereby falls away. Whoever can ascribe Galatians and Colossians to the same author, can with little difficulty believe that the author of Colossians is the same with the writer of Ephesians, which, in that case, would be of even date with Colossians. The principal difficulties lie in certain passages, viz.: iv. 11; ii. 20; iii. 5." *Chronologie*, p. 239

[2] I have purposely cited the opinions of representatives of the radical school. More conservative German scholars, and English scholars generally, hold to the genuineness of the first ten Paulines, and most of them regard the Pastorals also as genuine. For a fuller exhibit of modern critical opinion see the Introductions of Weiss, Holtzmann, and Jülicher, and the *Chronologie* of Harnack. The present state of criticism respecting the Paulines is described in an article by Weiss in the *American Journal of Theology* for April, 1897. He confidently defends the genuineness of all the epistles, except the Pastorals, with regard to which he expresses himself guardedly. Though favorable to the view that they are genuine, he rests in a *non liquet*. Many of the objections are held to be invalid; the spuriousness of the epistles is regarded as unproved. Zahn in his *Einleitung* defends the genuineness of all the Paulines.

mainly from the four great doctrinal letters. If he may also feel assured of the genuineness of the epistles to the Thessalonians and Philippians, and of the Pauline basis (to claim nothing more) of Colossians and Ephesians, he may go forward in his work with little embarrassment from the side of criticism. The pastoral letters are quite special and practical in their character and aim, and their subtraction from the list of Paulines would in no way impair the completeness of the apostle's doctrinal system. Our use of these epistles will be incidental, and no conclusion respecting Paul's doctrine will be based upon them, which is not sustained by passages from some one of the other ten letters whose genuineness I believe I am justified in assuming. I shall also make use of the Pauline discourses in Acts as secondary sources. They are not to be regarded as verbal reports, but as sketches. They preserve the substance of the apostle's thoughts as he presented them to unbelieving Jews and Gentiles, but are neither, on the one hand, precise reproductions of his very words, nor, on the other, inventions of the author of the Acts.

The theology of Paul cannot be well understood apart from his personality and history. The vigor and intensity of his mind fitted him, in a high degree, to fuse the contents of Christian belief into a reasoned system of doctrine. He was a deeply religious man by nature and by education. From his youth he had been an ardent devotee of religion as he understood it. He clearly defined his convictions and carried them out consistently in action. It was not strange that he became a persecutor of the Christians. He considered their beliefs false and dangerous. Their Messiah he held to be a pretender, who did not in the least correspond to the cherished Messianic ideal of the nation. Faith in him was loosing the bonds of attachment to the law, weakening the power of the cultus, and dimming the bright hopes of Israel's future power and glory. Here certainly was reason enough why a zealous and consistent Pharisee should hate the new sect and try to exterminate it.

By what process was this fiery persecutor transformed into the Christian apostle? Saul was not an ordinary Pharisee. Religion for him did not consist chiefly in outward observances. His was a deep moral nature. For him the law of God demanded holiness. Righteousness — conformity in heart and life to the divine will — was his ideal. How could he ever realize this ideal? He knew of but one answer: He must scrupulously perform all the requirements of the law; he must keep every commandment. But when he looked into the depths of his own heart he saw that he was not doing that. He strove the harder, but without success. What was hindering him? The power of indwelling sin. He found himself weak and helpless. He saw the ideal, but was powerless to achieve it. A perpetual struggle raged within him between his conscience, which showed him what he ought to do, and the power of sin, which prevented him from doing it. He has depicted this conflict, in his pre-Christian life, in Rom. vii. 7–25.

We may see in this inner struggle an indirect preparation of his heart for the acceptance of the gospel. It had taught him his own weakness and insufficiency. While there is no evidence that this conflict led him to doubt that obedience to the law was the one way of salvation, it is certain that it was driving him to despair respecting the success of his own efforts. His doubt with regard to his own earnest and honest strivings after peace with God by doing the deeds of the law, was certainly capable of developing into a doubt whether any one could attain salvation by that path. But the thought, no salvation by law, did not occur to him during the struggle which he describes. What he doubted during this period was his own acceptableness to God, and it probably led him to redouble his persecuting zeal and thus to render, as he thought, increased service to God. The experience in question did not point him to Christ, although it was an important pre-condition of his accepting Christ. Through it all he thought of no means of salvation but the law. His conscious failure to attain his ideal was driving him

to hopelessness, instead of discovering to him the way of peace.

How, then, are we to explain the crisis that came? What was the turning-point of his life? The Acts and the Epistles agree in declaring that it was a supernatural revelation of Christ to him. Whether we are to regard the outward accompaniments of that crisis, as described in Acts, as actual events, or not, is relatively unimportant; Paul has not mentioned them in his references to his conversion in his epistles. For his own mind the emphasis lay elsewhere; it lay in the inner disclosure to his spirit of the glorified Christ as the true Messiah and Saviour. This was to him a most certain reality. He classes it along with the appearances of the risen Jesus to his disciples on earth (1 Cor. xv. 5–8) as an objective fact. He elsewhere dwells at length upon the ecstatic states of which he has been the subject (2 Cor. xii. 1 *sq.*); but he gives no indication that the revelation of Christ in him (Gal. i. 16) was of the nature of a vision. The apostle believed that a miraculous disclosure of Christ's heavenly glory formed the crisis of his life, and he had the best opportunity of knowing. No explanation tallies with all the facts which are known to us except that which Paul himself gives.[1] His vain struggle to keep the whole law gave him a vivid realization of the difficulties of the theory of salvation by deeds of legal obedience. But it was the newly found assurance that Jesus was the Messiah, which led him to the positive certainty that salvation is by grace through faith in Christ. But the two poles of his theology, the positive and the negative, belong together. They are the inseparable aspects of one conclusion, which was not adopted till Christ was revealed in him. His previous struggle had thus a deep significance for his life. It gave the gospel a point of contact with his heart and conscience. It was the dark background on

[1] For the modern combination of the vision-hypothesis, and a psychological explanation, see Holsten, *Evangelium d. Paulus u. d. Petrus;* Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus;* and Weizsäcker, *Das apos. Zeitalter.* (Of the last two works there are English translations.)

which the revelation of God's grace in Christ seemed most bright and glorious.

This experience exerted a powerful influence upon his subsequent thought. It sharpened for his mind the contrast between the law and the gospel, between works and faith. He had tried to find peace with God by doing the deeds of the law, and had failed; he had found it, at last, by simple trust in God's mercy. Hence grace and faith became the watchwords of his teaching. He now saw that men had always been saved by grace on condition of faith, and that, in view of human weakness and sinfulness, they never can be saved in any other way. The fact that sin is the starting-point of his dogmatic system, as developed in Romans, is explained by his own experience. A vivid sense of his own sin was the reverse side of his earnest, but fruitless, striving after conformity to the law. As he contemplated human life and history, and dwelt upon the Old Testament pictures of human depravity, he felt that his own experience of the power of sin and of man's inability to throw off its dominion was representative of a universal fact; that all have fallen short and must be saved by appeal to God's mercy, that is, by faith.

In the apostle's pre-Christian experience and in his conversion we find not only the motives of his theology but the incentives to his missionary activity. As soon as he was converted he began to preach Christ (Acts ix. 22). The narrative in Acts represents his call to the apostleship to the nations as following directly upon his conversion (xxii. 15), and Paul himself connects his conversion and his call closely together (Gal. i. 15). His career was implicit in that crisis of his life which occurred on the way to Damascus. It is not necessary, however, to suppose that the full nature and extent of his mission was clear to him from the first. But he was from that event clearly committed to Christ and to the extension of his gospel. He awaited but the opening of the door of opportunity.

Several years passed before Paul was able to enter

upon the greater work of his apostleship. His period of solitude in Arabia (Gal. i. 17) must have given him a favoring opportunity for clarifying and maturing his new faith and defining its contents in contrast to the Pharisaic theology which he had formerly held. I believe that the essential elements of his system of thought were clearly defined in his mind from that time onward. His own description (Gal. ii. 14–21) of his argument against Peter's wavering and unclear views of the gospel's relation to Judaism, as revealed in his conduct at Antioch, shows that his own theology on that whole subject was fully developed before any of his epistles were written. I have not the slightest reluctance to recognize a development in Paul's doctrinal system, provided any evidence of such development can be found. But I find no evidence warranting the conclusion that the apostle's views changed materially from the beginning to the end of his public ministry. They grew and expanded and were more amply illustrated and applied; but his "gospel" was essentially the same throughout. We may note changes of emphasis, but no change of opinion. The diversity in the doctrinal contents of the apostle's letters is naturally and sufficiently explained by their different occasions, motives, and purposes.[1]

Paul's career opened gradually before him. After his return to Palestine from Arabia he began to proclaim that Jesus was the Christ. Many doubted the genuineness of his conversion, but Barnabas befriended him and introduced him to the primitive apostles. His life being threatened by the Hellenistic Jews, he departed for his native city, Tarsus (Acts. ix. 26–30). In due time he was summoned by Barnabas to aid in the newly established Gentile mission at Antioch (Acts xi. 25). From Antioch he went out as assistant to Barnabas on his first

[1] "There was certainly a development in the theological thought of Paul. But we think that it falls in an epoch anterior to his epistles, at least before that to the Galatians." Ménégoz, *Le Péché et la Rédemption d'après St. Paul*, p. 7. *Per contra*, see Sabatier, *The Apostle Paul*, who seeks by psychological analysis to trace an evolution in Paul's thought throughout his life.

missionary tour (Acts xiii., xiv.). These were the days when the purpose of his apostleship to the nations was maturing within him, and soon we behold him surrounding himself with a corps of workers and organizing his world-conquering mission. He traverses Asia Minor, and at Troas hears the call to enter on the evangelization of Europe. He crosses the Hellespont and carries the gospel into the centres of Greek culture — to Philippi, Thessalonica, Corinth, and Athens — and later to Italy and Rome. All this time it had become increasingly apparent to him that Israel, as a nation, was certain to reject the Christ. His experience with Jewish fanaticism and persecution presented to his mind some of the most difficult problems with which he had to deal. Jewish modes of thought, which he had learned clearly to distinguish from the gospel, invaded the churches which he founded and threatened to undo his work. His converts were taught that they must observe the ceremonies of Judaism, as well as believe in Christ, in order to be saved. This Judaizing error excited in the apostle great indignation and alarm, and was the occasion of his writing his most powerful letters. Without bearing in mind these circumstances, it is impossible correctly to understand and estimate his theology.

Paul's education was Jewish. Reared in a strict Pharisaic family and trained in Rabbinic schools, his chief study would be the Old Testament and the body of tradition which had grown up around it. His epistles confirm this view of his training. His mind was a Jewish mind. His interpretations of the Old Testament and his modes of argument are those which were current in the Jewish schools. He employs the typical and allegorical methods of exegesis, but, in consequence of his deep spiritual insight, he is not carried by them into the extravagances which were common. There is no evidence that Paul was a student of Greek literature and philosophy. The few incidental references which he makes to Greek writers are utterly inadequate to warrant such a conclusion. Still, his early life was passed in a cultured Greek city, and

later he was trained by the liberal-minded Gamaliel. His father was a Roman citizen and, apparently, a man of some position. These circumstances could not be wholly without influence upon his thought and character. They must have tended to give him a considerable acquaintance with the world and to impart to his mind a somewhat cosmopolitan cast. He would inevitably obtain some familiarity with Greek and Roman ideas and life, although he would view them from the standpoint of a strict Jew.

His theology is cast in Jewish moulds, although it took on a breadth of outlook which would be almost inconceivable in the case of a Palestinian Jew. Those who have sought to show that Paul's thinking was strongly influenced by Alexandrian thought, have not been able to prove more than that contemporary writings on religion, all of which were under the influence of Judaism, will exhibit some resemblances. These resemblances do not seem to me to show that the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, for example, was an important formative power in Paul's thought, and between Paul and Philo the differences far exceed the resemblances.[1] But his Roman citizenship, his acquaintance with the Greek language, and his association with Greeks and Romans must have greatly broadened his outlook upon life. He could never have been the man he was without these. Thus while the material of his training was substantially Jewish, his exceptional breadth and versatility of mind enabled him to deal with this material in a large and masterly way. It is not fanciful, therefore, to see in Paul something of the Greek and the Roman, as well as of the Jew. The Jewish religious spirit remained the fundamental factor. Reverence for God and a passionate devotion to his service characterized him throughout. This was the basis of his character and career. But with this fundamental peculiarity were combined a certain keenness and catholicity of thought which were naturally involved in a facile use of the most cultivated tongue in existence, and in the possession of the

[1] I have treated of this subject at length in my *Pauline Theology*, ch. iii. *Cf.* McGiffert's *Apostolic Age*, p. 113 *sq.*

rights and dignities of citizenship in the vast empire of Rome. Hence we note in Paul not only great religious fervor, but acute and subtle dialectic, and an undaunted energy which dares to cope with the gigantic task of conquering the world for Christ.

Paul has too often been regarded as a speculative Christian philosopher, who had little interest in historical facts. He has been represented as ignorant of the events of Jesus' life on earth or as indifferent to them. It is true that the apostle in his writings is chiefly concerned to maintain certain principles. It does not fall within the scope of his purpose to speak directly of the concrete facts of Jesus' life. He alludes to them by way of illustrating or confirming his arguments. But to me it seems quite incredible that Paul should not have had a keen interest in the history of Jesus on earth. He resided in Jerusalem either during or shortly after the public ministry of Jesus. He could not have pursued his persecuting career without learning much that Jesus had said and done. After his conversion the Lord's words and deeds must have taken on for his mind a living interest. He associated with the primitive apostles for a time in Jerusalem and paid a special visit of fifteen days' duration to Peter (Gal. i. 18). How is it conceivable that after the experience in which he had become a Christian and a preacher, and after his long reflection upon Christian truth in his seclusion, he should not have eagerly learned from Peter as much as possible concerning the earthly life of his Master and Saviour?

The epistles of Paul confirm the supposition that he would acquaint himself with the tradition of the words and deeds of Jesus. Through the medium of this tradition he had received the account of the institution of the Lord's supper (1 Cor. xi. 2, 23) and the narrative of the resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 3). He was familiar with the circumstances which occurred on the night of the Lord's betrayal, with the very words which he spoke at the supper, with the facts of his death, burial, and resurrection, and with his various appearances after the resurrection (1 Cor.

xv. 3–8). He knew what Jesus said about marriage and divorce, and clearly distinguished it from his own opinions and advices on that subject (1 Cor. vii. 10, 25). In several other instances he referred to words of Jesus (1 Thess. iv. 15; 1 Cor. ix. 14), and in one of his discourses has preserved to us that saying, not recorded elsewhere: "It is more blessed to give than to receive" (Acts xx. 35). He had in his mind a clear picture of Christ and his sufferings, and he reminds the Galatians how in his preaching he had portrayed him before them as the crucified One (Gal. iii. 1). In his pre-Christian life he had known Christ, but it was only a knowledge *κατὰ σάρκα* (2 Cor. v. 16).[1] When he became a Christian this knowledge did not lose its value, but was transformed into a knowledge *κατὰ πνεῦμα*. What he had known of Christ before was merely outward and superficial; now he truly knew him in his divine meaning and power. As a Christian he saw Christ with new eyes.[2]

But Paul was not merely the product of such forces and opportunities as have been mentioned. His was a mind of marked originality and power. He thought eagerly and profoundly on the subjects which engaged his attention. He clearly saw the relation of one truth to another. He was the first Christian to construct his beliefs into a doctrinal system. Paul was a born reasoner. We can conceive of him as born and educated as a Palestinian Jew or as an Alexandrian Hellenist. His language and forms of thought would, no doubt, have been very

[1] It is wholly unwarranted to understand this passage as an assertion of indifference respecting the historical life of Jesus. The choice lies among the following interpretations: (1) I do not lay chief stress, as many Judaic Christians do, upon having known Christ in the flesh. (2) I do not regard the Messiah as a national deliverer, as I did before my conversion, but as a spiritual King. (3) I do not attach importance to the Jewish descent and nationality of Jesus, as I did for a time after my conversion. (4) Formerly I knew Christ only outwardly; now I know him in a living fellowship. This view, which does not try to define precisely Paul's former knowledge *κατὰ σάρκα*, would include, to some extent, elements contained in the others.

[2] The traces of Paul's knowledge of Christ's life and teaching are fully exhibited by Knowling, *The Witness of the Epistles*, chs. v., vi.

different from what they are; but we are sure that he would still have been the Christian thinker, developing his views from certain fundamental principles and constructing his thoughts into the unity of a system. But Paul was a mystic as well as a logician. He believed that the discerning eye sees the truth, and that it is of little use to argue with those who are without spiritual perception. His arguments are mainly addressed to believers, and are designed to help them to define their own faith and to preserve it from admixture of Jewish or heathen error. The combination of the logician and the mystic in Paul was a great source of his power. Each quality reacted on the other. His logical mind preserved his mysticism from vagueness and extravagance, and his mystical contemplations prevented his arguments from taking on the character of barren and formal dialectics, and made them subservient to the interests of vital and practical religion.

But there is a higher factor than any that we have named which must be taken into the account; I mean the enlightening Spirit of God. Paul himself ascribed his achievements to the divine grace. He lived and wrought under an overpowering sense of the presence of God. Highly as we may estimate his intellectual gifts, he never considered his power to lie in his reasoning faculties. It was his sense of the appeal which divine truth makes to the heart and the conscience which made him strong and confident. Christ had met and conquered him, not by argument, but by the power of his divine grace and glory. The apostle's preaching and teaching were based upon the certainty that he would prove to all others who should receive him, the same transforming power, the same heavenly wisdom. Paul's assertion "By the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. xv. 10), was the presupposition of his whole life-work.[1]

The order of treatment which I shall follow is determined, in general, by the considerations already advanced.

[1] The topics which are briefly touched upon in this chapter are more fully discussed in my *Pauline Theology*, chs. i.–iv.

The starting-point of Paul's Christian thinking was anthropological. The power of sin preventing the realization of the demands of the divine law is the fact with which we may naturally begin our exposition. Thus our first themes will be human sin and the divine law. Next we shall turn to the counterpart of these themes, God's gracious purpose and promise, and the salvation from sin which he has provided in Christ. In this connection we shall have to study the person and work of the Redeemer and the appropriation and realization of salvation in the life of the believer. These topics will naturally lead us to consider the social applications of the gospel in the organization and administration of the Church. Finally, we shall summarize the views of the apostle concerning the future life, and inquire how far they involve a reasoned system of eschatological doctrine.

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CHAPTER II

FLESH AND SPIRIT

We may best begin the investigation of Paul's theology with a study of the contrast between flesh and spirit. From Rom. vii. 7–25 we learn how much this contrast meant for his pre-Christian life, and how the conflict between the two principles had been affected by his faith in Christ. I assume, as a secure result of exegesis, that this passage reflects Paul's own experience, and was intended to describe the inner struggle in the life of the sincere and earnest Jew, who sought peace with God by obedience to the demands of the law.

The apostle describes how the law, by holding its ideal constantly before him, revealed him to himself. He aspired to obey it, but a power in his nature prevented him. He gladly acknowledged the binding force of the law; his mind, or reason, fully consented to its obligations. But the principle of sin, reigning within him, made complete obedience impossible. "For that which I do I know not; for not what I would, that do I practice; but what I hate, that I do. But if what I would not, that I do, I consent unto the law that it is good. So now it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me" (Rom. vii. 15–17). And sin is allied with the flesh. "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing" (vii. 18). Sin dwells in the flesh and is a "law in the members which wars against the law of the mind" (vii. 23). It is to be noticed that sin and the flesh (*σάρξ*) are here distinguished, at least formally; and, further, that "the flesh" and "the members" (*μέλη*) are synonyms. Evidently, therefore, the flesh means the material of which the parts of the body are composed. The term here bears

a physical sense. The question now arises: Does sin, according to Paul, have its source and seat in the body? Is the flesh inherently evil? Sin and the flesh are closely connected. Are they inseparable? Many scholars, from Baur onwards, have held that Paul's philosophy of sin answers this question affirmatively. Several recent writers explain this supposed doctrine of the inherent sinfulness of the flesh as a result of the influence of Greek dualism upon the mind of Paul.[1]

Against this view of Paul's doctrine the following considerations seem to me decisive: (1) Paul carefully distinguishes sin from the flesh. Sin dwells in the flesh, takes occasion of its impulses and passions, and makes it the sphere of its manifestation. But the flesh is never identified with sin or described as inherently and necessarily sinful. (2) In Rom. vii. 7 *sq.* Paul is not speaking of the origin of sin, but of its empirical relation to the flesh. Even if that relation is in all cases what Paul describes it in the first person as being, it would not follow that sin had a sensuous origin. (3) In the one passage in which Paul treats of the beginning of human sin (Rom. v. 12 *sq.*), he ascribes it to a voluntary act of transgression (*παράβασις*), and not to the nature of a physical organism which is regarded as in itself evil. In passages where Paul's thought of the *σάρξ* transcends its physical meaning, the contrast between it and spirit is seen to be primarily ethical rather than metaphysical. In Rom. viii. 3–9 the apostle contrasts the two principles sharply. He speaks of a "flesh of sin" (*σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*), but it is an ethical principle whose "mind" or disposition (*φρόνημα*) is hostile to God and refuses obedience to his law. The spirit (*πνεῦμα*) is the higher nature in which man is akin to God. He yields to one or the other by the free consent of his will, and so lives or walks *κατὰ σάρκα* or *κατὰ*

[1] So Holsten, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes σάρξ, u. s. w.*; Lüdemann, *Die Anthropologie des Paulus*, 50–71; Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* ii. 19 *sq.*; and formerly Pfleiderer, who, however, materially modified his view on this subject in *Das Urchristenthum* and in the second edition of *Paulinismus*.

πνεῦμα. Whichever he does, his act is voluntary, and has its moral quality in consequence of his choice and preference. That the contrast between flesh and spirit is ethical and has its seat in the will, is also evident from Paul's description of the "works of the flesh" and the "fruit of the Spirit" respectively (Gal. v. 19–23). The apostle is here contrasting two kinds of moral choice and action. He says nothing of an ontological contrast between substances, one of which is the principle of sin. (4) When Paul compares the natural man, Adam, and the spiritual man, Christ, he does not intimate that the contrast between "natural" and "spiritual" involves, in itself, the contrast between sinful and holy. On the contrary, we see from Rom. v. 12 that Paul held the Jewish view of Adam's original sinlessness. (5) That the body (or its material, the flesh) is not essentially sinful, is clear from the way in which Paul speaks of it as capable of being cleansed and sanctified. Christians may "cleanse themselves from all defilement of flesh and spirit" (2 Cor. vii. 1). "The body is for the Lord" (1 Cor. vi. 13) and is capable of sanctification to his service. The members are capable of becoming instruments of righteousness (ὅπλα δικαιοσύνης, Rom. vi. 13). The body is to be made "a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God" (Rom. xii. 1), "a temple of the Holy Ghost" (1 Cor. vi. 19, 20). In the body the life of Jesus may be manifested (2 Cor. iv. 11), and it will be quickened and transformed in the resurrection (Rom. viii. 11, 23). It cannot, therefore, be essentially and necessarily sinful. (6) There can be no doubt that Paul held both that Christ possessed a real human body and that he was sinless. To him belonged the σάρξ; but not a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας (Rom. viii. 3). Hence σάρξ is not necessarily sinful.[1]

In the contrast between flesh and spirit we have to do, not with a metaphysical dualism based upon the inherent evil of matter and derived from the Græco-Alexandrian speculation, but with a view of man which has its basis

[1] The view which I have expressed on this point is supported by Bovon, Ménégoz, Gloël, Beyschlag, Sabatier, Bruce *et al.*

in the Old Testament. Let us trace its main outlines.

The primary meaning of *σάρξ* is, of course, the material of the body. Flesh is living, organized matter and belongs to birds and fishes as well as to men (1 Cor. xv. 39). In the narrative of creation in Genesis (ii. 7) man is described as made of material elements animated by a breath from God. Thus man became a "living soul" (*ψυχὴ ζῶσα*, 1 Cor. xv. 45). The matter which is thus animated by a principle of life (*ψυχή*) is "flesh," in the fundamental meaning of that word. It thus naturally happens that "flesh" (בָּשָׂר) is, in the Old Testament, a frequent synonym for man's creaturehood — a name for his weak and perishable nature, in contrast to God. In this idea the Pauline usage has its roots. *Σάρξ* and *ψυχή* are kindred terms, and *σαρκικός* and *ψυχικός* are synonyms, in contrast to *πνευματικός* (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). *Σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα* denotes man either in the perishable, corruptible part of his nature (1 Cor. xv. 50), or in his incompetence as contrasted with the power of God (Gal. i. 16). This mortal life is lived "in the flesh," that is, in creaturely weakness and liability to death (Gal. ii. 20; Phil. i. 22). Hence the term naturally designates outward relations, as one's descent and kinship (Rom. iv. 1; ix. 5, 8; xi. 14), or the relation of master and slave, in contrast to spiritual brotherhood (Col. iii. 22; Philem. 16), or material goods (*τὰ σαρκικά*) in contrast to spiritual goods (*τὰ πνευματικά*, Rom. xv. 27; 1 Cor. ix. 11). All such relations as are involved in physical descent, Jewish citizenship, and knowledge by the senses are, in themselves, *κατὰ σάρκα*, outward, incidental, unessential (Gal. vi. 12; 2 Cor. xi. 18; v. 6).

From these considerations the conclusion might plausibly be drawn that for Paul *σάρξ* is a name for man's creaturely weakness in contrast to God.[1] Clear evidence of the simple reproduction of this Old Testament idea is unquestionably found in some Pauline passages. But will this interpretation apply to his language as a whole? We shall pres-

[1] So Wendt, *Die Begriffe Fleisch und Geist im bibl. Sprachgebrauch.*

ently see that Paul has advanced beyond this conception and has given a more positive ethical content to his idea of the flesh than this interpretation involves. The steps of that development it is not difficult to imagine. Man's weakness is, in one aspect of it, moral weakness; but moral weakness is not merely negative, but positive. Thus with "the flesh" is naturally associated the notion of positive sinfulness. The flesh is not merely weak, but is the seat of passions and impulses which easily give occasion to sinful choices and actions. In this way the ontological dualism of flesh and spirit (to be carefully distinguished from the Greek dualism) easily merges into the ethical dualism of Paul. He looked upon the flesh in its positive aspects. He had experienced the power of its passions and the way in which it allied itself with sin and became the instrument of sinful desire. The Old Testament contrast still remained the basis of Paul's doctrine, but the contrast was sharpened and ethicized by Paul's intense realization of the power of sin. I cannot, therefore, agree with that theory which so far disregards the Old Testament basis of Paul's doctrine as to maintain that "the flesh" is for him a name for the whole man in one aspect of his life, in contrast to spirit which designates the whole man in another aspect of it.[1] If it is certain that Paul is not to be interpreted in terms of Manichæan or Alexandrian dualism, it is, to say the least, improbable that his language is to be construed in accordance with philosophical monism. Paul was a Jewish dualist whose dualism was rendered thoroughly ethical by his intense sense and experience of sin. His dualism was not based upon the idea of the inherent evil of matter, but upon the fact of experience that out of man's sensuous nature arise potent enticements to sin and that, in actual sinful humanity, the flesh is a powerful ally of evil.

Before further testing this view by reference to the relevant passages it is necessary to examine Paul's use of the term πνεῦμα. In Rom. vii. 18–25 we observe that the principle which is contrasted with the flesh is called the good

[1] So Ménégoz, *Le Péché et la Rédemption*, pp. 41–64.

will (*τὸ θέλειν τὸ καλόν*), the inward man (*ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*), the mind (*ὁ νοῦς*), or the law of the mind or reason (*ὁ νόμος τοῦ νοός*). These terms must be synonyms of *τὸ πνεῦμα*, which is so often opposed to the flesh. The spirit of man is, then, the true ego, the better self, the spiritual nature in which he is most closely kindred to God. The spirit is that immaterial part of man which relates him to the eternal and imperishable world. Hence it stands over against the corruptible flesh which has no future. He who makes the sphere of the outward and sensuous his world can only reap corruption, while he who fosters the life of the spirit will reap eternal blessedness (Gal. vi. 8), "for the mind of the flesh is death, but the mind of the spirit is life and peace" (Rom. viii. 6). The flesh is subject to decay, but the spirit is kindred to God, and bears within itself the potency of an endless life. Hence to live or walk according to the spirit means to cultivate the higher nature and to realize the life of fellowship with God.

The spirit is constitutive in human nature; it belongs to all men as the offspring of God (Acts xvii. 29). It is true that Paul describes the "first Adam," the archetype of natural humanity, as a "living soul" (*ψυχὴ ζῶσα*), without saying anything of a "spirit," while the "last Adam" is called a "life-giving spirit" (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*, 1 Cor. xv. 45). But to conclude from this passage that the natural man, according to Paul, possesses no *πνεῦμα*, would be an unwarranted *argumentum e silentio*. One might as easily prove from it that Jesus Christ possessed no soul and no body. Adam and Christ are here contrasted only in a single particular; the former is the natural, the latter the spiritual head of the race. It is natural that Paul should most frequently speak of the spirit in describing Christians, because in their life the spirit is the predominant element (Rom. viii. 16). The Christian man is *πνευματικός*, or if he must in some cases still be described as *σαρκικός*, it is because he has not yet realized the idea of his Christian calling (1 Cor. iii. 1–3). In that case the professed Christian is really living after the

manner of the unrenewed man. But the human πνεῦμα is not a *donum superadditum* which is conferred in regeneration. It is a factor of man's personality which is developed and assumes dominance in the Christian life. Before his conversion when the flesh mercilessly ruled his life, Paul still possessed the moral reason, the spiritual nature, which often asserted its claims and demanded its right to control his action. The fornicator at Corinth possessed a πνεῦμα which was capable of being saved (1 Cor. v. 5). Paul attributes man's self-knowledge to "the spirit of man which is in him" (1 Cor. ii. 11). The spirit is thus seen to be a constituent element in human nature.

We have now seen what is the fundamental idea underlying Paul's use of the terms "flesh" and "spirit" when they are set in contrast. There are certain cases where both are used in a neutral sense in which this contrast is not in mind. When, for example, Paul speaks of being present with the Corinthian Church "in spirit" (1 Cor. v. 3), he means that he sympathetically imagines what is transpiring in their congregation. In a popular use of the words the terms πνεῦμα and ψυχή might be used interchangeably (2 Cor. i. 23; Col. iii. 23). In writing to the Corinthians of his disappointments and trials he can even say in one place that his flesh found no relief (2 Cor. vii. 5), and in another that his spirit found no relief (ii. 13). But wherever the contrast between flesh and spirit is spoken of in connection with the moral and religious life, the basis of that contrast is the conflict in human nature, as it actually is, between sensuous impulses which become incentives to wrong choice and action, and the higher moral nature which knows and approves the right. This, I say, is the basis or starting-point of the contrast. But what then is that "ethical use" which Paul makes of the word σάρξ, and how does that usage stand related to the Old Testament contrast of the material and the spiritual factors of human nature?

Paul's doctrine of the flesh was not intended to be a philosophy of the origin of sin. So far as the apostle has given any account of sin's origin, it is found in the

parallel between Adam and Christ (Rom. v. 12–21). In what Paul says of the σάρξ, he is speaking entirely of empirical humanity as it is since the entrance of sin into the world. He does not represent man as originally and by his constitution sinful. On the contrary, he became sinful by an act of will. But he was by creation carnal; he had a lower nature whose appetites and passions readily entered into alliance with depraved affections and a perverted will. Thus the flesh became a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας; the body a σῶμα ἁμαρτίας (Rom. viii. 3; vi. 6). The members became the instruments of sin and the sphere of its manifestation. It is by such an easy transition that the physical notion of the flesh, which is found in the Old Testament, passes over into the ethical conception of it, which we find in Paul. A passage like Rom. vi. 19: "I speak after the manner of men because of the infirmity of your flesh," suggests the nature of the transition. The Roman Christians were still morally weak, and had not yet fully learned that the Christian life required that they should make their members servants to righteousness, and not to uncleanness and iniquity. Here the moral weakness which is connected with the flesh is, primarily, a tendency to carnality of life. Here creaturely weakness has its positive side, which is moral depravation.

The Corinthian Christians, whom Paul calls σαρκικοί (1 Cor. iii. 3), are also described as weak and immature, babes needing to be carefully nursed. But their weakness is not merely negative; it is a moral perversion issuing in "jealousy and strife." These passages carry us over to the more strictly ethical use of σάρξ whose various "works," partly sensuous sins and partly sins of disposition, are described in Gal. v. 19–21. It is a catalogue of sins which issue from the dominance of the lower nature. All forms of sin have a certain kinship and unity. Hence the dominion of carnal impulses involves the supremacy of the lower nature, and so naturally issues in other forms of sin than those which are more directly sensuous. Even in this passage it is not necessary to suppose that the apostle entirely deserts the Old

Testament basis of his doctrine. The same remark applies to his language in Rom. vi. 12 *sq.* The keynote of this passage is: "Let not sin reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey the lusts thereof: neither present your members unto sin as instruments of unrighteousness" (*v.* 12). The thought here is: Do not allow sin to subdue to its uses your bodily powers and desires. Preserve your members from such slavery and make them subservient to righteousness. In Rom. viii. 3 *sq.* the flesh is described as a power which, in its alliance with sin, is so strong that the law could not vanquish it. Christ, however, has appeared in the flesh (without sin) and has dethroned sin which reigned therein. The reference to Christ's appearance in the flesh, and the synonymous use of "flesh" and "body" in the passage (see *vv.* 10, 11) show that the Old Testament contrast of body and spirit, the earthly and the heavenly constituents of man's personality, lies at the basis of this representation. The flesh is personified. It has a "mind" (*φρόνημα*); it refuses obedience to God (*v.* 7). It is conceived of as a moral power ruling the life of those who are subject to it. The body is almost identified with the sin whose instrument it is. The flesh has become a synonym for the lower nature in general. But, strictly speaking, the identification of the flesh with sin is not made, either here or elsewhere. The flesh may be so subdued to the service of righteousness as no longer to be a hindrance to the Christian life. In the Christian man the dominant element is the spirit, and, although his body is subject to decay and death in consequence of sin, it will be quickened and transformed at the resurrection (*vv.* 10, 11), and made like to Christ's "body of glory" (Phil. iii. 21).

From this review of the passages it seems evident to me that no definition of the *σάρξ* can be given which will be equally applicable to all the uses which Paul makes of that word. Primarily, *σάρξ* is the material of the body, generally considered as a seat of impulses which become motives to sin, but sometimes as a symbol of creaturely weakness. But moral weakness implies a positive per-

version, and sensuous appetites and passions enter into natural alliance with sins of disposition, and thus σάρξ easily becomes a synonym for the lower nature in general, in contrast to the better self, the conscience or moral and religious nature. Paul uses these terms popularly and for practical purposes, and without any thought of making precise psychological distinctions. The main points are that Paul distinguishes sin from the flesh and from the organism which is composed of flesh, the body. Evil is not traced to a sensuous origin, although it is extended and intensified by its connection with sensuous appetites and passions. His references to the flesh are made not from speculative motives, but on the basis of experience. Their import is not metaphysical but ethical.

In the light of these considerations we see to what extent they are right who suppose σάρξ to be used in a neutral sense. Metaphysically considered, the flesh is neutral; empirically considered it is sinful. Matter as such is not evil, nor is it the source of evil; but the body, as animated by a soul capable of feelings and appetites, is a source of temptation and a seat of evil. But since by a perversion of will sin entered the world, it has made the body its slave, and has subjected it to vanity and corruption.

A fair test of the correctness of our conclusions is found in Paul's attitude towards asceticism. He does, indeed, speak of subduing the body (1 Cor. ix. 27), and of putting to death the members or the deeds of the body (Col. iii. 5; Rom. viii. 13). But how does he do this? Not by self-inflicted tortures, not by needless hardships and sufferings; but by maintaining, through the aid of divine grace, the predominance of the spirit; by summoning every power in the struggle for the attainment of good; by contending, as athletes contend, for the incorruptible crown of Christian virtue through self-control and the choice and pursuit of what is good (1 Cor. ix. 24–27). Paul neither practices nor recommends asceticism. He discountenances it as powerless to promote the spiritual life. On the contrary, a self-imposed humility

and severity to the body, which adopt as their maxim: "Handle not, nor taste, nor touch," belong to the rudiments of the world, and "are not of any value against the indulgence of the flesh" (Col. ii. 16–23).

It thus appears that Paul's doctrine of the flesh offers no solution for the problem of the origin of sin. Sin originated in a perversion of the human will and has its seat, primarily, in the will. But it extends its power to all the faculties and perverts them all to its own uses. The hereditary aspect of sin will next come into consideration.

CHAPTER III

ADAM AND THE RACE

THE historical origin and transmission of sin is touched upon by Paul in what he says of the relation of Adam to the race. It is evident that the apostle read the story of the first man and his fall in Genesis as literal history. He also shared the view which was current in his time, that the sinfulness of mankind in general had its origin in the transgression of Adam. Physical death was viewed as the consequence of sin. Such are the presuppositions of Paul's references to the hereditary aspect of sin and death.[1] Two passages are of special importance in this connection: 1 Cor. xv. 45–49 (*cf.* *v.* 22) and Rom. v. 12–21.

In the first of these passages the apostle is contrasting Adam and Christ as the head of natural and of spiritual humanity respectively. He is illustrating the saying of verse 22: "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive." He accordingly describes Adam's nature. He is "of the earth, earthy," and hence all men as natural descendants of Adam are, like him, subject to mortal frailty. Nothing is here said of Adam's sin; the whole passage is a description of him as a natural man, a child of earth, and therefore liable to death. But does the apostle then mean to imply that Adam was by his very nature mortal; that all die in him because he was himself, even apart from sin, a perishable creature? This conclusion would not agree with Rom. v. 12 *sq.*, where death is certainly contemplated as the consequence of sin. Nor does the apostle in teaching that Adam was "natural,"

[1] Cf. *The Pauline Theology*, pp. 125, 126.

while Christ is "spiritual," mean to imply that Adam had no spiritual nature. He is contemplating Adam in a certain aspect of his being as contrasted with Christ. Adam was a creature liable to death, and his descendants share that liability. Christ is a life-giving spirit, and those who are joined to him constitute a spiritual humanity over which death can have no power. Paul's idea must have been that which underlies the Old Testament representations, that man's primitive condition was that of weakness and indeterminateness; that he was, so to speak, a candidate for immortality. He was by nature a creature, but he might by obedience attain immortality. When he sinned, this possibility was forfeited and he became actually subject to death. The two goals, life and death, were conceived as set before him. Which goal he should attain would hinge upon his obedience or disobedience to God. These also were presuppositions with Paul, derived from the Old Testament and from the popular Jewish theology.

The modern mind inevitably asks how far these ideas of the apostle accord with critical theories of the ancient traditions embodied in the early chapters of Genesis and with current views of the history of mankind. In order to make any such comparison at all, we must translate Paul's terms into their modern equivalents. We must no longer regard the description of the first human pair, their temptation and fall, as history, but as a legendary rendering of man's moral experience, coming down in its substance from a remote antiquity, and at length taking form, in accordance with the genius of Israel's religion, in the present book of Genesis. When this is done such points as the following present themselves to our notice: (1) Adam, the symbol of primitive man, is not regarded as perfect, but only as innocent and undeveloped. He is conceived of as a weak and earthly creature, an *ἄνθρωπος χοϊκός* in whom the lower nature predominates, a "living soul" (*ψυχὴ ζῶσα*) with animal appetites and passions, but capable also of choice and action and of developing a positive moral character. Primitive man is morally neu-

tral, as yet non-moral, though endowed with capacities and powers which make possible to him a moral career, either of obedience or of disobedience to God.

(2) Physiology regards death as the law to which all organisms are subject by their very nature. What standing ground can then be left for the view of Paul, that physical death is the consequence of sin? There is a measure of inconsistency here, though not of the sort which is sometimes asserted. Jewish religious thought, in which Paul's view was rooted, could not look at death from the standpoint of natural science. Death was viewed not as a law of all created organisms, but in its ethical aspects. That which constituted the essence of death to the Hebrew mind was not physical dissolution, but the weakness, sickness, and sorrow which are its accompaniments here and, especially, the dread of the dark underworld, the land of shadows and forgetfulness, into which death ushers the soul. The word "death" had widely different associations for the Hebrew mind from what it has for the physiologist. The word "life" has equally different meanings. Paul could say that Christ has "abolished death" (2 Tim. i. 10), although he knew perfectly well that physical dissolution is the lot of all bodily organisms. For the Christian death has been transformed by redemption into departure to be with Christ (Phil. i. 23). All things are his who belongs to Christ, including life and death (1 Cor. iii. 22), because Christ has made death the gateway into his eternal joy. As a mere physiological fact — the fact of physical dissolution — death remains what it was before. But by a Jewish mind death is not regarded as a mere physiological phenomenon. When Paul says that death entered the world and has continued to hold sway over mankind in consequence of sin, we should not, in order to resolve the difficulty in question, jump to the conclusion, as many expositors have done, that moral and not physical death is meant. We should rather remember what "death" connotes to the Jewish mind, which does not separate the physical from the moral after the manner of natural science, but finds the primary

significance of the fact of death in its ethical aspects. It is sometimes said: On Paul's principles we should be required to suppose that, had sin never entered the world, all the human beings who ever lived would still be living on earth. The objection only shows how the real import of Paul's doctrine may be missed by making physical death mean in Paul just what it means in biology. Paul's thought would lead to the idea that, had there been no sin, death, with its accompaniments of sorrow, pain, and fear, would not have been. But some other transition or cessation of earthly existence (which would be death in the sense of biology) would not thereby be excluded. I am not contending that the Jewish view of death which Paul shared is wholly warranted from a scientific point of view, but only that the subject was regarded by Paul from quite a different standpoint from that of physical science. Practically, the religious motive of Paul's doctrine was that the "sting of death is sin" (1 Cor. xv. 56). It is sin which makes death terrible. Redemption robs it of its terrors. Theoretically, Paul held something more than this. But what was more than this was incidental to his thought in consequence of his Jewish training, and was not essential to his view of religion.

(3) With Paul sin is an affair of the will. It entered the world by man's choice. Whatever may have been man's native weakness, whatever his liability to temptation in consequence of animal appetites, sin itself is a perversion of the will. It is therefore alien to man's nature. It is a false direction and wrong use of his powers, a missing of his true goal. It is not inherent in his sensuous nature or in his imperfection as a creature, but in his choices and character. Hence, man is responsible for his sin and guilty in consequence of it. It brings him under the holy displeasure of God (Rom. i. 18). Various as are the degrees of light which different men enjoy, all have light enough to render them inexcusable for their sin (Rom. i. 20; ii. 1).

(4) Sin is universal. "All have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God" (Rom. iii. 23). The argument of

the Epistle to the Romans is based upon the fact that all men, Jews and Gentiles alike, are sinners. As such they are guilty before God and can be saved only by grace.

We note in Paul two classes of references to the subject of sin. One set of passages speaks of sinful choices and actions, *παραβάσεις, παραπτώματα* (Rom. ii. 23; iv. 15; v. 14 *et al.*); the other, of sin in general as a world-ruling power, *ἁμαρτία* (Rom. iii. 9, v. 12, 13 *et al.*). Ménégoz distinguishes these two ideas by calling the former Paul's *moral* notion, the latter his *dogmatic* notion, of sin. "The moral notion," he says, "considers sin in itself, in its nature, in its essence. The dogmatic notion considers it in its origin, its extent, its rôle, its end."[1] Paul speaks, on the one hand, of concrete sin; on the other, of sin in the abstract. In modern parlance we should make the distinction by speaking of sinful acts and of a sinful character out of which sinful acts spring. The peculiarity of Paul's thought is that he personifies sin, in this latter sense, and speaks of it as entering the world and ruling mankind. But this use of language need cause no confusion. By sin, in this personified sense, he means human sinfulness collectively considered — the power of a universal sinful bias.

It is in connection with this idea of sin that Paul draws the parallel between Adam and Christ (Rom. v. 12–21). The aim of that passage is to magnify the grace of God in redemption. This the apostle does by showing that the divine mercy which has been manifested in Christ is more than a match for the power of sin, mighty as that power is. As the apostle touches successively upon the points of comparison, he emphasizes the superior greatness of God's grace, as compared with sin, by exclaiming: "Much more" (*πολλῷ μᾶλλον*) does the grace of God surpass the power of sin. Incidentally, however, Paul has here given us the nearest approach to a theory of "original sin." The passage proceeds upon the view that Adam was the natural head of the race, as Christ is its spiritual head. Sin began in Adam's transgression; and since death was to be the

[1] *Le Péché et la Rédemption*, p. 15.

penalty of sin (Gen. iii. 3), death entered the world when sin entered. But death became the portion of all men, even of those who sinned before the Mosaic law was given. Sin must, therefore, have been universal. What, now, was Paul's view of the connection between Adam's trespass and the universality of sin in his descendants?

The various theological theories of original sin have been derived from different interpretations of the phrase, "for that all sinned" (ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον). The principal point in dispute has been whether "all sinned" means "all sinned in Adam or when Adam sinned" (as held by the Augustinian and federal theories), or that "all individually and personally sinned" (as held by various schools of modern theology). The differences on this point among critical interpreters is as great as among dogmaticians. If appeal on behalf of the view of "modern theology," that the phrase refers to personal sin, be made to Weiss, Weizsäcker, Pfleiderer, Sabatier, Lipsius, and Holtzmann, these famous names can be easily matched, on the other side, by Meyer, Godet, Ménégoz, Bruce, Beyschlag, and Bovon. It is impossible to determine this point with absolute certainty. Although, in former times, it was thought that the greatest doctrinal consequences hinged upon this phrase, it is now recognized by many that Paul's main thought is not so essentially affected by this difference of interpretation as was once supposed. In any case, the passage as a whole contains the idea that a moral corruption or depravation passed down from Adam to his descendants; and even if πάντες ἥμαρτον refers to personal sin, it probably refers to it as illustrating the moral corruption or sinful bias which the parallel assumes to have come down from Adam. The passage as a whole thus presupposes what in modern terms we call the transmission of sinful tendencies by heredity. In precisely what form Paul conceived that idea, we do not know. But the theological significance of the passage lies in its recognition of the significance of heredity for the moral life of man. Paul could no more have had in mind the notion of original sin which is contained in Augustinian realism, derived from Plato's philosophy, or the later notion

of Adam's federal headship, developed in Holland in the seventeenth century, than he could have had in mind the results of modern inquiry into the laws of heredity, or the speculations which underlie the theory of Julius Müller, that our "hereditary sin" is the consequence of a personal self-decision made in a pre-temporal state. Paul's thought is correctly apprehended when we recognize his vivid sense of the power of sinful character and his emphatic assertion that sin spreads itself abroad and intensifies its power in human life by means of our race-connection. Sin is not produced *de novo* by each individual for himself, as if man began his moral life in a state of perfect equilibrium. On the contrary, every man brings with him into the world an inheritance of tendencies to sin, a bias towards evil. With that every life is weighted from its beginning, in consequence of its connection with a sinful race and through the operation of the mysterious power of heredity.

But in spite of a changed view of the theological bearing of our passage as a whole, it still remains an interesting exegetical question whether *πάντες ἥμαρτον* refers to the conscious sinning of all individuals, or to some kind of constructive or collective sin which is conceived of as implicit in Adam's transgression. I hold this latter view, although I hold it in a form essentially different from the old theological theories. It must be remembered that Paul regards sin as a unit—a principle of which all concrete sins are but an expression and evidence. By Adam's transgression this principle was lodged in the life of humanity. The sinning of all men is regarded as implicit in the sin of the head of the race.

The language of the passage shows that Paul's thought is: All sinned when Adam sinned. As the righteousness of spiritual humanity is derived from Christ, so the sins of natural humanity have their causal principle in the sin of Adam. Throughout the passage stress is laid upon the transgression of Adam as the cause of sin in general and of the reign of death: "As through one man sin entered into the world" (*v.* 12); "the judgment came of one unto condemnation" (*v.* 16); "if by the trespass

of the one the many died" (*v.* 17). Now if we suppose that individual sinning is meant by πάντες ἥμαρτον, then a different reason for the universality of death is introduced from that emphasized in the passage elsewhere. Everywhere else death is said to have entered the world through the sin committed by Adam. Is it likely that in πάντες ἥμαρτον Paul meant to give a different reason for its universality, namely, the universality of personal sin? In what is stated in the passage concerning Christ as the author of righteousness, nothing is said of personal faith as the condition of its appropriation. The aim of the passage does not require that anything should be said of it. It is wholly unlikely that in the analogous case of Adam's relation to the sinful race anything should be said of personal sin. The passage is dealing with two principles and their relation to their respective sources, Adam and Christ. It deals neither with personal sin nor with personal faith.

If πάντες ἥμαρτον refers to the personal sinning of all individuals, the statement would not be true. The phrase is intended to give the reason for the universal reign of death: "And so death passed unto all men (εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους) because all (πάντες) sinned." Now, millions of infant children have died who have not consciously and personally sinned. How could Paul assign the personal sinning of all individuals as the cause of their death in view of this obvious fact? If he was thinking of personal sin, how could he overlook such an immense and significant exception? It is arbitrary in the extreme to take πάντες in any narrower sense than belongs to πάντας in the same sentence. It is certain that πάντας denotes mankind universally. It follows that πάντες also does, and that ἥμαρτον is predicated of all descendants of Adam. It must include infants, and cannot therefore refer to conscious, personal sin, since they have not consciously and personally sinned.

But what, then, did the apostle mean? Did he, after all, hold the realistic conception of human nature, that all men were in Adam, that all wills were in his will, and

that therefore all men actually participated in his sin? Or did he suppose that all sinned in him representatively or putatively, as a nation might stand or fall with the acts of its representatives? If either or both of these later modes of theological thought could be shown to have had any place in the thought-world of Paul, they would be entitled to serious consideration. But this is not the case. The key to Paul's thought in regard to the sinning of all men when Adam sinned is found in his own oft-repeated identification of the believing world with Christ in his saving deeds. All men sinned in and with Adam in the same sense as all believers died and rose with Christ. "Non agitur de peccato singulorum proprio. Omnes peccarunt, Adamo peccante, sicut omnes mortui sunt, salutariter, moriente Christo (2 Cor. v. 15)."[1] The principal passages which illustrate Paul's view are: "Our old man was crucified with him"; "If we died (*ἀπεθάνομεν*) with Christ," etc. (Rom. vi. 6, 8); "One died for all, therefore all died" (*οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*, 2 Cor. v. 15); "If ye died (*ἀπεθάνετε*) with Christ," etc. (Col. ii. 20); "If ye were raised together with Christ" (Col. iii. 1); "For ye died (*ἀπεθάνετε*), and your life is hid with Christ in God" (Col. iii. 3); "We were buried therefore with him through baptism into death; that like as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4).

In what sense did the believer die when Christ died? In what sense did he rise with Christ from the grave? It is evident from the drift and purpose of the passages where these expressions occur that Paul mystically identifies the believers with Christ and figuratively describes the process of salvation in the Christian man in terms of the saving deeds which procured his salvation. In and with the saving deeds — Christ's death and resurrection — the salvation of all believers is conceived of as accomplished, so that the believing world is described as dying (to sin) when Christ died, and as rising with him to newness of life. This method of thought is the supreme

[1] Bengel, *Gnomon N. T.*, *in loco*, Rom. v. 12.

example of Paul's mysticism.[1] We may say that the believing world dies, is buried, and rises with Christ in a figurative sense if we understand that the figure is based upon real relations; that the moral death of believers to sin is conceived of as having its cause and ground in the death of Christ with which it is identified.[2] We see in these representations the apostle's way of expressing his intense sense of the believer's vital relation with Christ. He is so joined to Christ that he is described as passing through those experiences of Christ in which his saving work culminates.

In an analogous sense all men are conceived of as sinning when Adam sinned. Natural humanity is mystically identified with Adam. This representation is figurative, but a great reality underlies the figure. What that real relation of primeval sin to all subsequent sin is, Paul does not state, either here or elsewhere. But it is evident from our passage as a whole that the apostle considers our sinfulness to have a hereditary aspect; that the first sin stands in some causal relation to sin in general, such as to justify him in figuratively blending them together in a single inclusive conception. The unity and solidarity of the race, and the power of heredity over the moral life of mankind, are the thoughts which underlie his mystical identification of the sin of all men with the trans-

[1] Cf. *The Pauline Theology*, pp. 32–43.

[2] We should naturally expect that as believers are conceived of as dying to sin when Christ died on the cross, and rising to holiness when Christ rose from the tomb, they would be represented as also buried with him in the grave. But Paul has not carried out his thought in this way. The reason is that he has identified the idea of burial into a moral death to sin with water-baptism (Rom. vi. 4). Formally considered, this representation stands by itself, because the ethical burial and its consequent resurrection to newness of life are conceived of as occurring, not when Christ was buried and rose, but when the believer was baptized. Thus we see that the believer's ethical resurrection is (*a*) identified with Christ's resurrection (Col. iii. 1), and (*b*) conceived as occurring when the believer is raised from the waters of baptism (Rom. vi. 4). This variation from Paul's usual representation shows that he was conscious of employing a figure or analogy which need not be developed in any fixed form. Its real import was that believers were saved by Christ's death and resurrection, and were joined to him in a living fellowship.

gression by which sin first gained entrance to the world and began its destructive sway. As from this mystical identification of the salvation of the believing world with Christ in his death and resurrection, we derive the idea of a real relation of those saving deeds to the believer's personal righteousness, so from a similar identification of the sinning of all men in and with Adam's sin, theology should deduce the principle of a real relation of individual sin to the previous sin of the race, through heredity — a principle to which modern science has added impressive emphasis.

Paul does not describe men as guilty for that inherited tendency to sin or vitiation of nature which they derive from their connection with a sinful race. The old theological theories which held that man was by nature sinful and guilty, that newly born children were blameworthy in the sight of God and objects of his wrath, found support for such a view in Paul only by unwarranted exegesis. The principal proof-text was Eph. ii. 3: "And (we Jews) were by nature children of wrath (*τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς*), even as the rest" (the Gentiles). This passage was understood to affirm that all human beings are objects of God's wrath from the moment of birth in consequence of original sin and native depravity. Meyer has abundantly refuted this interpretation, and many other recent scholars have adopted substantially the view which he advocated.[1] I have elsewhere[2] given my reasons for rejecting the interpretation that "Paulus nos cum peccato gigni testatur, quemadmodum serpentes venenum ex utero afferunt" (Calvin); I can only briefly summarize them here. It is apparent from the context that the object of the passage as a whole is to describe the actual sinfulness of the Gentile world, and thus to show from what great depravity the readers have been redeemed. But not wishing to excuse the Jewish world, Paul throws in the statement that the Jews were quite as bad as the Gentiles. The

[1] Among them, Weiss, von Soden, and T. K. Abbott. See, especially, the latter's *Commentary, in loco*, in the International Series.

[2] See *The Pauline Theology*, pp. 152–157.

passage is quite analogous to Rom. i. and ii. where, after depicting the depravity of the heathen, he turns to the Jews and charges them with doing the same things. In both cases he is speaking of actual sin. It is, moreover, utterly incredible that Paul should have described the Jewish people, the branches of the sacred olive tree of the theocracy (*οἱ κατὰ φύσιν κλάδοι*, Rom. xi. 21), as by their very birth and nature, objects of God's wrath. If this interpretation is correct, it is no wonder that it is regarded as proof that Paul could never have written the Epistle to the Ephesians. It is, indeed, quite certain that he never wrote anything which stands in such glaring contradiction with his doctrine of the "holy nation" as does the old dogmatic interpretation of this passage. The words *τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς* do not necessarily mean objects by birth of God's wrath. *Φύσις* may mean "growth" as well as "birth." It may refer to inheritance, as in Gal. ii. 15, or to the development of the voluntary life, as when the Gentiles are said to do *φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου* (Rom. ii. 14). Further, *φύσει* is not emphatic in our passage as the interpretation under review assumes. The passage, no doubt, presupposes a hereditary taint, but it does not assert that before and apart from any voluntary action, and on the basis of inheritance alone, human beings are objects of God's wrath. It teaches rather that Jews, as well as Gentiles, in their corrupt pre-Christian life, were objects of God's holy displeasure. "The word *φύσει* refers to their natural development (as in Rom. ii. 14), and purposely stands after *τέκνα*, because to them belonged, through divine grace and calling, the sonship to God (Rom. ix. 4), in virtue of which they remained beloved of God (Rom. xi. 28) even when their conduct (Wandel) exposed them to the divine wrath." [1]

As a result of our review it appears that the elements of Paul's doctrine of sin are as follows: (1) Sin does not have its origin and ground in the sensuous nature, or in any metaphysical limitation of man, but in the will. (2) Sin is universal and guilty. It pervades and affects

[1] Weiss, *Die paul. Briefe, in loco*.

all man's life and relations. Paul does not, however, teach the total depravity of all mankind. All men are not by nature "wholly inclined to all evil, and that continually." Even the heathen may "show the work of the law written on their hearts," and may, at least in some degree, "do by nature the things of the law" (Rom. ii. 14, 15), that is, partially conform to the divine will. (3) A bias towards sin is propagated by heredity. Men belong to a sinful race. They begin life with a predisposition to evil. Upon each life is entailed a moral inheritance from the past. The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. These principles are not shaken, but confirmed, by the results of science and by the subtlest speculations of ethical philosophy on the subject.

CHAPTER IV

THE LAW OF GOD

PAUL'S doctrine of the law is developed mainly from a Christological standpoint. He does not dwell upon the historic purpose and use of the law. He lays the greatest stress upon its office as preparatory to Christ. Of specific points under this general topic he discusses at greatest length the relation of the law to sin. This he does in order to show how the law served to quicken the consciousness and reveal the true nature of sin, and thus to prepare men to receive the gospel of redemption through Christ.

In setting forth this relation, Paul employs (1) a historical and exegetical argument founded upon the relation of the law to the promise given to Abraham (Gal. iii.; Rom. iv.), in which it is shown that the principle on which Abraham was justified was that of faith. The testimony of the Old Testament was that Abraham believed God, and his faith was reckoned to him for righteousness (Rom. iv. 3, 9). On the basis of this testimony Paul asserts that the promise to Abraham did not guarantee its blessing to him and to his seed on the ground of a legal obedience, but on the ground of a righteousness which is by faith (Rom. iv. 13). He therefore concludes that the way to acceptance with God is the way of faith, and that the validity of the promises made of old rests upon this principle (Rom. iv. 16; Gal. iii. 21, 22). He thus traces back his doctrine of the imputation of faith and of justification thereby (Rom. iv. 3, 5, 9, 22; *cf.* Gen. xv. 6) with historical continuity to the covenant made with Abraham. The effect of this argument is to show that the law had its main purpose in reference to the

Messianic age and work. Upon its use as a present power restraining from sin, Paul does not have occasion to dwell.

(2) He employs an argument based upon his doctrine of the cross. The postulate with which he starts is that the cross of Christ is the efficient means of redemption. But if righteousness were attainable by deeds of the law, there would not only be another way of salvation, but the way of the cross would be rendered unnecessary and useless (Gal. ii. 21; v. 4). But by the supposition this is impossible. The way by the law must therefore be shut, and the way by the cross remain the only path of life (Rom. ix. 30–33).

(3) A psychological argument is also employed to show how the law quickens the consciousness of sin, makes transgressions abound (Rom. iii. 20; v. 20; vii. 7–11), shuts men up in ward, and cuts off every other way but that of faith (Gal. iii. 23 *sq.*). The first of these three lines of proof is a general historical argument, the second a specifically Christological, and the third a psychological argument. This analysis gathers up the principal proofs by which the positive aspects of the law's preparatory office are set forth.

Its negative preparation for Christ is brought out in an argument showing the powerlessness of the law to secure righteousness. There are two main reasons for this inability of the law: (1) its external, preceptive character (2 Cor. iii. 6–18; Rom. ii. 27–29; vii. 6); (2) the carnal nature of man (Rom. viii. 3–7). Thus, negatively, the preparatory purpose of the law is shown by both its subjective and its objective inability.

Paul uses the word "law" to denote the Mosaic law, unless otherwise limited or defined.[1] Νόμος is sometimes used generically, but still denotes remotely the Mosaic legislation; ὁ νόμος denotes specifically the Mosaic law. A few passages may be taken as representative: Rom. ii. 14, where the Jews and Gentiles only are under consideration. The Gentiles "have not the law" (μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα); the Jews have the law. Here the Mosaic law must be meant

[1] As, *e.g.*, in Gal. vi. 2, τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ; Rom. ii. 14, ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος.

in both cases, though in one the reference is generic, in the other specific. Rom. v. 13: "For until the law (ἄχρι νόμου) sin was in the world, but sin is not reckoned where there is no law" (μὴ ὄντος νόμου). Here appear both the more specific and the more general use of the word without the article. Rom. vii. 7: "What shall we say then? Is the law (ὁ νόμος) sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin but by the law" (εἰ μὴ διὰ νόμου). These passages will fairly illustrate Paul's use of the word "law." They show that in cases where he does not use it as a simple equivalent for the Mosaic law, and seems to speak of law in general, he still has the Mosaic legislation in mind. Sometimes he speaks of this law specifically, sometimes generically.[1] The law was for Paul the concrete embodiment of the divine will. It would not however follow that the Mosaic law exhausted the conception of moral law for his mind. He recognizes moral law as existing where the Torah was not known. The heathen had a law — a moral rule of life — revealed in their own hearts and consciences. When the Mosaic system was done away, the moral government of God was not impaired. On the contrary, God's moral will was all the more plainly revealed to those who received Christ. When circumcision disappeared, the substance of "God's commandments" yet remained and were still to be kept (1 Cor. vii. 19). Thus while we see that Paul did not formally distinguish the written law from the moral law in general, he did practically regard the latter as more comprehensive than the former — as a system of which the Torah was an adequate but not exhaustive expression.

It follows that by "the law" Paul denotes the whole Mosaic code. Whatever, therefore, he teaches in regard to "the law" at all, applies to the whole system, not to an element or phase of the system arbitrarily selected. Paul's theology of the law has been too often interpreted

[1] "Quand Paul parle de la Loi, ce n'est donc la loi morale abstraite, c'est la législation mosaïque qu'il a en vue." Ménégoz, *Le Péché*, etc. p. 98. The whole chapter (iv.) by Ménégoz, on *Le Péché et la Loi*, is admirable.

by means of unwarranted divisions within the law itself. But we can be certain from the use of the word that whatever he teaches in regard to the purpose and present validity of the law, he teaches in regard to its totality. "The traditional division of the law of Moses into moral, ceremonial, and juristic laws may serve to facilitate a general view of theocratic ordinances; but it is incorrect if it seeks to express a distinction within the law, and to claim various dignity for its various parts."[1] It does not follow, however, from what has been said that the law denotes for Paul merely the contents of the Pentateuch. It includes these as its primary element, but for Paul the whole Old Testament was conceived as constituting a single code. Hence, when he wishes to prove something to "those who are under the law" from what "the law saith," the passages which he quotes in evidence are not taken from the Pentateuch at all but from Isaiah and the Psalms (Rom. iii. 10–19).

Paul asserts in the strongest terms that the law is divine in its origin, and in its nature, "holy, just, and good" (Rom. vii. 12). It was "ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator" (Gal. iii. 19)[2]; it is "spiritual" (Rom. vii. 14), that is, of divine origin. In his elaborate argument showing the relation of the law to sin, he is careful to guard against the misconception that the sinfulness which the law quickens and occasions is due to any moral defect in the law itself: "Is the law sin? God forbid!" (Rom. vii. 7). So, also in his argument showing the inadequacy of the legal dispensation to

[1] Oehler, *Old Testament Theology*, I. 264.

[2] This reference to the mediation of angels and of Moses in the giving of the law is not designed to convey the idea that the law was *made* by intermediaries and was therefore inferior and transitory, as Ritschl holds. The law is not less truly divine in its origin on account of this mediation; it occupies an essential place in the plan of God. But Paul regards it as less absolute than the promise which was spoken directly to Abraham. With the fact that it was given *less directly* than was the covenant with Abraham, Paul associates the idea that it was secondary and subordinate. In giving the promise God stands alone and speaks directly; in giving the law he acted mediately. The former is absolute; the latter is relative.

the fulfilment of the promises made to Abraham, he is careful to urge that there is no opposition between the legal system and the gospel of faith preached beforehand to him (Gal. iii. 8): "Is the law then against the promises of God? God forbid!" (Gal. iii. 21). The dispensation of the law is, indeed, subordinate to the covenant of promise, but so far from being in opposition to it, it has its ideal end in the fulfilment of that covenant. The law is intermediate between the ancient covenant and the completed gospel, — between the promise and the fulfilment. It was a divinely appointed means of revealing human need and of hastening its satisfaction. We thus see how completely is the law auxiliary to the gospel of grace and faith in the historic development of the Kingdom of God.

It belongs to the very nature of statute law to restrain transgression by ordaining penalties. The Mosaic law aimed to check sin, promote morality, and secure righteousness. It did this by presenting motives to obedience: "Ye have seen how I bare you on eagles' wings and brought you unto myself" (Ex. xix. 4). The Decalogue is thus prefaced: "I am the Lord thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage" (Ex. xx. 2). The excellence and fitness of the law are commended to the people (Deut. iv. 6–8). The motives to obedience are both positive, being drawn from appeals backward to God's care and guidance, and forward to the promises; and negative, being founded upon threats and penalties. The law has a restraining, regulative power. It has more than a negative force. It seeks more than outward conformity; it insists upon a right disposition of heart; morality as well as legality. Though itself external to man, it is a grave mistake to suppose that it required only external obedience. What it was able to secure is another question. But such, in brief, was the historic aim of the law for the time then present, as apprehended by the Jews themselves.

At first sight it appears strange that Paul has not developed this idea of the law, but rather a view of it which

almost seems contradictory to this. How different would have been his treatment of the law while still a zealous and devout Jew! In what a different light does he see the whole subject from his new standpoint! He now looks wholly beyond the immediate aim of the law for the Jew, and sees it only in its relations to the gospel. The whole subject is therefore treated by Paul with a purely Christological purpose. This change is an impressive illustration of the radical revolution which his modes of religious thought must have undergone. That which once held for him the highest place in veneration and esteem he never ceases to honor, but its chief glory now is that it was a means of ushering in the new "ministration of the spirit." Henceforth for the apostle the glory of the law must ever pale before the brighter and more enduring glory of the new "ministration of righteousness" (2 Cor. iii. 8–11).

Some writers on the Pauline theology maintain that Paul not only fails to consider the historic purpose of the law to check transgression and secure morality, but that he teaches, to the exact contrary, that the law was given to increase sin. Pfleiderer strongly emphasizes the sharp antithesis between the Jewish, or historic, and the Pauline, or Christological, purpose of the law, and asserts that, according to Paul, the law was not given to check sin but to increase it.[1]

This point will be discussed subsequently. We have already granted that Paul nowhere dwells upon the historical idea of the law; but are there no incidental traces of this idea in the Pauline epistles? Such traces seem to be found in the following passages: Rom vii. 10, "The commandment which was unto life" (ordained unto or aimed at [securing] life, ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωήν, *sc.* οὖσα)[2]; Rom. viii. 3, 4: "For what the law could not do," etc., God did, in order that "the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit." "The righteousness of the law" is the righteousness which the law contemplates and seeks to secure, though for reasons to be separately considered it was not able to secure it.

[1] *Der Paulinismus*, p. 92 *sq.*

[2] *Cf.* Meyer, *in loco.*

If it be said that the righteousness of the law is only the righteousness which the law demanded, it is admitted; but we cannot suppose that Paul conceived of God as instituting a system making certain demands upon men, and comprehending in itself no purpose and no means of securing the fulfilment of the demands. The righteousness of the law is the righteousness which the author of the law contemplated and purposed to secure, so far as a legal system can be designed and adapted to secure such a result. From these phrases it is apparent that the language of 1 Timothy on this point is not un-Pauline: "The law (νόμος) is not made for a righteous man, but for the lawless and unruly; for the ungodly and sinners," etc. (i. 9). The meaning here is that the law was given to restrain the lawless and disobedient; to check tendencies which are not according to "sound teaching" and the "glorious gospel" (i. 9–11). It cannot be maintained that Paul meant to say that the law was given to increase the wickedness of these classes of persons. The peculiar Pauline doctrine of the purpose of the law as quickening the sense of sin does not here come into view. This passage is not a theological argument, but a piece of practical, moral instruction. On this point, then, the substance of the Pauline doctrine is: Have love, which is the one word in which the whole law is fulfilled (Gal. v. 14), and then you will not be under the law, for it is not made for the righteous — to regulate his life or threaten him for disobedience — but for sinners. Love is "the fulfilling of the law," and he who is ruled by love has within him the principle of righteousness which the law aims to secure (Rom. xiii. 8–10). The divine design of the law during the period of its validity was to secure obedience by threatening and checking transgressions. This is not equivalent to saying that it had power to justify. It could hold out inducements to righteousness, but could not secure the obedient heart. This impotence or inadequacy of the law forms the transition from the Jewish to the unique Pauline idea of the law in its relation to sin. Hence we consider next the failure of the law to secure righteousness.

We have already touched upon its external, preceptive character. It was a "ministration of death, written and engraven on stones" (2 Cor. iii. 7). It could not secure its own ideal end, because it was not a spiritual power. It could punish disobedience, induce to outward conformity, and even by motives and promises induce to obedience, but these combined results did not constitute a perfect righteousness, and could not, therefore, fulfil the conditions of a justification to be received on the basis of debt, not of grace. And here appears the greatest obstacle of all to the securing of righteousness by the law. It was powerless against the sinful, fleshly nature of man (Rom. viii. 3). As an outward "letter" (*τὸ γράμμα*) and as elementary (*τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*, Gal. iv. 3, 9; Col. ii. 8, 20) it was weak "through the flesh" (*διὰ τῆς σαρκός*), that is, unable to cope with the power of sinful desire — weak in comparison with the power of the flesh. This argument, like those that have preceded it, tends to establish the Christological aim of the law. It could not, in view of this inadequacy, be a finality. It must be a system subordinate to the principle of salvation by grace on condition of faith, a principle which existed before the law, and for the more complete revelation and realization of which the law was given. The legal principle is: "He that doeth them shall live by them" (Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12); but "the carnal mind is not subject to the law of God; neither, indeed, can be" (Rom. viii. 7). Hence, the way by deeds of the law is shut, and only the way of grace and faith is left.

We are thus led to consider the purpose of the law in its relation to sin. Paul teaches that the purpose of the law was to quicken the consciousness and intensify the power of sin. This idea was unknown to Jewish theology. The Jewish and the Pauline ideas, which seem so radically different, had each its element of essential truth. The former was correct historically, the latter ideally. The first step in the development of sin by the law is seen in the fact that "by the law is the knowledge of sin" (Rom. iii. 20). The law reveals sin as transgression. "I had

not known sin but by the law; for I had not known lust except the law had said: Thou shall not covet" (Rom. vii. 7). The sin existed before the law came, but was not definitely and consciously known as such. "For until the law sin was in the world, but sin is not imputed (reckoned as such) where there is no law" (Rom. v. 13). By the revelation of sin in its true character the law becomes a ministration of death. By revealing sin as transgression of divine right it "works wrath" to the disobedient (Rom. iv. 13). Thus "sin by the commandment becomes exceeding sinful" (Rom. vii. 13). In this way sin is defined. Men see themselves in the mirror of divine law as guilty. The law becomes the occasion by which sin really intensifies its power in human life. "The law entered that the offence might abound" (Rom. v. 20; *cf.* Gal. iii. 19). "Without the law sin was dead. I was alive without the law once; but when the commandment came sin revived, and I died" (Rom. vii. 8, 9). Thus the law became the "strength of sin" (1 Cor. xv. 56).

It is important, in this connection, to distinguish between ἁμαρτία and παράβασις. The former is sin considered as a principle; the latter is the manifestation of sin in specific acts. The law calls out the principle of sin into increased expression in action. It provokes a reaction of sinful desire against itself and thus increases transgressions. "The law was added (to the promise) because of transgressions" (παραβάσεων χάριν, Gal. iii. 19), that is, in favor of transgressions, in order to multiply them. "The law came in alongside (of the reign of sin and death[1]) that the trespass might abound" (Rom. v. 20), that is, that the trespass of Adam might, as it were, repeat

[1] Interpreters differ as to the force of παρεισῆλθεν. Some render: "It entered alongside of sin" (Meyer, Weiss); others: "It entered parenthetically, that is, between Adam and Christ" (von Soden, Sanday). Pfleiderer renders: "It entered between sin and redemption, as a means to the end of the latter" (*Paulinismus*, p. 101). In any case, the law is regarded as intervening in an era of sinfulness to make sin's real nature and power apparent, and so to aid in preparing the way for a gracious deliverance from it. The law helped to show the depth and power of the sinful principle by multiplying its expressions in transgressions.

itself in the lives of men. Thus the law increased the consciousness of sin — showed sin to be such — and also increased its expression as transgression. We can now see in what sense the law "increased sin." It sharpened the sinful self-consciousness by revealing sin as such. Thus relatively to man's previous consciousness of sin, it increased it. Besides this, it became by its restraint the occasion of increasing the violence and expression of sinful desire. "Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata" (Ovid). But the law did not causally increase sin. It became the occasion of its development into new strength. According to Rom. vii. 8, it is *sin*, not the law, which "wrought all manner of desire." Sin was the *cause* of this desire, the law only the *occasion* of its development. Paul's argument here is briefly this: The commandment was unto life, — had life as its end and aim, — but by reason of the hold which sin had upon my nature, it only served to reveal me to myself, and to convict me of guilt before God; and thus what was meant to be unto life I found to be unto death. The law then pronounced the death sentence on me (vii. 9), and showed me the mercy of God in Christ as my only hope (vii. 25). That the law caused a positive increase of sin, considered as a principle inherent in human life, Paul does not teach. The action of the law upon men was like that of all the influences and agencies of God's grace upon those who persist in sin. The gospel message itself becomes a "savour of death unto death" to those who reject it (2 Cor. ii. 16). Truth hardens the heart that spurns it. Moral law develops character into definiteness in both directions.

The argument which proves that the law intensified sin also shows how it became a negative means of salvation by sharpening the need and longing for redemption. In the redemptive work of Christ, therefore, the law finds its fulfilment. The law aims at life by pointing to Christ, who alone can give it. The historic aim is secured in the principle of love, which is "the end of the commandment"; its ideal aim is secured in Christ, who accomplishes for

the believer what the law could not accomplish — its just requirement (*δικαίωμα*, Rom. viii. 4). Thus the Christological and historic purposes meet and blend, since Christ brings in the perfect gospel of love. In him, therefore, the apparent antinomy is solved. The law requires righteousness and shows the sinner the depths of his sin, not to leave him in despair, but rather to lead him humbled and penitent to Christ, that God may receive him through faith. Paul's philosophy of the law is most succinctly set forth in Gal. ii. 19: "For I through the law died unto the law, that I might live unto God." The apostle died to the law ethically; he broke off all relations to the law as a supposed means of salvation. Compare Rom. vii. 4, where death to the law is illustrated by the dissolution of the marriage-bond by the death of one of the parties. But how did he die to the law *by means of the law?* The answer is found in full in Rom. vii. 7 *sq.* The law had shown him his sin and his guilt. It had put him to death ethically. It had slain his self-righteousness. This was a severe, but, in its ultimate result, a saving process. The law had prepared him to receive Christ. It had taught him the inadequacy of all his "works," and had led him to accept a gracious salvation. He thus broke off all relations to the law and fled to Christ for salvation, and it was the law itself which, when he clearly saw its requirements, proved a powerful incentive urging him to do this. Thus the law, by showing him his sinfulness and helplessness, was a means of driving him to Christ. Hence, through the law, he became as a dead man to the law — ceased to regard it as a saving institute — and was pointed to the spiritual life graciously offered in Christ, in whose fellowship he found joy and peace. The law had slain him, but it was only that Christ might make him alive. He forsook the law forever, but only that he might become "under law to Christ" (*ἔννομος Χριστῷ*, 1 Cor. ix. 21).[1]

[1] "The law had wrought in me the infinite consciousness of sin, and the sense that, do what I would, the fulfilment of its requirements was impossible. It was a state of death, but of death unto life." Jowett, *The*

From this view of the Pauline doctrine of the law it follows as an inevitable consequence that the Mosaic law does not retain under Christianity the same prescriptive moral authority which belonged to it before. It is completed in the gospel. All its elements of permanence are taken up into Christianity, which is complete in itself and does not need to be supplemented from any previous incomplete stage of revelation. This view does not rest for its support upon any single passage or set of passages. It runs through the whole Pauline conception of the relation of the two dispensations. A few passages may be quoted in illustration: Gal. iii. 19, 24, 25: "What then is the law? It was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise hath been made. So that the law hath been our tutor to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith is come, we are no longer under a tutor." The law was designed to train the people in the knowledge of their own sinfulness, and by its severe discipline "to humble the proud to desire Christ's aid" (Luther). Rom. x. 4: "For Christ is the end of the law unto righteousness to every one that believeth." The best interpreters agree that τέλος νόμου here is literally the end, the completion, and that the meaning of this passage is that the validity of the law has come to an end in Christ. 2 Cor. iii. 11: "For if that which passeth away was glorious, much more that which remaineth is glorious;" Col. ii. 16, 17: "Let no man judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a holyday, or of the new moon, or of the sabbath days, which are a shadow of things to come; but the body is Christ;" Rom. vi. 15: "We are not under law, but under grace." According to Paul, revelation is complete in Christ. The gospel is lacking in nothing that was of permanent value in the law. God has taken away the first; he has established the second. He has completed the old in the new, as the blossom is completed in the fruit. The law will always be worthy of all honor,

Epistles of St. Paul, in loco, Gal. ii. 19. Similarly Lightfoot in his *Commentary* on the passage.

but its chief glory must ever be that it served to usher in the gospel (2 Cor. iii. 9–11), and to prove to humanity a παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν (Gal. iii. 24).[1]

[1] Ménégoz (*op. cit.*, p. 123) sums up the various points of view in which Paul presents his special theory of the law, thus: The law was given (1) to increase transgressions (παραβάσεων χάριν); (2) to lead to faith (εἰς πίστιν); (3) to conduct to Christ (εἰς Χριστόν), and (4) to give life (εἰς ζωήν). These are but different expressions of the same fundamental notion. Thus the formally contradictory assertions respecting the law, when seen in their true light, present the same conception of the law's character and end under different aspects.

On the whole subject I would also refer to the interesting monograph of Grafe, *Die paulinische Lehre vom Gesetz nach den vier Hauptbriefen*, 2te Aufl., 1893.

CHAPTER V

THE DIVINE PURPOSE

We have seen that the law was but one — and that a subordinate one — of the dispensations of God. It was one of the methods of the divine grace — one of the various means by which God sought to realize his purpose of salvation. Its aim and operation were really embraced within the scope of that primeval gospel, that gracious action of God by which, from the beginning of human sin, he had been seeking to reconcile the world to himself. Rom. iv. and Gal. iii. are the passages in which this thought is most fully developed. The principle of grace was operative in the days of Abraham, long before the law came into being. Faith and grace are the marks of that gospel which is contained in the promise to Abraham. Thus the gospel, in its essential elements, antedates the law. It has its basis in the mercy of God, and is as old as human sin and human needs. The law came in long afterwards, not to serve any ends of its own, but to serve the ends of the divine grace. It never changed the conditions of salvation which are involved in the very nature of the relation between the holy God and sinful man. It was only an incentive to man to fulfil the conditions of a gracious salvation. By making sin "exceeding sinful," and demonstrating to man his own helplessness, the law constrained him to fly to God's mercy as his only hope. Thus the law, rightly understood, is no rival of the gospel, but a method of God adapted to open men's eyes to their need of the gospel. The law does not make void the promise; faith does not destroy the law. Both contemplated essentially the same method of salvation. In its own way the law prepared men for Christ. By

such considerations the apostle proves the inner unity and harmony of the law and the gospel. The gospel was before the law, and underlies and embraces it. The law contemplates the ends of the gospel, and is a providential aid in promoting them.

Thus a consideration of the Pauline doctrine of the law leads us to the study of that divine purpose of grace which underlies the gospel, and is the motive of the whole history of redemption. This idea of the divine purpose received a strong emphasis from Paul. He shared that intense and living sense of God and of his causal efficiency which was characteristic of the Hebrew mind God's action is the expression of his purpose. The work of salvation is the realization of a gracious plan which lay in the mind of God before the world was. Sometimes the divine purpose is conceived of as eternal; sometimes as historical. In either case the treatment of the subject is not speculative, but practical and religious. The references to God's purpose illustrate the effort to form a rational conception of God's historic action; to find an ideal principle underlying the course of the world, and to correlate the doctrines of the gospel with the character of God. For Paul the purposes of God are rooted in the nature of God.

The apostle has not directly discussed the nature of God or presented any analysis of his attributes. There are two qualities, however, which he attributes to God which combine to constitute his working conception of God's ethical nature. They are represented, on the one hand, by the words "love" and "grace," and on the other, by the words "righteousness" and "wrath." Paul lays strong emphasis upon the love, the gracious favor, of God towards men. It was this love which prompted the gift of Christ for our salvation (Rom. v. 8). The love of God is the mightiest power in the universe (Rom. viii. 38, 39). God is "rich in mercy" (Eph. ii. 4), and the keynote of Paul's doctrine of his gracious purpose is, "that he might have mercy upon all" (*ἵνα τοὺς πάντας ἐλεήσῃ*, Rom. xi. 32). Grace (*χάρις*, Rom. iii. 24; v. 2

et al.), mercy (ἔλεος, Rom. ix. 23; xi. 31), and compassion (οἰκτιρμοί, Rom. xii. 1; 2 Cor. i. 3) are the watchwords of Paul's doctrine of God's nature and action.[1] We may confidently add that in assigning to love the preëminence among virtues (1 Cor. xiii. 13), and in designating love as moral completeness (τὸ τέλειον, 1 Cor. xiii. 10), the apostle implies that love is the essential glory of the divine perfection. As love is the crowning virtue for man, so must it be for God. But what, then, can be the meaning of those terms which seem to express a contrast or counterpart to love?

Paul emphasizes a principle, called the divine wrath (ὀργή), which stands in contrast to those expressions of love which are called mercy or grace: "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men" (Rom. i. 18). The riches of God's goodness — glory, honor, and peace — are bestowed upon the good; while wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish are the lot of the wicked (Rom. ii. 4, 5, 8). Sinners are exposed to God's wrath from which it is the purpose of redemption to deliver them (Rom. iv. 15; v. 9). They are described as objects of God's hostility (ἐχθροί, Rom. v. 10; xi. 28) — a term which, in my judgment, is to be taken, as the context in both passages shows, in a passive, and not in an active, sense.[2] What, now, is the relation of this ὀργὴ θεοῦ to the divine love? It seems clear to me that it is regarded as an aspect or activity of God's holy love. It is God's holy displeasure at sin — the reaction of his nature against it. It is the energy with which his love, being holy, repudiates its opposite. It is not, therefore, inconsistent with love; it does not stand

[1] "L'amour (ἀγάπη) est l'attribut divin. Placé en présence du pécheur, l'amour donne naissance à la miséricorde (ἔλεος), et la grâce (χάρις) est l'amour dans son application effective et personnelle au pécheur. Les trois termes expriment la même idée sous différent faces, et Paul les emploie fréquemment l'un pour l'autre." Ménégoz, *Le Péché*, etc., pp. 130, 131.

[2] So Meyer, Weiss, Pfleiderer, Lipsius, Ménégoz, von Soden, Holtzmann, Klöpper, Schmiedel, *vs.* Baur, Ritschl, Beyschlag. I think that ἐχθρός is probably active in Col. i. 21, and certainly so in Rom. viii. 7.

in opposition to it. The opposite of love is hate, and God is not described as hating men.[1] Wrath stands in contrast to those activities of love which are called grace or compassion. They denote the aspect of the divine love according to which it pities the sinner and waits to forgive him. Wrath denotes the attitude of the divine love towards wilful sin. Both qualities or impulses — that of grace, and that of wrath — are embraced within the divine love. The conception of God's righteousness (*δικαιοσύνη*), where it expresses his attitude towards sin, is similar. Sometimes the word denotes God's faithfulness to his own nature and promises, as in Rom. iii. 5: "But if our unrighteousness commendeth the righteousness of God, what shall we say?" But in iii. 25, 26, *δικαιοσύνη* expresses God's disapproval of sin in contrast to a seeming laxity in his estimate of it. Through Christ God has accomplished an "exhibition or demonstration of his righteousness" (*ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*) which is adapted to prevent men from supposing that because he refrained from punishing the sins of men in past times, he is indifferent to sin or regards it lightly. Here *δικαιοσύνη* must mean the self-respecting attribute of holiness in God, the reaction of his nature against sin which must find expression in its condemnation.[2] Holy love is the best definition of Paul's conception of the ethical nature of God.

What, now, is Paul's view of God's relation to the world? In this conception his doctrine of God's special purpose in Jewish history and in Christ must have its root. We find that Paul regards the world as the scene of a great redemptive process. Nature is now subject to

[1] The phrase: "Esau have I hated" (Rom. ix. 13) means, as the context shows, "a rejection of one in favor of another who is preferred" (Beyschlag). Paul explains this preference by the words: "The elder shall serve the younger."

[2] The context of this passage is decisive against the view of Ritschl, Beyschlag, and others, who deny that *δικαιοσύνη* here bears a judicial or penal sense. It does this, however, without being "placed in fundamental contradiction to the divine grace" (Beyschlag). *Cf.* my articles, "Holiness" and "Righteousness," in Hastings's *Bible Dictionary*.

imperfection and death, but not without hope of deliverance (Rom. viii. 18–25). In this passage in which the present condition and the hope of both nature and man are described, the apostle has strikingly approximated the great modern generalization of evolution. In Colossians and Ephesians he portrays the "cosmic significance" of Christ, and shows that he has always been in the world to which he sustains an original relation. Thus the forces of redemption have always penetrated the world. Christ was not only in the history of Israel a "spiritual rock" of which they drank (1 Cor. x. 4), but is in the whole history of man. In these broad conceptions of God's all-embracing interest for his world, Paul's ideas of his special purposes, dispensations, and promises are grounded.

Accordingly the apostle teaches that revelation is universal. God has not "left himself without witness" in the case of any people (Acts xiv. 17), but in the bounties of his providence has taught men to recognize him. The course of history, also, and the testimony of conscience are means by which God has led men to "feel after him" and to divine their kinship to him (Acts xvii. 26–28). Thus, even to the heathen, God made himself known, and "that which may be known of God" (*τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ*, Rom. i. 19) was evident (*φανερόν*) to them, for God made it evident (*ἐφανέρωσεν*) to them. Such a disclosure of himself as they were capable of receiving in the dim light of nature, God gave them. This he did through the evidences of his wisdom and power which are displayed in nature, and which the reason of man is competent to interpret (Rom. i. 20); but still more plainly did he do so through the voice of conscience, the moral law written on the hearts of men, which speaks of a holy authority to which they are subject. Man's rational and religious nature makes him susceptible to the evidences of a supernatural power and a moral lawgiver to whom he is responsible. This "light of nature," or universal self-revelation of God in his world, is sufficient to found moral obligation and responsibility, and to render the heathen "without excuse" for the gross idolatries and wickedness

into which they have fallen (Rom. i. 20). It is true that "the world by its wisdom knew not God" (1 Cor. i. 21), that is, the Greek philosopher did not attain by his speculations to such a saving knowledge of God as the Christian possesses. Yet there is a real knowledge of God, which is available for all, and which might have been the possession of all men if they had not in wicked perversity become vain in their reasonings, darkened their foolish hearts, and so refused to retain God in their knowledge (Rom. i. 21, 28).

The God in whom Paul believes is not the God of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles (Rom. iii. 29). Yet he bears a special relation to Israel. To the Jewish people he specially revealed himself, and, despite their sin and unbelief, his faithfulness to his covenant shall not fail (Rom. iii. 1–5). What, now, was the nature and purpose of this divine election of Israel? I answer that Paul conceives of it as a historic action of God in setting apart the Jewish nation to a special mission or function in the world as the bearer of his revelation to all mankind. God's purpose of blessing for the world is universal. Israel is a chosen instrument for carrying that blessing to all men. The gospel has been from of old, and is designed for mankind and adapted to man as man. The great sin of the Jewish nation is that they have narrowed the mercy of God and have fallen into thinking that the blessings of heaven are pledged to them and terminate upon them, instead of seeing them as a gift intrusted to them to be passed on to others. The current particularism against which Paul contended, sprang out of a narrow conception of Israel's election as an arbitrary preference for the Jewish people, for their own sake — a divine partiality in the government of the world. Against this view Paul's whole doctrine is a protest.

In Rom. ix.–xi. he deals with the perplexing question: How can the election of Israel be harmonized with the actual history of the nation? How can the Jews' rejection of the Messiah consist with God's purpose to make the nation the means of ushering in his Messianic King-

dom?[1] Paul begins by pointing out the fact that there may be now, as in previous epochs, an election within the election — a faithful nucleus in an otherwise faithless nation. If the mass of the nation should perish in rejecting the Messiah, there might still be a faithful remnant, an Israel within Israel (ix. 6–13). Moreover, besides this providential selection, there is God's free supremacy. He may choose the instruments of his providence for reasons of his own. We should not criticise what he does. Paul here attempts no concrete theodicy, but only urges that what God does, however perplexing to us, is just and wise (ix. 14–33). But these general considerations, the one a fact of observation, the other a maxim based upon the nature of God, do not wholly satisfy the apostle's mind or relieve the subject of its difficulties. Something analogous to the present situation may, indeed, be seen in the past, and God may, of course, do what he will. But God must be self-consistent. The question returns: How is the Jews' attitude towards the Messiah reconcilable with God's own covenant? Is not the promise to the fathers annulled by the present position of the nation?

At this point the apostle introduces a new consideration. If the Jews do fail of the Messianic Kingdom, it will be by their own fault. Their present partial failure is due to their seeking to establish their own righteousness. If they lose the Messianic salvation, it will be from unbelief. It will be another case such as Isaiah describes when he speaks of Jehovah as stretching out his hands all day long to a disobedient and gainsaying people. This is the gist of the tenth chapter.

[1] Dr. Bruce (*St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, p. 311) holds that the question before Paul's mind, in these chapters, is: How adjust the Jews' rejection of the Messiah with my doctrine of a *universal gospel*? I think that this question is logically involved, and that the solution which the apostle reaches bears upon it; but I see no evidence that this was precisely the question which was directly before his mind in the discussion. He starts with the problem: How reconcile the present attitude of the Jewish people towards the Messiah with the "word of God" (ix. 6) in his covenant with Israel?

But Paul now shifts his defence somewhat. Thus far he has been developing an *argumentum ad hominem*. His point is that the Jews' idea of an election of God, based upon an exclusive preference for them, is groundless. It is contrary alike to their own history, to the nature of God, and to the fact that man is required to fulfil the conditions of obedience and faithfulness if he is to continue in God's favor. The problem to which Jewish history gives rise is, indeed, a perplexing one. But whether, in itself considered, it can be solved or not, what can be confidently said in regard to it is amply sufficient to refute the Judaizing interpretation of the divine purpose in the election of Israel. Paul interprets it in the light of the boundless mercy of God and in accord with his doctrine of a universal gospel. But what has been said in chapters ix. and x. is occasioned by looking at the subject only on its dark side. It is as if he said: Most of my countrymen, the nation as a whole, are refusing the Messiah. If this rejection goes on indefinitely, how can such a fact be adjusted to my view of God and of the providential mission of Judaism? But that is to assume that the lapse is to be substantially complete. From this assumption the apostle, "animated by the invincible optimism of Christian patriotism" (Bruce), now recovers himself. "Did God cast off his people?" "By no means," he answers. In the eleventh chapter he pursues this more hopeful view of Israel's future. He, as a Hebrew of the Hebrews, cannot admit that such is to be the goal of the nation. Just now the prospect is, indeed, dark — as dark as it was when Elijah contemplated the prevailing idolatry of the nation. Yet he learned that a far larger number than he had supposed were faithful to Jehovah. It may prove so again (*vv.* 1–10).

But the matter may be looked at in another way. It seems as if the Gentiles were taking the place of the Jews in the Messianic Kingdom; as if the reception of the heathen meant the rejection of the Jews. But this is not really so, says the apostle. The conversion of the Gentiles, so far from closing the doors of the Kingdom against the Jews,

opens them the wider. Paul's hope is that when the Jews see the heathen possessing the blessings which were so freely offered to them, they will be "provoked to jealousy" and constrained to receive the Messiah. And thus, if the refusal of the Jews to believe on Christ occasioned an earlier preaching of the gospel to the heathen, it is the apostle's hope that the acceptance of Christ by the Gentiles may act as a motive upon the Jews to accept him also, "that by the mercy shown to you they also may now obtain mercy" (*v.* 31). Paul presents this idea pictorially by describing the Old Testament theocracy, which was the historic basis of the Messianic Kingdom, as a sacred olive tree. The natural branches — the Jews — have been broken off on account of their unbelief, and in their place the branches of a wild olive tree — the Gentiles — have been grafted in. But these retain their places in the sacred trunk only by faith. Should they be guilty of the same unfaithfulness, they would be lopped off as the natural branches have been. But what the apostle hopes for is that the grafting in of the wild olive branches will be followed by the recovery of the natural branches. He argues *a fortiori* that, if salvation has now come to the Gentiles, it is reasonable to think that the natural heirs of God's promise will not ultimately fail of it. Certainly this ingenious and, to us, somewhat strange argument is the product of a persistent and splendid hopefulness for the world. Paul refuses to despair of his people. He insists that there is light behind the dark events of the present hour; that Gentiles and Jews shall yet be united in one Church. Sin and unbelief do dim the light of hope, but God is over all, and his purpose of grace will not fail. In spite of all, the apostle raises the triumphant cry: "That he might have mercy upon all"; "O, depth of the riches of divine love"; "Of God, and through him, and unto him are all things" (*vv.* 32, 33, 36).

From this brief review of these chapters the following points are evident: (1) They treat, primarily, of the election of a people, not of the election of individuals. (2) They treat of election to a historic function or mis-

sion, not of election to eternal destiny. (3) They contemplate this action, in the manner and on the basis of the Old Testament, as a historic action of God, rather than as a pre-temporal action. (4) This election is regarded as unconditional only in the sense that it is not based upon meritorious works or upon rights derived from birth or nationality; it does not follow that it is unconditional in every sense. (5) The passage, taken as a whole, recognizes conditions to be fulfilled on man's part, if he will enjoy the favor of God. God's purpose is a purpose of grace, but grace and faith are correlatives in the Pauline system.[1]

We now turn to other expressions of Paul where the idea of God's purpose is clearly set in connection with the final salvation of men. It was quite in accord with

[1] We may, at this point, be reminded that a historic election is logically inseparable from a pre-temporal election; that the rejection of the Messiah was equivalent to the forfeiture of final salvation; that Paul represents God's choice of men, as of Jacob against Esau, as without reference to anything that they did, and that God is described as the efficient cause of Pharaoh's obduracy. Even if all these contentions should be admitted in their full force, it would be unwarrantable to derive the Pauline doctrine of predestination from the ninth chapter alone; it must be derived from chapters ix., x., and xi. But there is more or less misapprehension involved in all the above positions. Paul comes at the subject of God's dealings with men, not from a speculative, but from a historic, standpoint. It is a point of importance that he is discussing the historic missions of men and nations, and not eternal destiny. It does, at least, show that it is exegetically unwarrantable to apply his language in these chapters to a speculative problem which was not before him. That his choice of Jacob and rejection of Esau had no reference to their eternal destiny, but to their historic position, is clear from the Old Testament description of the "election": "The elder shall serve the younger." Paul does not say that God was the direct and efficient cause of Pharaoh's wickedness — a supposition which would be utterly inconsistent with the Old Testament. Much less does he say that he appointed him, from eternity, to eternal destruction. The Calvinistic theology has long built its doctrines upon these verses by taking them in isolation, by applying them to a metaphysical problem instead of to a historic situation, and by regarding a series of speculative inferences from Paul's words as part and parcel of his explicit and dogmatic teaching. But even if all the assumptions involved in this proceeding were well grounded, it would still be fallacious to take, as a man's view of a subject, the incipient stages of an argument concerning it, and persistently to ignore both its later stages and its conclusion.

Jewish methods of thought, as well as logically necessary, that Paul should trace the work of salvation back to God's eternal purpose. Hence he speaks of God's foreknowing and foreordaining men to be "conformed to the image of his Son" (Rom. viii. 29), and of Christians as being chosen in Christ "before the foundation of the world" (Eph. i. 4). The divine wisdom which is manifest in the mystery of redemption was hidden in God and "foreordained before the world unto our glory" (1 Cor. ii. 7), "according to the eternal purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Eph. iii. 11). Christians are "the called (κλητοί) according to God's purpose" (Rom. viii. 28), the elect (ἐκλεκτοί, Rom viii. 33). "God from the beginning chose them to salvation in sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth" (2 Thess. ii. 13). It is worthy of notice that, in all these passages, the apostle sets this purpose of God in relation to the salvation, and not to the reprobation, of men. In Rom. ix. he does, indeed, represent God's purpose as involving the acceptance of some and the rejection of others; but, as we have seen, the subject of final salvation is not there under consideration. Jacob is chosen, Esau is rejected. Pharaoh is brought upon the field of history to show God's power. As the potter makes vessels for various uses, so God appoints to one man or nation one providential rôle, to another, another. And this he does according to his own sovereign good pleasure. He is not governed in so doing, as Paul's opponents supposed, by the merits or claims of certain persons.

Theology has often applied these ideas to the subject of man's final destiny. Whatever may be the logic of such an application, it is exegetically unjustifiable. It is a use of Paul's words which he does not sanction, and which misapprehends the point of his argument. But it may be said: Elsewhere Paul teaches that the eternal destiny of men is fixed in God's eternal purpose. In any case, Paul is a predestinarian. I reply that Paul does not teach the eternal, unconditional predestination of some men to final salvation and of others to final condemna-

tion. He does not teach the doctrine of predestination which Calvin taught,[1] nor does he teach the doctrine as held by historic Calvinism, whether of the supralapsarian or infralapsarian variety. If we should assume, for the sake of argument, that in Rom. ix.–xi. Paul was speaking of human destiny, and that he held the Calvinistic view of God's purpose, we might summarize his argument thus: God has from eternity appointed some to eternal salvation and others to eternal perdition, "in order that he might have mercy upon all." On the contrary, Paul's whole doctrine of sin assumes that Adam fell freely and voluntarily. His sin was contrary to the will of God. It equally assumes that all men who perish do so by their own fault. The salvation of all is the aim of the gospel. God "willeth that all men should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii. 4). Christ came to be the "Saviour of all men" (1 Tim. iv. 10). The maxim which emerges from Paul's discussion of the mysteries of God's providence and purpose is: "That he might have mercy upon all" (Rom. xi. 32). God may choose some and reject others; he may appoint some to one career, others to another; his ways are past finding out; he may do what he will; but whatever he does, it is to the end "that he may have mercy upon all." It would be a glaring contradiction for Paul to affirm that God does not will the salvation of some, but has eternally appointed them to perdition. Happily for his consistency, he has never recorded such a statement or its equivalent. It is reasonable to suppose that consequences which Paul has not himself drawn from his own doctrine of predestination, and which if drawn would contradict his explicit teaching regarding the universality of God's purpose of grace, are not a part of his system of thought.

What, then, are the principal motives and elements of

[1] Dico Deum non modo primi hominis casum et in eo posterorum ruinam prævidisse, sed arbitrio suo dispensasse. . . . Non pari conditione creantur omnes: sed aliis vita æterna, aliis damnatio æterna prædordinatur. . . . Cadit homo, Dei providentia sic ordinante. *Inst.* iii. 2, 5, 23, 27. Ed. 1585.

Paul's doctrine of God's election of men to salvation? On this question I would make the following suggestions: (1) Religious thought necessarily translates the actual world back into the ideal world. Paul's doctrine of election and predestination is a carrying back of God's actual dealings with men into his eternal purpose. (2) Thus what God does he from eternity intended to do. The principles on which he acts, and the terms on which he blesses and saves men, are grounded in his thought and nature. (3) Therefore God's purpose of salvation must embrace all the elements which the actual process of salvation includes. If God actually saves men on conditions, he intended to save them so. In whatever sense he predetermines those who are to be saved, he must equally predetermine the conditions of salvation.[1] (4) Hence whatever is the relation in fact between man's faith and his acceptance with God, such was the relation in God's purpose. God cannot purpose to save men apart from all conditions, and then actually save them on conditions. (5) Paul's practical aim in his doctrine of predestination is to exalt the divine grace as the efficient cause of salvation. He wants to ground the work of salvation in God's undeserved mercy. Man does not achieve it; God in sovereign freedom and love bestows it. But so far is this from excluding *all* conditions of salvation that faith is, in the Pauline theology, the inseparable correlate of divine grace. (6) God's purpose terminates on the establishment of the gracious plan of salvation. It is "the mystery of his will according to his good pleasure which he purposed in Christ" (Eph. i. 9). "Æterna prædestinatio in Christo et nequaquam extra Christum consideranda" (*Formula Concordiæ*). (7) Hence, in speaking of God's eternal purpose of salvation, Paul never speaks

[1] Kühl in an elaborate essay, *Zur paulinischen Theodicee*, in the volume entitled *Festschrift für B. Weiss*, contends that the election of Rom. ix.-xi. is a pre-temporal election to final destiny, but holds the view expressed in the text that, according to Paul's principles, the divine predestination must include the determination of the manner and content of salvation and the condition of its bestowment. See, especially, p. 88.

of reprobation or preterition. On his principles his eternal purpose as related to the "non-elect" could only mean that God chooses not to do more or otherwise than he does in order to save men, that is, more than perfect wisdom and love permit and require. (8) God's eternal purpose of grace, ideally or virtually, embraces all men. God wishes to save all; Christ comes to save all. He is the head of redeemed humanity. But as in spite of God's choice of Israel some sundered themselves from the sacred tree of the theocracy by unbelief, so it may be in the case of God's gracious purpose of salvation. He cannot annul man's freedom, which is part and parcel of his plan of the world. He cannot override the conditions which are involved in the nature of a moral, as opposed to a mechanical, universe. If it is insisted that "God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass," it must be remembered that freedom and the realization of salvation upon moral terms and conditions "come to pass." [1]

[1] I would especially commend the discussions of this subject by Ménégoz in *La Prédestination dans la Théologie Paulinienne*, and by Bruce in *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, ch. xvii., entitled "The Election of Israel."

CHAPTER VI

JESUS CHRIST

CHRIST had been disclosed to Paul in his heavenly glory on the road to Damascus. From that moment Paul knew him as Messiah and Saviour. It was doubtless from this point of beginning that he developed his doctrine of the nature and work of Christ. From his conversion he began to know him *κατὰ πνεῦμα*. He saw him as risen and glorified, as establishing the Kingdom of redemption, and as ruling the world. In this way Paul's doctrine of Christ stands connected, as his whole theology does, with his experience. We must not conceive of the apostle as setting out, after the manner of a philosophical theologian, to define the person of Christ. He has developed no systematic view of the subject. He has not directly discussed such topics as the preëxistence of Christ and the union of divinity and humanity in him. The statements which bear upon such themes as these are incidentally made. Paul is certain that Jesus Christ is the Saviour of men. His doctrine of the person of Christ comes to expression in what he says of his saving work. But it is not on that account less important. What Paul takes for granted is quite as certainly fundamental in his doctrine as what he tries to prove. His doctrine of Christ is found in solution in his various arguments and exhortations. Only in the Epistles of the Imprisonment is the person of Christ the more immediate subject of discussion, and here only so far as is necessary for the refutation of certain errors.

The earliest creed of Christendom consisted of two words, *κύριος Ἰησοῦς* — Jesus is Lord (1 Cor. xii. 3; Rom. x. 9). To make that confession was the mark of a

Christian: "For, whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved" (Rom. x. 13). Accordingly, we find the lordship of Christ greatly emphasized by Paul. He preaches "Christ Jesus as Lord" (2 Cor. iv. 5). But Christ's lordship extends not only over Christians, but over all men: "There is no distinction between Jew and Greek: for the same Lord is Lord of all, and is rich unto all that call upon him" (Rom. x. 12). The rule of Christ is absolute; God will subject all things to him (1 Cor. xv. 27; *cf.* Phil. ii. 10, 11). Not only does Paul apply to Christ the term κύριος, the Septuagint name for Jehovah, but he freely applies to him passages from the Old Testament which were spoken of Jehovah (*cf.* Rom. x. 13 with Joel ii. 32, and 1 Cor. x. 22 with Deut. xxxii. 21). Hence the naturalness of the titles so commonly used by Paul: "Jesus Christ our Lord" and "our Lord Jesus Christ." As Lord, Christ is an object of worship.[1] Paul refers to three occasions when he "besought the Lord" (τρὶς τὸν κύριον παρεκάλεσα, 2 Cor. xii. 8), that is, Christ, as verse 9 conclusively shows. "Those who call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ" (οἱ ἐπικαλουμένοι τὸ ὄνομα κ.τ.λ., 1 Cor. i. 2; *cf.* Rom. x. 12, 13) is a periphrasis for Christians. This worship of Christ certainly includes prayer directed to him.[2]

We have found good reasons for believing that Paul was not without a knowledge of the historical Jesus. This knowledge enters into his doctrine. He knows that Jesus committed no sin. His was a "spirit of holiness" (Rom. i. 4). He "knew no sin" (2 Cor. v. 21). All

[1] *Cf.* Seeberg, *Die Anbetung des Herrn bei Paulus*, pp. 32, 33: "Κύριος is, in the writings of Paul, an exclusive designation, involving Deity, for the Christ exalted at the right hand of God, who, in this position, exercises a lordship which brings God's action to expression in saving men on the ground of the historically completed work of redemption, — and who, further, in this position of his as God, is the object, on the part of Christians, of a worship which corresponds to his activity."

[2] See the elaborate investigation of Seeberg, just cited, in which the author concludes that the prayer directed to Christ is not merely relative, that is, as to a Mediator or Intercessor (as Lücke and Meyer hold), but is absolute, that is, contemplates Christ as an independent divine person, pp. 56, 57.

other men are sinful. The human σάρξ is a σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, but Jesus did not share it. God sent him into the world ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας (Rom. viii. 3); he possessed a real human body and dwelt in human flesh (1 Tim. iii. 16), but without the taint of sin which empirically belongs to all flesh except his. Only such a sinless one could condemn sin in human flesh, that is, destroy the power of sin which reigns in humanity.

Paul is also acquainted with the fact of the human birth of Jesus. He was "born of a woman, born under the law" (Gal. iv. 4). He was "born of the seed of David according to the flesh" (Rom. i. 3). It is frequently asserted that these references to the human birth of Jesus quite exclude the idea of his fatherless generation and virgin birth as recorded in Matthew and Luke; that the phrase ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυεὶδ necessarily refers to descent on the father's side.[1] But it seems to me that all that can fairly be said on this point is that Paul gives no evidence of possessing the idea of the virgin birth of Jesus. He says nothing which would be inconsistent with it. Even if no account be taken of the somewhat doubtful tradition that Mary was also of Davidic descent, and if we surrender the position held by some scholars,[2] that Luke's genealogy is intended to be that of Mary, it is still possible that Paul might, for his purpose, indicate the legal and putative descent of Jesus by the words "of the seed of David." The genealogies of Matthew and Luke, assuming them to trace Joseph's line, proceed upon this view; Jesus was "the son (as was supposed) of Joseph" (Lk. iii. 23). If, on the other hand, Paul was thinking of Jesus' descent in Mary's line, there is no great difficulty in his use of the phrase ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυεὶδ, since "seed" was a name in common use for posterity, whether of a man or of a woman, *e.g.* Gen. iii. 15: "I will put enmity between thy seed and her seed" (*cf.* Rev. xii. 17). We can only say that Paul does not touch the question of the

[1] So Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* II. 67, 68 (Bk. IV. ch. iii. § 8).

[2] *E.g.* Olshausen, Godet, *Commentaries, in loco;* Weiss, *Life of Christ*, I. 216 *sq.*; Andrews, *Life of our Lord*, p. 56 *sq.*

virgin birth of Jesus, and that his statements do not prejudice it either way.

The most characteristic designation which Paul applies to Christ is "the second Adam." This title suggests the idea that he is the head and founder of a new humanity; that in him a new human history takes its rise.[1] The relevant passages are in 1 Cor. xv. and in Rom. v. In the former chapter the apostle is contrasting death and life. Adam is the cause of the one; Christ of the other: "Since by a man (Adam) came death, by a man (Christ) came also the resurrection of the dead" (xv. 21); in Adam death, in Christ life. Later (xv. 45–49), he contrasts their natures. The first Adam was made a living soul (*ψυχὴ ζῶσα*) — a creature, sharing the perishable life of nature; "the last Adam" (*ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ*) became (in his resurrection) a life-giving spirit (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*). He is "the second man from heaven" (*ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*); he is "the heavenly one" (*ὁ ἐπουράνιος*). In Rom. v. 12 *sq.* Christ is the counterpart of Adam. Through him comes to men the abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness which outdoes the power of sin introduced by Adam. "Through his obedience many are made righteous" (v. 19), and "grace reigns through righteousness unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord" (v. 21). Combining these expressions, we see that Paul, either directly or by implication, describes Jesus Christ as *ὁ δεύτερος*, or *ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ* — *ὁ πνευματικός*, *ἐπουράνιος ἄνθρωπος* by whom is undone the work of *ὁ πρῶτος*, *ὁ χοϊκός Ἀδάμ*. By these terms Paul clearly places Christ within the category of humanity. Did this category exhaust his conception of his person? This question naturally conducts us to Paul's doctrine of Christ's preëxistence.

The personal preëxistence of Christ as Son of God is naturally implied in such statements as that "God sent forth his Son" (Gal. iv. 4;[2] *cf.* Rom. viii. 3). The same

[1] *Cf.* Somerville's *St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, Edinb. 1897, which makes this idea its starting-point.

[2] *Cf.* Lipsius on Gal. iv. 4 in the *Hand-Commentar*: "Ἐξαπέστειλε presupposes the preëxistence of the Son."

conception is involved in the representation of Christ as the spiritual rock of which Israel drank (1 Cor. x. 4). The apostle describes Christ as passing from a previous heavenly life to the poverty of an earthly existence when he says that "our Lord Jesus Christ, though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor, that we through his poverty might be rich" (2 Cor. viii. 9). Christ as ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος is said to be ἐξ οὐρανοῦ (1 Cor. xv. 47).[1] The force which I have attributed to these expressions from the earlier epistles is substantially admitted by Beyschlag, who, however, regards the fact that Paul assigns to Christ a heavenly life before his earthly birth, as very surprising.[2] This author adds: "What strikes us in all these statements about preëxistence is, that the apostle really nowhere establishes or teaches the preëxistence of Christ, but, especially in his earlier epistles, presupposes it as familiar to his readers and disputed by no one. It must therefore have been a notion which was not in the least strange even to the primitive apostolic Christians before Paul, such, for example, as the readers of the Epistle to the Romans."[3]

After these representations it is not surprising to find the apostle assigning to Christ a part in the creation of the world and an original relation to mankind: "To us there is one God, the Father, of whom (ἐξ οὗ) are all things, and we unto him (εἰς αὐτόν); and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom (δι' οὗ) are all things, and we through him" (δι' αὐτοῦ, 1 Cor. viii. 6). This thought of Christ as the coefficient creator of the world or as the agent of God in its creation, and of his cosmic significance, is most fully set forth in Colossians. The following is the most significant passage: "The Son of his love; in whom we have our redemption, the forgiveness of our

[1] It must be admitted that it is doubtful whether Paul means to refer in this passage directly to the preëxistent Christ. It is so understood by Weizsäcker, Ménégoz, and Beyschlag. Most recent interpreters, however, understand it to refer to Christ in his glorified life. So Heinrici, Klöpper, Sabatier, Weiss, and Holtzmann.

[2] *N. T. Theol.* II. 76 (Bk. IV. ch. iii. § 10).

[3] *Ibid.* II. 78.

sins: who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him, and unto him; and he is before all things, and in him all things consist" (i. 13–17). Beside this passage should be placed the famous description of Christ's condescension in Phil. ii. 5–8: "Have this mind in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: who, being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men; and being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross." It is necessary briefly to examine the terms of these passages. In connection with what is said in the former of the Son of God as the firstborn of all creation, it will be convenient to consider the statement of Rom. i. 4 that Christ "was declared (or determined) to be the Son of God with (or in) power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead." In connection with the terms of the latter passage: "being in the form of God," "on an equality with God," naturally stands the question whether the words: "who is over all, God blessed forever" (Rom. ix. 5), are intended to apply to Christ.

The phrase: "The firstborn of all creation" (*πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, Col. i. 15), cannot be understood as including Christ in the creation, for the apostle immediately adds: "For in him were all things created" (*ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα*). The phrase, therefore, describes the absolute primacy of Christ in relation to the creation. If on behalf of the view that Christ is here ranked within the *κτίσις*, appeal be made to i. 18: "The firstborn from the dead" (*πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*), and Rom. viii. 29: "The firstborn among many brethren" (*πρωτότοκος ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς*),[1] it must be said that *πρωτότοκος* is a

[1] As by Ménégoz: "Le Fils est ainsi la première entité personelle née de la volunté créatrice de Dieu; . . . un être supérieur, céleste, élevé en

metaphor, the force of which must be judged by the context. In these two passages it relates to the state which is entered at the resurrection, while in i. 15 it refers to Christ's relation to creation and is defined by the words which exclude Christ from the *κτίσις* (*cf.* 1 Cor. viii. 6).[1] As related to the universe, Christ is original. "He is before all things (*πρὸ πάντων*) and in him all things consist" (*συνέστηκεν*, Col. i. 17). As related to God, he is "the image of the invisible God" (*εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*, Col. i. 15). He is the representation and manifestation of God. The word *εἰκών* naturally suggests the notion of essential kinship (*cf.* 1 Cor. xi. 7; xv. 49; Rom. viii. 29), and should be understood in the light of such statements as that in Christ dwells all the plenitude of Deity (*πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος*, Col. ii. 9). In both passages Paul probably has in mind Christ's glorified life.[2] Granting, then, that *εἰκών* and *πρωτότοκος* are figurative terms, and that it is difficult to determine their precise meaning in application to the person of Christ, we may say with confidence that they are intended to define him as one whose relation to God and to the universe is absolutely incomparable. If they do not categorically assert his absolute eternity and deity, they do, in my judgment, place him outside the category of creation and affirm of him an absolutely unique kinship with God.

Some scholars find a confirmation of the view that, according to Paul, Christ was the highest of created beings in Rom. i. 4: "Who was declared to be the Son of God (*τοῦ ὁρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ*) with power, by the resurrection of the dead." But we have seen that, for

puissance et en dignité au-dessus de tout le reste de l'univers, mais crée lui-même. Le Christ n'a pas de position intra-divine." *Le Péché*, pp. 161, 190. Beyschlag (*N. T. Theol.* II. 84, 85) draws a similar conclusion from a comparison of Col. i. 15 with i. 18 and Rom. viii. 29, and Briggs says that it must be conceded that, according to these latter passages, we are to think of the Messiah as "the firstborn of all creatures" (*Messiah of the Apostles*, p. 213). *Per contra*, see Sanday on Rom. viii. 29, and Lightfoot and T. K. Abbott on the passages in Colossians.

[1] So Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II. 83.

[2] *Σωματικώς*, "in bodily form," therefore probably refers to Christ's glorified corporeity; *cf.* Phil. iii. 21, *σῶμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*.

Paul, Christ *is* Son of God, and as such is sent into the world (Rom. viii. 3; Gal. iv. 4). Nowhere does he speak of Christ's *becoming* Son of God. His sonship to God is coextensive with his being. Hence Beyschlag correctly says: "That Christ should have first become Son of God through the resurrection is, according to Paul's view, inconceivable."[1] The passage itself justifies no other conclusion. Paul is describing Christ in two aspects of his being. According to the flesh he is descended from David; according to a spirit of holiness, that is, in his essential life, he was shown to be God's son by the resurrection. The verb ὁρίζειν means to set a boundary (ὅρος), to bound off anything; hence to define or distinguish anything. Christ was defined as Son of God, that is, distinguished as having that character, by that great act of divine power, the resurrection. The sense is well enough given by saying that, to Paul's mind, Christ's resurrection was the supreme proof of his divine sonship — the act by which he was declared to be God's Son. Here, as in other passages, we see that Paul rises to his conception of Christ from the contemplation of his resurrection and glorified life in heaven.

In the *locus classicus*, Phil. ii. 5–8, there are four principal thoughts: (1) A description of Christ's pre-incarnate state. He was "in the form of God" (ἐν μορφῇ θεοῦ) and was "on an equality with God" (τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ).[2] (2) A statement of his disposition not to retain the advantages or prerogatives of that state. "The mind which was in Christ" was a disposition which led him not to count his equality with God as a booty or prize, something to be grasped and retained (οὐχ ἁρπαγμὸν ἡγήσατο τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ), but which, on the contrary, impelled him to divest himself of his heavenly glory (ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν).[3] (3) A

[1] *N. T. Theol.* II. 68 (Bk. IV. ch. iii. § 8).

[2] I assume that these words refer to the pre-incarnate life of Christ, and not to his historic life — a view which, says Holtzmann, "ist von der grossen Mehrheit der Exegeten, zuletzt auch von Beyschlag (Bk. IV. ch. iii. § 10), mit Recht aufgegeben worden." *Neutest. Theol.* II. 82, 83.

[3] I think it is well established by exegesis that ἁρπαγμός here has a passive rather than an active force, and denotes something to be grasped or

description of self-divestiture or *kenosis*. In the transition from heaven to earth he "took on the form of a servant" (*μορφὴν δούλου λάβων*), and "was made in the likeness of men and was formed in fashion (*σχῆμα*) as a man." (4) He then stooped to the deepest depths of humiliation and endured the shameful death of the cross.

It is difficult to reduce to precise doctrinal expression a passage which was written for a purely practical purpose. It is, at any rate, clear that Paul here represents Christ as preëxisting in a divine form of being, which is contrasted with the servant form, in the likeness of men, which he assumed, and as relinquishing a Godlike dignity which is called equality with God in order to suffer and die. Such was Christ's great self-renunciation. He stooped from heaven to earth. He left the divine glory and prerogatives which he possessed to become subject to human limitations and conditions. And this he did voluntarily. He did not cling to the dignity which was his, but freely divested himself of it that he might bless and save men. Here, as in the other passages which we have noticed, the apostle has prominently in mind the glorified Christ. In return for the Redeemer's condescension, God has exalted him to a throne of power and glory and given him the name (*τὸ ὄνομα*) that is above every name. This name must be that of Lord (ii. 11). It is probable that Christ's pre-temporal glory is thought of as the counterpart of his exaltation to sovereignty over the world.

In view of the foregoing passages it does not seem to me incredible that Paul should have applied to Christ the words: "who is over all, God blessed forever" (Rom. ix. 5). That Christ should be called *θεός* does not seem strange

held — a prize or booty. I cannot help distrusting all efforts to distinguish sharply between *μορφὴ θεοῦ* and *τὸ εἶναι ἴσα θεῷ*. The most recent and one of the ablest of these attempts is that made by Dr. Gifford in his study of Phil. ii. 5–11, entitled *The Incarnation*. He holds that *μορφὴ θεοῦ* denotes the "specific character" of Deity which is inseparable from the "nature" which Christ, as divine, could not renounce, while *ἴσα θεῷ* denotes the mode of his manifestation, subordinate to his essence, which he could and did lay aside in the incarnation. The exposition is turned against the various forms of the kenotic theory.

after preëxistence, creatorship, being in the form of God, equality with God, and the fulness of the Godhead have been attributed to him. The principal reasons for holding that our English versions are right in so rendering the passage are: (1) The other rendering, which places a full stop after the words "concerning the flesh," and then reads the remainder of the verse as an exclamation of praise to God, is unnaturally abrupt. As a description of Christ, however, it comes in as a climax in the statement of the glories of Israel as the agent of God in the work of revelation and redemption. (2) As applied to Christ the words form a natural antithesis to τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, thus: In that aspect of his being denoted by σάρξ Christ is descended from the Jewish people, but in his essential nature he is God over all.[1] The principal objection to this view is that Paul does not elsewhere call Christ θεός, much less θεὸς ἐπὶ πάντων. But it is answered, on the other side, that Paul does elsewhere attribute creatorship and sovereignty over the universe to Christ (*e.g.* Col. i. 16), and applies to him terms clearly implying θεότης.[2] Those who

[1] I cannot agree with Dr. Cone that the primary question respecting this alleged antithesis is whether it "can be shown to be required or even expected in this connection" (*Paul*, p. 297). The primary question is, whether the structure of the sentence shows that Paul made it. A secondary question is, whether such a contrast is natural in view of the whole course of thought. Dr. Cone's objection to an appeal to Colossians is weakened by an increasing recognition by criticism of its genuineness (*cf.* p. 326).

[2] A full stop is placed after τὸ κατὰ σάρκα by Lachmann and Tischendorf; a comma by Scrivener, Westcott and Hort, Weymouth, and Weiss. Among interpreters who regard ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς as a doxology to God are Meyer, Lorenz, Ezra Abbot, Beet, Lipsius, and H. J. Holtzmann. Among those who refer the words to Christ are Reuss, Ritschl, Godet, Weiss, Dwight, and Sanday. Several recent writers express themselves doubtfully upon the point. Ménégoz, *Le Péché*, p. 193, refers the words to Christ in a *signification flottante*, *cf.* θεοὶ πολλοί (1 Cor. viii. 5). Pfleiderer, who in *Das Urchristenthum* (p. 240) expressed a preference for the first interpretation, in *Der Paulinismus* (2te Aufl. p. 163) inclines to refer the words to Christ in the same sense as Ménégoz. Beyschlag, who in his *Christologie* (p. 210) defended the reference to God, in his *N. T. Theol.* (Eng. tr. II. 73) gives it as his opinion that the phrase is intended to express the κυριότης (not θεότης) of Christ. Bovon (*Théol. du N. T.* II. 282), Bruce (*St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, p. 340), and Somerville

hold the genuineness of the Epistle to Titus may appeal to ii. 13: *ἐπιφάνειαν τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ*, where grammatical considerations certainly favor the application of both appellatives, *μεγάλου θεοῦ* and *σωτῆρος*, which are connected by *καὶ* under a common article, to the same person, thus supporting the rendering of the Revised Version: "The appearing of the glory of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ."

There are two related points in Paul's teaching which create a certain difficulty in view of the representations which we have considered, and which are often urged as requiring a different conclusion from that towards which the passages just reviewed seem to point. The first is the description of Christ as standing in an order of dependence or subordination to God. The principal passages are, 1 Cor. iii. 23: "God is the head of Christ," as Christ is the "head of man" and the husband the "head of the wife"; 1 Cor. xv. 24–28, where Christ is spoken of as "delivering up the Kingdom to God, even the Father" and as finally becoming himself subjected to God "that God may be all in all." The second point is the description of Christ's lordship or glory as a gift conferred on him by the Father, *e.g.* the *κυριότης* of Christ is graciously bestowed upon him (*ἐχαρίσατο αὐτῷ*) as a reward of his self-humiliation (Phil. ii. 9–11); Christ died and rose "that he might reign (or be Lord, *κυριεύσῃ*) of both the dead and the living" (Rom. xiv. 9). Many times his resurrection is ascribed to the power of God (Rom. vi. 4; 1 Cor. vi. 14; 2 Cor. xiii. 4). Moreover, the indwelling in him of the fulness of Deity is ascribed to a free act of God: "It pleased (*εὐδόκησεν*) [the Father] that in him should all the fulness (*πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα*) dwell" (Col. i. 19).

The thoughts presented in these passages are not to be minimized or explained away. Christ is placed in a

(*St. Paul's Conception of Christ*, p. 143) express themselves doubtfully. For the exegetical considerations on both sides, see the articles by Drs. T. Dwight and E. Abbot in the *Journal of the Society for Biblical Literature and Exegesis*, 1881. Dr. Abbot's article is reprinted in his *Critical Essays*.

secondary relation to God. But in all these passages, as it appears to me, the apostle is approaching the subject from the historic side, rather than stating what Christ is in himself. Exaltation and lordship are bestowed upon him as a reward of his redemptive work. He has come to his throne by the way of the cross. His surrender of the Kingdom to the Father when his redemptive work shall be complete and his own subjection to God seem to refer to the completion of his function as Saviour. He will surrender his commission as Redeemer when his work is complete, so that, in contrast to the mediatorial rule of Christ, God may be the immediate ruler in all the subjects of his Kingdom. "The fulness" of all divine power to bless and save is, indeed, represented as bestowed upon Christ in his glorification. But this description does not necessarily conflict with the possession by Christ of an essential pre-temporal glory. The apostle certainly did not regard the two ideas as mutually exclusive, since he has clearly expressed them both. John has reported a word of Jesus which combines the two: "Glorify thou me at thy side with the glory which I had with thee before the world was" (xvii. 5). It is quite unwarranted to use the idea of God's glorification of Christ following his redemptive work as a means of discrediting his possession of a glory with God before the world was.[1] In the mind of Paul these two ideas went together and were the counterparts of each other. Nor does it appear that they are in logical conflict except for a Christology which approaches them with purely humanitarian presuppositions.

It would unduly extend the limits of this chapter to review at length the various speculations of critics respecting the sources and motives of Paul's Christology. Ménégoz explains it by reminding us that the apostolic age was the period of the incubation of Gnosticism. Notions of emanations, incarnations, and hierarchies of supernatural beings filled the air. Alexandrian speculations

[1] "The sonship of Jesus to God is for Paul a metaphysical relation of essence, grounded in his pre-temporal being with the Father, and in his spiritual nature." Lipsius on Gal. iv. 4 in the *Hand-Commentar.*

upon such subjects became known to the Jews of the Dispersion. Thus was prepared a soil in which such theories as that of the Logos, the firstborn Son of God and the head of all creation naturally sprang up. Christian thought adopted and worked over for its own purposes the conceptions of its opponents.[1] A favorite supposition of many modern writers, *e.g.* Baur, Dorner, Holsten, Hilgenfeld, Hausrath, Harnack, and Holtzmann, is that Paul adopted the Philonic notion of the ideal, heavenly man, and conceived Christ as existing before his incarnation as an archetypal man. On behalf of this view appeal is made to 1 Cor. xv. 47: "The second man is of heaven" (*ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*) — a passage which, as we have seen, is referred by most recent interpreters, not to the preexistent, but to the glorified Christ. This view is sometimes combined with certain Jewish elements of thought, such as the personification of the divine word and wisdom.[2] Beyschlag reduces Paul's Christology to a personification of a principle of revelation in God which, he thinks, was due to his unwarranted confounding of an idea with a person. All the elements of Paul's teaching which go beyond a purely humanitarian view of Christ are speculative additions. When these are subtracted, what remains is this: Christ is the ideal man who stands in absolute communion with God and in whom God fully dwells.[3] As we are here concerned only with the exposition and not with the refutation of Paul's Christology, we have no occasion to discuss this theory. Respecting the theories that Paul's Christology was due to the reaction upon him of Gnostic ideas or was borrowed from Philo, I regard them as singularly destitute of proof and intrinsically improbable. Paul approached the subject of Christ's person from his knowledge of him as a historic personality, supplemented by his vivid sense of his exaltation to heavenly glory. He developed his view of Christ

[1] See *Le Péché*, pp. 199–204.

[2] See Pfleiderer, *Der Paulinismus*, pp. 115–123; Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* II. 63 *sq.*; 79 *sq.* (Bk. IV. ch. iii. §§ 7, 11).

[3] *Op. cit.* II. 60–88 (Bk. IV. ch. iii. §§ 6–13).

over against the errors which were rife at Colossæ, and, to some extent, in terms derived from these speculations. He no doubt saw fully realized in Christ the Old Testament personifications of God's word and wisdom, but it is quite gratuitous to seek the motives of his Christology either in Philo or in Gnosticism.[1]

[1] Weizsäcker says: "We need not turn to Philo's notion of the heavenly man, as ideal man; a conception existing in Palestinian theology is sufficient." . . . "In any case, Paul has stated that he came from heaven, and therefore was previously existent there." *Apos. Age*, I. 145.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEATH OF CHRIST

THE crucifixion of Jesus was, for the first disciples, the principal obstacle to belief in his messiahship. After their recovery of faith in him through the resurrection, their chief problem was, how to reconcile his death with his messiahship and to show that the former was essential to the latter. The unbelieving Jews still continued to dwell on the contradiction between an ignominious death and the Messianic vocation. This was "the stumbling-block of the cross" (Gal. v. 11; 1 Cor. i. 23). They seem to have reasoned thus: Jesus is an impostor, for had he been the true Messiah, he could not have suffered the accursed death of the cross. His death is the supreme proof that he is *not* the Messiah.

We have seen in the study of the primitive apostolic theology how the earliest Christians sought to parry this objection. At first they charged the death of Jesus upon the Jews as a crime and, later, sought in the Old Testament some explanation of it as a part of his Messianic work. But the apostle Paul was, so far as we know, the first man who grappled boldly with this problem and sought to prove that the death of Jesus on the cross was the culmination of his saving work and the crowning glory of his Messianic vocation. To the primitive Church the death of Jesus presented itself more as a problem, an event to be explained and defended against the view taken of it by the Jews. To Paul it was the chief glory of the Christian faith, the fact of supreme significance, the primary means of salvation. They came at the subject from the standpoint of the popular Jewish Messianic expectations which they had shared; he approached it in

the light of his experience in which the glorified Christ had appeared to him. This experience had shown him that Jesus was the risen and glorified Messiah. He now approached every question from that fixed conviction. It was, no doubt, from that beginning that he developed his views of Christ's supernatural being and of the mystic communion with him of his followers on earth.

If this was Paul's method of approach to the subject of Christ's death, it will be evident how different was the original motive of his doctrine from that which underlies the abstract problem as to the relation of mercy and justice in the nature of God. The apostle's teaching gives rise to such questions, but it did not start with them. It is, of course, impossible to arrange his references to the subject in an order which will certainly exhibit the logical development of the subject in his own thoughts. A natural point of beginning, however, is found in Gal. iii. 13: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us: for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." It is reasonable to think that we have in these words a reflection of the way in which the apostle met the calumnies of the Jews. They proved Jesus a pretender from the Old Testament, which declared that a crucified one is accursed of God. Paul admits that in enduring the shameful death of the cross he "became a curse," but maintains that he became such, not on account of what he was, but on our account (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*). It is as if the apostle had said: Yes, Jesus was accursed, as the Jews say; he was subjected to the most shameful death — not *justly*, as they affirm, but *vicariously*: he bore this shame *for us*. His ignominious death proves nothing against him but, on the contrary, shows to what a depth of shame he was willing to descend in order that he might bless and save men. Thus the cross is not something of which the Christian should be ashamed, but something in which he should rejoice. It is the symbol of a divine condescension and pity which, in order to save men, stopped not short of that pitch of shame and suffering, the death of the cross. Hence the apostle says:

"Far be it from me to glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ" (Gal. vi. 14). "The word of the cross" is the substance of his preaching; it is "the power of God unto salvation" (1 Cor. i. 18), and he will have but one object of knowledge and interest—"Jesus Christ and him crucified" (1 Cor. ii. 2).[1]

[1] Professor Everett in his study of Paul's doctrine of salvation entitled, *The Gospel of Paul*, very properly started with Gal. iii. 13; but I think he has interpreted it too narrowly, has built too exclusively upon it, and has developed from it a series of unwarranted inferences. His theory is that Christ's endurance of the curse of the law consisted in the *manner* of his death, namely, crucifixion; that *as crucified*, he was accursed, that is, *ceremonially unclean* and so *free from the law*. All his followers, *as being crucified with him*, were also unclean, and hence freed from the law. For him and them the law was abolished. Their redemption from sin followed from their redemption from the law, because sin is not imputed where there is no law (Rom. v. 13). From the abolition of the law follows the breaking down of the wall of partition between the Jews and the Gentiles (Eph. ii. 11–20). Some of the difficulties of this theory are: (1) It lays an exaggerated emphasis upon the *form* of Christ's death. It is the death itself which Paul chiefly emphasizes. The cross is a synonym of the death or the blood of Christ. No special stress is laid upon crucifixion, except to emphasize the ignominy of the death (*cf.* Phil. ii. 8). There is not a single allusion to the cross in the Epistle to the Romans, which contains some of Paul's most significant words on salvation through the death of Christ. *Cf.* Briggs, *Messiah of the Apostles*, p. 137. (2) It emphasizes far more than Paul does the relation of Christ's crucifixion to the ceremonial law. In the theory in question this relation is absolutely central and controlling; with Paul it is quite incidental. Paul does not dwell (unless he does so in Gal. iii. 13), as the Epistle to the Hebrews does (xiii. 10–13), upon the ceremonial pollution involved in the cross. And if he had done so, it is difficult to see how he could have derived from that idea the elements of his doctrine of redemption. (3) It is not natural to ascribe to Paul a view on this subject so contrary to historic fact as is the idea that Jesus was accursed by the Jewish law merely or mainly because he was crucified. From the Jewish standpoint, he was accursed primarily because he was condemned by the constituted authorities as a malefactor. The *form* of his death was determined, no doubt, by the Roman domination. (4) Paul's peculiar mystical idea that Christians are "crucified with Christ" is treated in this theory as if it had primary reference to ceremonial pollution. This is impossible. It refers to spiritual renewal, ethical death to sin. Dr. Everett's theory of the salvation of believers by being crucified with Christ quite overlooks the real genesis and nature of Paul's faith-mysticism. (5) The early Christians did not regard themselves as accursed in the eye of the law by reason of their faith in Christ. The Jews, generally speaking, did not so regard them. The Jewish Christians remained for a long time within the Jewish Church

Paul's doctrine is, then, that Christ died in order to save men. He "died on behalf of our sins" (*ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*, 1 Cor. xv. 3), that is, to save us from them. But how should a shameful death be able to secure such a result? How does such a result proceed from such a cause? We soon discover that the ignominy of Christ's death is but one aspect of the case, and is significant only as expressing his great self-abnegation. Paul emphasizes the further fact that he was a pure and holy being who

without calling out any such reproach. Paul claimed to be a genuine Israelite to the last, and declared that Christians were the true circumcision and that by faith in Christ the law, which had been preparatory to him, was most truly honored. (6) Dr. Everett takes a passage which is intended to bring out a single aspect of Christ's sufferings and makes it the basis of a whole theory. The passage emphasizes the shamefulness of Christ's self-humiliation to the death of the cross in terms of Deut. xxi. 23. Dr. Everett treats it as if it were meant to be a statement of the saving significance of Christ's death in general, and even carries it over in application to the position of his followers before the law. The inferences drawn from this single passage are made determining for the interpretation of all other passages, so far as they are touched upon. The theory is built upon an undue elaboration of a single verse. Secondarily, the theory makes use of Gal. ii. 19: "I, through the law, died to the law." While many interpreters understand this passage in a sense similar to that advocated by Dr. Everett, I must regard it as having reference to Paul's conception of ethical death to sin. (7) It is not clear how one could abolish a law by undergoing its curse, especially in the mere sense of ceremonial pollution. It is certain that Paul's doctrine of the abolition of the law was not derived from such premises. The law passed away because it had served its pedagogic function, because it was an imperfect institute and could not bestow life. Paul never intimates that it was abolished because Christ and his followers became ceremonially polluted. I can only agree with Holtzmann when he says of Dr. Everett's theory: "Evidently there is here attached to the incidental argument of Gal. iii. 13 — which can only be justly estimated in connection with iii. 10 — an entirely foreign chain of ideas, in the sense of Heb. xiii. 10–13." *Neutest. Theol.* II. 108. See critical notes on Professor Everett's theory in Briggs's *Messiah of the Apostles*, pp. 136, 137 and in Bruce's *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, pp. 184–186. The fullest review of it which I have seen is by Professor C. M. Mead in the *Hartford Seminary Record* for November, 1896. Dr. Everett replies to Drs. Bruce and Briggs in *The New World* for March, 1896. He still defends his method as "the only true one," and regards the exegetical results of his critics as determined by "dependence upon traditional dogma" and as being "only in the slightest degree the result of New Testament exegesis." One can but wonder whether he would attribute to Holtzmann also a bias in favor of traditional dogma.

submitted to be treated as a sinner for our sakes: "Him who knew no sin God made to be sin on our behalf (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν*), that we might become the righteousness of God in him" (2 Cor. v. 21). This passage cannot mean less than that the sinless Christ endured a lot which he did not personally deserve, and underwent an experience of suffering such as belonged to sinful man, rather than to him, and that he did this to secure the salvation of men. I will here place together the principal additional passages which we have to consider, arranging them for convenience as follows: (1) Those which simply connect Christ's death with salvation from sin, *e.g.*: "Who died for us (*περὶ ἡμῶν*), that whether we wake or sleep (that is, live or die), we should live together with him" (1 Thess. v. 10); "Who gave himself (that is, gave himself up to death) for our sins (*περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*), that he might deliver us out of this present evil world" (Gal. i. 4); "Who was delivered up (to death, *παρεδόθη*) on account of our trespasses" (*διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*, Rom. iv. 25); "God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin (*περὶ ἁμαρτίας*),[1] condemned sin in the flesh" (Rom. viii. 3); "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up (to death, *παρέδωκεν*) for us all (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν πάντων*), how shall he not also with him freely give us all things? . . . Who is he that shall condemn? (No one shall, for) it is Christ who died" (Rom. viii. 32, 34); "One died for all (*ὑπὲρ παντῶν*), therefore all died" (2 Cor. v. 15); "For to this end Christ died, and lived again, that he might be Lord of both the dead and the living" (Rom. xiv. 9); Christ has "blotted out the bond written in ordinances that was against us (the law's verdict of condemnation) . . . nailing it to the cross" (Col. ii. 14). (2) Passages which express the idea of a redemption (*ἀπολύτρωσις*) or deliverance of men as by purchase,

[1] The R.V. renders these words "as an offering for sin" in consideration of the Septuagint usage which employs this phrase to denote the "sin-offering." It is improbable that Paul uses the phrase in this technical sense. His use of *περί* elsewhere (see 1 Thess. v. 10; Gal. i. 4; Rom. viii. 3, quoted above) favors the ordinary force of the preposition here, viz. "on behalf of sin."

e.g.: "Christ redeemed (ἐξηγόρασεν) us from the curse of the law, etc. (Gal. iii. 13); "God sent forth his Son . . . that he might redeem (ἐξαγοράσῃ) those under the law" (Gal. iv. 4); "In whom we have our redemption" (ἀπολύτρωσις), the forgiveness of our sins" (Col. i. 13; *cf.* Eph. i. 7; also 1 Cor. i. 30 where Christ is called our δικαιοσύνη, ἁγιασμὸς καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις); "Ye were bought with a price" (1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23; *cf.* 1 Tim. ii. 6 and Tit. ii. 14, where the figure of a ransom is employed); "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God set forth as a propitiation (ἱλαστήριον), through faith, by his blood, to show his righteousness, because of the passing over of the sins done aforetime, in the forbearance of God; for the showing, I say, of his righteousness at this present season: that he might himself be just, and the justifier of him that hath faith in Jesus" (Rom. iii. 24–26). (3) Passages which speak of a reconciliation (καταλλαγή, καταλλάσσειν) between God and men by the death of Christ: "For if while we were enemies, we were reconciled (κατηλλάγημεν) to God through the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled (καταλλαγέντες), shall we be saved by his life; and not only so, but we also rejoice in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received the reconciliation" (καταλλαγήν, Rom. v. 10, 11); "But all things are of God, who reconciled (καταλλάξαντος) us to himself through Christ, and gave unto us the ministry of reconciliation (τὴν διακονίαν τῆς καταλλαγῆς); to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself (κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ), not reckoning unto them their trespasses, and having committed unto us the word of reconciliation. We are ambassadors therefore on behalf of Christ, as though God were intreating by us: we beseech you on behalf of Christ, be ye reconciled to God" (2 Cor. v. 18–20). Beside this passage should be placed Col. i. 20–22, where Christ is spoken of as reconciling (ἀποκαταλλάξαι) all things unto God (or unto himself), whether things on earth or in the heavens, making peace between himself and

them by the blood of his cross, and also as reconciling the readers who had formerly been enemies, through his death; also Eph. ii. 16, where Jews and Gentiles are said to have been reconciled and united through the cross. These are the passages from which Paul's doctrine of the saving import of Christ's death must be derived. The problem is bound up with the meaning of four terms or phrases: (1) ὑπέρ or περὶ ἡμῶν or τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν — Paul's doctrine of substitution; (2) ἀπολύτρωσις and kindred terms — Paul's idea of redemption; (3) ἱλαστήριον or propitiation;[1] (4) καταλλαγή and cognates — the conception of reconciliation.

We naturally seek the elements of Paul's doctrine of salvation in the Old Testament, but in so doing we encounter two difficulties. The first is the difficulty of determining the exact meaning of the sacrificial system, and the second arises from the fact that Paul has made so few references to this system. The most noticeable instance is Eph. v. 2: "Even as Christ also loved you, and gave himself up for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for an odor of a sweet smell" — a passage in which the sacrifice of Christ is conceived of as a gift pleasing to God. It seems to me clear that while there is important truth in the theories that the sacrifices were gifts to God, and that they expressed communion with God, it is also true that they expressed — at any rate, some of them — the consciousness of sin, and were considered as a means of obtaining its forgiveness. In the later period of Israel, says W. Robertson Smith, "the victim whose life was treated as equivalent to that of a man, was a sacrifice to justice, accepted in atonement for the guilt of the worshipper."[2] There was a certain substitution in the sacrificial system. It was not, however, a strict and literal, but a symbolic and representative, substitution. We naturally look for something similar to this in Paul's doctrine

[1] Of the words kindred to ἵλεως, ἱλάσκεσθαι, Paul uses only this one, Rom. iii. 25.

[2] *Religion of the Semites*, p. 419. Cf. *The O. T. in the Jewish Church*, pp. 228, 229.

of the death of Christ. He does not, indeed, say that Christ died instead of us (*ἀντὶ ἡμῶν*); no such literal and exact substitution as that phrase would imply, is affirmed. Yet the repeated affirmation that he died on our behalf and for the sake of our sins, taken in connection with other statements, does imply some kind of a substitution of Christ's sufferings and death in place of the sinner's punishment. The desert of sin is penalty; Christ by his death averted that penalty. In that sense his death was substituted for the penalty. Paul uses no expressions which imply a sameness in kind or a precise equivalence between Christ's sufferings and the penalty due to sin. Yet in some way the former are regarded as meeting the ends of the latter. He was "made sin for our sakes" (2 Cor. v. 21). He so far took the sinner's place as to suffer for him. He was treated as a sinner in order that, in consequence of what happened to him, sinners may become righteous before God. Paul's idea certainly is that Christ was so far substituted for us that his sufferings and death accomplish in God's moral order the end which punishment would accomplish, namely, the expression of God's holy displeasure against sin (*ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*, Rom. iii. 26).

But it would not follow that Christ's sufferings would have, in Paul's view, the moral quality of punishment, or that Christ would be, as the sinner is, the object of the divine wrath. Paul's conception of substitution does not involve, but excludes, this conception. Christ remains throughout the holy and sinless Son of God, the object of the Father's good-pleasure. Paul represents God in almost an anthropomorphic way as rejoicing in the work of Christ and as rewarding him for it afterwards (Phil. ii. 8–11). The "one act of righteousness" (*ἓν δικαίωμα*, Rom. v. 18), in which Paul sees the crowning proof of God's favor, was the death of Christ. His tasting of the accursed death, his sharing of the lot of sinners, was not at all personal, but entirely representative. Paul does not say that Christ *was* accursed, but that he "*became* a curse on our account" (*γενόμενος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν κατάρα*, Gal. iii. 13).

In this passage the apostle carefully refrains from asserting that the curse which the law pronounced against sin and that which Christ, in his crucifixion, endured are the same in kind. He does not write: "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law (*ἐκ τῆς κατάρας τοῦ νομοῦ*), having become, or having taken upon himself *the curse of the law;*" but, "having become *a curse*" (*κατάρα*). If Paul had meant to say that Christ endured the precise curse which the law pronounces upon sin, he should have said that Christ became *ἡ κατάρα* or *ἡ κατάρα τοῦ νομοῦ*. That statement would have affirmed the moral identity of the curse pronounced upon sin and that endured by Christ; but such a statement he instinctively avoided. In like manner in 2 Cor. v. 21 it is necessary to understand *ἁμαρτίαν ἐποίησεν* under the limitations imposed upon the idea by *τὸν μὴ γνόντα ἁμαρτίαν* and *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*. The apostle is careful not to say that Christ *was* a sinner, or that *personally* he was regarded as such; he says that he "*was made* sin *for us*" (2 Cor. v. 21); that is, he was, for the sake of others, and not for his own sake, treated as a sinner. His experience of the consequences of sin was entirely vicarious and representative. These considerations look towards the conclusion that with Paul substitution means, not the substitution of Christ's punishment for our punishment, but the substitution of his sufferings, which were not of the nature of punishment, for our punishment; in other words, the substitution of another method of revealing and vindicating the divine righteousness in place of the method of punishment. God in his grace adopts another course of procedure with sinful man than that of retributive justice and a course which more fully displays his glorious perfections.

The passages which speak of Christ's saving work under the figure of a ransom or purchase strongly confirm this conclusion. The death of Christ is the price of man's salvation; that is, it represents the greatness of God's self-sacrificing love. It accomplishes the ends of God's moral government more fully than mere retributive justice could do. And the reason why it does so must be

that it is a completer expression of God's entire nature than punishment would be. The price is infinitely great. It represents the absolutely boundless and holy love of God. Punishment would be partial in comparison with this. It would evince but one aspect of God's being. But the humiliation, sufferings, and death of the Son of God, prompted by infinite love, represent and satisfy the total perfection of God. If Paul has expressed this sublime truth in commercial and legal analogies, it need cause us no difficulty. The ancient theology which built upon these analogies as if they were scientific formulas, and the modern theology which rejects them altogether, are equally unjust to the thought of the apostle. The categories of law were the forms of thought in which he had been trained. But for him the judicial and the ethical coincided. When it is said that, according to Paul, Christ rendered satisfaction to God's violated law and so enabled him to suspend its verdict against sinful man, several un-Pauline inferences are likely to be involved. The essence of Paul's thought does not lie in such notions as those of a deified law, quantitative equivalents, and literal substitutions and transfers, but in the conception of a fuller realization in Christ of God's perfections in his treatment of mankind than was otherwise possible.

The nearest approach which Paul has made to a theoretic statement of the principle of redemption through Christ's substitution for us is found in Rom. iii. 24–26. There are two important terms in the passage whose meaning is disputed, namely, *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* and *ἱλαστήριον*. Some would interpret *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* as denoting God's goodness in general or his self-consistency, the accord of his will and action with his love; while others think that it is here a name for his attitude towards sin, the law and penalty side of the divine nature. I hold this latter view on the ground of the context. The passage sets forth the method of God's grace in saving *sinners*. He seems to have been unduly lenient towards sin in past ages, says the apostle; but his method of salvation in Christ rescues his procedure from such an appearance and

adequately and fully exhibits his righteousness. This righteousness, therefore, is that quality in God which seemed to be in abeyance in the former "passing over of sins," but which is now manifested. It must be the attribute which would have been exhibited in punishment, that is, punitive righteousness. It is here kindred to the *ὀργὴ θεοῦ*. *Ἱλαστήριον* is understood by some to mean the *Kapporeth* or mercy-seat of the ark of the covenant (as in Heb. ix. 5; *cf.* Ex. xxv. 17–20). In this case, it is sometimes contended, the meaning probably is: God set forth Christ, in his death, as the antitypical mercy-seat, the one in whom his gracious saving presence was supremely manifested. The principal objections to this meaning are that if the mercy-seat were meant, *ἱλαστήριον* should have the article (as in Hebrews); that it would be incongruous, and without parallel elsewhere, to call Christ the lid of the ark, and that Paul is not so strongly influenced by Septuagint usage as is the author of Hebrews. The word is more commonly, and, in my opinion, correctly, taken in its etymological sense as a means of rendering favorable, *Sühnemittel*, *Expiatorium*. As a *ἱλαστήριον* Christ is designated as a means of effecting a reconciliation between the holy God and sinful man. His suffering and death proclaimed God's righteous displeasure towards sin and removed the obstacle to a favorable treatment of sinful man.[1] How the death of Christ avails to express his repudiation and condemnation of sin, we are not told. But that it does so the apostle plainly asserts. The death of Christ expresses the verdict of the divine holiness upon sin. In that death God's holy nature is satisfied by asserting itself, and by evincing as over against an apparent laxity, the severity of his condemnation against sin. In this way the ends of penalty — the exhibition of God's self-preserving holiness — are met. In Christ God pur-

[1] "It is impossible to get rid from this passage of the double idea: (1) of a sacrifice; (2) of a sacrifice which is propitiatory. . . . And, further, when we ask, who is propitiated? the answer can only be 'God.' Nor is it possible to separate this propitiation from the death of the Son." Sanday, *Comm. on Romans, in loco.*

sues a method which illustrates alike his goodness and his severity, that is, reveals, vindicates, and satisfies his whole moral nature. That this is, in substance, Paul's thought in this passage is the verdict of the great majority of interpreters of all schools.

We have next to notice the passages which speak of reconciliation between man and God by the death of Christ. "We were reconciled to God through the death of his Son" (Rom. v. 10). Is this reconciliation conceived of as accomplished solely by a change *in men*, as is so often said, or is it mutual, involving a changed attitude on the part of God as well as on man's part? The context favors the latter view. The apostle is speaking of men being "saved from the wrath of God" (*v.* 9). They were enemies (ἐχθροί, *v.* 10) in the sense of being objects of that wrath. The reconciliation, therefore, must have fulfilled the conditions on which this holy displeasure of God might no longer be directed towards sinful man, as well as have secured a change of attitude towards God on man's part. The reconciliation comes to man from God (*v.* 11); it is not directly ascribed to any act or change in man. Quite as clearly is the Godward aspect of the reconciliation recognized in 2 Cor. v. 18–20. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself" (*v.* 19). But how does he do this? The apostle continues: "not reckoning unto them their trespasses." The reconciliation involves a gracious procedure instead of a penal procedure in dealing with sin, on the basis of which men are besought to come into accord with God. In Col. i. 20–22 the thought is more general. Here the reconciliation is the unifying and harmonizing of all things in heaven and earth, and no intimation is given respecting its method beyond the statement that it is to be accomplished by the death of Christ. In Eph. ii. 16 the death of Christ is regarded as a means of uniting Jew and Gentile.

Such are the principal representations of the saving significance of the death of Christ in the teaching of Paul. It would be unjust to suppose that Paul found this meaning in Christ's death considered merely as an

isolated event. The person of the Saviour gave divine meaning to his sufferings, and Paul perpetually regarded them in the light of his resurrection and glorified life in heaven. Hence he can say that Christ "was raised for our justification" (Rom. iv. 25) and that "we are saved by his life" (Rom v. 10), that is, by the union of faith and love with him who lives and reigns in heaven. Paul seems to have conceived of the death of Christ as fulfilling a condition precedent to salvation, not, indeed, in time, but in principle, for God had always been saving men. The death expresses for his mind the fulfilment of a condition of the operation of God's grace, namely, such a satisfaction of the claims of righteousness that this righteousness need not be manifested in punishment. It is regarded as an initiation or founding of salvation, and, in that sense, as the primary saving deed. It safeguards the divine self-consistency in forgiveness. Paul conceives of the death of Christ as doing this, because it is experienced in place of our punishment, and, even more completely than punishment could do, attests and vindicates the inviolable holiness of God, which is the premiss of salvation. If theology will follow Paul beyond this point, and elaborate, on Pauline principles, a philosophy of atonement, it must seek to show the *rationale* of this substitution; how the sufferings and death of Christ were competent to meet the ends of penalty and so to prove an ἔνδειξις τῆς δικαιοσύνης θεοῦ. For the philosophy of religion Paul carries us only to the beginning, and not to the end, of the problem of atonement to which his own principles give rise.[1]

The principal elements of Paul's thought on the subject in hand are as follows: (1) Salvation originates in the divine love and mercy (Rom. v. 8; viii. 32; Eph. ii. 4, 5). (2) But there is an aspect of God's ethical nature which leads him to disapprove sin (ὀργή or δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ). This also must be expressed in any method of salvation which he adopts. (3) The ὀργὴ θεοῦ would by itself

[1] In my *Pauline Theology*, pp. 243–258, I have followed out the logical implications of Paul's doctrine somewhat further than my present purpose requires me to do.

lead to the punishment of sin; but it is *not by itself*. God saves according to his whole nature. (4) In the sufferings and death of Christ the self-respecting holiness of God, his necessary attitude towards sin, is revealed and satisfied. Thus the attribute which conditions the operation of the divine grace in forgiveness realizes its most perfect expression. (5) God does not substitute Christ in punishment for sinners. He substitutes for punishment another course of proceeding with sinners which is not punishment, but which, even more adequately than punishment would do, expresses the ill desert of sin. The sufferings of Christ, which are graciously substituted for the sinner's punishment, are not regarded by Paul as themselves penal. (6) Thus sin is pardoned in accord with absolute righteousness. Benevolence and holiness are equally manifested and realized in the work of Christ. What is done is righteously, as well as graciously, done. Mercy and justice are equally satisfied, and both "the goodness and the severity of God" equally illustrated.

CHAPTER VIII

JUSTIFICATION

THE death and resurrection of Christ represent, to Paul's mind, God's objective provision for man's salvation. Justification is a name for the way in which the saving benefits of Christ's work are made available for the individual. The motive of the doctrine in the form which it has assumed with Paul is found partly in the Old Testament and partly in his polemic against the doctrine of salvation by works of the law. The Old Testament frequently portrays God's approval of men under the form of a judgment or verdict of acquittal. God's relation to men is often represented according to legal analogies. In the later Judaism the juristic method of thought concerning God and his relations to men was the prevailing one. "Justification" and "justify" were common terms in the vocabulary of Jewish thought. Paul naturally carried them over into his exposition of Christian doctrine. But the use which he made of the idea in question was largely determined by the demands of his controversy with the Judaizers. They conceived justification as a result of human achievement; he conceived it as a free gift of God's grace. To their minds the condition of its attainment was a strict performance of the requirements of the law; to his it was an act of self-surrender and of trust.[1]

[1] Ménégoz connects Paul's doctrines of expiation and justification by means of Rom. vi. 7: "He that hath died is justified from sin." His exposition is: Christ by his death has satisfied the law, has gone free from it, and is justified before it. And the proof of this justification of Christ is his resurrection. In like manner the sinner who dies with him partakes in his justification and is himself justified. Hence he "was raised for our

Justification means essentially the same as the forgiveness of sins (ἄφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν). Paul uses them synonymously in Acts xiii. 38, 39. In Rom. iv. 5–8 justification, the reckoning of faith for righteousness, the imputation of righteousness apart from works, the forgiveness of iniquities, and the non-imputation of sin, are all equivalent expressions. Why did the apostle speak so infrequently of forgiveness — the term which the primitive preachers so constantly used to denote the inception of salvation? I think that the term "justification" was better adapted to express the idea of a *state* of grace in which the believer stands (Rom. v. 2); it served to emphasize the secure position of acceptance with God occupied by him, notwithstanding the sin which still cleaves to him. It stood for the completeness and the permanence of salvation. It is the verdict of God, which none can annul or gainsay.

These thoughts were also rooted in Paul's experience. He had tried the Pharisaic way of salvation and had proved its insufficiency. He had once been ignorant of the righteousness which God graciously gives (ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη), and had sought to establish his own (ἡ ἰδία δικαιοσύνη, Rom. x. 3; ἐμὴ δικαιοσύνη ἡ ἐκ νομοῦ, Phil. iii. 9), namely, a righteousness achieved by legal works, and had failed. The coveted acceptance with God he had at last secured through faith in Christ. In this personal experience his polemic against Pharisaism was

justification" (Rom. iv. 25), *Le Péché*, p. 251 *sq.* This is ingenious, but I cannot accept it as reproducing the form of Paul's thought. In Rom. vi. 7 Paul is not speaking of Christ's death, but of the believer's ethical death to sin. It is quite unwarranted to apply the passage to Christ's death as a satisfaction to the law and to deduce from it the idea of a justification of Christ by the resurrection. Moreover, the phrase δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας would be very strange in application to Christ. Christ's death in its substitutionary aspect and the believer's death to sin (moral renewal) are very different categories and cannot be treated as one. From this identification several unwarranted inferences are drawn and a confusion of ideas (see p. 259) needlessly attributed to the apostle. Rom. iv. 25 more naturally means that Christ's death is the ground of salvation (*Heilsbegründung*), and that his resurrection is the ground of faith (*Glaubensbegründung*).

grounded. He knew that salvation was not by works from his own pre-Christian struggle after a sense of peace with God and with his own conscience. He knew that it was by faith in Christ from the experience which had transformed him from an enemy into a disciple of Christ and had begotten in him the certainty of salvation. The sense of sin, whose power he realized more and more as he contemplated the holy requirements of God, also contributed to this conviction. How could man ever achieve or deserve salvation in the face of such a hindering power? From this point of view the apostle felt certain that if man was to be saved from sin it must be by a gratuitous act of God. He can present to God no adequate righteousness of his own. He must renounce dependence upon his own merits. Salvation cannot be received on the basis of debt, but only on the basis of grace. The idea of salvation by meritorious deeds would imply that God bestows forgiveness as something due (*κατὰ ὀφείλημα*, Rom. iv. 4). The watchwords of the Pharisaic doctrine are "works" and "debt"; those of Paul's system are "faith" and "grace." The motive of salvation is God's mercy to the undeserving; faith is the attitude, on man's part, which corresponds to grace; it is the disposition to accept God's gracious gift. Salvation is possible because God treats men better than they deserve.

We have now to consider more particularly the meaning of the terms "justification" and "faith," and to study their mutual relation to Paul's doctrine. As has been observed, justify is a legal term. In the Old Testament its prevalent significance is forensic. It belongs to a type of religious thought which is accustomed to represent God as a sovereign or judge, and his acts in relation to men under the analogy of decrees or verdicts. Paul was familiar by his training with these Jewish forms of thought concerning God, and he did not deem it necessary to abandon them in his Christian teaching. In fact, the use of them put him at a great advantage with his Judaizing opponents. In important respects he and they occupied common ground; they had, to some extent, common conceptions and a com-

mon vocabulary. Paul meets his opponents on their own plane and discusses with them the question: On what conditions does God pronounce his verdict of acceptance? I do not mean to intimate that Paul retained this form of thought and expression merely by way of accommodation; it was his own thought-form also, but it was not his only one and is in no sense the measure of his doctrine of salvation.

Paul uses "righteousness" in two senses. Sometimes it is a quality or attribute, as in Rom. iii. 5, where he asks the rhetorical question: "But if our unrighteousness commendeth the righteousness of God, what shall we say?" Likewise in Rom. iii. 25, 26 the righteousness of God which is exhibited by the death of Christ is that quality of God's nature which stands opposed to the lenient treatment of sin. It is the quality which expresses itself in the *ὀργὴ θεοῦ*. But more commonly in Paul — especially in his discussion of the appropriation of salvation — the righteousness of God (*δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ*) means a state of acceptance with God into which one enters by faith. It is objectively conceived as a gift or bestowment from God. It is so used in Rom. i. 17, where we are told that in the gospel is revealed a righteousness from God by faith. This is God's free gift of righteousness (*δωρεὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης*, Rom. v. 17). In Rom. iii. 21, 22 a righteousness of God is said to have been manifested and made available through Christ. In the epistle up to this point the apostle has been describing the sinfulness of mankind and the wrath of God which is revealed against their wickedness. Here he turns to a gracious gift of God of which man, on condition of faith, may be the recipient, whereas, otherwise, he would have been the object of the divine wrath. In Phil. iii. 9 the righteousness which is available through faith is called *ἡ ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη* and is contrasted with man's own righteousness (*ἐμὴ δικαιοσύνη*), as in Rom. x. 3 *δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ* is contrasted with *ἰδία δικαιοσύνη*. The righteousness of works, were it possible, would be a righteousness which would proceed from man's own doings and strivings, but the righteousness of faith proceeds, on the contrary, from

God as a gift of grace. The genitive *θεοῦ* must therefore be taken as denoting the source or author. These two conditions of God's righteousness — as a quality and as a gift of God — are essentially related. The righteousness which God confers is grounded in the ethical righteousness which is an attribute of his character. The state of acceptance which is opened to the believer is a state of harmony and fellowship with God. The conditions of being accounted righteous are such as accord with God's perfect character.

The terms "justify" (*δικαιοῦν*) and "justification" (*δικαίωσις*) must be understood in accord with this objective sense of righteousness. They are terms derived from legal analogy. To justify means to declare righteous, to acquit, to pronounce a sentence of acceptance. They illustrate the fact that religious language must be largely analogical. This is true of such terms as "moral governor," "redemption," and "judgment." Religious truth must often be conveyed in terms which reflect human relations. In such cases we never think of regarding the forms of expression as scientific definitions. Nor do we, on the other hand, repudiate such analogical expressions as false and misleading so long as they convey the particular truth which we wish to teach. Such terms are more concrete and realistic than the more abstract language which we should employ in efforts at precise definition. The forensic concept of justification was a favorite analogy with Paul, and was admirably adapted to convey the idea of a purely gracious salvation freely offered and fully possessed in spite of sin, as well as to place the apostle *en rapport* with the forms of argument which it was most necessary for him to combat.

That which completely saved Paul's doctrine of justification from formalism and externality, such as belonged to the Pharisaic theology, was his conception of the believer's relation to Christ. We might suppose, from Paul's doctrine of substitution, that faith would be presented as a passive acquiescence in a vicarious righteousness. In fact it is not so. If Paul lays stress upon the idea of

Christ *for us*, he lays even a greater emphasis upon the idea of Christ *in us*. Paul's doctrine of salvation is sure to be misconceived unless his conception of faith is clearly and correctly apprehended. With Paul faith is a very rich conception. It is a trust or repose of soul in God or in Christ — an attitude at once of receptivity and of sympathy towards the divine. It is an affair of the heart and is closely kindred to love. It is "with the heart that man believeth unto righteousness" (Rom. x. 10). Through (διά) faith Christ dwells in the heart (Eph. iii. 17). Faith worketh by love (Gal. v. 6); that is, it is an active and energetic principle as well as a receptive attitude. Faith is therefore a powerful motive to obedience and to every good work. Paul speaks of "the work of faith" (τὸ ἔργον τῆς πίστεως) alongside of "the labor of love" and "patient continuance in hope" (1 Thess. i. 3; *cf.* 2 Thess. i. 11). Faith stands in no contradiction with action, or with works in the sense of the deeds and services required by the gospel. It is opposed to works only in the sense of deeds of legal obedience contemplated as the meritorious ground of salvation. "What is not of faith is sin" (Rom. xiv. 23), says the apostle. Faith must therefore be the inseparable accompaniment of all good choices and actions. It involves the will. It includes the choice and pursuit of the truth (2 Thess. ii. 12). It implies subjection to the righteousness of God (Rom. x. 3). It is, in short, that attitude and disposition on man's part which correspond to God's love and grace. In faith man enters into fellowship and sympathy with God. It is not a mere passive receptivity; it does not simply receive; it uses what God bestows.

Such is Paul's general idea of faith. But he connects it more closely with Christ who is the specific object of the Christian's faith. One of his characteristic phrases is, "to believe on Christ" (πιστεύειν εἰς Χριστόν, or ἐν Χριστῷ, or πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Gal. ii. 6; Eph. i. 13; Rom. iii. 22). And this faith is a personal relation of fellowship and love. To live by faith on the Son of God is synonymous with living in Christ and with Christ's living in the

believer (Gal. ii. 20). To be in the faith is equivalent to having Christ dwell in the heart (2 Cor. xiii. 5). Hence for the apostle faith in Christ involves a reciprocal indwelling of Christ in the believer and of the believer in Christ. It denotes a mystic union, a mutual fellowship. His favorite phrase to describe the Christian life is *ἐν Χριστῷ εἶναι*. To be in Christ is to be a new creature (2 Cor. v. 17). It will thus be seen that justification by faith is not Paul's only formula for the way of salvation. Quite as characteristic of him is the idea of entering into life-fellowship with Christ. No judicial analogy could fully convey his doctrine of the Christian life. He uses the vital, quite as much as the forensic, analogies to describe the appropriation of Christ's saving benefits. He has no consciousness of any incongruity between them. Indeed, he can combine them in a single conception and write of a "righteousness in Christ" (*δικαιοσύνη ἐν Χριστῷ*, 2 Cor. v. 21), and of the "righteousness which is through faith in Christ, that is, the righteousness which is from God" as synonymous with "being found in Christ" (Phil. iii. 9). To be justified by faith is to obtain God's gift of righteousness, to enter into a state of acceptance with God, through living union with Christ. Justification by faith means the reception of Christ into the heart (Eph. iii. 17); the forgiveness of sins means becoming a new creature in Christ (2 Cor. v. 17). These terms differ only formally — as terms based on one kind of analogy differ from those based on some other kind — and for the consciousness of the apostle they differ not at all.

Another formula for the way of salvation — quite as characteristic of Paul as justification by faith — is, dying to sin and rising to holiness. The apostle seems, at least in one case, to have employed this representation as a means of refuting unwarranted inferences from the idea of justification. He had taught in the earlier chapters of Romans that upon believing in Christ man has a verdict of acquittal pronounced in his favor, and goes free from the condemnation proclaimed by the law against sin.

He is then entitled to rejoice in his liberty. Yes, but, says an imaginary objector, what about sin itself? Is it still there the same as ever? If God in his grace acquits, may not the believer safely go on in sin? It might seem as if the verdict of justification was only a formal affair; as if, after all, the grace of God conferred in its decree did not really destroy, but rather encouraged, the sin itself. The objection was of Paul's own making. He saw that a particular terminology was liable to leave some side of the truth unguarded; that his discussion of justification, up to that point, had not fully safeguarded all the elements of his belief. He replies (Rom. vi. 2 *sq.*) that the objection cannot hold against his real doctrine. To be accepted with God involves a new life; it means a new heart as well as a new standing. The Christian dies to sin, that is, breaks off all relation to the old sinful life as one breaks relation with earth when he dies. This dying to sin Paul identifies with baptism because that rite symbolized for his mind union with Christ, and because the idea of death, burial, and resurrection naturally suggested an analogy with immersion into and emergence from the waters of baptism. As Christ when he died ceased to hold those relations to the sinful world which he sustained before, so we must die to the sinful world and rise to a holy life. The justified man must be a holy man; there is no separation possible between justification and moral renewal. So completely are they one for the apostle's mind that he can blend the language of the two representatives (as in the case mentioned above) and write: "He that hath died is justified from sin" (Rom. vi. 7). In my judgment, the context makes it certain that by ὁ ἀποθάνων here is meant: he who has died to sin, he who has ceased from the old sinful life. Justification from the verdict of the law is, at the same time and equally, justification from sin. The verdict of acquittal is also the effective realization of an actual deliverance from sin itself. The cancellation of guilt takes place only on terms that involve, at the same time, the breaking of the power of sin. This, then, is Paul's

answer to the possible objection to his doctrine of gracious justification. It endangers no ethical interest. It permits no toleration of sin. Justification is justification *from sin* as well as acquittal from guilt and condemnation. There is no such thing as a judicial acquittal which is not also an effective moral deliverance.

This representation of dying and rising with Christ is also figurative or analogical. But it is adapted to convey an aspect of Paul's doctrine of salvation which the forensic term "justification" does not convey. Justify was a term derived from Paul's Jewish and Rabbinic training. The phrases, to be in Christ and to die and rise with Christ, were a part of his Christian vocabulary. He retained the juridical term, we may believe, because it answered to an aspect of his own experience, and because it was especially serviceable in his polemic against Judaizing teaching. But it is evident that in his constructive thought upon the method of salvation he preferred his Christian terminology. It was based upon his consciousness of union with Christ. Justification emphasized well the completeness and the graciousness of God's forgiveness; it accentuated the precious truth of God's favor and lifted the sense of condemnation; but dwelling in Christ and rising with him into the heights of his own holiness, expressed the inner nature of the Christian life and correlated it with Christ as the living power who rules in the Christian man. When the apostle was not refuting the doctrine of salvation by meritorious works, but wished to show that to receive God's gift of grace in Christ means to enter on a holy life, he instinctively preferred the phrases denoting mystic communion. He makes effective use of the figure of dying and rising with Christ in 2 Cor. v. 14 *sq.*, where he is urging upon his readers the claims of the new life of holiness and love. He died, exclaims the apostle, that we might live holy and unselfish lives. Now all died with him; that is, the purpose of his death is realized when men die to sin and live to holiness. Virtually, all died (to sin) when he died; actually, all Christians thus die to sin. Let us then see to it that we live as

new creatures in Christ. Here Paul employs both his characteristic mystical terms — dying with Christ and living in Christ (*vv.* 15, 17). In Gal. ii. 19, 20 and in Col. ii. 20 and iii. 3 he employs the figure of dying with Christ — in all cases to emphasize the idea that the Christian life is a holy life. This death means the cessation of the sinful life and the living of a new life in Christ. We have observed elsewhere that the basis of this figure was, no doubt, the conviction that salvation was established through the death and resurrection of Christ. Here the appropriation of salvation is so far identified with its ground as to be described in terms of Christ's saving deeds. Thus the phrases, to die and to rise with Christ, epitomize both Paul's doctrine of the founding and his doctrine of the realization of salvation, and suggest the genetic connection between them. In Gal. ii. 19, 20 and Phil. iii. 9, 10 we see the equivalence of the ideas, dying with Christ and being in Christ.

What, now, is the relation of faith to righteousness? We have seen that, to Paul's mind, righteousness is a state of acceptance with God, but that such a relation involving the divine approval is inseparable from the right moral attitude of the soul towards God. Such an attitude is faith. Faith introduces to right standing before God because faith is the receptive and obedient attitude of the soul towards the grace of God in Christ. Righteousness is God's approval and acquittal from guilt, but it is equally a right moral disposition towards him and his holy requirements. It is both of these, and equally. Thus righteousness may be defined as in its essence Godlikeness. Now faith is life-union with Christ, and such union insures increasing Godlikeness. Is faith, then, synonymous with righteousness? If by righteousness is meant the actual and full realization of our moral ideal, faith certainly is *not* righteousness. Faith is the opening of the life to God's mercy; it means facing the right way; it is the condition on man's part of realizing the status and character of righteousness. It does not procure righteousness as a reward of merit, for faith is self-surrender and the

renunciation of merit. But it does not follow that faith is without moral value. It has all the moral value of a right, instead of a wrong, attitude towards God. As such it does not procure salvation as a compensation, but it does morally condition its bestowment. It is inconceivable that the gifts of God's grace could be bestowed on any other terms. What Paul is concerned to prove is, that God's favor and forgiveness are not given as a reward for some meritorious act of man; they are purely gracious. But it is not warranted, on this account, to deny the moral excellence of faith in the interest of maintaining that it is not regarded as a work of merit.

No just exegesis will try to separate the subjective and the objective factors in Paul's doctrine of salvation. Too long have they been arrayed against each other. We observe that several recent writers on the subject have not escaped the onesidedness which denies or disparages one of them in the supposed interest of the other. Such a procedure is based, not upon a just estimate of Paul's teaching as a whole, but upon an unwarranted emphasis upon some passages to the neglect of others. If dogmatic bias has long favored a onesided forensic interpretation, an equally strong preconception is observed in many expositions of the ethical theory. But why should there be any contradiction between a juridical and an ethical form of expression? All writers on religion, whose thought is marked by any richness or vivacity, employ a variety of figures and analogies to convey their ideas. We have seen that Paul has at least three favorite forms of expression for his idea of salvation. His language was not subject to that leaden uniformity which many of his interpreters would impute to him. But the essence of his doctrine is the same in all these forms of teaching. I have elsewhere called the forensic representation of his doctrine the form or formal principle of his teaching, the ethical and mystical expressions of it the essence or material principle of it.[1] But the use of such an analogy exposes one's meaning to misapprehension and easily gives rise to unwarranted in-

[1] *The Pauline Theology*, p. 275 *sq.*

ferences.[1] It would, perhaps, be less liable to misapprehension to say that, like every vital thinker, Paul uses analogies. One is drawn from legal relations; another from the phenomena of life and death. The analogies are not to be taken as formally precise. They express a great moral and spiritual fact. They stand for great realities. But the realities are ethical and spiritual. The analogies in question are good and true so far as they go, but, in the nature of the case, they cannot be accurate and perfect expressions of spiritual relations and processes. Each of Paul's forms of expression for his doctrine should be read in the light of the others, and all should be understood in accord with the characteristics of his mind and the method of his teaching as a whole.

I accordingly hold that Paul's teaching regarding the way of salvation is not two, but one. I cannot, therefore, entirely agree with Dr. Bruce, who thinks that Paul's juristic doctrine was developed first, in point of time, and that his "doctrine of subjective righteousness, its causes and hindrances, was of later growth than his doctrine of objective righteousness."[2] This view describes the objective and the subjective in Paul as "two revelations" which did not, however, cancel each other, but "lived together peaceably in Paul's mind." Elsewhere Dr. Bruce reminds us that "St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans does not refer to the subjective aspect of faith as a renewing power till he has finished his exposition of the doctrine of justifi-

[1] Professor Bruce, one of the fairest of critics, infers from my use of this analogy that I suppose Paul to have regarded objective righteousness as a *mere form* and not as "a great essential reality," and that I consider the doctrine of juridical justification to have been for the apostle "a mere controversial weapon." These inferences seem to me quite unwarranted by my discussion, and are certainly contrary to my opinion. Perhaps they may serve to illustrate the risks of misapprehension which are involved in the use of analogical language — a point of importance for our present investigation. I observe, however, that Professor Bruce himself makes use of the same distinction in his exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "We must distinguish," he says, "between the form and the substance of the writer's thought, between his essential idea and the mode in which he states it in an argument constructed for the benefit of others." *The Expositor*, 1888. (Third series.)

[2] *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, pp. 214, 215.

cation."[1] There is, of course, no question that the apostle views the way of salvation mainly in a forensic manner in Rom. i.–v., and that he develops the ethical aspects of his doctrine in chapters vi.–viii. But this fact in no way favors the idea that for Paul the objective and the subjective were "two revelations," or separate forms of doctrine, one of which followed the other chronologically. The ideas which Paul expresses in Rom. vi.–viii., were certainly in his mind when he began to write. The manner in which his thoughts are unfolded was determined by the purpose of his argument. In the early chapters he is concerned to prove the true method of justification, as against the false method. His point is: All men being sinful, we must hold that God accepts them, not on the basis of their good deeds, but on condition of a self-surrender. It is only after this point is fully established that the apostle has occasion to develop his thought of the inner nature of the Christian life. Quite inconsistent with the theory of two doctrines, chronologically separate, is the fact that in Galatians (written before Romans), as well as elsewhere (*e.g.* Phil. iii. 9–11), the different forms of expression are used interchangeably.

I therefore hold that, in justice to Paul's thought, we should refuse, on the one hand, to minimize the juridical form of his doctrine in the supposed interest of an ethical idea of justification, and, on the other, should decline to rest in the forensic analogies alone as if they were precise, scientific definitions of the spiritual realities. We should rather hold that for Paul the juridical and the ethical coincide. His doctrine does not in the least fall short in point of ethical reality. In whatever various terms it is presented, it is ethical to the core. Modern religious thought lays great stress upon the importance of reading all Christian doctrines in ethical terms, and rightly; but this requires no break with Paul. His conception of salvation is ethical through and through, because it is intensely real and personal. Faith is imputed for righteousness because it sets a man in the way of righteousness; it is the soul's entrance

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 159.

upon right relations to God as revealed in Christ.[1] A legal analogy is in no way inconsistent with ethical and spiritual reality when, as in this case, the lawgiver is the God of all grace, the law itself holy love, and the condition of acquittal before God union with Christ.

[1] That the old theological formula, "the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer," does not correctly render Paul's thought of justification is now so generally recognized by exegetes that I have not thought it necessary to refer to it in the text. See my *Pauline Theology*, p. 263.

CHAPTER IX

THE HOLY SPIRIT

In the Old Testament the Spirit is hardly more than a name for the power or presence of God. His Spirit broods over creation, educing order out of chaos (Gen. i. 2). He sends forth his Spirit, and men are created (Ps. civ. 30). By his Spirit God bestows strength upon heroes (Judg. xiv. 6), skill upon artificers (Ex. xxxi. 3, 4), inspiration upon poets (2 Sam. xxxii. 2), and the knowledge of his will upon prophets (1 Sam. x. 10, etc.). The Spirit is mainly correlated with extraordinary gifts and endowments, although its relation to the ethical and religious life is not unrecognized (Ps. li. 11; Is. lxiii. 10). In the later Jewish period the Spirit was more distinctly correlated with the life of man. It was not, however, in his moral and spiritual life that the Spirit was supposed to be operative so much as in unusual states and experiences, such as prophecy, ecstasies, and visions. God was in the thunder and the whirlwind of man's life rather than in the stillness of his daily growth and common experience. The extraordinary and the marvellous were the marks of the Spirit's presence and power. The Spirit is regarded as an adequate cause for phenomena which are deemed supernatural and inexplicable. Not practical religious value, relation to holiness in thought and life, but the mysterious and miraculous is the test and proof of the Spirit's operation. Hence the prophet with the ecstatic inspiration which was commonly attributed to him was the typical example of a Spirit-filled man.[1] Such were

[1] The popular Jewish ideas of the workings of the Spirit of God are very fully illustrated and discussed by Gunkel in Part I. of his very instructive work, *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes nach der popu-*

some of the current ideas concerning the working of the Spirit in the time of Paul. It is interesting to observe how far he accorded with them and how he modified them.[1]

In the New Testament we meet with clear traces of this popular view of the Spirit's activity. In the early chapters of Acts the work of the Spirit is mainly seen in the miraculous and the marvellous. The speaking with tongues at Pentecost (contemplated in Acts ii. as a miraculous endowment with the ability to speak foreign languages) is regarded as a signal exhibition of the Spirit's power (*vv.* 4, 17). Here it is the marvellous which is magnified and regarded as the supreme proof of the Spirit's operation. The Spirit of the Lord catches away Philip and transports him from the place where he baptized the eunuch to Azotus (Acts viii. 39, 40). The miracles of the apostles are especially regarded as works of the Spirit. It was the "signs" which Philip did which excited the desire of Simon Magus to possess, for his own use, the gift of the Holy Ghost (Acts viii. 18). For the Christians, indeed, the possession of the Spirit involved that the heart should be "right before God" (*v.* 21), but it was the Spirit of *power*, rather than that of *holiness* upon which primary stress was laid.[2] The same association of the Spirit with the unusual in the religious life is reflected in the circum-

lären Anschauung der apostolischen Zeit und nach des Lehre des Apostels Paulus.

[1] Respecting the origin and motive of Paul's doctrine of the Spirit wide differences of opinion exist. Sanday says: "The doctrine of the Spirit of God or the Holy Spirit is taken over (by Paul) from the O. T." *Comm. on Romans*, p. 199. With this view agree, substantially, Wendt, *Fleisch u. Geist*, p. 152 *sq.* and Gloël, *Der Heilige Geist*, p. 238 *sq.* Gunkel, on the contrary, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–90 thinks that Paul's doctrine has very little connection with the O. T., and explains it from his experience and his originality. Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 206 *sq.*; Cone, *The Gospel and its Earliest Interpretations*, p. 167; and Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II. 145, think it stands connected with Hellenistic thought, especially with the Book of Wisdom. *Per contra*, see Gunkel, pp. 86, 87. I hold that the historic root of Paul's doctrine is in the O. T., but that Gunkel correctly emphasizes the great importance of his personal experience and originality in determining its development.

[2] *Cf.* Bruce, *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, p. 245.

stance that the Spirit was regarded as a special gift which did not always accompany baptism and faith. The Samaritans are not regarded as having "received the Holy Ghost" when they "received the word of God." They had believed and had been baptized, but it was only when Peter and John went down and prayed for them and laid their hands on them that the gift of the Spirit was bestowed (Acts viii. 14–17). Evidently some special endowment or experience is here in view. The same conception emerges even more clearly in the narrative concerning the disciples of John whom Paul found at Ephesus (Acts xix. 1–7). Not only did they not "receive the Holy Ghost" when they believed, but after they had been baptized into the name of Christ, it was only when Paul had laid his hands on them "that the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spake with tongues and prophesied" (*v.* 6). Here it is obvious that the gift of the Spirit is regarded as synonymous with the ecstatic *charismata* of speaking with tongues and prophesying. Such circumstances can only be rightly understood and estimated in the light of the popular conceptions of the Spirit's agency.

What attitude did Paul assume towards this idea of the work of the Spirit? We shall find, I think, that he shares it in part, but that he has modified it in important respects and has given to it quite a new form and proportion. What he says that bears upon our present inquiry is mainly found in his discussion of the gifts of tongues and of prophecy in 1 Cor. xii.–xiv.

The apostle so far shares the current views as to think of miracles, visions, and charisms as special products of the Spirit's action. A mysterious sacredness attaches to these phenomena. Paul is reluctant to speak freely about them. Only when compelled to do so by the aspersions of his enemies, does he refer to his "visions and revelations of the Lord" (2 Cor. xii. 1). The words which he heard in the ecstatic experience which he proceeds to describe were "unspeakable words which it is not lawful for man to utter" (*v.* 4). Paul feels himself to be a πνευματικός

(1 Cor. ii. 15; Gal. vi. 1) — a man endowed with unusual powers and gifts and, upon occasion, when he "must needs glory," he puts forth this claim boldly and rejoices in his charismatic endowments and experiences. "I thank God," he exclaims to the Corinthians, "I speak with tongues more than ye all" (1 Cor. xiv. 18), and to the Romans he declares that he will dare to speak only of those things which Christ wrought through him by word and deed, "in the power of signs and wonders, in the power of the Holy Ghost" (xv. 18).

From these general indications of Paul's attitude towards the pneumatic gifts, as popularly conceived, we turn to his fullest discussion of the subject in 1 Cor. xii.–xiv. The Corinthians were an excitable folk, who readily yielded themselves to those rapt states which were regarded as seizures of the Spirit. Paul saw that their fondness for ecstatic excitement produced an unhealthy effect upon their religious life, and he proceeded to instruct them upon the whole subject. His first point is that the primary gift of the Spirit is the recognition of the lordship of Christ. Formerly they recognized idols; now as spiritual men they must recognize Jesus as the only Lord (xii. 1–3). He next reminds them that the many gifts and operations of the Spirit are one in source and aim. The various endowments must be made to minister to unity. Wisdom, knowledge, faith, healing, miracle, prophecy, glossolalia, — "all these worketh one and the same Spirit" (*v.* 10), and "to each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit to profit withal" (*πρὸς τὸ σύμφερον*, *v.* 7). Unity and utility define the aim of all the gifts and prescribe their legitimate exercise (*vv.* 4–11). By these principles the apostle sets strict limits to the religious enthusiasm which was rife at Corinth, and provides against excesses to which he saw the Corinthian greed for the marvellous and extravagant to be tending. The diversity of gifts from the same Spirit furnishes an occasion to dwell upon the unity of believers. Thus the rule, that all religious exercises are to be used for the practical benefit of all, is further enforced. This splendid plea for Christian

unity we shall have occasion to notice in another connection. It is only necessary now to observe how Paul applies it to the right use of the gifts. Each person has his own place and work. Each has his special endowment. Let him use it for the general good. Gifts are good in proportion as they are practically good for something. Therefore let the most useful gifts be held in highest esteem.

But how shall this comparative value of the gifts be determined? It was in answer to this question that Paul wrote the most splendid passage to be found in all his epistles (1 Cor. xiii). The subject of the charismatic gifts has in itself, for the modern mind, hardly more than an antiquarian interest. It is well to remember that it was the discussion of that subject which called out the passage which the Christian world esteems as the gem of all his writings. And what is this "way of surpassing excellence" (*καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὁδόν*, xii. 31), this principle by which the desire for the best gifts is to be regulated, by which the usefulness and value of all charisms are to be tested? It is love, answers the apostle; "Follow after love" (xiv. 1). Paul then institutes a comparison between the gift of tongues and the gift of prophecy. The former was a species of ecstatic speech and was most highly esteemed by the Corinthians. Prophecy was a plainer and simpler expression of religious feeling in exhortation or instruction. For this exercise the apostle expresses a strong preference on the principle: "All things for edification" (*πάντα πρὸς οἰκοδομήν*, xiv. 26). Paul does not call in question the reality of the gift of tongues. He believes in the gift and in its use upon occasion. But it is of little or no use in the public assembly. It edifies the speaker himself, but not the congregation. No one understands it, for it is a speaking in mysteries (*v.* 2). If it is used at all, the meaning of what is said should be interpreted, either by the speaker himself or by some one else, so that what is said may be understood (*vv.* 5, 13, 28). Otherwise the exercise is profitless and may even prove harmful, since unbelievers who are present would naturally interpret such

incomprehensible fervors as madness (*v.* 23). The apostle's conclusion is that while the glossolalia is not to be wholly discouraged, the exercise of prophecy should be preferred. By so doing the interest of decorum and utility will best be promoted.

We thus observe that Paul shares the popular view that the Spirit bestows extraordinary gifts and experiences, but that he judges and regulates their employment in the assembly by their adaptedness to edify all. Utility is not so much the test of their reality as of their use. Paul rejoices that as a speaker in tongues he surpasses all those to whom he is writing; but in the assembly he would rather speak the fewest words in plainness, in order to edify others, than "ten thousand words in a tongue" (*v.* 19). "Herein we observe," says Gunkel, "the difference in principle between the Pauline and the popular conception. For the congregation the charisms are astounding wonders; the most valuable is that in which the miraculous is most clearly manifest. No thought is given to its *purpose*. But for Paul the charisms have a divine aim — the edification of the Church. By this test the worth of the various gifts is estimated."[1] Paul treats the subject in a practical, ethical interest. Thus the representations which we have been reviewing pave the way to what we should call a more purely spiritual conception of the Spirit's working. The emphasis of the apostle's teaching concerning the Spirit is found to lie within the ethical life. The Spirit is, indeed, the cause of the marvellous, but the most truly marvellous is found in the inner life. His own conversion and his experience as a Christian were always before his mind as the typical example of the Spirit's work. The holy life was to Paul the greatest marvel, the most convincing evidence of the Spirit's power. Accordingly, we find scarcely any references to these outward "gifts" except in the letters to Corinth where he had found a peculiarly excitable type of religious life. Taking his references to the subject as a whole, we find the work of the Spirit distinctly correlated with a holy, Christlike

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

life. The Spirit is holy (*πνεῦμα ἅγιον*), and the work of the Spirit is sanctification (*ἁγιασμός*). Paul speaks of "salvation in sanctification of the Spirit," that is, sanctification wrought by the Spirit (2 Thess. ii. 13). The life in the Spirit is the counterpart of that justification by which the believer was accepted and forgiven. With Paul these are inseparable elements or aspects of the process of salvation. They are organically related to each other. Justification opens the way into the new life; sanctification is the development of that life through the union with Christ which is entered into by faith. Sometimes he blends them together in what must seem to a schematic theology a most reckless disregard of the normal *ordo salutis*, as when he exclaimed to the Corinthians: "But ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God" (1 Cor. vi. 11).

The truly "spiritual" man, the man in whom the Spirit truly predominates, is the man whose life, inner and outer, is Christlike. "If we live by the Spirit, by the Spirit let us also walk" (Gal. v. 25). Although love is not spoken of in 1 Cor. xiii. as a "gift of the Spirit," it is evident that it is such for the apostle's mind because in Gal. v. 19 it is first named in the list of the "fruit of the Spirit," and because the consciousness of God's love to us is ascribed to the action of the Holy Spirit in the heart (Rom. v. 5). The same influence which quickens man's sense of God's love must also kindle man's love to God. To "walk by the Spirit" is the surest guaranty against the sinful life (Gal. v. 16), and the truly spiritual man will be the bearer of others' burdens (Gal. vi. 1, 2). How radically different was Paul's attitude towards "spiritual things" (*πνευματικά*, 1 Cor. xii. 1; xiv. 1) from that of the vain and contentious Corinthians! To them he was most "spiritual" who evinced the most showy gifts, who revelled most in visions and raptures and in frenzied utterance. To Paul he is most spiritual who shows compassion towards the erring, seeking to restore such in a spirit of meekness, remembering his own liability to temptation;

who enters by sympathy into the suffering lot of others and "parts their burdens, taking half himself." "For if," adds the apostle, "a man thinketh himself to be something, when he is nothing, he deceiveth himself" (Gal. vi. 3). In the popular sense of "spiritual," Corinth was the most "spiritual" church in the apostolic age; but it was the most factious, contentious, and immoral church of the period. Similar tests of "spirituality" have always been in vogue — showy gifts, frantic enthusiasm, extravagant self-assertion. All need to be tested by the standard which Paul applied. Without the love which is modest and humble, and which serves and bears, they are worthless. They foster only the self-deception of him who thinks himself to be something when he is nothing.

Paul insists that the Holy Spirit sanctifies not only the inner life, but the body as well. "Know ye not," he exclaims, "that your body is a temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have from God" (1 Cor. vi. 19)? This is the keynote of his argument against the defilement of the body by sensuous sins. The Christian has been cleansed by the divine Spirit; he has received a spiritual life to which such sins are utterly contrary. "The body is for the Lord" (vi. 13). The Spirit of God dwells within it. Hence sensuality is sacrilege. In Corinth sensuous sins were lightly regarded. A fornicator was harbored in the church. Hence special emphasis upon the relation of the Spirit to the body was necessary. "Know ye not," writes the apostle, "that ye are a temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? If any man destroyeth the temple of God, him shall God destroy; for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are" (1 Cor. iii. 16, 17). And as the individual believer, alike in his inward and his outward life, is an abode of the Spirit, so also is the body of believers "builded together for a habitation of God in the Spirit" (Eph. ii. 22). The Church is a spiritual and holy temple, reared "upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Christ Jesus himself being the chief corner-stone" (ii. 20). Each believer is a stone built into this temple, which is

founded in truth, shapely in its proportions, and radiant in its beauty. When we contemplate the deformed "spirituality" of the churches of the apostolic age, we can but admire the splendid and persistent optimism of the apostle which enabled him still to cherish such a lofty ideal and prophetic hope for the Church at large.

Paul's doctrine of the Spirit is at once ideal and practical. It deals with the commonest and homeliest virtues, and regards them as the products of the Spirit's indwelling. Not devout fervors alone, not dreams of far-off ideals alone, but the every-day qualities which one needs most in his commonplace life, are the Spirit's work. "The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, self-control" (Gal. v. 22). These are the virtues which men need for every day's common life and experience. They are the very substance of a good and useful life. They make up the value and dignity of life. And see how Paul ennobles them by assuring us that the plainest qualities, such as sympathy, generosity, patience, and helpfulness, are divine; yes, they are, in his view, the divinest things in man's life. They are the ripe fruitage of the Spirit's life in man. They are the fulfilment of God's law. Their possession is heirship in the Kingdom of God, for "the Kingdom of God is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17). This Kingdom is, indeed, a dream, a perfected society, an ideal life; but it is also a present reality in so far as men live the life of the Spirit and produce the fruits of the Spirit in their character and action. Thus we see how Paul refuses to connect the Spirit only with the miraculous and the extraordinary. The spiritual covers man's common life and daily duty. It embraces his plainest virtues, and dignifies them by connecting them with God and with God's presence and power in human life. When the religious ideas of the apostolic age are considered, this correlation of the Spirit with man's ethical and practical life seems to be Paul's greatest contribution to the doctrine under consideration. In Judaism and in primitive Christianity the work of the

Spirit was viewed as sporadic and special; with Paul it is constant and general. Popularly, the Spirit was correlated with extraordinary deeds and experiences; by Paul it is correlated with the whole religious and ethical life. On this point Gunkel aptly says: "The community regards as pneumatic the extraordinary in the life of the Christian, Paul the ordinary; they that which is peculiar to individuals, Paul that which is common to all; they that which occurs abruptly, Paul that which is constant; they the special in the Christian life, Paul the Christian life itself. Hence the value which the primitive Church attaches to miracles, Paul attaches to the Christian state. No more is that which is individual and sporadic held to be the divine in man; the Christian man is the spiritual man." This author justly adds: "We do not hesitate to pronounce this thought one of Paul's most ingenious and truly spiritual conceptions." [1]

We reach the apostle's most characteristic thoughts in his doctrine of the Spirit's witness in the believer assuring him of his sonship to God. It is not quite clear, at first sight, whether the Spirit is conceived of as the cause of the *fact* of sonship, or as the cause of the *assurance* of it. I hold the latter to be Paul's thought. Adoption is a synonym for justification. It is conceived as a single act of God by which the believer is received into the divine favor and fellowship. This view is rendered quite certain by such passages as Rom. viii. 14: "For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God;" and, especially, Gal. iii. 26, 27: "For ye are all sons of God, through faith, in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as were baptized into Christ did put on Christ." Then the apostle adds: "And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father" (Gal. iv. 6). The sinner becomes a son of God in justification by faith. To this fact the Spirit bears witness, enabling him to realize the certainty of his sonship to God. With this agrees Rom. viii. 15–17, where the believer is said not to have received "a Spirit of

[1] *Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes*, p. 82.

bondage," but "a Spirit of adoption"; that is, the Holy Spirit which he received is not a Spirit which accompanies bondage and causes fear, but a Spirit which accompanies adoption and enables the believer to rest in the consciousness that he is a son of God. "The Spirit beareth witness with our spirit, that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs," etc. In Gal. iv. 6 it is the Spirit who is said to cry, "Abba, Father," but it is evident that the meaning is: The Spirit inspires in the heart the conviction of sonship which is expressed in the cry, "Abba, Father." The matter is so presented in Rom. viii. 15, where it is the believers who, under the inspiration of a Spirit of adoption, are enabled to cry, "Abba, Father." I understand the apostle to use this expression, which was probably a current formula in prayer, as a symbol of the conviction of sonship. I see no reason for supposing, with Gunkel, that the utterance of this cry was one of the ecstatic phenomena of the glossolalia.[1] The thought of both passages where the Abba-cry is mentioned is quite remote from the subject of speaking with tongues.

The Spirit, then, is a powerful aid and comfort in the life of the Christian. The Spirit is the "Spirit of life" (Rom. viii. 2), by whose power the Christian is made free from sin. "According to the Spirit" he is to walk (*v.* 4), since in him the Spirit dwells (*v.* 9). The life-giving Spirit is also the guaranty of the resurrection life (*v.* 11). Christians "have the first-fruits of the Spirit" (*v.* 23), the pledge of greater blessings to come. The Spirit strengthens the inner life of the believer. By the Spirit he is aided to pray as he ought, and the apostle adds: "The Spirit himself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered; and he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints according to God" (*vv.* 26, 27). Here, as in Gal. iv. 6, the utterance of the believer in aspiration and prayer is described

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 66. Gunkel, p. 67, refers the groaning of creation (Rom. viii. 22) and of the Spirit (*v.* 26) to the same category. The explanation seems to me far fetched in both cases.

as an utterance of the Spirit. The meaning is that the Spirit inspires it (*cf.* *v.* 23); that even in the believer's inarticulate sigh the Spirit's voice is heard. The believer's yearning desire may be very ill defined; it may be none the less genuine; the Spirit inspires it, and, although the believer himself may not be able to interpret his own prayer, God can interpret it, for the Spirit's work is all according to his will. It is God who is supervising all that happens in the life of the believer, and making all things coöperate for his good (*v.* 28). This intercession or entreaty on our behalf by the Spirit is conceived of as taking place through an inspiration of the believer's own thought and feeling and as uttering itself in inarticulate sounds. The whole passage means that, although we do not definitely know what we ought to desire from God, and cannot state our wishes in adequate language, but can only disclose them in such expressions as sighs and groans, yet God will receive such prayers inasmuch as they come from a heart which is inspired by his own Spirit.

What, then, is the Spirit, according to Paul? From 1 Cor. ii. 10 *sq.* we might be led to suppose that the Spirit is a name for the divine self-consciousness. It is the spirit of a man, says Paul, which knows the man; just so it is the Spirit of God which knows God and searches the deeps of the divine nature (*vv.* 10, 11). Here we must remember that we have to do with an analogy, and that the analogy is used for a particular purpose. Paul is discussing earthly and heavenly wisdom. The former is taught in the schools and by the rhetoricians; the latter is bestowed by the Spirit. He then refers to the depths of this divine wisdom which the Spirit searches and reveals, and in order to emphasize that thought appeals to the analogy of a man's own self-knowledge in comparison with the knowledge which others have of him. The point of the argument here is: The Spirit knows the heavenly wisdom as much better than the sophist or philosopher does as a man knows his own inner thought and feeling better than another man does. By this analogy Paul does not mean to teach anything concerning the nature of the Spirit.

Does Paul identify the Spirit with the glorified Christ? He certainly applies the term *πνεῦμα* to Christ: "The last Adam [became] a life-giving spirit" (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν*, 1 Cor. xv. 45); "Now the Lord is the Spirit" (*τὸ πνεῦμα*); "as from the Lord the Spirit (*ἀπὸ κυρίου πνεύματος*, 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18). Certainly the first of these passages is not available as a proof of the identity of the Spirit with Christ. The apostle is contrasting Adam as, by his creation, a natural man, with Christ who became by his resurrection a life-giving Spirit who, as such, is heavenly (*ἐπουράνιος*) and in whose likeness men shall be when they receive the *σῶμα πνευματικόν*. It cannot be maintained that by *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* here Paul means the same as elsewhere by *τὸ πνεῦμα* and its equivalents. In the second passage the Lord is called *τὸ πνεῦμα* (2 Cor. iii. 17, 18), but the apostle immediately adds, "the Spirit of the Lord" (*τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου*). When we consider the connection, we see that he is contrasting the old and the new covenants. The former was a dispensation of outward commandments; the latter a dispensation of spiritual principles and laws; the word to describe the former is "letter" (*γράμμα*); that to describe the latter is "spirit" (*v.* 7). Now the apostle sums up the nature of the gospel in the words: "The Lord is the Spirit;" he is the life-giving Spirit of the new dispensation. It is evident that Paul is not here giving a theoretic description of the essence or substance of the Lord, which justifies a metaphysical identification of Christ with the "Holy Spirit," but is describing him as a source of spiritual blessing to those who turn to him. Christ sums up the spiritual system in himself, as Moses sums up the legal system. If one were to seek here theoretic determinations concerning the metaphysics of Deity, it would be as legitimate to call attention to the distinction observed between the Spirit and the Lord as to their identification (*v.* 17). In either case we should be quite transcending the apostle's thought.

But how, then, does Paul think of the nature of the Spirit? Is the Spirit a generalization of man's religious

experience, a force, a substance, a person?[1] We must admit that Paul's language does not furnish us with the materials for an accurate definition of the Spirit.[2] It is, however, certain that the Spirit was to him an objective divine reality and power. Perhaps he did not more sharply define his own conception. His language is, for the most part, general and practical, and does not lend itself to our aid in the metaphysics of the subject. Regarding the personality of the Spirit, the question should be, not whether Paul thought of the Spirit as a person distinct from God and Christ, but whether what he says of the Spirit naturally involves that conclusion *for us*. In general we must say that the Spirit is distinguished from God and from Christ. God sends the Spirit of Christ into the hearts of men. He works (*ἐνεργεῖ*) in believers (1 Cor. xii. 11) as he wills (*καθὼς βούλεται*), and dwells (*οἰκεῖ*) in them (Rom. viii. 9). He leads believers (*v.* 14) and bears witness in them (*v.* 16); he helps (*v.* 26) and teaches them (1 Cor. ii. 13). To such expressions should

[1] Respecting Paul's view of the *nature* of the Spirit opinion is much divided. Holsten, *Zum Ev. d. Paulus u. Petrus*, p. 378, defined it in accordance with the supposed metaphysical dualism of Paul, as a material substance. This view of spirit in general as "superterrestrial material substance" (überirdisch-stoffliche Substanz) has been extensively applied to Paul's eschatology by Richard Kabisch, *Die Eschatologie des Paulus*, p. 188 *sq.* For Wendt, *Fleisch u. Geist*, pp. 139–146, the Spirit is a name for the totality of those supernatural operations of power in which God reveals himself. Pfleiderer says, *Paulinismus*, p. 207: The Spirit is "an independent divine power and reality," "a supernatural divine life-power." Similarly Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* Bk. IV. ch. vii. § 2, *πνεῦμα* = *δύναμις* (1 Cor. ii. 4), and Gunkel, *op cit.*, 51: "The principal idea in the conception of the Spirit is always that it is a supernatural power. This is the most exact definition of the Spirit." Issel, *Der Begriff d. Heiligkeit im N. T.* p. 56, reduces the Spirit to the consciousness of sonship in believers. Ritschl, *Rechtf. u. Versöhn.* iii. 562, defines the Spirit as "the common thought of God as our Father, so far as this is a comprehensive motive of our moral and religious life," etc. Gloël, *Der heil. Geist*, pp. 376, 377, holds that although Paul has not explicitly predicated personality of the Spirit, he does ascribe to this power functions which we can interpret only as the functions of personal life.

[2] Dazu kommt, dass wir es bei dem Geiste überhaupt mit einer Grösse zu thun haben, die wir wohl *beschreiben*, nicht aber im eigentlichen Sinne *definieren* können. Gloël, *Der heil. Geist*, p. 370.

be added Paul's coördination of the Spirit with the Father and with Christ in such passages as 2 Cor. xiii. 14: "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all;" 1 Cor. xii. 4–6: "Now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministrations, and the same Lord. And there are diversities of workings, but the same God, who worketh all things in all;" and Eph. iv. 4–6: "There is one body, and one Spirit, even as also ye were called in one hope of your calling; one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all."

The problem to which these passages give rise lies in the field of doctrinal theology. It is only necessary here to point out the considerations derived from Paul's writings, which have contributed to the theological doctrines of the personality of the Holy Spirit and of the Trinity. By some this personification of the Spirit is regarded as purely poetical and rhetorical.[1] It is, however, quite certain that there are important differences between Paul's personifications of sin and death and his personification of the Spirit. The operations of the Spirit are, in any case, really personal whether the Spirit is distinguished from God and Christ or not. To say that the Spirit is a power, as Beyschlag does, defines nothing. It is to take refuge in an abstraction. God is also called a power (Mt. xxvi. 64) without detriment to the conviction of his personality. I am confident that no such coördination with God and Christ as we observe in the case of the Holy Spirit in the three passages above cited (2 Cor. xiii. 14; 1 Cor. xii. 4–6; Eph. iv. 4–6) can either be found, or even reasonably imagined, in the case of any of Paul's other personifications. It seems to me that reflective thought can most naturally construe the functions of the Spirit, as Paul describes them, upon the view that the Spirit is a self distinct from God and from Christ.

[1] So Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* II. 207 (Bk. IV. ch. vii. § 2): "Our apostle has, indeed, poetically and rhetorically personified the Holy Spirit now and then, just as he has personified the flesh, sin, and death."

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL MORALITY

THE logical root of Paul's ethics is found in his doctrine of love, the most fundamental and comprehensive virtue. But the apostle does not rest in a general subjective principle. The outer life must be conformed to the requirements of truth and righteousness. The life of the Spirit must be expressed in outward relations. "If we live by the Spirit, by the Spirit let us also walk" (Gal. v. 25). Paul lived at a time when society was extremely corrupt. His description of heathen morals in the first chapter of Romans, and his allusions to the state of Greek society in the Epistles to the Corinthians, throw a lurid light upon the gross perversions of natural life which obtained in his age, especially in regard to the relations of the sexes. Chastity had almost ceased to be required of men, and the honor of woman was lightly esteemed in the Græco-Roman world. The apostle insisted upon both. He taught that man and woman were upon the same plane as respects their personal dignity and value before God (Gal. iii. 28; 1 Cor. xi. 11), and he uncompromisingly demanded sexual purity in both. "The body is for the Lord," he exclaims; "flee fornication" (1 Cor. vi. 13, 17; *cf.* 1 Thess. iv. 3, 4). He required that the incestuous man in the Corinthian church should be expelled (1 Cor. v. 7). He was, indeed, aware that in heathen society, as then constituted, it was not possible for the Christians to avoid all associations with those who were guilty of such sins, "for then must they needs go out of the world" (1 Cor. v. 10). But within the church no one guilty of such sins as fornication, idolatry, and drunkenness was to be tolerated (*v.* 11).

Paul presupposes that the family should be monogamous (1 Cor. vii. 2). He assumes that marriage is a natural relation, founded in the divine order for human life, and he knows that Christ expressed himself with regard to its nature and sanction (1 Cor. vii. 6, 10, 40). The Corinthians had submitted to the apostle certain questions respecting the relations of the sexes on which he proceeds to express his personal conviction and feeling. They had asked whether, in general, the married or the unmarried state were preferable (1 Cor. vii. 1); whether, for example, virgins and widows had better marry or remain single (vii. 8); and whether Christian and heathen partners should remain united (vii. 10). In each case the apostle disclaims having any word of Christ which furnishes an explicit answer to this question. He believes, however, that he has the Spirit (vii. 40), and that he can answer the questions in accord with the demands of Christian expediency.

In answer to the first question he recommends, in general, the celibate state. Marriage is permissible and is even useful as a preventive of unlawful desire, but the unmarried state is to be preferred. What is the ground of this preference? Many scholars answer that it is found in an ascetic view of the natural life based on Paul's dualism of flesh and spirit.[1] The apostle's view certainly wears an ascetic appearance. But did it have its root, for his mind, in an ascetic view of the world? He has not connected it with the contrast of flesh and spirit, and even if he had done so, it would not follow that marriage, if it belonged to the former category, would be unholy, since flesh and spirit are not necessarily synonymous with evil and good. When he commends celibacy in preference to marriage he does not add that marriage is evil, but says that it is, at least, a relative good. One man may have his

[1] So Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II. 153, who speaks of Rom. viii. 13, as an "asketisches Schlagwort"; Pfleiderer, *Paulinismus*, p. 259, who thinks that Paul, in consequence of his dualism, regarded marriage as less holy than celibacy, because it belonged to the earthly life. Weizsäcker, *Apos. Age*, ch. iii. sec. ii. § 7, expresses, in guarded language, a similar view.

"gift from God" after that manner, another after the manner preferred by the apostle (1 Cor. vii. 7). But is marriage, then, good only because it prevents incontinence? Is it, after all, but the lesser of two evils? Paul does not say this, and such a meaning does not agree with what he writes concerning marriage in Eph. v. 22–33, where the whole subject is transferred into the ethical sphere and treated as a realization of the life of love analogous to the communion between Christ and his Church.[1] After a digression (1 Cor. vii. 10–24) upon mixed marriages and social classes, Paul resumes the subject (vii. 25 *sq.*) by taking the specific case of virgins — no doubt in answer to a special question. Now for the first time does he give a reason for his advice against marriage. It is this: "I think therefore that it is good by reason of the impending distress, namely, that it is good for a man to be as he is" (vii. 26). Paul expects the return of the Lord in the near future. This event is to be preceded by the "woes of the Messiah" (*cf.* 2 Thess. ii. 1–12) — a fearful manifestation of the powers of evil, which will tax and try the souls of the faithful. This is the "impending distress" (*ἡ ἐνεστῶσα ἀνάγκη*) which the apostle sees as imminent, and in view of which he thinks all changes of one's social state, and especially the assumption of new responsibilities, inexpedient. The married will experience special tribulations in that great coming trial (*v.* 28). But even the conditions already present point, for Paul, to the same conclusion. The married are more encumbered with cares than the unmarried, and are not so well able to devote themselves entirely to whatever duties the present and future may bring. The married must have responsibilities to one another which render undivided service impossible. It is better, urges the apostle, that the unmarried person remain so, "in order that he may attend upon the Lord without distraction" (*vv.* 32–35).

These are the only reasons which Paul himself gives for

[1] The scholars cited in the previous note do not, of course, admit the genuineness of Ephesians.

recommending celibacy. All other supposed reasons are conjectural. He insists that if his "judgment" is disregarded, no sin is committed. He does not intimate that marriage is sinful. How, then, can it be essentially "less holy" (Pfleiderer) than celibacy? He says that if the father or guardian of the virgin shall deem it wise to give her in marriage, he "doeth well"; though he adds that if he does not give her, he shall "do better" (*v.* 38). "She is happier if she abide as she is, according to my judgement" (*v.* 40), says Paul. But this is not presented as a question of *good* and *bad*, or even as one of *better* or *worse*, but as one of *well* or *better*, that is, as a question of wisdom and expediency in view of present and prospective conditions, as the apostle interprets them. It is quite true that in 1 Cor. vii. marriage is not placed upon high ground, and that the apostle's expediency was the product of a natural, but mistaken, eschatology which cut off all hope of the world's continued progress and made the propagation of the race seem unimportant. In these views, not in asceticism, I find the motive of what he says about marriage.[1]

Paul knows that Jesus discountenanced divorce (1 Cor. vii. 10, 11). He repeats the same principle, and adds the inference that if separation does, nevertheless, take place, remarriage is not thereby permitted. But what shall be said of cases where Christians and heathen are united in marriage? Shall they separate? In general, Paul's answer is negative (*vv.* 12, 13). If they can be content to dwell together, they should do so. The Christian partner "sanctifies," that is, brings within Christian influence, the non-Christian partner, as well as the children of the union (*v.* 14). But what if the heathen partner refuses to dwell with the Christian and departs, thus sundering *de facto* the marriage bond? The apostle does not think that Jesus' general principle of non-separation furnishes an answer to

[1] Similarly Beyschlag: "Paul nowhere urges in support of this view of his an ascetic motive, or regards the unmarried life as a higher stage of morality; his reasons for preferring it are plainly of another character." *N. T. Theol.* II. 221 (Bk. IV. ch. vii. § 5).

this question; and he gives it as his own judgment that, in such cases, the believing party may acquiesce in the separation. In this way the interests of peace will best be conserved (*v.* 15). If it is argued that such a separation forfeits the opportunity which the Christian would have of winning the heathen party to Christ, the apostle replies that such a result is not at all certain (*v.* 16). His view seems to be that obvious present interests, rather than mere possibilities, must govern action in such matters. It seems clear that in such instances the apostle would not regard the Christian party as at liberty to marry again. It is rather a separation in the interests of peace than a divorce in the proper sense of which Paul is speaking. Against the idea of remarriage would be Paul's counsel that Christians should not enter into new relations in view of the near parousia (*v.* 20), and, especially, the principle that only death really dissolves the marriage-bond (*v.* 39).

Incidentally Paul makes frequent reference to the subject of slavery. He frequently exhorts masters and slaves to perform their respective duties to each other (Col. iii. 22–iv. 1; Eph. vi. 5–9); and the Epistle to Philemon is an appeal to the owner of a runaway slave, Onesimus, urging a kind reception of him, on the ground that he has become a Christian and will make all possible restitution. Paul's churches were largely composed of slaves. With the institution of slavery he had always been familiar. He assumed it as a part of the order of society. He made no protest against it. It is wholly improbable that the thought of its abolition ever occurred to him. Questions of social transformation could hardly arise in a mind which was so preoccupied, as was Paul's, with the idea that the course of history was soon to be terminated. His maxim was: Let each man remain in that state or relation in which he was when converted (1 Cor. vii. 20). This principle he applies to slaves. If one is a bondservant, let not that trouble him; let him not seek freedom, but rather use his position as a slave for the Lord's service, knowing that spiritually he is Christ's freeman (*vv.* 21, 22). Outward condition is of small account, in view of the approaching

end. "Let each man, wherein he is called, therein abide with God" (*v.* 24).

It is quite unwarranted to suppose that Paul refrained from disapproving of slavery from considerations of expediency. It is equally incorrect to say that he attempted any theoretic justification of it. There is no reason to think that the question of its abstract rightfulness or wrongfulness was before his mind at all. He certainly could not have considered it as wrong *per se;* for in that case he could not have recognized it without protest, as he did by giving directions for its regulation. We must conclude, I think, that Paul assumed that it was legitimate for one man to own another. He has presented no objection to such ownership. What he aimed at was to secure the just and humane treatment of bondmen. He sought to arouse in those to whom he wrote the sentiment of human and Christian brotherhood. Especially in writing to Philemon did he insist that the converted slave was "more than a slave, a brother beloved" (*v.* 16), whose fellowship and friendship Philemon should have forever (*v.* 15). Such sentiments as these were certain to place the relation of master and slave upon quite a different plane from that on which it rested in antiquity. So far as such ideas prevailed, they were certain to abolish the abuses of slavery; and the destruction of its abuses would go a long way towards the ultimate destruction of the institution. At the destruction of the institution, however, Paul did not consciously aim. But by treating the relations involved in the light of the principles of Christian love and brotherhood, he aided to set forces at work which have, as matter of fact, accomplished the abolition of slavery on almost a world-wide scale. Paul did not define to himself such a task, or even such a possibility, as belonging to the mission of Christianity in history; but he did clearly apprehend the moral principles which have, in fact, accomplished this result wherever Christianity holds sway, and which, we can now see, must logically conduce to it whenever they become lodged in the heart of society.

With respect to the state Paul took up an attitude

different alike from that which was common among the Jews, and from that towards which his doctrine of Christian liberty might seem to tend. To the Jewish mind the Roman Empire was the embodiment of cruelty and oppression, and its overthrow was the fond dream of every Jewish heart. Paul does not discuss the character of the Roman power as such. He contents himself with urging the general principle that the state is a divinely constituted order of human society, and that it is an instrument of God for accomplishing his ends among men (Rom. xiii. 1–7). The state derives its authority from God (*v.* 1), and to resist its power is to resist God's ordinance (*v.* 2). It exists for the good of its people; its function is to protect the law-abiding and to restrain the lawless; hence it possesses the right to punish (*vv.* 3, 4). In order to carry out this purpose it may exact tribute of its citizens. This right gives rise to the duty to pay taxes (*vv.* 6, 7). Paul's maxim: "Render tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom," is probably a reminiscence of the saying of Jesus: "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Mk. xii. 17). The duty to obey the laws of the state and to contribute to its maintenance is a duty to God, since the state is God's instrument for the regulation of society, and his will is the source and original of all legitimate civil law and authority among men. The immediate practical aim of the apostle in these verses probably was to check any tendencies to antinomianism which might develop in the Roman church or elsewhere, through the perversion of his doctrine of Christian freedom. He is not attempting a political philosophy. He does not mention the defects of existing governments or express any view respecting the fate of the Roman Empire which he doubtless regarded as nearing its end (2 Thess. ii. 7). He says nothing of the limits of obedience or of the right of revolution. It is enough for him to emphasize those considerations which were adapted to save his readers from the practical errors and perils to which they were exposed.

The apostle's references to the institution of private property are entirely incidental. He insisted upon honest industry in order that each man might supply his own needs (1 Thess. iv. 11), and set the example by working at his trade that he might not be a burden upon others (1 Thess. ii. 9; 2 Cor. xii. 13, 14). He severely rebuked the disposition of the Thessalonians to abandon their daily employments in their ardent hope for the Lord's speedy coming, and exhorted them in quietness to work and to eat their own bread (2 Thess. iii. 10–13). The apostle assumes that men have a right to the products of their labor. His exhortations to liberality in giving rest upon that assumption (Gal. vi. 6; 1 Cor. xvi. 2; 2 Cor. viii. 14, etc.). What one gives is to be given voluntarily, that is, by the free relinquishment of that to which he has a right (2 Cor. ix. 7); yet such bestowments of one's possessions (*ὑπάρχοντα*) for the relief of the needy is morally valueless unless done from love (1 Cor. xiii. 3). Paul thus assumes the right of private property. But in view of the near advent of the Lord it is regarded by him as relatively unimportant. He counsels his converts to be free from concern about such things, since the present world-period is near its end (1 Cor. vii. 31). For the Christian the right of private possession will be held subject to the motives of liberality (*ἁπλότης*, 2 Cor. viii. 2; ix. 11, etc.) and equality (*ἰσότης*, 2 Cor. viii. 13, 14), an equitable regard for the needs of others. If, as some critics have observed,[1] the apostle has not dwelt upon the dignity of man's work as such by describing it as his moral task, and as the divinely appointed means of attaining his true goal in life, it is sufficient to say that such considerations scarcely fell within the sphere of his thought, the less so as he believed himself to be living in a vanishing world. To me the wonder is not that Paul did not dwell upon such views of man's daily tasks, but that, with his eschatological expectations, he still continued to value human life with its various

[1] Von Soden, *Die Ethik des Paulus* in *Zeitschrift für Theol. u. Kirche*, 2 Jahrg. 2 Heft, p. 142; Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* II. 156, 157.

duties and relations so highly as he did. In many others the parousia-expectation developed a rank fanaticism (2 Thess. ii. 1–3; iii. 6–15). The most disastrous consequences might easily follow from such a view of the future as Paul entertained, unless it was accompanied by a strong and healthy sense of the sacredness of human life as at present constituted. Such a sense of the divineness of those obligations and ties which constitute man's social life was possessed by Paul. Hence for him human society was sacred, however soon its fabric should be dissolved. Its institutions — marriage, the state, the rights of possession — are of divine appointment, and must be upheld and honored, however short the time before the order to which they belong shall pass away forever.

One of the most perplexing questions with which the apostle had occasion to deal was that which arose in connection with the distinction between "clean" and "unclean" meats. Such "cases of conscience" he found in the Roman and the Corinthian churches. In the former there appear to have been certain persons of Jewish education who were still affected by scruples as to what food might lawfully be eaten. The practical question was whether those who had no scruples on that subject should refrain from the use of their liberty out of regard to the scrupulous. In Rom. xiv. the apostle discusses this question and lays down the following principles: (1) Such differences as that between those who freely "eat all things" and those who will eat only herbs (*v.* 2) should be charitably tolerated. Those who so differ should not harshly judge and condemn one another. God has received both, and the responsibility of each for his own action is to God and not to man (*vv.* 3, 4). Such differences should not be allowed to divide the Church and to undermine Christian fellowship. (2) Christ is the sole judge. Believers are not to assume the right to judge one another. There may be differences respecting the observance of days and respecting liberty of personal conduct. Such differences are not fundamental. Let each hold his own conviction and pursue his own course con-

scientiously in such matters, having regard, not to human but to divine judgment (*vv.* 5–12). (3) Theoretically, Paul sides with the strong minded, who refuse to believe that any particular kind of food is in itself unclean. But since there are some who cannot adopt this view, it is the dictate of Christian love to refrain from courses of action which create moral hindrances for such Christians. Christian liberty should not be so used as to injure the consciences of the scrupulous (*vv.* 13–15). (4) The Kingdom of God is righteousness, peace, and joy. Let these ends be supreme. Love is the law of the Christian life, and love may require concessions in conduct in such cases, so that the scrupulous may not be led by the example of the "strong" to do what their consciences cannot yet clearly approve (*vv.* 16–21).

But it was at Corinth where this question of the rights of Christian liberty took on its most perplexing form. Some of the newly made converts, fresh from heathenism, could not wholly cease to regard the gods whom they had formerly worshipped as real beings. Hence they continued to conceive of the meat of animals which had been killed at idol-sacrifices as defiled by contact with powers which were now regarded as evil. Such meat was sometimes offered for sale in the shops, and might unwittingly be bought and eaten. Was the Christian at liberty to eat of such meat? Many thought not; others had no hesitation. The former class Paul calls the "weak brethren" (1 Cor. viii. 10, 12), that is, the scrupulous, the perplexed, those who were not clear in their consciences as to what they might safely do in such matters; the latter class were the "strong," those who, like Paul, knew that an idol was nothing and could not really defile meat.

The apostle treats the weakness in question as due to ignorance, and the concessions to it which he recommends are based entirely upon benevolence towards the "weak," and not at all upon their rights to demand them. If these concessions are demanded, they are no longer due, since then the "weak brother" would be no longer "weak," but "strong," that is, positive and certain as to the rightness

of his course. But where this hesitation really exists it must be tenderly dealt with, until, by teaching, the weak may attain to that knowledge of God in the light of which all such conscientious scruples as those about meats will fade away. But here again love is the guiding principle. We cannot always wisely do what we know we have a right to do, since we may thereby mislead those who are influenced by our example (1 Cor. viii. 1–3). Absurd though it is to suppose that an idol can defile meat, yet many still retain that conviction, and the question is, how they may best be helped on to a better conception (*v.* 7). Here the problem for the strong is not one of absolute right and wrong. It is a question of Christian expediency. If a "strong" man should sit down to meat in an idol's temple, he might thereby influence a "weak" man to do the same, and in so doing the latter would violate his conscience and suffer a moral injury, because he would be doing what he is not clear that he has a right to do (*vv.* 8–11). From such considerations the apostle deduces the maxim: "If meat maketh my brother to stumble, I will eat no flesh forevermore, that I make not my brother to stumble" (*v.* 13). In order to make the principle plainer, he supposes that both "strong" and "weak" Christians are together at a meal in a private house. Meat of the kind previously described may be on the table. Paul advises that no inquiry respecting it be raised. But suppose some "weak brother" knows that it is sacrificial meat and calls your attention to the fact. He hesitates to eat of it from conscientious scruples. Do not by your example embolden him to do so, says the apostle. By so doing you would encourage him to do violence to his conscience and so to inflict upon himself a moral injury (1 Cor. x. 27–33). Paul's whole philosophy on such questions is: The interests of love and peace are primary; knowledge must be tempered with benevolence; the rights of Christian liberty must be held subordinate to the obligations of Christian charity.

The apostle is urgent that the duties which spring out of man's natural relations shall be conscientiously ful-

filled. Wives are to be in subjection to their husbands; husbands are to love their wives (Eph. v. 22–33; Col. iii. 18, 19). Children must obey their parents, and parents are to beware of provoking their children to wrath (Eph. vi. 1–3; Col. iii. 20, 21), that is, of needlessly irritating them and fostering in them angry passions. Servants and masters should remember their reciprocal obligations, the former rendering their service as a Christian duty (Eph. vi. 5–8; Col. iii. 22–25), the latter doing that which is "just and equal," and both classes should know that "their Master is in heaven, and that there is no respect of persons with him" (Eph. vi. 9; Col. iv. 1). All these duties and relations the apostle distinctly connects with the religious life by reminding his readers that they are all comprehended within the service to be rendered to the common Lord. The family relations are "in the Lord" (Eph. v. 22; vi. 1; Col. iii. 18, 20), and the mutual duties of the master and slave are embraced within the common obligation of both to "serve the Lord Christ" (Col. iii. 24). The inequality of social condition seemed to Paul of slight moment in view of the equality of both before the Master to whom they shall give account, and before whom there "can be neither bond nor free" (Gal. iii. 28). With equal energy does Paul insist upon just and upright conduct on the part of the Christian in all his relations with his fellow-men. The truth must be spoken on the ground that we live in a plexus of common rights and duties (Eph. iv. 25). Angry and revengeful passions are to be repressed (*vv.* 28, 29, 31), industry exemplified (*v.* 29), and kind, generous, and forgiving dispositions cultivated (*v.* 32). If the apostle has not given us a formal list of virtues and duties, or a full discussion of the principles and grounds of moral obligation, it is but fair to say that such a task lay quite outside his purpose; and that he has, nevertheless, given us, incidentally, the essential elements of a system of Christian ethics. Nothing is more unfair than to represent the apostle as so engrossed in certain theological theories that he is indifferent to the ethical life. His religion is, above all things, the religion of a good life.

CHAPTER XI

THE CHURCH

PAUL speaks of the Church much more frequently than of the Kingdom of God. We may find a natural reason for this in the fact that the apostle was concerned with organizing his converts into societies and with equipping them for self-government. He does not lose sight of the greater idea of Jesus — the Kingdom of God; but his special mission is to promote the reign of God by making converts and organizing churches. He knows of a Kingdom of God which is "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17), that is, a reign of heavenly truth and law in the heart such as Jesus had described in his beatitudes. But for Paul's mind, the phrase Kingdom of God pointed mainly to the future. It is a state which will be completely realized only at the parousia. Then Christians will "inherit the Kingdom of God" (1 Cor. xv. 50; Gal. v. 21). This eschatological sense is the prevalent one in Paul's use of the title; we must, therefore, seek for his views respecting Christian society in connection with other terms. Of these the word "church" (ἐκκλησία), which occurs more than sixty times in his epistles, is the most prominent.

The term "church" sometimes denotes a local organization of Christian believers, as "the church which is at Corinth" (1 Cor. i. 2), "the church of the Thessalonians" (1 Thess. i. 1). It may be applied to a portion of the Christians in any city who assemble in a private house for worship, "the church that is in the house" (1 Cor. xvi. 9; Rom. xvi. 5; Col. iv. 15). But the term has also a wider meaning and denotes the whole body of believers (1 Cor. xii. 28; xv. 9; Gal. i. 13). This two-

fold meaning of the term — the local and the general — we shall consider in order.

Respecting the organization of the churches of Paul's time, the prevalent view has been that there were in them, when they were regularly organized, two well-defined offices: that of bishops or presbyters, and that of deacons. The Epistles to the Galatians and to the Corinthians contain no references to official leaders. From the nature of the disorders which existed in these churches, and from the fact that no one is held especially responsible for regulating them, we should naturally conclude that these churches were not yet officered when Paul wrote his letters to them. Where officers are found, as at Philippi (Phil. i. 1), they are bishops and deacons. The former are generally supposed to have administered the affairs of the congregation and to have taught; the latter to have had charge of the alms. Bishops (ἐπίσκοποι) and presbyters, or elders (πρεσβύτεροι), are regarded, on this theory, as synonyms, the former being of Greek, the latter of Hebrew origin and associations. This view has been defended with great ability and learning by Bishop Lightfoot[1] and by Dr. Hatch,[2] who considers the identity of bishop and presbyter practically certain.[3] This theory has been assailed, within recent years, on every side. I can only express my conviction that it has not been disproved, and that no other theory accords so well with the facts which are known to us. The investigation of the subject does not belong to the Pauline theology.[4]

[1] In his essay on the Christian Ministry in his *Commentary on Philippians*.

[2] In his Bampton Lectures on *The Organization of the Early Christian Church*, 1882.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

[4] Brief reference should, however, be made to the principal recent theories. Dr. Hort (*The Christian Ecclesia*) holds that the word "bishop" or "overseer" (ἐπίσκοπος) was not the designation of an *office*, but of a *function*. The elder (πρεσβύτερος) is the officer, and oversight (ἐπισκοπεῖν) is his function. In this view bishops and elders were the same persons; the bishop was not a higher officer than the presbyter. Indeed *as bishop* he was not an officer at all. Dr. Allen (*Christian Institutions*) holds that both bishop and presbyter primarily designate functions. He thinks

The apostle gives no detailed directions regarding the regulation of the affairs of the local assembly. He inveighs against the toleration of social immorality in the Church, and urges the importance of reverence and decorous conduct in the congregation, especially in the observance of the Lord's supper (1 Cor. xi.). The apostle was particularly anxious that his churches should not expose themselves to criticism by such applications of the principle of liberty as would offend the ideas which were current in antiquity regarding the place and function of woman. The sexes are on a plane of equality in Christ upon whom both are alike dependent; in Christ "there can be no male and female" (Gal. iii. 28). The wife is to be loved as Christ loved the Church (Eph. v. 25). Even in natural relations Paul does not forget that the sexes are mutually dependent (1 Cor. xi. 11, 12). But in spite of these facts, he places woman in a position of natural and social dependence upon man (Eph. v. 23; 1 Cor. xi. 3). This view he carries over into his regulation of the Christian congregation. The woman is to be veiled in the public assembly as a sign of her dependence (1 Cor. xi. 5). She should wear her hair long because nature has given it to her as a kind of veil (xi. 15). To Paul's mind these proprieties are based upon the divine order of creation (Gen. ii. 18–20), since man was created by God immediately, and woman mediately, from man. In 1 Tim. ii. 14 the dependence of woman is deduced from the circumstance that she first yielded to temptation. In view of this secondary position of woman, she must not speak or teach in the public assembly (1 Cor. xiv. 34; 1 Tim. ii. 12), not even to the extent of asking

bishops were presbyters who exercised certain special prerogatives. Dr. McGiffert (*The Apostolic Age*) and Dr. Vincent (*Commentary on Philippians*) reverse the view of Hort and hold that presbyters in the apostolic Church were not Church officers; that there was no such thing as an official eldership in the early Church. The elders were simply the older and more experienced Christians. From this class the bishops were commonly chosen, so that "to appoint elders" (Acts xiv. 23; Tit. i. 5) means to elevate some of the more mature Christians to the office of bishop. This interpretation seems to me quite unnatural.

questions. If she wishes instruction upon the subject under consideration in the assembly, she should ask her husband at home (1 Cor. xiv. 35). Some have held that the apostle's prohibition of women from praying or prophesying in public without a veil (1 Cor. xi. 5, 13) implies that they might properly do so *if veiled*. But this supposition involves an explicit contradiction between 1 Cor. xi. 5, 13 and 1 Cor. xiv. 34, 35. Moreover, we observe that in the former passages Paul says nothing of how women may, *with propriety*, speak in public, but is merely denouncing the obvious impropriety of speaking without the veil. It is quite certain, as appears later when Paul takes up the subject of women's speaking in general, that for his mind the requirement to appear in the assembly only with veiled head would preclude, by its very significance, the public speaking in question. These views are due in part to a literal interpretation of the narratives of the creation and the fall in Genesis, and in part to the idea of woman's relation to man which was common in Paul's age.

The ordinances of the apostolic Church were baptism and the Lord's supper. The former symbolized the bestowment of the divine grace through union with Christ; the latter was the memorial of his sacrificial death and the sign and pledge of the believer's participation in his life. Baptism is "into the name of Christ" (*cf.* 1 Cor. i. 13–16) or "into Christ" (Rom. vi. 3).[1] It is a symbol of union with Christ. Paul calls it baptism into death and into Christ's death, and explains his meaning by speaking of the baptized as united with the likeness of Christ's death and resurrection (Rom. vi. 5). It is not baptism considered as an outward rite, but baptism considered in its inner import, which portrays this ingrafting into

[1] In 1 Cor. xv. 29, 30 Paul alludes to a custom of baptizing the living in behalf of (*ὑπέρ*) persons who had died without baptism. He gives no explicit sanction to this custom, although the use which he makes of it in his argument seems to show that he felt no objection to it. We can only conjecture the motive of this vicarious baptism. Dr. McGiffert, *Apostolic Age*, p. 272, suggests that it was meant to express the idea that those who had died without baptism had died with Christ and would rise with him.

Christ. His point is that baptism commits one to a holy life. It betokens a moral renewal — a death to sin and a life to holiness. The baptized should regard himself, as it were, as buried out of sight of the sinful world, and as risen with Christ into the world of the spirit. This moral import of baptism Paul figuratively represents as a dying, burial, and resurrection with Christ, because, as we have seen, these are Christ's supreme saving deeds. It is sometimes said that Paul considers the form of baptism as a picture of Christ's death, burial, and resurrection. This view is not warranted by his language, and, indeed, misconceives his point in Rom. vi. 1–7. Baptism is a symbol of moral renewal which is figuratively represented as a dying to sin and a rising to holiness; or, in a mystical manner, as a dying with Christ on his cross and a rising with him from the grave. The characteristic thing in Paul's thought here is the cessation from the sinful life, which he calls dying with Christ, and the realization of the holy life which he calls rising with Christ. With these he starts out in his reply to the supposed objection to his doctrine (Rom. vi. 1, 2). Then baptism as fitly symbolizing such a death and burial occurs to him. He never speaks of baptism as a symbol of the historic facts of Christ's death, burial, and resurrection.

We are repeatedly reminded in the Acts of the Apostles that the early Church was largely built up by the accession of households (xi. 14; xvi. 31; xviii. 8). These came into the Church from without. But in due time the Christian family would develop within the Church. It would be a matter of great interest if we possessed the means of clearly tracing the process by which the comparative individualism of the first days gradually gave way to a recognition of the saving significance of Christian family life and of the social operation of the divine grace. Did Paul in any way take account of this? Are his principles favorable or unfavorable to a ritualistic recognition of it by the Church? He speaks, as the Book of Acts does (xvi. 15, 33, 34), of the baptism of households (1 Cor. i. 16). But, of course, it cannot be proved that they contained young children.

In 1 Cor. vii. 14 the children of Christian parents are termed "holy" (*ἁγιά*). This can hardly mean less than that they stand in a special relation to the grace of God which is mediated through a Christian inheritance and a Christian nurture. It is very doubtful, however, if the baptism of such children was thought of by Paul, since he also says that the unbelieving partner in the marriage relation is rendered holy (*ἡγίασται*, vii. 14) by the believing one. He is thinking of the organic life of the family as a means for the transmission of spiritual blessing. The Christian wife may be the medium of the divine grace to the un-Christian husband, and *vice versa*. If even one parent is Christian, the child will be born within the "household of faith" (Gal. vi. 10) and will be the presumptive inheritor of a Christian environment and training. Whether these and similar considerations which emerge in both the Old Testament and the New, and bear upon the significance and function of the family in the Kingdom of God, are a sufficient warrant for the early and widespread practice of household baptism is a question which carries us over into the field of doctrinal theology and is not pertinent to our present investigation.

Paul has preserved to us, in 1 Cor. xi. 23–25, the earliest narrative of the establishment of the Lord's supper which we possess. It is as follows: "For I received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, how that the Lord Jesus in the night in which he was betrayed took bread; and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, This is my body, which is for you: this do in remembrance of me. In like manner also the cup, after supper, saying, This cup is the new covenant in my blood: this do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me." That the bread and wine were regarded, both by our Lord and by Paul, as symbols is evident, not only because Jesus was bodily present with his disciples when he spoke the words of institution, but because it is impossible to take the words: "This cup is the new covenant" literally, as the words: "This is my body" have been so extensively taken. There can be no doubt that for Paul

the supper was a perpetual memorial of the Lord's sacrificial death. It is a visible witness to the believer of the saving grace of God bestowed in Christ's death. But we have seen that, to Paul's mind, this death does not simply affect man's life externally and legally. There is a "fellowship of his sufferings" by becoming conformed unto his death (Phil. iii. 10), in which the believer is to participate. Hence the supper does not merely denote something wrought *for us*, but also something wrought *in us*. He calls it *κοινωνία*: "The cup of blessing is communion or participation in the blood of Christ" (1 Cor. x. 16). Spiritual fellowship with Christ, entrance into his life, is, for the apostle, an essential element in the meaning of the supper. Hence it symbolizes the spiritual unity of all believers in Christ: "Because there is one bread, we, the many, are one body; for we all partake of the one bread" (1 Cor. x. 17). All Christians are one because they draw their life from a common source. They are bound together because they are bound to Christ.

Recurring now to Paul's use of the word "church" in its wider sense, we observe that it is a name for the total company of all believers on earth. At the parousia the present world-period (*αἰὼν οὗτος*, Gal. i. 4; 1 Cor. iii. 18) will terminate and the Messianic age (*αἰὼν μέλλων*, Eph. i. 21) will begin. To the former age belongs the Church; to the latter, the Kingdom of God. The Church is the partial realization of Christian society here on earth — ideally perfect, indeed, but never really so. The Kingdom will be the perfected society in the life to come.

In Paul's view the Church is one. It is made up of many local assemblies, people of many lands, speaking diverse languages. There are differences of opinion and of practice, but it never occurred to Paul that these differences constituted a basis of division. The common salvation and lordship of Christ bind all believers together into one fellowship. "Is Christ divided?" (1 Cor. i. 13) he exclaims when the Christians of Corinth began to draw apart in consequence of their preferences for different Christian teachers. Paul's favorite figure for expressing

the unity of the Church is that of the body, which is an organic unity, though composed of many and diverse parts: "We, who are many, are one body in Christ, and severally members one of another" (Rom. xii. 5); "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ" (1 Cor. xii. 12). Christ is the bond which unites all the members of the Church into one. Each is a member of his body, and no one can cast the other out. "The eye cannot say to the hand, I have no need of thee: or again the head to the feet, I have no need of you" (1 Cor. xii. 21). If the parts of the body could thus separate themselves off one from another, there would soon be, as Paul says, no *body* left. But this cannot be. So long as there is a body of Christ at all, it must be one. The Church is one in spite of itself. All who are joined to Christ rightfully belong to it, and no one can really cast him out, for Christ hath received him (Rom. xiv. 3; xv. 7). Some may "eat all things" without scruple; others may "eat herbs" (xiv. 2). Such differences do not divide the body of Christ. The Church is one in Christ, and it cannot divide itself, any more than it can divide Christ. It may try to divide itself, but its division is only in outward seeming; it is a human pretence and not a reality. On Paul's principles, what we call "the holy Catholic Church — the communion of saints" on earth — is one as Christ is one, and no human power can destroy that indivisible unity. In Ephesians this thought receives a magnificent development where the apostle depicts Christ as the unifying bond of all saving powers and processes. It is the purpose of God to unite all things under the headship of Christ and in union with him, to put all things under his feet, and to make him head over all things to the Church, which is his body (Eph. i. 10, 22). Here we note an expansion of the idea of the Church so that it approximates the conception of the "Church triumphant." The attainment of the ultimate goal of redemption is comprehended in Christ's function as head of the Church. Here "the Church" virtually coincides

with "the Kingdom of God" as used in the earlier epistles.

As the figure of the body is Paul's favorite representation of the unity of the Church, so that of a temple, or other building, is that by which he sets forth its symmetry and sanctity. The Church is a spiritual sanctuary (*ναός*), whose defilement by jealousy and strife is sacrilege (1 Cor. iii. 16, 17). The Christian who is a part of this temple must have no association with idol-shrines, for "what agreement hath a temple of God with idols?" (2 Cor. vi. 16). The apostle uses this idea of the sacredness of the Church to emphasize the sin of conformity, on the part of believers, to heathen customs and of marriage with unbelievers (2 Cor. vi. 14, 15). In Ephesians Paul uses the same figure to picture the process of redemption and the goal which it contemplates. Believers are built up into a spiritual house "on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone." Each part of this spiritual building is so adjusted to its own place and use that the whole rises into a temple hallowed by the presence of the Lord — a sanctuary in which the Spirit of God dwells (ii. 21, 22). Another figure for the Church is that of a tilled field (*θεοῦ γεώργιον*, 1 Cor. iii. 9) — a figure which is especially adapted to suggest that each member has his own work, for example, that of tilling or of irrigating, and that he should do this without disparagement or jealousy of others. In any case the laborers are but the instruments of God in accomplishing his work; they are God's "fellow-workers." "But God giveth the increase" (1 Cor. iii. 6–9). He is the efficient cause of all growth and progress. Hence the laborers in his field should respect one another as all alike are his husbandmen. Each should regard his work as supplementing that of others. The toil of all should coöperate to a common end.

The Church in this general sense in which we are now speaking of it was not formally organized into an outward unity in the apostolic age. The local congregations which composed the Church at large were, in most cases, far

apart. They were scattered over an immense range of territory stretching from Jerusalem to Rome. The unity among these widely separated congregations was spiritual. They shared a common truth and a common life. They all partook of the same spiritual food, and drank the same spiritual drink, and the common source of supply for them all was known to be Christ (1 Cor. x. 3, 4). A common participation in God's spiritual benefits made the Church of Paul's day and that of the Old Testament times one: the little companies of Christians, dispersed over a large part of the Roman world, were similarly bound together, but by a more definite and tangible bond of union. There was no central government which extended over them all, no officers who possessed authority over them all, or even over all those comprised within a given district. Whatever the functions of bishops and elders, — whether they denote the same persons or not, — the sphere of their official activity was local.

But was each local church, then, left entirely alone to take care of itself? Not wholly so. The apostle Paul, for example, was a kind of overseer to all the Gentile churches. He concerned himself for their welfare; he wrote them letters, even if he had not personally founded them, as in the case of the Roman and the Colossian churches; he visited them when he was able. Through him one Church learned about the progress and devotion of others. Mutual interest was fostered. The apostle was a kind of medium of communication and bond of connection between these widely scattered churches. No doubt other apostles performed, on a smaller scale, the same office. Such oversight would be sure, as occasion demanded, to grow into a more definite supervision, as in the work of Timothy at Ephesus and of Titus among the churches in Crete.

There were other Christian preachers and teachers whose labors were not always confined to any one place. Besides apostles Paul speaks of "prophets and teachers" (1 Cor. xii. 28), and, again, of "prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers" (Eph. iv. 11). These titles are introduced to

illustrate the variety of gifts which has been bestowed upon the Church. They do not, at any rate in most cases, designate offices, but functions or endowments. Paul continues the list thus: "then miracles, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, divers kinds of tongues" (1 Cor. xii. 28). But although the prophets, teachers, and evangelists of the early Church were not, as such, Church officers, yet they, no doubt, served in some degree to bring the churches into relations with each other and to foster the feeling of a common life and interest. The evangelists at least seem to have travelled from place to place, and would naturally concern themselves for all the believers with whom they would come into contact. They might be, at the same time, officers in some local church, as was Philip "the evangelist" who was also "one of the seven" (Acts xxi. 8). The labors of such men, so far as they were not merely local, would tend to foster a common consciousness and a sense of unity among the believers of various localities. The believers would thus be helped to refer their differing gifts and functions to the one Spirit and to connect their various duties with the one Lord.

In the early Church, outwardly considered, we seem to see only isolation and division. There was the great division between Jewish and Gentile Christianity. For a time this threatened to separate the Church into two irreconcilable factions. But this danger was averted mainly through the labors and arguments of Paul, who was able to show that the old covenant was fulfilled in the new, that the gospel was complete and sufficient in itself, and that grace and faith are the principles on which men always have been and always must be saved. Then appeared the divisions over various teachers, over the relation of the believer to heathen practices, over points of ritual and of etiquette. Some of these differences were trifling and could be easily composed, but others were serious and far-reaching. Yet the believers were held together, largely by the power of Paul's comprehensive view of Christian unity. Many of the grounds on which, in subsequent times, Christians have separated have been

trifling compared to some of the apparent reasons for division which existed in Paul's day. Yet he held them together, and he did so because he believed, and succeeded in making others believe, that the Church's true unity is not outward but inward; that it does not consist in uniform opinions or uniform ritualistic practice, but in the unity of the Spirit. This unity was what the apostle labored to induce his churches to keep (Eph. iv. 3), and they kept it—not, indeed, perfectly, but sufficiently to prevent the believing community from falling apart into unsympathetic divisions over every point of difference that might arise. It was reserved for a later age to develop a conception of Church unity which is widely different from Paul's, namely, that of a leaden uniformity of opinion and practice. This conception has been in full operation for many centuries. It has worked out its results on the largest scale in modern Protestantism on the principle that the Church is a means of discriminating against those who have defective opinions, and that men who differ in some theory or point of ritual cannot, of course, belong to the same Church. Had this principle prevailed in the apostolic age, the early Church would have been rent into contending factions. That this principle, which so readily allies itself with human prejudice and selfishness, was not permitted to assert itself and to do its divisive work in the early Church, must be credited, I think, in great measure to the splendid advocacy, by the apostle Paul, of a truer and more Christian view.[1]

[1] "The one real sin against the unity of the Church is the spirit which would exclude from its fellowship any who confess Christ as Head and own the common brotherhood in him." D. W. Forrest, *The Christ of History and of Experience*, p. 287.

CHAPTER XII

ESCHATOLOGY

THE conceptions of the apostle which fall under this head are chiefly developed in connection with his descriptions of the Christian's hope of a life beyond this. The Lord's second coming and the resurrection are the most prominent themes of Paul's eschatology. His arguments on both these subjects are directed towards the strengthening of the believer's faith and hope. To the Lord's parousia the apostle, with the whole apostolic Church, looked forward as the great day of deliverance and triumph, when Christ should destroy his enemies by the brightness of his coming (2 Thess. ii. 8). He dwelt upon the resurrection in order to remove the difficulties and objections which were felt by the Greek mind with regard to it, and to assure the Corinthian believers that there would be provided, even in the spiritual world, a suitable embodiment for the spirit (1 Cor. xv. 12 *sq.*). The references by Paul to other eschatological themes than these are rather incidental.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the apostle expected the personal, visible return of Christ to occur in the near future. In 1 Thessalonians he expresses himself in such a way as to show that he hoped to be living at the parousia. In his preaching Paul had emphasized the hope of Christ's speedy coming (v. 2). When some of the members of the church died, the question naturally arose: How should those who had died stand related to the Lord's advent? Would not they be at some disadvantage as compared with the living, who would be ready and waiting to enter at once into the joys and rewards of the Messianic Kingdom? To this difficulty the apostle

addresses himself in 1 Thess. iv. 13–18. He assures his readers "by the word of the Lord" — some saying of Jesus which he regards as covering the point — that those who have fallen asleep in Jesus will be at no disadvantage. The certainty of resurrection is the guaranty of their full and immediate participation in the Messianic blessedness at the parousia. At the Lord's coming "the dead in Christ" shall at once arise so as to be ready to join the living in being caught up into the clouds to meet the Lord in the air, hence to be ever with the Lord (*v.* 17). Paul evidently regards those members of the Church who had died as forming in this scene a minority as compared with those who should be living, among whom he himself expected to be. Twice he uses the expression: "*We* that are alive" (ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες, *vv.* 15, 17), in contrast to those who shall have died before the Lord returns. The well-known fact to which the whole New Testament testifies, that the apostolic Church regarded the parousia as near at hand, confirms this natural interpretation of the passage in question.

Did the apostle abandon this expectation in later years? It is certainly less prominent in the later epistles. The references to it are less definite. Still, the Lord's coming is urged as a motive to faithfulness. The Corinthians are urged to await the Lord's coming (1 Cor. i. 7, 8); to refrain from judging "until the Lord come, who will both bring to light the hidden things of darkness and make manifest the counsels of the hearts" (iv. 5). In his later letters also he refers to the manifestation of Christ in glory (Col. iii. 4), and his watchword still is: "The Lord is at hand" (ὁ κύριος ἐγγύς, Phil. iv. 5). Such are the facts. The natural inference to be drawn from the facts is that, as time went on, the parousia ceased to be central in Paul's thought. The great controversies over the doctrine of salvation drew his attention away from that subject and concentrated it upon other themes. Thus there took place a change of emphasis and of proportion in the apostle's doctrine. It is improbable that the expectation of personally surviving the parousia remained so fixed and defi-

nite in his mind as it was in his earlier ministry. How could this be the case, when in prison he faced the prospect of speedy martyrdom? He still believed that in the near future the Lord would come to consummate his Kingdom and to judge the world, but he must have deemed it less and less likely that he would still be living when that event should occur. It would be natural that the expectation of the advent should lose something of its definiteness with the passing of time and the unfolding of events. Still we cannot affirm, as some have done, that Paul changed his opinion respecting the nature or the nearness of the second advent. All that can be legitimately inferred from his language is that his later expectation was less definite and precise, and that the parousia had a relatively less prominent place in his thoughts than it had formerly occupied.

This changed emphasis may be accounted for in part by considerations which meet us in the passage commonly called "the Pauline Apocalypse," 2 Thess. ii. 1–12. The practical effect at Thessalonica of the preaching of the Lord's speedy return had been to develop fanaticism. Some had relinquished their employments and given themselves up to idleness and to indifference respecting the present life (2 Thess. iii. 11, 12). The apostle must have perceived the dangers attending a form of expectation which so easily led to such results. In the second Epistle he seeks to recover his readers from the fanatical excitement into which they had been thrown by directing their attention to certain intermediate events which must happen before the parousia. He declares that he had never taught them, and that there is no reason to believe, that the day of the Lord is on the very point of dawning (ἐνέστηκεν, ii. 2), that is, in the immediate future. Various events must precede it. Not until these have occurred should the parousia be expected. These intermediate events are described by the terms, "the apostasy" (ii. 3), the revelation of "the man of sin, the son of perdition" (*v.* 3), and the "mystery of lawlessness" (*v.* 7). The apostle evidently has in mind some form of the doctrine

of the *dolores Messiæ* which was current in Judaism. Messiah's advent is to be preceded by dread signs and portents.

Within what sphere these events were to occur and of what nature they were to be, are questions on which the most divergent opinions have been entertained. I hold that the manifestation of evil of which the apostle speaks was conceived of as occurring within the sphere of anti-Christian Judaism. This view is favored both by the opposition to his work, which he had encountered from the Jews (*cf.* Acts xiii. 46, 50; xiv. 2; xvii. 13), and by the terms in which he describes the wickedness in question. It is an "apostasy," which naturally suggests a defection from the true religion, and is embodied in a "lawless one," apparently a false Messiah, who takes his place in the temple and sets up blasphemous pretensions. The power which is holding this "mystery of wickedness" in check is, I cannot doubt, the Roman Empire. This view is favored alike by the vague terms in which Paul names it (*ὁ κατέχων*; *τὸ κατέχον*, *vv.* 6, 7), which are quite natural in connection with the intimation of its approaching destruction (*ἕως ἐκ μέσου γένηται*, *v.* 7), and by his experience in being protected by the Roman power against Jewish fanaticism during this period of his career (*cf.* Acts xix. 35–41; xxii. 22–29). It should not be claimed, however, on the ground of this passage that Paul changed his view of the parousia between the time of writing the first and that of writing the second Epistle. He simply qualified his statement of it by emphasizing considerations which were adapted to temper the expectation of the parousia as immediate by directing attention to certain events which must first occur. The materials for this representation, which does not meet us elsewhere in Paul, were present in his mind and are amply illustrated in the existing form of one Synoptic tradition. They represent a survival in the early Church of the Jewish conception of the premonitions and accompaniments of Messiah's advent. This conception was transferred by the disciples from the first to the second coming

and modified in accordance with what Jesus was supposed to have said respecting his advent and interpreted, as in the present case, in the light of the progress of events.

It must have been a great change for Paul to pass from the Jewish to the Christian view of death. To the mind of the Jew death was the greatest of misfortunes. It was departure to Sheol, a gloomy realm of shadows and forgetfulness. It was the forfeiture of life, the loss of life's fulness and richness, abandonment to a vague and purposeless existence, a state of deprivation and incompleteness. For Paul the Christian all this was changed. Death was departure to be with Christ, which is better than continued life on earth (Phil. i. 23); it is the portal to a full and happy existence in which the believer is "at home with the Lord" (2 Cor. v. 6–8). Death is not to be feared, but to be welcomed, because it is the gate to eternal fulness of life. Death, as the Jew knew and dreaded it, exists for the Christian no more. This conception was no doubt rooted in Paul's conviction of the believer's union with Christ, confirmed probably by words of Jesus concerning the future life with which he was familiar (*cf.* 1 Thess. iv. 15). As involving the dissolution of man's earthly body, death remains; but for the Christian its power is broken, its sting is taken away (1 Cor. xv. 56). The believer knows that death shall not have dominion over him; that life shall subdue the "last enemy" (xv. 26), and that death shall be "swallowed up in victory" (xv. 54). Hence Paul is fond of describing death, by a euphemism, as a sleep in Jesus (1 Thess. iv. 14; 1 Cor. vii. 39; xv. 6, 18, 20, etc.). The term expresses the blessed rest in fellowship with Christ into which the believer enters at death. Death is robbed of its terrors and is seen as the entrance into the fulness of peace, joy, and blessedness.

It is in connection with this conception of death as the entrance into fulness of life that Paul develops his doctrine of resurrection. As I have said, the immediate occasion of his defending this doctrine at so great length was the denial of it by some (1 Cor. xv. 12) who were evidently

possessed of the common Greek idea that the soul, as a spiritual entity, was sufficient unto itself and required no embodiment (*v.* 35). The apostle's argument proceeds on the assumption that in passing from this world into a higher sphere man's personality is not to be dismembered; that his corporeal life, like his spiritual life, is to be continuous and unbroken. The primary ground of this conviction lies in Paul's mysticism. It is union with Christ which, to his mind, guarantees this continuity of life. Christ's resurrection is the pledge that God will bring from the dead those who are fallen asleep in him (1 Thess. iv. 14; 1 Cor. xv. 12–19). Paul starts from the fact that Christ rose from the dead. That being true, the possibility of resurrection cannot be sweepingly denied (*v.* 12). Now Christ's resurrection carries with it the resurrection of those who are united to him (*v.* 20). Moreover, our salvation would be only an imperfect affair if it related only to this life (*v.* 19). If the idea of resurrection is to be summarily ruled out of Christian belief and hope, then the apostle's doctrine of salvation would rest upon an error of fact, since the assertion that Christ rose from the dead was central in it (*v.* 15) and, equally, upon a delusive hope for the future since, in that case, we should be without the guaranty of triumph over death (*vv.* 16–18). But when we know that Christ, the spiritual head of humanity, has risen from the dead, all is changed. Faith and hope have strong foundations (*v.* 21 *sq.*), and sufferings for the cause of Christ are amply justified (*vv.* 31, 32).

These arguments are adapted to foster faith in the resurrection, but they do not clear it of the difficulty: How can it be conceived as happening? With what sort of a body is the subject of resurrection clothed (*v.* 35)? The apostle declares the objection superficial, and appeals to analogies to show that transformations from one form of being to another, and the variety of bodies which we observe in nature, suggest the reasonableness of an appropriate embodiment for the spirit in the heavenly world. His first illustration is drawn from seed-grain. The kernel which is buried in the earth is transformed by

nature into a new product; to the life which the seed enfolds God gives a new form or body through the mysterious operation of natural law (*vv.* 36–38). This analogy is adapted to suggest both the possible organic connection between the present and the future body and, also, the superiority of the latter. He next appeals to the variety of embodiments which God provides for different creatures, — men, beasts, fishes, — which are, in each case, adapted to the environment and needs of the several orders of being (*v.* 39). "All flesh is not the same flesh." Again: If we contemplate the heavenly bodies, we behold great variety in magnitude and beauty. Here we observe higher and lower; more and less glorious (*vv.* 40, 41). "So also," says the apostle, "is the resurrection of the dead." There may be a future embodiment for the spirit as much higher than the present as the spiritual world is beyond this material world, as well adapted to the uses of man's personality in a higher realm of existence as the present body is adapted to this, and as much surpassing our present body of flesh and blood as one star surpasses another star in splendor. "There is a spiritual body" (*σῶμα πνευματικόν*), a glorified corporeity, adapted to the spiritual world, as truly as there is "a natural body" (*σῶμα ψυχικόν*) adapted to our life in this world (*v.* 44). Paul's gospel is the gospel of the body as well as of the spirit. The whole personality is to be conserved and saved. No part of our life is to be discarded, but all is to be fulfilled and perfected. Salvation includes "the redemption of the body" (Rom. viii. 23).

It is obvious that these considerations do not answer all the questions which it is natural to ask concerning the subject. The apostle does not undertake to say what is the nature of this higher embodiment, this "house from heaven" (2 Cor. v. 2), which God will provide for the redeemed spirit. It is enough for him to know that it will be in the image of the glorified Christ (1 Cor. xv. 49) — a body conformed to his own glorious body (Phil. iii. 21). What the relation will be between the present body and

that which is to be, Paul does not say. His analogy of the relation of the seed to its product suggests at once a connection and a difference. The grain comes out of the seed, but it is also something new and different from it. "Thou sowest not the body that shall be" (*v.* 37). The analogy would be quite inappropriate if the apostle had conceived the resurrection as consisting in the resuscitation of the buried flesh. It was enough for Paul to maintain a continuity of corporeal life. It is unlikely that he had any precise conception of the mysterious connection between the psychical and the spiritual bodies.

How, then, does Paul conceive of resurrection (*ἀνάστασις*)? What is raised, and from what is it raised? It is to be noticed that Paul does not speak of the resurrection *of the body*, as he naturally would have done had he believed in a *resurrectio carnis*. He always predicates resurrection of *persons*. His uniform phrases are: *ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν*, or *τῶν νεκρῶν*, and *ἀνάστασις ἐκ νεκρῶν* (1 Cor. xv. 12, 13, 21, *et al.*; Rom. vi. 4; vii. 4 *et al.*) The latter expression he regularly applies to Christ's resurrection;[1] the former to the resurrection of other persons. It is therefore the *person* who is raised and he rises from among the dead (*ἐκ νεκρῶν*), that is, from the abode of the dead, conceived of by the Jewish mind as the underworld. Unless Paul had completely abandoned the conception of Sheol he would necessarily conceive of resurrection as a rising from the realm of death. For him, resurrection is neither resurrection of the body nor resurrection from the ground in which the body is buried, but is a rising of the personality from the realm of death into the realm of light and life, whereupon the spirit is clothed with its heavenly habitation. In this Jewish form the apostle has expressed the contents of his Christian hope respecting the blessed

[1] In Phil. iii. 11, however, the apostle writes: "If by any means I may attain unto the resurrection from the dead" (*εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τὴν ἐκ νεκρῶν*). The phrase refers to the resurrection of believers, elsewhere expressed by *ἀνάστασις* [*τῶν*] *νεκρῶν*, but this resurrection is here mystically conceived of as participation in the resurrection of Christ (*cf.* *v.* 10), and is thus naturally described in the terms which are regularly applied to Christ's resurrection.

and perfect life. He has not touched upon the numerous questions which speculation suggests. These questions did not concern him. His interest in the subject was entirely religious and practical. It was enough for him to know that Christ was the guaranty of a perfected life to come, that the believer should triumph over death, and attain his complete salvation in the fellowship and likeness of Christ.

Did Paul, then, believe in an intermediate state? His views of the resurrection as a rising from the underworld and as a definite future event, would seem to involve the idea of a middle state. Yet he has developed no doctrine on that subject. Perhaps his neglect of it may have been due to his expectation that the parousia was near. On such a view the significance of an intermediate state would be greatly reduced. Against the supposition that Paul believed in such a state between death and resurrection, may be urged the fact that he describes Christians as entering at death into immediate fellowship with Christ (2 Cor. v. 6–8; Phil. i. 23). How is this idea of perfected blessedness at death to be adjusted to the idea that the resurrection is a future eschatological event occurring in connection with the Lord's second coming? The apostle has furnished us with no means of answering this question. If we solve the problem by making the resurrection a process, or by supposing that an imperfect preliminary embodiment which is, perhaps, subject to a development, is given at death, we go quite beyond Paul. Some such supposition, however, seems necessary if the two conceptions in question are to be adjusted at all.

Paul does not hold the conception of two resurrections, that of believers, and that of the rest of mankind, separated by a millennium or other period. The words: "The dead in Christ shall rise *first*" (1 Thess. iv. 16), stand over against the words: "*Then* we that are alive shall be caught up" (*v.* 17). The correlatives πρῶτον and ἔπειτα here refer to the rising of the dead in Christ as a *first* event, to be followed *next* by the translation of believers, and contain no reference to a second resurrection. Some

find the idea of two resurrections in the words: "Christ the first-fruits; then they that are Christ's at his coming. Then cometh the end," etc. (1 Cor. xv. 23, 24), that is, the end *of the resurrection*, that is, the resurrection of non-Christians. But this interpretation is improbable in view of the words which follow and which seem to explain "the end," namely: "When he shall deliver up the kingdom to God, even the Father" (*v.* 24). "The end" most naturally refers to Christ's consummation of his Kingdom, and denotes the termination of the present world-period, the goal of human history.

Whether Paul held that the resurrection will be universal or not is a difficult and disputed question. In Acts xxiv. 15 he is described as asserting "a resurrection both of the just and unjust." In his epistles, however, he nowhere speaks of a resurrection of all mankind, unless he does so in the passages just noticed. The words: "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. xv. 22), can hardly be appealed to in support of the absolute universality of the resurrection, since the context and drift of the whole argument naturally limit "all," in its concrete application, to those who are in living fellowship with Christ. Moreover, the whole argument for the resurrection, in 1 Cor. xv., is based upon mystic union with Christ as its ground and guaranty, and would be inapplicable to unbelievers. Such are the facts of the case. What is the natural inference from the facts? Those who argue from the silence of the epistles respecting the resurrection of unbelievers and from the applicability of his arguments to Christians only, may be referred to Acts xxiv. 15, and to the fact that, according to Paul, all men are to be judged (1 Cor. vi. 2; xi. 32), and that Paul regards the judgment as preceded by and presupposing resurrection. Moreover, the argument of 1 Cor. xv., which was addressed to Christians, may have been constructed in view of a special situation, and may not have represented the only ground on which Paul would have affirmed belief in the resurrection. On the whole, it is probable that he assumed the resurrection of all men,

though in some different sense and with different accompaniments and conditions, in the case of the righteous and in that of the wicked respectively.

All men are amenable to the final judgment. The work of Christians shall be tested and approved or rejected, but even if the work is burned up in the fire of the judgment, the persons shall be saved, but as if by escaping through the flames which consume their misdirected life-work (1 Cor. iii. 14, 15). "We shall all (that is, all Christians) stand before the judgement-seat of Christ. Each of us shall give account of himself to God" (Rom. xiv. 10, 12). But in the day of judgment God will render to all men according to their works (Rom. ii. 5–9). The apostle here seems to describe the judgment in strictly legal terms, and to represent its awards as bestowed according to the works of men (2 Cor. v. 10). How can such a conception be harmonized with the doctrine that God deals generously with the obedient and trustful. If equivalence to one's deeds is the principle of award in the judgment, what becomes of the doctrine of grace? Various answers have been proposed for this difficulty. It has been held that the correlatives, faith and works, and grace and debt, express theoretic contrasts which are resolved in application to life and character. Some have said that Paul's doctrine of judgment remained Jewish, and was never assimilated to his doctrine of grace. It is certain that Paul has expressed his doctrine of judgment in Jewish, rather than in evangelical, terms. But the suggestion of Weiss, that the equivalence between the awards and the deeds done "is not to be regarded in the rigid judicial sense, but as the natural correspondence of harvest and seed-time" (Gal. vi. 7, 8),[1] seems to me very pertinent. The Christian's "deeds" are not regarded by Paul as legal "works" of merit, but as deeds and services which, as inwardly inspired by the Spirit, naturally flow from the Christian life. It is no more necessary to separate Paul's doctrine of judgment from his gospel of grace and faith than it is to read his doctrine of salvation in juridical

[1] *Bibl. Theol.* § 98, *d.*

terms alone, because of his doctrine of justification. For some reason Paul did not carry over the terms of his doctrine of grace and apply them to the subject of final judgment. But it is impossible that he could have conceived of the principle of equivalence as having the same application, in the judgment, to the believer and to the unbeliever. For the former whom God has graciously accepted and forgiven there is "no condemnation," either here or hereafter. His references to the judgment must be read in the light of his central doctrine of gracious forgiveness.

The order of the events which we have studied, as Paul conceives it, is, the parousia, the resurrection, and the judgment. These issue in the final consummation of the Messianic Kingdom. Then Christ, after vanquishing all enemies, will surrender to God his mediatorial Kingdom, that God may be all in all (1 Cor. xv. 24–28; Col. i. 20; Phil. ii. 10, 11). The apostle is confident of the victory of Christ over all opposing powers. Does he conceive this victory as involving the voluntary submission of all, that is, universal restoration to holiness, or does the supposition of a reduction of all foes to impotence, even should they remain foes, satisfy the apostle's language? Paul's strong expressions concerning the triumph of Christ must be understood in the light of his system as a whole. Taken in isolation such phrases as: "In Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. xv. 22), and, "that God may be all in all" (*v.* 28; *cf.* Eph. i. 10), strongly suggest universal restoration. But the former doubtless refers to resurrection and how can "all" be raised "in Christ" unless they first be joined to Christ by the union of faith and love? In the second phrase (*ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*), the word *πᾶσιν*, whether taken as masculine or neuter, cannot well be understood as more comprehensive than the "all things" which have just been mentioned as ruled over by the Son. All shall bow to Christ (Phil. ii. 10), but the apostle does not say that all shall willingly and obediently bow to him. He certainly does not conceive that, at the judgment, all will have received Christ, but that there will then be those who "are factious and obey

not the truth, but obey unrighteousness" to whom God will render "wrath and indignation, tribulation and anguish" (Rom. ii. 8, 9).[1]

The apostle's eschatology was the projection of Christian hope into the life beyond. The form of this hope was not a little affected by the views of the future life in which he had been trained. Paul was certain that God would judge the world in righteousness (Acts xvii. 31) and that a blessed and perfected life awaited the Christian. His language cannot be made to yield any definite and complete eschatological programme. The elements of his teaching are not coördinated into a scheme of doctrine. It is only by making the most generous inferences from his language that any of the modern eschatological systems can be derived from his teaching. On this subject, as on all others, he wrote, not with a view to satisfying speculative thought, but with the hope of fostering and strengthening the Christian faith and hope.

[1] On "Alleged Pauline Universalism" see Note C to Lecture IX. in Orr's *Christian View of God and the World.*

PART V

THE THEOLOGY OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

WITH respect to the historical problems which concern the Epistle to the Hebrews there is but a single point on which modern critics are substantially agreed, and that is the rather barren negative conclusion that the epistle was not written by the apostle Paul. This result is the less satisfying because there is no cogent reason known to us why it should ever have been regarded as Pauline. It does not claim to have been written by Paul, and the diction, style, and mode of argument are so widely different from Paul's as to furnish almost a demonstration that the epistle is the work of some other hand. Little, if any, progress, however, has been made in modern times towards a positive view respecting its authorship. Criticism is still compelled to acquiesce in the ancient opinion of Origen, as reported in Eusebius.[1]

The most plausible conjectures respecting the authorship are those of Tertullian and Luther, the former of whom assigned the epistle to Barnabas,[2] the latter to Apollos. Either of these suppositions would fairly well

[1] "Who it was that really wrote the epistle, God only knows." *Ecc. Hist.* Bk. VI. ch. xxv.

[2] "For there is extant an epistle of Barnabas, inscribed to the Hebrews, a man of such authority that Paul has placed him next to himself in the same course of abstinence" (1 Cor. ix. 6). *De Pudicitia*, ch. xx.

account for the phenomena of the epistle. As a prominent member of the Jerusalem Church and a disciple of the primitive apostles (*cf.* ii. 3), Barnabas might naturally write to his fellow-believers in Palestine to warn them against lapsing back into Judaism. Moreover, as a Hellenist from Cyprus, Barnabas might be supposed to possess the requisite literary qualifications for writing such an epistle, and as a Levite he might, not unnaturally, have the familiarity with the details of the Levitical worship and the keen interest in it which the epistle so frequently displays.[1] On the other hand, it is strange that if Barnabas, a man of apostolic rank and influence (Acts xiv. 4, 14), had been the writer, his name should not have been given to the epistle, or, at any rate, preserved in connection with it from the beginning. Moreover, we have no evidence that Barnabas possessed the Alexandrian culture which is revealed in the epistle. The principal consideration in favor of Apollos is that he is described in the Acts as a cultured and rhetorical Alexandrian, who was well versed in the Greek Old Testament.[2] This fact might account for the elaborate style, the Alexandrian cast, the kinship with Philo and the Book of Wisdom, and the copious use of the Septuagint in the epistle, while the fact that Apollos had come under the influence of Paul might be regarded as explaining its kinship to Paul's thought.[3] On the other hand, Apollos was not a disciple of the primitive apostles, as the author of Hebrews seems to have been (ii. 3). The argument carries us only thus far: The author, if not Apollos, was some such a man as Apollos was; he was a literary Hellenist, who was familiar with the philosophical ideas which were current at Alexandria and practised in the argumentative use of the Septuagint.

[1] Among the modern scholars who favor the Barnabas hypothesis may be mentioned Renan, Ritschl, Weiss, and Salmon.

[2] Acts xviii. 24 *sq.*; *cf.* 1 Cor. ii. 1–5, where Paul seems to be contrasting his own plain and straightforward style with the more rhetorical and speculative method of Apollos.

[3] Among the modern scholars who have adopted this view are Bleek, De Wette, Lünemann, Alford, and Farrar.

Respecting the nationality and location of the persons addressed, and the date of writing, scholars are still much divided. The common view is that the readers were Jewish Christians. Some, however, hold[1] that they were, at least in part, converted Jewish proselytes, and that the writer warns against a relapse into heathenism (*e.g.* in iii. 12; vi. 2; xiii. 9) as well as against a reversion to Judaism. The title, "To the Hebrews," cannot greatly help us here, since, although ancient, it is not original. The Alexandrian tone of the letter supplies but a slender basis for the view that it was addressed to Alexandria — the more so since we have no evidence that at Alexandria, where the epistle was so highly valued, anything was known of that city as being its original destination. A widely prevalent view at present — especially among the representatives of the German liberal school — is that the epistle was written to Rome. It is thought that the allusions to the persecutions of the readers (x. 32, 33; xii. 1–13) tally with the history of Roman persecutions under Nero and Domitian respectively, and that the allegorizing and typical method of interpretation found in the Epistle of Clement of Rome may have been derived from Hebrews, since Clement betrays a special fondness for this epistle. The fact that greetings are sent to the readers by the Italian Christians (xiii. 24) is also thought to point in the same direction. This theory is sometimes associated with the view that the Roman church was predominantly Jewish — an opinion which seems to me decidedly contrary to the evidence furnished by the Epistle to the Romans.[2] More commonly, however, those who now regard Rome as the destination of the letter hold that it was not addressed to Jewish Christians at all, but to Christians in general.[3]

[1] So Weizsäcker, von Soden, Pfleiderer.

[2] The view that our epistle was addressed to Rome is held by Pfleiderer, von Soden, Holtzmann, Jülicher, and McGiffert. Harnack and Ménégoz say that it is impossible to determine where the persons addressed resided.

[3] "The inscription 'To the Hebrews' is only the unhappy conjecture of a later time." Weizsäcker, *Apostolic Age*, II. 157 (orig. p. 490). "It

The more common view has been that the letter was written to Palestinian or Syrian Jewish Christians.[1] The numerous and detailed references to the Jewish temple-worship, the apparent reference to the readers as hearers of the primitive apostles (ii. 3), the allusion to the long time which had elapsed since their conversion (v. 12), and the fact that the whole burden of the letter is: Do not go back to the ritual law and the sacrificial worship, are among the reasons for this theory.[2] This view is not without difficulties. We should hardly expect to hear the dependent Palestinian Christians credited with such liberality and generosity as the author ascribes to his readers (vi. 10); yet the poor may be generous. The peculiar use which the author makes of the Septuagint may not have been perfectly adapted to Hebrew readers, but if he was trained in the Greek Bible it would be perfectly natural for him. All things considered, I hold this "traditional" opinion to be the best supported.

Closely connected with the question of destination is the question of date. Those who hold that the letter was addressed to the Christians of Rome commonly place it within the reign of Domitian (81–96).[3] The more common view is that the epistle was written during the years 65–70.[4] The numerous references in the present tense to

is extremely unlikely that the epistle was addressed to Jewish Christians at all." McGiffert, *Apostolic Age*, p. 465.

[1] "To one of these great Syrian churches, perhaps to Antioch itself, I conceive the epistle to have been addressed; for there alone existed flourishing Christian churches, founded by the earliest missionaries of the gospel, animated with Jewish sympathies, full of interest in the Mosaic worship, and glorying in the name of Hebrews, who nevertheless spoke the Greek language, used the Greek version of the Scriptures, and numbered amongst their members those who had, like the author, combined the highest advantages of Greek culture with careful study of the Old Testament, and especially of the sacrificial law." Rendall, *Theology of the Hebrew Christians*, p. 69.

[2] This opinion is defended by Bleek, Weiss, Godet, Westcott, Hort, Bruce, and Beyschlag. Ménégoz holds that the epistle was written to Jewish Christians, but whether living in Rome, Palestine, or the Diaspora, cannot be determined.

[3] So Holtzmann, Pfleiderer, Jülicher, Harnack, McGiffert. Harnack, however, says that the epistle may be earlier than the reign of Domitian.

[4] So Weiss, Beyschlag, Sanday, Farrar, Ménégoz.

the temple-worship naturally imply that the temple was still standing at the time of writing. The whole character and scope of the argument against a reversion, on the part of the Christians, to the Levitical cultus seem to assume that the sacrificial system was a present reality and exerted a powerful attractive force upon the minds of the readers. To these considerations it is hardly a sufficient answer to say that the references to the temple services are made solely on account of their significance, and therefore do not imply the temple's existence at the time.

Although I hold to the earlier date and to the Palestinian, or Syrian, destination of our epistle, a pronounced view on these points is in no way essential to my present task. The doctrinal ideas of the epistle, and their relation to Paulinism on the one hand, and to Alexandrianism on the other, may be studied and determined independently of one's theory on these difficult and disputed points.

The aim of the epistle is to induce the readers to remain steadfast in their adherence to Christ. The burden of all the author's arguments and appeals is: Do not apostatize. The author fortifies his exhortation by an elaborate series of arguments designed to prove that the gospel is more perfect than Judaism. He first dwells on the superiority of Christ to the angels who (according to the Septuagint and Jewish tradition) introduced the legal system (chs. i., ii.); then upon his superiority to Moses, the great lawgiver (chs. iii., iv.). He then enters upon the most elaborate argument of the epistle to show that Christ's priesthood is superior to the Old Testament priesthood. The chief points of the argument are that Christ is a priest after a higher order (that of Melchizedek) than the Aaronic priests; that unlike them he ministers in the upper, heavenly sanctuary, the immediate presence of God; and that he is connected with a better covenant than that which God made with the Jewish people. These points are enforced with appropriate exhortations to fidelity (chs. v.–xii.). The letter closes with sundry advices and appeals (ch. xiii.).

The epistle betrays a general kinship to Paulinism. There is the same eagerness to prevent the readers from going back to Judaism which we find in Galatians — the same intense conviction of the defects of the Old Testament system, and of the completeness of the gospel, which Paul so frequently asserts. With Paul our author regards the old covenant as divine, but as having served its providential purpose and as having been superseded by the gospel. But these resemblances are, after all, very general. In their modes of thought and methods of argument the two writers differ widely. When Paul speaks of the law he refers primarily to its ethical content and requirements. To this writer the law means the Levitical cultus. The apostle's philosophy of the law as deepening the consciousness of sin and making transgressions abound, is wholly wanting in Hebrews. The reasons why the law cannot save are quite different in the two writers. With Paul the law cannot save because of the moral impotence of sinful man to keep it; with our author its failure is due to the inefficiency of animal sacrifices to cleanse the conscience. In Hebrews the law and the gospel are related as shadow and substance, promise and fulfilment; the contrariety of the two in principle and effect is less strongly emphasized than by Paul. Our author's conception of faith is less mystical than Paul's. With the former, faith is constancy, fidelity, heroic belief in the unseen and the apparently improbable; with Paul it is life-union with Christ. Of the import of circumcision, the opposition between flesh and spirit, Christ's endurance of the curse of the law, justification by faith, and the call of the Gentiles, our author says nothing. The likeness and differences to which I can only refer here will be more particularly noted in the exposition.[1]

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews was strongly imbued with Platonic and Alexandrian thought. The contrast between the lower world of shadows and semblances and the heavenly world of abiding realities which

[1] For an instructive study of our author's relation to Paulinism, see Ménégoz, *La Théologie de l'Épitre aux Hébreux*, ch. vi. § 2.

is so prominent in the epistle, reminds one of the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible world which Philo had derived from Plato. Many of our author's peculiar words, phrases, and allusions, such as the cutting word of God and the references to Melchizedek, are, doubtless, echoes of Philo. Most clearly of all do the allegorizing exegesis of our author and his exclusive use of the Septuagint betray his Alexandrian education. These peculiarities seem to me to lend a special interest and charm to his exposition of Christianity. Since we have interpretations of the gospel, largely in terms of Judaism, from the primitive disciples, James and Peter, and an elaborate exposition and defence of it from the bold and independent mind of the converted legalist, Paul, it is a matter of no small interest that we have also a rendering of Christianity in terms of the Alexandrian philosophy of religion. Yet these various tongues speak essentially one message.[1]

[1] In addition to the elaborate biblico-theological treatises of Riehm and Ménégoz on this epistle, I would particularly commend to the student a series of twenty papers by Professor A. B. Bruce, in the Third (Vols. VII.–X.) and Fourth Series (Vols. I., II.) of *The Expositor*. These articles take up the epistle part by part, and graphically portray its theological and practical contents.

CHAPTER II

THE OLD AND THE NEW COVENANT

THE author's main purpose is, as we have seen, to persuade his readers to remain faithful to Christ. In the effort to attain that end it is necessary for him to establish the superiority of the gospel to the law. This he does by exhibiting a series of contrasts between the two systems The comparison is chiefly made between Christ, on the one hand, and the angels, Moses, and the Aaronic priests, on the other. The author develops his argument both on its negative and on its positive side. He pictures the defects of the Mosaic system and dwells upon the superlative excellences of Christ and his work of salvation. It will be convenient, for purposes of analysis, to begin by deducing from the epistle the writer's doctrine of the old covenant.

Like the apostle Paul, our author regards the Old Testament system as divine in its origin. God made the old covenant with the fathers in the days of their deliverance from Egypt, although it was not a faultless covenant (viii. 7–9). It was the voice of God which, in the olden time, spoke through the prophets, although it gave but a partial disclosure of the divine will and purpose (i. 1). We have seen that, for our author, the sacrificial system was the centre and soul of Judaism. This he regards as divinely established The plan of the tabernacle and the arrangements for its worship were divinely revealed and sanctioned (viii. 5; ix. 1 *sq.*). Jewish history presents a long list of believers who have been the agents of God in the accomplishment of his purposes (xi.). Moses was God's faithful servant in the regulation and administration of his household, the Old Testament theocracy (iii.

2–5). With awe-inspiring portents the law was divinely promulgated on Sinai (xii. 18–21) and solemnly ratified by the covenant-sacrifice (ix. 18–21).

This teaching resembles that of Paul, who declares that the law, in itself, is "holy, righteous, and good" (Rom. vii. 12), and that it is "glorious," although its splendor pales before the surpassing glory of the gospel (2 Cor. iii. 7–11). The points of likeness and of difference can be best exhibited by ascertaining what were the specific defects of the Old Testament religion, as our author views the matter, and what the grounds of its failure to give men a secure sense of pardon and of peace with God.

The opening words of the epistle — *πολυμερῶς καὶ πολυτρόπως πάλαι ὁ θεὸς λαλήσας* — "in many parts and in many ways," etc. (i. 1), suggest the relative inferiority of the earlier revelation. It was given fragmentarily, by a series of providential dispensations, and was communicated to men by a great variety of means and methods. It lacked the marks of complete unity and finality which belong to the self-disclosure which God has made in his Son. Moreover, it was introduced by angels whose rank is far beneath that of Christ; his is the highest place of authority and dominion at God's right hand (i. 3), while they, the ministering servants of his people (i. 14), are bidden to render him homage (i. 6).

Our author here avails himself of an idea which meets us in but two other places in the New Testament (Acts vii. 53; Gal. iii. 19) — that of angelic mediation in the giving of the law. This idea is not found in the Hebrew Old Testament, but is probably derived from the Septuagint rendering of Deut. xxxiii. 2: "The Lord came from the myriads of holy ones," that is, issued forth from his heavenly dwelling-place, from the midst of the great company of angels which surrounded his throne. Here the Seventy introduced the very loose rendering, *ἄγγελοι μετ' αὐτοῦ*. This phrase readily lent itself to the support of the idea which was so current in the later Judaism, that the angels were the agents by whom the law was introduced into the world. In the speech of Stephen (Acts vii. 53)

this mediation of angels is regarded as heightening the dignity of the law and as emphasizing the guilt of those who transgress it, while by Paul (Gal. iii. 19) it is used to show that the law was not given immediately and directly by God, and was, therefore, inferior to the gospel promise, which was given without mediation Our author makes a similar use of the idea and dwells upon it at length. The angels who introduced the legal system are inferior in rank to the Son who is the author and theme of the gospel. Jehovah addresses him as his Son *par éminence* (i. 4, 5), and they are bidden to do obeisance to him when he comes in glory to judgment (i. 6).[1] The angels may, indeed, be likened to the swift and subtle powers of nature (i. 7), but to the Son is applied the highest title of divine majesty (ὁ θεός), and to him is ascribed supreme and universal dominion (i. 8 *sq.*). To no angel has Jehovah ever said: "Sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool" (i. 13); it is only the Messiah who is so addressed. To angels, on the contrary, is assigned the relatively humble position of acting as servants and attendants upon those who become partakers in the Messianic salvation (i. 14). Since, then, the agents by whom the old system was introduced are so inferior in nature, rank, and office to the Messiah, it follows that the system must be less complete as a revelation of God and less adequate to meet the needs of mankind. Our author's practical conclusion is: Since we possess a fuller revelation, we have a heavier responsibility; for if God severely punished disobedience to the earlier and less perfect legislation, with what strictness will he treat those who disregard the clearer light of the gospel (ii. 1, 2). We have here an example of the characteristic procedure of our author. Each point which is established by argument is enforced by an exhortation. Here, accordingly, the order of thought is: Since the gospel is so superior to the law in the dig-

[1] I refer this "bringing in of the first-born into the world" to the parousia, and not to the incarnation, resurrection, or exaltation. The reference to the second advent is favored by most modern interpreters, *e.g.* Riehm, Moll, Lünemann, Weiss, Davidson.

nity and authority of its introducing agent, do you remain faithful to him; in a word, do not apostatize.

The author's second argument, designed to show the superiority of the new covenant to the old, is that Christ takes rank above Moses, the great lawgiver of the Old Testament system (iii.). In this argument, however, even less than in the previous one, does the writer exhibit his real philosophy of Old Testament revelation. In both these arguments the primary intention is to exalt the person of Christ, and the defects of the Jewish religion, as contrasted with Christianity, are only hinted at so far as they are involved in the contrast between the rank of Christ and that of the angels and of Moses. Further consideration of these passages, therefore, may best be deferred until we come to the study of our author's doctrine of the person of Christ.

Another mark of imperfection which belonged to the old covenant was that its priests were weak and sinful men who needed to offer sacrifices for their own sins as well as for those of the people. The author graphically pictures the Old Testament priests as perpetually performing the round of animal offerings; and how ineffectual it all is! "Weak and unprofitable" is his verdict on Leviticalism (vii. 18). Everything about it is faulty. Its priests are erring men (vii. 28); its offerings are mere dumb animals, whose blood can never cleanse from sin (x. 4); the constant repetition of the sacrifices shows how unavailing they are, for if they were effectual their work would remain (x. 1, 11.). They can, indeed, keep alive the consciousness of sin (x. 3), but they are powerless to purge it away; they are mere outward symbolic transactions, useful only as pictorial representations of certain truths until the day of fuller revelation (ix. 10). Hence the sacrificial system cannot be final. It is external and symbolic, and, therefore, preparatory and provisional. It necessitates and prophesies a more adequate system. Its representatives, the prophets, discerned its inadequacy. They spoke of a new covenant, thereby implying that the system then existing was old, and if old, then destined

soon to pass away (viii. 13). Thus Judaism, conscious of its own imperfection, foretold its own abrogation. "I will make a new covenant," is Jehovah's word to Israel (viii. 8).

Thus it appears that our author holds essentially the doctrine of Jesus concerning the fulfilment of the law and the prophets in his own person and work. He is also at one with Paul in regarding the law as a temporary institute designed to serve a providential purpose in preparation for the gospel. But we have already followed him far enough to see that he has quite an original view of the nature and relations of the two systems. For Paul, indeed, the law is a rudimentary system of religion (Gal. iv. 3, 9), as it is for our author (vii. 16, 18). Both emphasize its outward or cosmic character.[1] But the emphasis is widely different in the two cases. The idea is quite differently carried out and applied by the two writers. For Paul the inadequacy of the law is not so much due to any inherent weakness as to its incapacity to enable man to obey the will of God. The law is "weak," but it is weak "through the flesh" (*διὰ τῆς σαρκός*, Rom. viii. 2), that is, unable to overcome the resistance to its demands which is made by the power of sin dwelling in the flesh. Paul would never characterize the law as carnal (*σάρκινος*, vii. 16) or as consisting of "carnal commandments" (*δικαιώματα σαρκός*, ix. 10). For our author, however, the legal system is inherently, and by reason of its external character, weak and unprofitable (vii. 18). It can "make nothing perfect" (*v.* 19) because it consists of a series of outward and morally ineffectual transactions. It cannot reconcile men to God; it cannot cleanse the heart from sin or give peace to the conscience; it cannot, therefore, accomplish that perfecting (*τελείωσις*, vii. 11) of man, that placing of him in right relations of fellowship and likeness to God, which is the ideal of religion. The difference between our author and Paul at this point is due, as has been mentioned, to the fact

[1] Paul: *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* (Gal. iv. 3). Hebrews: *νόμος ἐντολῆς σαρκίνης* (vii. 16); *δικαιώματα σαρκός* (ix. 10); *τὸ ἅγιον κοσμικόν* (ix. 1).

that the former views the law in its ceremonial, the latter in its ethical, aspects. Paul's doctrine of the law is a corollary of his doctrine of justification by faith; our author's is a corollary of his doctrine of the perfection of Christ's sacrifice. The two views are quite different, but they are not incompatible. The contrast between the two dispensations is most strikingly exhibited under the categories of type and reality, shadow and substance, and the like, which were probably adopted from the vocabulary of Alexandrian philosophy.

According to the conception of our author, the priestly *régime* belongs to the realm of the lower, the external, the pictorial; while the work of Christ belongs to the world of abiding and heavenly realities. The sacrificial rites of Judaism are a "copy and shadow of the heavenly things" (*ὑπόδειγμα καὶ σκιὰ τῶν ἐπουρανίων*, viii. 5), the pictured semblances of their spiritual and eternal counterpart which is embodied in the work of Christ. They bear a relation to their archetypes like that of the Mosaic tabernacle in the wilderness to the divine idea which was disclosed to Moses on Mount Sinai (viii. 5). This tabernacle was a "cosmic sanctuary" (*ἅγιον κοσμικόν*, ix. 1), a visible, earthly symbol and representation of the immediate presence of God where Christ is exercising his ministry for our salvation. It was a "parable" (*παραβολή*, ix. 9), or similitude, by which, in the pre-Christian age, certain religious truths were pictured forth. Its various appointments were "copies of the things in the heavens" (ix. 23), and its most holy place is an "antitype of the true" (ix. 24), an imitation of the ideal — heaven itself. The author sums up his argument, under this head, as follows: "For the law having a shadow of good things to come (*σκιὰ τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν*), not the very image of the things (*οὐκ αὐτὴν τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν πραγμάτων*), can never[1]

[1] I follow the reading *δύναται* here, which makes the subject *ὁ νόμος* (so Bleek, Tischendorf, Lünemann, Weiss, Farrar), instead of *δύνανται* (W. and H., R. V.), although the latter is more strongly supported by external evidence. On this reading the subject would be "the priests" understood. The idea is essentially the same in either case.

with the same sacrifices year by year, which they offer continually, make perfect (*τελειῶσαι*) them that draw nigh" (x. 1).

What is the nature of this contrast between "shadow" (*σκιά*) and "image" (*εἰκών*)? It is to be noticed that three things are here distinguished: the shadow, the image, and the good things (*ἀγαθά*). The law has the shadow (*σκιά*); the gospel has the very image (*εἰκών*) of the good things. The two systems are thus contrasted as containing, respectively, a less and a more adequate embodiment of divine truth. *Σκιά* means a meagre outline; *εἰκών* an exact representation. A rude pencil sketch of a man, or his shadow cast on a wall, would be a *σκιά*, while a lifelike statue representing him would be an *εἰκών*.[1] Both are relative terms, and their difference is, primarily, one of degree, though it may pass, as it does here, into a difference in kind. In the view of some the contrast is derived from art.[2] In any case, it represents the priestly system as a rude and imperfect expression of heavenly truth, — outward, symbolic, pictorial, — while it describes the gospel as adequately exhibiting to us the true nature of the divine realities. These realities constitute, for our author, the invisible, intelligible world. We cannot directly contemplate them; we know them as they are disclosed to us; the law vaguely represented them; the gospel adequately discloses them. We see, then, that the contrast here drawn is not exactly that between shadow and substance, although those terms loosely express its practical import; it is a contrast between two widely differing representations of the "substance," the heavenly "good things," of grace and salvation.

[1] "The terms *σκιά* and *εἰκών* are fitly chosen to convey an idea of the comparative merits of Leviticalism and Christianity. A *σκιά* is a *rude* outline; an *εἰκών* is an *exact* image. But a shadow is, further, a likeness separate from the body which casts it; whereas the image denoted by *εἰκών* is inseparable from the substance, and here, without doubt, stands for it." Bruce, *The Expositor*, Fourth Series, Vol. I. p. 437.

[2] So, *e.g.* Westcott: "The word (*σκιά*) contains one of the very few illustrations which are taken from art in the New Testament. The 'shadow' is the dark, outlined figure cast by the object, contrasted with the complete representation (*εἰκών*) produced by the help of color and solid mass." *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, p. 304.

We have now reviewed the principal terms in which our author presents his view of the relation of the two covenants. His doctrine of the superiority of the new to the old is, to us, very familiar and commonplace. But we must remember that he was writing to people who were still enamoured of the ancient order and who were still disposed to sew the gospel of Christ as a patch upon the old garment of Judaism. His arguments are not needful to convince us; indeed, many of them would have little convincing force for the modern mind. But for the mind of his age they must have been forcible. The demonstration from the Old Testament that a higher dignity is there accorded to the Messiah than to the angels or Moses, the description of the wearisome round of ritual sacrifices, — altars dripping with blood, oft-repeated atonements made by sinful priests, which still left the conscience burdened with guilt, — and the contrast of all this with Christ's willing and obedient sacrifice of his holy life, must have produced a powerful effect on the minds of the readers. And justly so; for, making all due allowance for the peculiar form of the author's interpretations and arguments, his appeal is marked by a dignity, eloquence, and lofty spiritual tone which must have given it a persuasive power for those to whom it was addressed, and which, ever since, have made this anonymous writing, of the historical setting and relations of which we know so little, one of the literary treasures of the Church.

CHAPTER III

THE MEDIATOR

THE two most elaborate biblico-theological treatises on our epistle — those of Riehm and Ménégoz — reach diametrically opposite conclusions concerning its doctrine of the person of Christ. Riehm holds that the epistle ascribes divine attributes to the Son and explicitly teaches his preëxistence and eternity;[1] while Ménégoz holds that the author regards him, not as divine, but as a unique, created being, who became incarnate by natural generation and achieved perfection by discipline and suffering — a view closely resembling the doctrine of Arianism.[2] We must make our decision between these two interpretations by carefully reviewing the relevant passages.

The author's doctrine of the person of the Mediator is developed quite incidentally; but it is not on that account less fundamental to his whole view of the new covenant. In the effort to secure the practical end which his epistle contemplates, he begins by exalting before his readers the incomparable person who is "the captain[3] of their salvation" (ii. 10). But very soon the purpose of his argument requires him to dwell on the humiliation of the Son and his perfect contact and sympathy with men. Let us

[1] *Lehrbegriff des Hebraerbriefs*, p. 269 *sq.*

[2] *La Théologie de l'Épître aux Hébreux*, ch. i.

[3] It is a disputed question whether ἀρχηγός here and in xii. 2 bears its primary meaning, leader or captain, or its secondary meaning, author or originator. I prefer the former meaning in both cases. R. V. renders "author" in both passages; A. V., "captain" in ii. 10 and "author" in xii. 2 — renderings which Thayer's Lexicon exactly reverses. Similar ambiguity attends the meaning of the word in the phrases, ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς and ἀρχηγὸς καὶ σωτήρ in Acts iii. 15, and v. 31 respectively, the only other places where the word occurs in the New Testament. Here, too, the word seems to have its primary meaning (so R. V. and A. V.).

start from this point in the study of his doctrine and seek to determine to what length the author carries out the correlative idea — that of the Son's exaltation and dignity.

The writer is well acquainted with the experiences of the historical person Jesus, who lived, sorrowed, and suffered here on earth. He knows to what tribe he belonged (vii. 14), that he wrought miracles (ii. 3, 4), passed through a course of temptation, and was rejected and ill treated at the hands of sinful men (xii. 3). The scenes of Gethsemane and Golgotha are vividly present to his imagination (v. 7; xii. 2; xiii. 12). The resurrection and glorification of Christ are to him familiar truths (xiii. 20; i. 2, 3). He emphasizes the sinlessness of Jesus and its relation to his saving work when he says: "For such a high priest became us, holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens" (vii. 26).

Our author lays stress upon the genuine humanity of Jesus. He assumed human flesh and blood (ii. 14) and was in all things made like to his brethren (ii. 17). He made common cause with the men whom he had come to save; he confessed himself their brother and, along with them, acknowledged his dependence upon God (ii. 11–13). He had a genuine human development. He grew and learned in consequence of his earthly experience (v. 8). His life was characterized by such human virtues as obedience (x. 7), humility (v. 5), piety (v. 7), and fidelity (iii. 2). The writer does not hesitate to represent him as the chief example of faith in God. When the Messiah calls men his brethren, he announces his perfect community of life with them as consisting, in part, in the common trust which he and they must exercise in God (ii. 13). The author calls upon his readers to follow after the "leader and perfecter" of their faith,[1] who has illustrated his trust in God and his pursuit of his heavenly vocation in a life which is the perfect pattern of fidelity (xii. 2, 3). Thus for our author Christ is represented not only as the object of faith, but as the perfect example of it. By his faithful performance of his divinely appointed task

[1] See previous note on ἀρχηγός.

and by the discipline of his sufferings he was perfected for his redeeming work (v. 8, 9). He experienced a normal, moral development in which through temptation and discipline he achieved a positive perfection of life. This development was, at every stage, sinless; but it moved forward from the imperfections or innocence which belongs to the earlier stages of a moral career, to that completeness which can only be achieved by the processes of testing and struggle. The life of Jesus on earth was genuinely human, but sinless; its progress was not, as in the case of other men, a gradual elimination of the evil, but a constantly increasing realization of the good.

But the perfecting of Jesus for his work by means of his earthly experience does not express the whole of the author's thought respecting his career as Messiah and Saviour. He stooped to become "a little lower than the angels" (ii. 9), and humbled himself to endure the shameful death of the cross; but this, in turn, proved to be the way to his heavenly glory and crown. "Because of the suffering of death we behold him crowned with glory and honor" (ii. 9).[1] His exaltation to heavenly power and glory is strikingly emphasized. God has appointed him heir of all things (i. 2)[2] and has assigned to him the seat of honor and authority in his Kingdom (i. 3). The angels are bidden to worship him when he shall come again (i. 6). His victory is assured by Jehovah's decree:

> "Sit thou on my right hand,
> Till I make thine enemies thy footstool" (i. 13).

[1] With most modern interpreters I connect *διὰ τὸ πάθημα κ.τ.λ.* with *ἐστεφανωμένον* (R. V.), instead of with *ἠλαττωμένον* (A. V.). Bruce (*Expositor*, Third Series, Vol. VIII., p. 372 *sq.*) gives to *διά* here the force of *εἰς*, and understands the passage to mean that Jesus was crowned for death, that is, accorded the high honor and privilege of dying for the salvation of men.

[2] In the view of many scholars this verse refers to God's pre-temporal purpose, and not to the glorification of Christ (so Bengel, Bleek, Westcott, Lünemann, and Dwight). I have assigned to it a historical sense like that of the phrase: "Sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high," in the next verse (so Tholuck, Delitzsch, DeWette, Moll, Riehm, Kendrick, and Davidson). If the former interpretation be adopted, the passage would simply fall into the category of those which refer to the preëxistence of the Son, to be considered later.

To his authority has been subjected the new order of things in the coming age of Messianic blessedness (ii. 5), and nothing has been left outside the scope of this subjection (ii. 8). He is not, like Moses, a mere servant in God's household (iii. 2, 5); but as a son he has been set over the house with full authority, that is, made supreme in God's Kingdom on earth (iii. 6).

Our author dwells with special fondness upon the idea that Christ, now exalted to heaven, is perpetually ministering on behalf of his people on earth. He has passed through the heavens to the immediate presence of God where he now fulfils, for our salvation, his high priestly office (iv. 14). This lofty position he did not assume, but God appointed him to it (v. 5). It belongs to him by virtue of his own inherent, indissoluble life (vii. 16). Hence his high office is perpetual and changeless: "Because he abideth for ever, he hath his priesthood unchangeable" (vii. 24). The solemn oath of God has appointed to this function him who is "a Son, perfected for evermore" (vii. 28). In heaven he continues to exercise the functions of a faithful helper and heavenly friend to his people, "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever" (xiii. 8).

Such is the writer's conception of the position to which Christ was elevated after the completion of his work on earth. The question now arises: Is there in the epistle any corresponding idea of the Son's dignity and glory previous to his earthly manifestation? Did Christ come from heaven to earth as well as ascend from earth to heaven? We can best answer the question by reviewing again the earlier chapters of the epistle.

In contrast to the prophets, through whom God revealed himself in olden time, stands one who is a Son (i. 2). The word is used without the article in order to accentuate the superior character and dignity of Christ as compared with the prophets: "One who is no less than a Son" (*cf.* vii. 28). Of this Son the writer makes two affirmations: first, the one already noticed, that God has made him "heir of all things," Lord of the world (*cf.* i. 8; ii. 5); and, second, that through his agency or mediation

God created the world.[1] The logical relation of the two affirmations, if the first one is understood as referring to Christ's glorification, is that his installation in his world dominion rests upon his original relation to creation; if, on the other hand, *ὃν ἔθηκεν κληρονόμον* be referred to God's eternal purpose, the second assertion would rest upon the first.[2] In either case Christ is described as the coefficient agent of God in creation.

The three following phrases (i. 3) continue the description of this Son whose pre-mundane existence has already been affirmed. They must all refer, therefore, to what he inherently and essentially is. He is the effulgence or outshining of God's glory (*ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης*), the impress of his substance (*χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως*), and the sustainer of the world (*φέρων τὰ πάντα*) by his all-powerful word. He is one in whom God's glory is perfectly reflected, and in whom his essence is perfectly expressed, and, as such, his will supports the order of the world which he has constituted.[3] We have here a striking parallel to Paul's Christology in Colossians, where the readers are described as rescued from the realm of darkness and transferred into the Kingdom of God's dear Son, who is the image, the exact counterpart (*εἰκών*), of the invisible God, antedating all creation, of which, in the most emphatic way, he is described as the originator and sustainer (Col. i. 15–17). The correspondence of *χαρακτήρ* with *εἰκών*, of *ἐποίησεν τοὺς αἰῶνας* with *ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα*, and of *φερὼν τὰ πάντα* with *τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκεν* is especially noticeable.

A similar conception of Christ's preëxistence emerges,

[1] Literally "the ages" (*τοὺς αἰῶνας*) here used to denote the contents of time and space, equivalent to *πάντων* (v. 1) and *τὰ πάντα* (v. 3). The same use of *αἰῶνες* is found in xi. 3.

[2] See note on p. 500.

[3] For the discussion of the precise meaning to be attached to *ἀπαύγασμα* and *χαρακτήρ* here, I must refer to the critical commentaries. They are both figurative words, and we should beware of hinging great doctrinal questions too much upon them. For our purpose it is sufficient to note that, taken in connection with their context, they express the unique and incomparable relation of the preëxistent Son of God.

here and there, in the course of the argument. He is the one who built or arranged (ὁ κατασκευάσας) the house of God (iii. 3), that is, established the Old Testament system and was the authoritative agent in its development (*cf.* 1 Cor. x. 4). One point in the author's use of Melchizedek as a type of Christ is to emphasize not only the perpetuity of Christ's priesthood, but the eternity of his person. The independence of Melchizedek's priesthood of all human conditions and relations (vii. 3) suggests the still higher character of his saving activity, whose work is based upon his own absolute life (vii. 16). There can hardly be a doubt that the writer means to assert that the mysterious priest-king who, so far as the validity of his office is concerned, has "neither beginning of days nor end of life" (vii. 3), is "made like unto the Son of God" because the Son is regarded as a pre-temporal, eternal Being.[1] We do not, however, find in the epistle the later theological conception of the "eternal generation" of the Son.[2]

Two other passages remain to be considered. In i. 8 the author quotes Ps. xlv. 7: "Thy throne, O God (ὁ θεός; Heb., *Elohim*), is for ever and ever," etc., as being spoken by Jehovah to the Messiah, and in i. 10 he uses in a similar manner Ps. cii. 25 (after the Septuagint): "Thou, Lord (κύριε), in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth," etc., which he also understands as addressed to Christ. Interpreters are divided on the question whether *Elohim* in the original refers to an Israelitish king (after the analogy of Ps. lxxxii. 6; *cf.* Jn. x. 34, 35), or to Jehovah. For our purpose it makes no practical difference, since our author knew only the Septuagint whose

[1] So Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* II. 308 (Bk. V. ch. iii. § 3), who, however, regards this "higher Christology" as a poetizing personification characteristic of "naive Biblical realism."

[2] Interpreters are greatly divided as to the reference in σήμερον γεγέννηκα in the quotation made in i. 5 and v. 5. It is variously referred to the incarnation, baptism, resurrection, and ascension of Christ, and to eternity. With De Wette, Riehm, and Dwight I hold that the word σήμερον is not to be pressed into any definite time-reference in the application of the quotation.

language, including the title ὁ θεός, he freely applies to Christ. The second Psalm passage in question clearly refers to Jehovah, although there is no title in the original corresponding to κύριος in the Septuagint. Our author's use of the Old Testament, here as elsewhere, disregards the primary sense and historical setting of the passage which he uses. But it is not what Calvin called the *pia deflectio* of Old Testament language from its original meaning by our author, but the application of that language — its meaning *for him* — with which we are now concerned. He must have held a view of Christ's person which made it seem natural to apply to him the titles of κύριος and ὁ θεός[1] — titles with which he was perfectly familiar as designations of supreme Deity. At the same time and in the same connection (i. 9), he distingnishes Christ from God by speaking of his God: "Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee," etc. For our author, therefore, Christ must have been distinguished from God, the *fons et origo* of divinity, but, at the same time, must have been an eternal Being, sharing the divine nature and attributes. His doctrine is, in substance, the same "higher Christology" which we find in Paul and John. Jesus Christ is, in the strict sense, divine, and, at the same time, personally distinct from God, alike in his historic manifestation, his glorified life in heaven, and his eternal preëxistence and activity.

Beyschlag has subjected the Christology of our epistle to the same treatment which he applied to that of Paul. He admits that the author regarded Christ as an eternal person, whose almighty word supports the universe, but holds that he was able to entertain this view only "because his thought, like all the thought of antiquity, was not directed to the idea of personality and its preconditions,"[2] and that the opinion in question had no basis

[1] No special significance attaches to the use of the article here. The writer quoted the text as he found it in the LXX. In an Alexandrian, like our author, we should rather expect that Christ would be designated by the generic θέος, in distinction from ὁ θέος, as in Philo and the prologue of the fourth Gospel (i. 1, 2).

[2] *N. T. Theol.* II. 313 (Bk. V. ch. iii. § 5).

either in the teaching of Christ himself or in that of the primitive apostles. In fact, Beyschlag finds an insoluble contradiction between the author's description of Jesus' human life and his higher Christology. He regards the latter as having been useful in heightening the appreciation of Christ at the time of writing, but as without value or truth for us. As I am here concerned with the exposition, and not with the defence, of our author's teaching, I will only say concerning Beyschlag's view that it assumes: (1) that the effort of himself and others to explain away the teaching concerning Christ's preëxistence in the Gospels has been successful; (2) that both Paul and John, as well as our author, were led by defective ideas of personality into the mistake of hypostatizing an idea; and (3) that preëxistent glory and a lowly human life in the flesh are mutually exclusive. These are, to say the least, disputable assumptions. For myself, I doubt them, each and all, and, therefore, am not convinced by the argument which rests upon them.

CHAPTER IV

THE HIGH PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST

OUR author prefaces his discussion of the high priesthood of Christ by a sketch of the essentials of the high priestly office (v. 1–9). These are two: first, the priest who will minister on behalf of men must himself be a man; he must be able to enter with full sympathy into the sins and sorrows of mankind; second, he must not assume his office, but must be divinely appointed to it. Jesus fulfils both these conditions. He can be "touched with the feeling of our infirmities" (iv. 15), for he has undergone a truly human experience of suffering and trial by which he himself achieved his moral victory over sin, and was fitted to be the perfect Redeemer (v. 7–9). He fulfils the second condition also, for he did not "glorify himself to be made a high priest," but he who proclaimed him his Son, that is, God, declared him "a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek" (v. 5, 6). But if, in these respects, Christ resembled the Old Testament priests, he also differed from them. They were sinful; he was sinless. They must offer sacrifice for themselves; he makes his offering solely for others. They served in a temporary sanctuary made with hands; he has passed through the skies and now ministers on our behalf in heaven itself, fulfilling an office which is changeless and perpetual.

After the manner of Philo, our author allegorizes the brief history of Melchizedek, the priest-king, as given in Genesis (xiv. 18–20), and draws a parallel between his priesthood and that of Christ (vii. 1–10). He finds a special significance in the name Melchizedek, "king of righteousness," and in the name of his residence, Salem,

meaning "peace." The dignity of his office is shown in the fact that the great patriarch paid tithes to him, as to a superior, and in the further fact that he appears suddenly on the stage of the Old Testament history — a fully authorized priest, as if by some inherent or divine right. Nothing is said of his descent, nor even of his birth or death; he simply stands forth in his priestly character, dependent upon no tribal connection or outward relations whatever. In this absoluteness of his priesthood Melchizedek stands in contrast with the Levitical priests and is "made like unto the Son of God" (vii. 3). Indeed, his office is more directly shown to be superior to theirs. When Abraham paid tithes to him, the whole priestly tribe of Levi did, as it were, pay him honor, because Abraham's act may be regarded as representative and as logically including the homage of his descendants (vii. 9, 10). Since, now, Melchizedek's priesthood is so superior to that of the Aaronic priests, how much more superior must be the priesthood of Christ who is the antitype of the royal priest.

From this general conception of Christ's independent and perpetual priesthood the author now deduces several conclusions (vii. 11 *sq.*). One of these is, that the very fact of the rise of a new priesthood is a proof of the inadequacy of the Levitical system. For if this system could have accomplished that perfecting of man's relations with God which is sought in sacrifice, it would thereby have proved itself sufficient and would have continued in operation. But, as matter of fact, it has been superseded by a priesthood, not after the order of Aaron, but after the order of Melchizedek. This is proof of its imperfection (vii. 11). Now for our author the priestly cultus is the very centre and soul of the Old Testament religion. Hence he argues that a change in the priesthood involves a change in the whole legal system (vii. 12). With the appearance of the new priest, whose office rests upon his own indissoluble life (vii. 16), the old order disappears, a new way of access to God is opened, and a new hope is born in the hearts of those

who draw nigh to God through this "new and living way" (vii. 19; x. 20).

Another corollary of the perpetuity and independence of Christ's priesthood is that his office is unique and incomparable. In the Old Testament system there were many priests; under the new and better covenant there is but one, and his work is not interrupted by death but is continuous and constant. Hence he can effectually save those who avail themselves of his mediation, since "he ever liveth to make intercession for them" (vii. 23–25). It is, indeed, true that the pure and holy high priest has offered up his sacrifice once for all when he died upon the cross (vii. 27; ix. 26; x. 12); but our author also attributes to him a perpetual priestly activity in heaven on behalf of mankind. This intercession, or appearance on behalf of men (ἐντυγχάνειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, vii. 25), is a priestly function. Christ is in the heavens at the right hand of God in the character of a priest (viii. 1). "He abideth a priest continually" (vii. 3). Our author thus combines the conception of Christ's single and final sacrifice on earth with that of a continuous and perpetual atoning work carried forward in the upper sanctuary, the immediate presence of God. The relation between these two conditions he does not define, or even consider. We are left free to harmonize and unify them on the supposition that Christ's saving work, as wrought on earth, is a historical expression of principles and laws which are eternal and perpetually operative in the nature of God. It was "through an eternal spirit" (διὰ πνεύματος αἰωνίου, ix. 14),[1] the spirit of eternal love and sacrifice in his own nature, that he offered himself unto God. Traces of this

[1] "This fitly chosen phrase thus makes the one sacrifice of Christ cover with its efficacy all prospective sin. But it does more than that. It is retrospective as well as prospective, and makes the sacrifice valid for the ages going before. For an eternal spirit is independent of time, and gives to acts done through its inspiration validity for all time. In this respect it might be said of Christ, that though he offered himself in historical fact after the world had been in existence for some thousands of years, he offered himself in spirit 'before the foundation of the world.'" Bruce, in *The Expositor*, Fourth Series, Vol. I. p. 159.

conception of "eternal atonement" are found elsewhere in the New Testament, but have been but sparingly recognized in theology.[1]

Having thus sketched the salient features of Christ's priesthood and shown its superiority, in the various particulars specified, to the Aaronic priesthood, he pauses to emphasize the chief point in his whole argument, which is, that Christ's saving office is exercised, not in this lower world of time and sense, but in the heavenly world of abiding spiritual realities (viii. 1 *sq.*). Christ is thus lifted above all comparison with those priests who, in their ministrations, deal only with pictures and shadows of the heavenly realities of grace and salvation. He belongs to a higher order — the realm of spiritual and abiding reality. Hence he represents a better covenant through which men may obtain such a secure sense of peace with God as was not possible under the law (viii. 6).

This contrast between the spheres, in which the two priesthoods are exercised, is now more fully elaborated in chapters ix. and x. 1–18. The author dwells upon the structure and arrangement of the cosmic sanctuary (*τὸ ἅγιον κοσμικόν*, ix. 1). It consisted of two parts, an outer one, called the holy place, and an inner one, called the most holy place, each with its appropriate furnishings (ix. 2–5). Now, in accordance with this construction of the tabernacle, the priests might at all times freely enter the outer court and offer their sacrifices. But the inner court might be entered by the high priest only, and by him but once a year, when he made atonement for his own sins and for those of the people (ix. 6, 7). What now, in our author's view, is the significance of this arrangement? Why was the holy of holies made so inaccessible? The answer is, that it was made so as a divine indication that free approach to the immediate presence of God was not yet permitted under the old covenant, that is, that the perfect system of religion had not yet appeared (ix. 8). Our author thus sees in the seclusion of

[1] See my *Doctrine and Life*, pp. 170–175.

the inner sanctuary a symbol of the inadequacy of Leviticalism. The sacrifices which were offered also bore the marks of imperfection; they were outward and temporary; they could not cleanse and renew the heart (ix. 9, 10).

Now Christ has introduced the ideal religion to which the Mosaic economy pointed. His ministry on our behalf is not an outward performance, making use of material means which are but symbols of divine realities, but is a moral and spiritual affair. He has offered not some foreign object, but himself. He shed not the blood of unknowing beasts, but his own blood. He presented to God not some lower creature, but his own spotless and holy life — an offering of inherent value and of perpetual validity. Hence his sacrifice does not merely procure forgiveness in a constructive way; it secures deliverance from the power of sin (ἀθέτησις ἁμαρτίας, ix. 26). It does not merely cleanse ceremonially and technically, but really and inwardly (ix. 11–14). A priesthood so superior in these respects to that of Judaism must belong to a more perfect type of religion than that of the Old Testament. Christ's perfect sacrifice supplies the defects of the Jewish offerings and possesses a retroactive power which makes its benefits available for those who lived under the law. His death is described as having for its purpose the deliverance from their transgression of those who lived under the first covenant, so that the salvation of all God's people — under Judaism and Christianity alike — might be secured (ix. 15). Here we find the counterpart of our author's doctrine of the perpetuity of Christ's priestly office in heaven. His offering is not only valid for all future, but for all past time. His giving up of his life when on earth is founded in those changeless principles and laws of the divine nature which must find expression wherever sin is. It was "through an eternal spirit" that he offered himself — a spirit of eternal love and holiness which makes atonement, in its essence and principle, an eternal process in the nature and action of God.

At this point (ix. 16, 17) the writer gives a new turn

to the comparison which he is making between the two covenants. By dropping the uniform Scriptural meaning of διαθήκη (covenant), and adopting a current Alexandrian meaning (testament), he is able to urge upon his readers in a new way the necessity of the Messiah's death.[1] A will goes into effect only when the testator dies. Hence that Christ might bequeath to us his saving benefits, it was necessary that he should die. This argument serves to introduce the next point which he wishes to urge, namely, that the shedding of blood in sacrifice was a constant factor in Judaism. So common was it as a means of ratifying covenants, of accomplishing ceremonial purifications, and of seeking forgiveness at the hand of God, that it was practically universal: "According to the law, I may almost say, all things are cleansed with blood, and apart from shedding of blood there is no remission" (ix. 22). By such analogies our author seeks to illustrate the necessity of Christ's death. As the lower sanctuary, the symbol of the true, was ceremonially purified by sacrifice, so "the heavenly things themselves must be cleansed with better sacrifices" than those of Judaism, that is, made ready and accessible to believers by the sacrifice of Christ (ix. 23).

The leading points on which the author dwells as he draws his argument to a close are these: Christ's priestly ministration is performed in the upper holy of holies, God's dwelling-place in heaven (ix. 24); his sacrificial death was so effectual that it does not need to be repeated, as the Jewish sacrifices did (ix. 25, 26); hence when he comes again to earth it will not be to die a

[1] Some interpreters, indeed, refuse to admit that there is a play on the word διαθήκη here, and seek to maintain the meaning "covenant" throughout the passage. With the great majority of exegetes, I regard this effort as quite unwarranted. Its result may be seen in Mr. Rendall's translation: "For where a covenant is made, it is a necessity that death be offered of him that maketh the covenant; for a covenant is valid *only* if men be dead; for is he that maketh it strong at the time (τότε) when he liveth?" (*Theology of the Hebrew Christians*, p. 160). A similar effort to carry through the meaning "covenant" is made by Professor Moulton in Ellicott's New Testament, *in loco*.

second time, but to complete the salvation of his followers (ix. 27, 28): his offering consisted in his perfect obedience to the will of God, whereby, in contrast to the ineffectual sacrifices of Judaism, "he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified" (x. 14). How fitly, then, does the prophet describe forgiveness and moral renewal as the characteristic effects of the Gospel (x. 16, 17), and how clear is the conclusion that under a system where these results are attained, there can be no further need for expiatory sacrifices (x. 18).

It remains, now, to estimate the doctrinal significance of the type of teaching which we have just sketched. It is obvious that we have here a reading of Christ's saving work in terms of Judaism, but with a difference; and this difference is deep and wide. The Jewish sacrificial system belonged to the world of picture and symbol; Christ's sacrifice belongs to the world of eternal spiritual reality. The words by which it is described are Jewish, but the writer takes all possible pains to make his readers understand that they are used in a higher than the Jewish meaning. He sees in the death of Christ a wealth of divine truth at which the Old Testament sacrifices could only vaguely hint. That wonderful self-offering of the Son of God was to him the expression and revelation of the deepest mysteries of Deity. This conception is involved in the constant emphasis which is laid upon Christ's work as a copy or representation of eternal truths and realities. But when we ask: Precisely what were the divine truths which Christ's death embodied and expressed, and how did it embody and express them, we do not find a ready answer. The writer planted himself upon the current views of sacrifice, and was content to urge the capital point that Christ had made the one complete and adequate offering. Into the philosophy of sacrifice he does not go further than to insist that Christ's sacrifice belonged to a higher world than that to which the Levitical offerings pertained.

It is sometimes said that our author comes nearer to elaborating a theory of atonement than any other New

Testament writer.[1] If this means that he dwells more at length — in terms of the Jewish ritual — upon Christ's priestly function on earth and in heaven than any other New Testament writer, the statement is quite correct. But if it means that our author comes nearer to supplying us with the elements of a philosophy of atonement, I can by no means agree with it. The problems concerning the atonement are: What is the necessity in the nature of God and in his relation to sinful man for the death of Christ? and: How does the death of Christ meet the demands arising out of that necessity? An answer to these questions will be sought in vain in our epistle. Not that they are formally answered anywhere in the New Testament; but the apostle Paul clearly shows (Rom. iii. 24–26) that he had pondered them, and his epistles contain suggestions of a theoretical view of atonement. On the contrary, our author, while giving expression to highly suggestive views of the spiritual and eternal significance of Christ's atoning work, betrays no philosophy of the subject. Of the motive in God which renders atonement necessary, or the way in which it procures or conditions the bestowment of forgiveness, he says nothing.

He lays the main stress upon the moral effect of Christ's sacrifice. His favorite words are *καθαρίζειν*, *ἁγιάζειν*, *τελειοῦν*. Christ's work cleanses the conscience, puts away sin, and renews the life. Paul's figure of ransom (*λύτρωσις*) through Christ's death he uses but twice (ix. 12, 15), but without elaborating or explaining it. The conception of reconciliation (*καταλλαγή*) — so common in Paul's epistles — does not meet us in Hebrews. The term *ἱλάσκεσθαι*, to expiate, occurs once (ii. 17). But it is difficult to base any conclusion as to the import of sacrifice upon it, since the employment of this word by an Alexandrian like our author may reflect the well-known Septuagint use of *ἱλάσκεσθαι* as a translation for כִּפֶּר, to cover, to forgive, to purge away (as in Ps. lxxv. 3; Sept. lxxiv. 4), where these verbs mean *to purge away* (sins).[2] Ἱλαστή-

[1] So Adeney, *Theology of the New Testament*, p. 227.

[2] So both our English versions.

ριον occurs but once (ix. 5), where it is used in the Septuagint sense of the *Kapporeth*, or lid of the ark of the covenant.[1]

The question how, in the view of our author, sacrifice is related to sin, involves questions as to the nature of the Old Testament offerings with respect to which interpreters are divided. I cannot doubt that they were regarded as expressing, in some instances at least, the guilt and heinousness of sin in God's sight and as testifying to his condemnation of it. That idea seems to me to be assumed in this epistle. Sacrifice has something more than a subjective significance and effect. On the great day of atonement "a remembrance is made of sins year by year" (x. 3). In like manner Christ's offering for sin must have been regarded as expressing its ill desert. Why such an expression was necessary, and how it can be shown to be an indispensable accompaniment and condition of remission, are questions for theological reflection into which our author does not enter.

[1] *Cf.* Paul's use of the word in Rom. iii. 25. See p. 413 of this volume.

CHAPTER V

FAITH AND HOPE

THE author depicts the religious life chiefly in terms of faith and hope. Salvation is appropriated by faith, which remains a constant factor in the development of the Christian character. "Without faith it is impossible to be well pleasing to God" (xi. 6). Hope is the confident expectation of future blessedness, "the sure and steadfast anchor of the soul" which, amid the storms of life, holds the believer in secure connection with the invisible world beyond the veil which separates heaven from earth (vi. 19).

The writer sets forth his doctrine of faith both negatively and positively. On the one hand, he shows how essential faith is to the religious life by illustrating the disastrous consequences of unbelief in Israel; on the other, he confirms this necessity by an eloquent description of the nature and effects of faith, as seen in a long list of heroic believers. He warns his readers against imitating the unbelief with which the Jews received the promise of a happy rest in Canaan (iv. 2). Faith is thus, at least in part, a believing reception of the divine word; in this case it is the assurance that in the coming ages God will fulfil his promise to grant a sabbath rest to his people. The writer prefaces his catalogue of the heroes of faith by a definition: "Now faith is a firm confidence with respect to the objects of hope (*ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις*), an assured conviction of the existence of invisible realities" (*πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων*, xi. 1). Faith is belief in a supersensuous world. The author purposely defines it in the most general terms as an attitude of mind with respect to a realm of reality lying

beyond human perception and calculation — a definition large enough to include the various phases of faith which he proposes to illustrate. No other New Testament writer makes use of so abstract and philosophical a conception of faith. With Paul especially, faith is personal trust in Christ and mystic fellowship with him. This idea is not wanting in our epistle, which speaks of believers as "partakers of Christ" (iii. 14) and of faith as involving obedience to Christ (v. 18); but it is not brought out as defining the essence of faith. This difference is not due to any fundamental doctrinal divergence, but to the different method and object of the two writers. Paul, arguing against putting confidence in legal works, insists upon trusting in Christ alone for salvation; our author, seeking to strengthen a weakening hold upon all spiritual truth, aims to make the invisible and supernatural in general seem more real and practical to his readers. Both aimed to foster devotion to Christ as the one only Saviour, — the former more by an appeal to a sense of sin and of the need of pardon, the latter more by an appeal to the religious nature, the capacity to perceive and respond to an invisible spiritual order.

The writer's conception of faith is amply illustrated in chapter xi. It is by a conviction concerning the unseen that we believe in the creation of the world by the power of God, whereby the visible order of nature has come into being (xi. 3). This is an example which especially illustrates the attitude of the understanding (*πίστει νοοῦμεν*) towards an event lying wholly beyond the range of human observation. The next illustration — the faith of Abel — presents quite a different aspect of the subject. The offerer's faith gave religious value to his sacrifice, and won for him the divine verdict which pronounced him righteous, that is, acceptable to God (xi. 4). In like manner Noah, by heeding the divine warnings and acting in view of them, "became an heir of the righteousness which is according to faith" (xi. 7). Our author makes no use of the juridical analogies by which Paul is accustomed to expound the divine acceptance of men. He

does not use the terms, "to justify" (δικαιοῦν) and "to reckon for righteousness" (λογίζεσθαι εἰς δικαιοσύνην), and "righteousness" (δικαιοσύνη) is not represented as a legal status but as a moral condition. There is thus a formal difference; but, if I have correctly interpreted the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith, there is no contradiction in principle, since for Paul, as well as for our author, the terms in question are ethical in their content.[1] The confidence of Abraham and Sarah that what God had promised, although from a human standpoint so highly improbable, would come to pass (xi. 8–12), is especially adapted to illustrate the faith of those who "believe that God is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek after him" (xi. 6). But, continues our author, after all that may be truly said of the heroic confidence in God which was cherished by these Old Testament saints, there was something which they lacked. They never realized on earth the full fruition of their faith. Abraham and his family died without having received the blessings of a happy life in Canaan which had been promised them. But not even by this disappointment was their faith shaken. They did not regard this life as measuring the scope of God's purpose of grace. As the world darkened on their sight they caught a clearer view of the divine promise, and knew that God would fulfil it in a more perfect way than they had dreamed. Though they found no home in Canaan, they knew that they would find it in the heavenly city of God, which has eternal foundations, and thus faith achieved its victory in the very face of disappointment and disillusion (xi. 13–16).

The faith which Abraham showed in his willingness to offer up Isaac was a heroic trust in God. Although to human seeming the death of his only son would preclude the fulfilment of the divine promise of a numerous posterity, the patriarch still believed that it would come true even if it were necessary to raise up Isaac from the dead (xi. 17–19). The faith of Isaac in declaring what

[1] See p. 421 *sq.*

should be the future destiny of his two sons seems to have been a prophetic prevision (xi. 20). Similarly, Jacob was enabled by faith — a sublime confidence in God's plan and purpose — to forecast the future of Joseph's two sons, and reverently to thank God for his goodness, supporting himself in his weakness upon his staff (xi. 21). Joseph's foresight of the deliverance of Israel from Egypt is an example of faith (xi. 22). The action of Moses' parents in daring the wrath of the Egyptian king, and hiding the child for safe-keeping during three months, was an act of faith because they believed that God had some great purpose to serve in the life of the beautiful child (xi. 23). It was due to his faith in God that Moses, when he grew up, disdained the honor and power which might have been his as the reputed son of a royal princess, and chose to suffer hardships with the people of God rather than to enjoy the sinful pleasures of Pharaoh's court. The faith displayed in this choice lay in his preference for righteousness to wealth — for heavenly blessedness to earthly comfort and luxury (xi. 24–26). These examples, and those which follow, illustrate the effects of faith in the field of human life and action. They show what dangers men have faced, what sufferings they have endured, what improbabilities they have been able to believe in, in consequence of their confidence in God and their assured conviction that there is a supernatural and invisible order of forces and laws which asserts itself in the life of men.

For our author faith is no mere intellectual belief. It is a living and intense conviction of the supernatural which evinces itself in conduct. Its most characteristic effect is heroism. It is the faith which "removes mountains" of difficulty and improbability on which our author is most fond of dwelling. Among its fruits are achievements in war, deliverance from perils, and endurance of the greatest privations and sufferings (xi. 33–38). The Christian must regard himself as surrounded by a great company of persons who have given such proofs of their faith and who are now watching him to see if he, too, will

prove steadfast. He should be inspired to a heroic confidence in God by the examples of those whose achievements, through faith, are described (xii. 1). Especially should the Christian look to Jesus himself who is the "leader and perfecter of faith," the supreme example of unshaken trust in God. He passed through a career of the severest moral trial and proved himself victorious over evil. He endured the greatest sufferings without the slightest loss of confidence in God, because his hope was set upon the future blessedness with which he knew he would be rewarded (xii. 2). Thus did it please God, "in bringing many sons unto glory," to set before them, in the life of Jesus, an inspiring, perfect example of the faith which is well pleasing to himself. Thus was the "captain of their salvation perfected through sufferings" (ii. 10), and now he is going before his followers, and, if they are true to him, will lead them on in their conflict with sin and suffering to final victory. Faith has a certain militant quality in the thought of our author. It is an imitation of Christ in his endurance of suffering and his triumph over sin. It possesses the magic power to transmute the hardships which the readers are enduring into benefits. Faith looks upon sufferings as providential chastisements at the hand of God (xii. 5–11). It sees a way in which such trials may minister to the good of the believer by disciplining him in patience and directing his thoughts to the heavenly reward of the faithful.

We have seen that the faith of the epistle is intensely ethical and practical. The question now arises: Does our author also know of the love which Paul declares to be greater than faith (1 Cor. xiii. 13), without which even the faith which could "remove mountains" would be morally worthless (1 Cor. xiii. 2)? The idea of love is certainly not developed, or dwelt upon at length, in the epistle. But it is by no means wholly wanting. The circumstances of the readers and the purpose of the letter sufficiently account for the stronger emphasis which is laid upon courage and steadfastness than upon love and

kindred virtues. But our author incidentally recognizes the fundamental importance of love in the Christian life. One of the grounds of his hope that his readers will not finally apostatize from Christ is, that they have shown their love to God by benevolent ministrations to their fellow-believers (vi. 10); and in his concluding exhortations he urges them to exercise fraternal affection towards one another, to show hospitality unto strangers, and to succor those who are enduring imprisonment or persecution (xiii. 1–3; *cf.* x. 24). The epistle is not a treatise on the Christian virtues, but an argument and an appeal designed to dissuade the readers from going back to Judaism, by strengthening their confidence in Christ and his salvation. Naturally, therefore, it takes account chiefly of those aspects of the Christian life which are most closely related to the present condition and experience of the reader.

Both on this account and in consequence of the current expectation of the near return of the Lord (x. 25, 37), the writer dwells much upon the attitude of the Christian towards the future life — the coming age of Messianic blessedness. He solemnly warns his readers against imitating the unbelief and perverseness of the Israelites in consequence of which entrance into the promised land was denied them (iii. 7 *sq.*), and exhorts them to hold fast to the end their hope of entering into the rest of the Messianic Kingdom (iii. 6, 14). Now the rest of Canaan and that of the Messianic age are, in the view of our author, typical parallels. They are so nearly identified that his thought glides easily over from one to the other. Since the Israelites did not occupy the rest which was promised to them, it still remains available, in a new and higher form, for the people of the new covenant (iv. 6, 7). "There remaineth therefore a sabbath rest (σαββατισμός) for the people of God" (iv. 9). The believer must give all diligence to make that rest his own, for God who searches the depths of motive and purpose in man will hold him to a strict account of his fidelity and obedience (iv. 11–13). To such a holding fast of his confession the

Christian is encouraged by the sympathy of Christ with him in all his trials. He may ever rest assured of the divine aid in helping him to overcome the power of evil (iv. 14–16).

The readers are exhorted to such progress in religious life and knowledge as will enable them to understand the deeper aspects of Christian doctrine, especially, it would seem, the doctrine of Christ's heavenly priesthood (vi. 1 *sq.*). In this connection the author introduces a dark picture of the fearful consequences of apostasy from Christ (vi. 4–8; *cf.* x. 26–31, where the same subject recurs). These passages have been so long forced to do service in the dispute about predestination and irresistible grace, that their original and natural meaning has been well-nigh lost to view. Curiously, they were, in part, available on both sides of the controversy. On the one hand, it was argued, as against the doctrine of irresistible grace, that the first passage speaks of some as having fallen away from a state of enlightenment and of participation in the Christian salvation (vi. 4–6); on the other, it was contended that if such a fall is possible, it must be fatal, since it is stated that "it is impossible to renew again unto repentance" those who "fall away" (vi. 6; x. 26). As thus used these passages contradicted both theories: the one in speaking of "falling from grace" as possible, if not as actual; the other, in saying that the lapsed could not be restored to repentance. This fact is evidence enough that both parties to the controversy misapplied the passages. As I have elsewhere shown,[1] the author's thought here is: If a man deliberately and wilfully deserts Christ, he will find no other Saviour; there remains no sacrifice for sins (x. 26) except that which Christ has made. The Old Testament offerings are powerless to save; one who refuses to be saved by Christ refuses to be saved at all. For him who turns away from Christ and determines to seek salvation elsewhere, there can be only disappointment and failure. While such an attitude of refusal and contempt

[1] *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 154, 155. See the references there given.

lasts,[1] there is no possibility of recovery for those who assume it. But this impossibility is not an absolute but a relative one; it is an impossibility which lies within the limits of the supposition made in the context, namely, that of a renunciation of Christ. Nothing is said against the possibility of recovery to God's favor whenever one ceases from such a contempt of Christ and returns to him as the one only Saviour.

The future is full of bright prospects for the Christian. The hardships of the present life will be far outweighed by the glory and blessedness of the world to come. There the believer will receive a better possession than those of earth — a great recompense of reward for all his sufferings here (x. 34, 35). There he will enter "a better country, that is, a heavenly" (xi. 16), "the city which hath the foundations, whose builder and maker is God" (xi. 10), the heavenly Jerusalem, inhabited by an innumerable company of angels and of perfected men (xii. 22, 23). The day of testing draws near when a great shaking will overturn all things that are not stable, "in order that those things which are not shaken may remain" (xii. 27). Then the full perfection (τελείωσις) of the believer will be realized and all his longings satisfied. This hope of a speedy and blessed consummation is the ground of exhortation to gratitude and devotion: "Let us feel thankfulness, whereby we may offer service well pleasing to God with reverence and awe" (xii. 28); "Let us offer up a sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is, the fruit of lips which make confession to his name" (xiii. 15).

[1] Note the force of the *present* participles, ἀνασταυροῦντας and παραδειγματίζοντας (vi. 6), which we may render: while they are crucifying to themselves afresh the Son of God and putting him to an open shame. See R.V., margin.

PART VI

THE THEOLOGY OF THE APOCALYPSE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

THE Apocalypse represents a type of religious literature which flourished in the late Jewish and early Christian periods. It was an aftergrowth of prophecy and made free use of prophetic materials.[1] The age of apocalyptic writing was marked by revolution, oppression, and persecution. The Syrian and Roman conquests, and the threatened destruction of the Jewish state, gave to the spirit of prophecy in the nation a new direction and a new sphere of activity. The minds of the people were filled with mingled alarm and hope in view of impending calamities, and their eager attention was directed to their significance and consequences.

During the later years of Judaism two great emotions struggled in the heart of the nation: anxiety on account of the darkening cloud that was gathering over the land, and hope of deliverance through the Messiah. Jewish apocalyptic literature took its rise from this combination, which supplies its motive and determines its character. This literature depicts the sufferings of the people and derives comfort and hope for them from the expectation of Messiah's speedy advent. The Jewish apocalypses are commonly issued under the name of some prophet or other worthy of the olden time, and into his mouth are put warnings and predictions which, under forms of thought

[1] See Terry's *Biblical Apocalyptics*. New York, 1898.

derived from the age of the person whose name is assumed, reflect the time when the writing is actually composed. A convenient example is the Book of Daniel. The temptations and sufferings of a faithful servant of Jehovah in the period of the captivity are rehearsed, the doom of his oppressors is declared, and the fall of Babylon, "the beauty of the Chaldeans' pride," is proclaimed, in order that, under this form, the apocalyptist may utter, on behalf of his people, his complaint to heaven against the cruelties of the Syrian oppressor, Antiochus Epiphanes, and comfort the nation by fostering the hope of his destruction at the impending advent of the Messiah. Here we observe the two main factors which unite to produce apocalyptic writing: (1) complaint against oppression, coupled with delineations of its severity; and (2) assurances of the deliverance of the people from it — the object of all being to encourage and comfort the people of God.

When the occasion, nature, and aim of this species of literature are considered, and when its great influence in the later Judaism is appreciated, it seems quite natural that Jewish Christians should adopt this style of writing for the expression of their complaints against Jewish and Roman hostility, and of their hope of Messiah's second coming. Here, as before, the two facts which combine to prompt these apocalyptic representations are oppression and the Messianic hope, with this difference, that now it is the oppression of the Christians by Jews and Romans and the hope of Messiah's second, not of his first, advent.

Our canonical Book of Revelation is a specimen of the type of literature whose general features have been described. The peculiarities of the book illustrate the fixed characteristics of this kind of writing. It is, on the one hand, an outcry against Jewish antichristian fanaticism and Roman persecution, and, on the other, a symbolic description of the destruction which should overtake these hostile powers, and usher in the deliverance of the Church at the second coming of Christ. The book is at once "a rallying cry to Christian warriors" (Farrar) and "the

epic of Christian hope" (Beyschlag). It is the outcry, the protest of the persecuted Church against Jewish hate and Roman cruelty; it is also a prophetic threat of the destruction of these foes, and thus a message of comfort to believers. The writer sees in the troublous times in which he lives the travail-throes of the coming age, the *dolores Messiæ*, the manifestations of the "mystery of lawlessness" (2 Thess. ii. 7), which, according to the prevailing mode of thought, were regarded as heralding the approaching advent. Thus the aim of the book was distinctly practical. It was primarily a book for its age, and must be read in the light of the conceptions and conditions of its time. We may believe that it had a powerful effect in promoting Christian courage and hope during the trying experiences of an age of bitter persecution.

The obscurity of the book is partly due to the nature of its theme, the programme of the future which God has not clearly revealed, and partly to the nature of its language and materials. It is purposely obscure in its references to the dread power of Rome. It deals in visions and symbols. It is a book of enigmas. The interpretation of its language must always be, in considerable part, conjectural. But the leading thought and purpose of the book need not remain doubtful, if it is read in the light which the study of apocalyptic writing has thrown upon it, and with a sense of the terrible sufferings which called it forth. As some one has said, the book must be read by the lurid glare of burning cities, — Jerusalem and Rome, — and, it might be added, by the light of martyr-fires.

Respecting the questions of the authorship, the date, and the unity of the book, scholars have not been able to reach any agreement. Only a brief reference can here be made to the present state of criticism. The principal discordant note in the early ecclesiastical tradition, which ascribed the book to the apostle John, is the opinion of Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, who held that it was written by John the presbyter.[1] Many moderns have adopted the

[1] Eusebius, *Ecc. Hist.* Bk. VII. ch. xxv.

same opinion.[1] The Tübingen school accepted the common tradition respecting the origin of the Apocalypse, and then made its differences from the fourth Gospel a makeweight against the Johannine authorship of the latter. The successors of this school deny both Gospel and Apocalypse to the apostle.[2] Some maintain the apostolic authorship of both.[3] The book does not claim to have been written by the apostle John; its style and tone are very different from those of the fourth Gospel, and its manner of speaking of the apostles (xxi. 14) seems strange if the author were one of the Twelve. For these and other reasons a decided majority of scholars, holding various theories respecting the fourth Gospel, doubt the apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse. Moreover, the hypothesis of composite authorship, to be noticed presently, has put quite a new face on the whole question. It is very difficult to suppose that the apostle John was the author of the book, in the strict sense of authorship, provided it be held that he wrote the fourth Gospel. But the documentary theory represents the book as a growth arising out of successive combinations of a fund of apocalyptic material. On this view the apostle might well have compiled and published one or more editions of it. In this way the association of his name with it would be explained, and the apocalyptic style, characteristic of the materials used, would create less difficulty than on the supposition of direct and unitary authorship. But whatever view be taken on this point, the entire thought-world of the Apocalypse is so different from that of the Gospel and Epistles of John that it should be separately treated in Biblical Theology.[4]

[1] So De Wette, Bleek, Düsterdieck.

[2] So Pfleiderer, Holtzmann, Harnack, and Weizsäcker. The last-named scholar, however, regards it as a product of the "school" of John, which had its centre at Ephesus. *Apostolic Age*, II. 174 (orig. p. 504).

[3] Godet, Meyer, Salmon, Westcott, Weiss, Farrar. Beyschlag thinks it not impossible that John wrote two such different books, supposing an interval of twenty years between them.

[4] As by Weiss, Farrar, and Beyschlag, who says: "The difference between the Apocalypse and the rest of the Johannine writings is so

The question of date is as unsettled as that of authorship. The traditional date is 95 or 96, in agreement with the testimony of Irenæus: "The vision of the Apocalypse was seen no very long time since, but almost in our own days, towards the end of Domitian's reign" (91–96).[1] Later, however, this date was given up by most scholars in favor of 68–70, on the ground of internal indications.[2] This remained the generally received view until quite recently. At present a large number of critics hold to the later date, partly in deference to the testimony of Irenæus, partly from historical considerations derived from the study of conditions reflected in the book, and partly (in some instances) for reasons connected with theories of composite authorship.[3] It remains, therefore, a disputed point whether the book reflects the age of Nero (54–68) or that of Domitian (91–96). On the documentary theory of the book which holds that it is composed of short apocalypses emanating from different periods, a combination of these views is made possible. By this theory the phenomena which favor an earlier, and those which favor a later date, could be accounted for, as well as the apparent combination of Jewish and Christian elements.

Although the unity of the Apocalypse had been questioned before, it was in 1882 that a scientific character was given to the partition-hypothesis by the labors of Weizsäcker and Völter. Increased currency was given to the theory by Vischer,[4] who held that the canonical Apocalypse was a translation into Greek of a Jewish apocalypse, written before A.D. 70, and published, with additions and interpolations, shortly before 100. To this

great, and the question of authorship so unsettled, that we must consider them for Biblical Theology separately, inasmuch as, even though the author should be the same, they give expression to a different view of the world." *N. T. Theol.* II. 362 (Bk. V. II. ch. i. § 5).

[1] *Against Heresies*, V. 30, 3. *Cf.* Eusebius, *Ecc. Hist.* V. 8.

[2] So Westcott, Lightfoot, Farrar, Bovon, Sanday, Beyschlag.

[3] Among those who hold the later date are Weizsäcker, Harnack, Jülicher, Ramsay, Briggs, and McGiffert.

[4] *Die Offenbarung Johannis*, 1886.

view Harnack gave his assent. A little later Sabatier[1] contended, on the contrary, that the Apocalypse is Christian in structure and basis, but that the author blended with his materials certain Jewish oracles. Still later Spitta[2] maintained that the book had a Christian nucleus, written by John Mark about 60, and that with this the Christian editor had combined two Jewish apocalypses: one written in the time of Pompey (*ca.* 63), the other in the time of Caligula (37–41). In this view the book is made up of three distinct apocalypses — one Christian, two Jewish — blended together. More recently, Gunkel[3] has sought the key to the sources of the Apocalypse in the Babylonian creation-myth. Briggs[4] holds that six complete apocalypses underlie our Book of Revelation, and that it has passed through four editions.[5] The earliest of these apocalypses is held to date from the time of Caligula; the latest — that of the epistles — to be not earlier than Nero and perhaps as late as Domitian. All of them, with the possible exception of the latest, were originally written in Hebrew. This composite work, as we now have it, was issued near the end of the first century.[6] It will be seen that there is a difference of opinion as to whether the Apocalypse is composed in part of Jewish materials[7] or is entirely Christian.[8]

Although the theory in question has met with vigorous opposition,[9] an increasing number of scholars favor it in

[1] *Revue de Théologie*, Lausanne, 1887.

[2] *Die Offenbarung des Johannes*, 1889.

[3] *Schöpfung und Chaos*, 1895.

[4] *The Messiah of the Apostles*, 1895.

[5] For the analysis, see *op. cit.*, p. 305.

[6] For a fuller history of the documentary theory, see Dr. Briggs's work cited above, pp. 284–305, and an article by Professor George A. Barton, entitled "The Apocalypse and Recent Criticism," in *The American Journal of Theology*, October, 1898.

[7] So Vischer, Harnack, Pfleiderer, O. Holtzmann, Sabatier, Spitta, Gunkel, Bousset, McGiffert.

[8] So Weizsäcker, Völter, Ramsay, Briggs.

[9] From Warfield, Weiss, Salmon, Beyschlag *et al.* H. J. Holtzmann, in the *Hand-Commentar* (1891), expresses himself as doubtful respecting the value of the hypothesis. In his *Neutest. Theol.* (1897), however, he seems to regard it more favorably.

some of its various forms. I do not feel warranted in expressing any positive opinion upon it. This much, however, must be said in its favor: It offers, at least, a tentative explanation of some of the seams and incongruities in the structure of the work and a solution of the apparently conflicting evidence bearing on the date of the book, and supplies a new method of harmonizing its Jewish and Christian elements. Since, however, the book as it stands undoubtedly has a certain unity of plan and aim, whatever may have been the method of its composition, I shall not hesitate to speak of "the writer" or "the author." For our present purpose, it makes small difference whether he was the author in the strict sense or a compiler and redactor. The substantial unity of the book is not inconsistent with the documentary theory.[1]

A brief sketch of the way in which the scenes of the Apocalypse are unfolded may properly precede the more particular exposition of its main thoughts. After the first three chapters, which contain the messages to the seven churches of Asia, a mysterious voice calls the seer to heaven and promises to show him the events which must shortly come to pass (iv. 1). These events are connected, more or less closely, with the destruction of Jerusalem and of Rome, and with the return of the Lord for the salvation of his people and the destruction of his foes. Here the glory of God is described in striking imagery. He is seated in heavenly splendor upon his throne, surrounded by the figures which represent the Church (elders) and the powers of nature (living creatures), and other symbols of less certain meaning, generally presented under the sacred number seven. This chapter, whatever its details mean, is a splendid description of the supremacy of God, and of the homage of the universe to him.

Chapter v. opens with the description of a sealed book — symbol of the mysteries of the future. In a most

[1] Both the analysis and the unity are maintained by Briggs, *Messiah of the Apostles*, p. 289.

striking way the thought is presented that only Jesus can open this book. The Messiah alone holds the key of the future; he alone can unlock the mystery of providence. The representatives of the Church and of nature (elders and living creatures, *v.* 8) reverently ascribe to the Lamb alone power to open this mysterious book; and this is true because he is the Redeemer (*vv.* 9, 10). Angels join this chorus of praise, and then the opening of the seals begins.

At the opening of the first seal (vi. 1, 2), a white horse — a good omen — appears; on him is seated the conquering Christ. The first mystery of the book is that Christ shall triumph over all foes. The opening of the second seal discloses a very different omen. A blood-red horse appears, and on it sits one armed with a sword, who takes away peace from the earth (*vv.* 3, 4). It is the symbol of war. Next comes a black horse, and a voice is heard announcing the price of a morsel of wheat or barley (*vv.* 5, 6). This horse and his rider represent famine. The opening of the fourth mystery reveals a pale horse, on which sits Death, and after him follows Hades — the realm of Death (personified) — to claim his prey (*vv.* 7, 8). The breaking of the fifth seal discloses a picture of persecution and martyrdom, in which the followers of Christ are heard to cry: "How long, O Master?" in anguish of spirit, and are seen to receive the white robe of righteousness (*vv.* 9–11). When the sixth seal is opened, a terrific catastrophe overtakes the physical world (*vv.* 12–17). It is a time of terror and of judgment. The whole description of chapter vi. is an apocalyptic picture of the calamities and judgments which are to come upon those who spurn Christ and persecute his followers. Similar modes of describing great crises are found in the prophets, as in Joel ii. 28–32 — a passage of which Peter sees the fulfilment in the events of Pentecost (Acts ii. 16–21). Indeed, to a considerable extent, our Lord's description of his second coming, as presented in Matthew xxiv., is embodied in similar pictures and symbols.

The description now pauses, before the opening of the seventh and last seal, in order that a picture of the host of the redeemed may be presented (ch. vii.). It is a scene of peace, in which an angel sets the seal of God upon the vast and countless multitude of the redeemed, who now join the universal chorus of praise to God for his redeeming love (vii. 1–12). The seer is now asked: Who are they who are arrayed in white robes? and is told that they are those whom the Lamb has redeemed, and that they live henceforth in blessed fellowship with him (*vv.* 13–17). This episode of the seventh chapter is intended to enhance the interest with which the opening of the last seal is awaited.

And now, at the dread moment of the opening of the seventh seal, all heaven waits in silent expectancy (viii. 1). The contents of this last mystery are presented in a peculiar and elaborate manner. When the seventh seal is broken, seven angels appear with trumpets, to proclaim the revelation of the final mysteries. Thus we pass from the seven seals to the seven angels and the seven trumpets. As these are sounded, one after the other, the terrible events which constitute the contents of the seventh mystery occur one by one. The detailed interpretation of the symbols under which the events proclaimed by the trumpets are portrayed is very difficult (ch. viii.); but in general the trumpets announce signs and portents of the coming judgment, when the Messiah shall appear for the destruction of his enemies and the glorification of his saints.

Just as before the opening of the seventh seal was long delayed (ch. vii.), so now the sounding of the seventh trumpet is deferred until a long episode (x. 1–xi. 14) is introduced. This passage includes a solemn proclamation of the near-approaching end, a symbolic description — under the figure of the little book which is sweet to the taste, but afterwards bitter — of the mingled joy and sorrow which the end will bring (x. 9–11), and the abandonment of Jerusalem to destruction. In this connection the faithful testimony of the Chris-

tians and the cruelty of their persecutions are depicted (xi. 1–14).

And now the seventh trumpet sounds, proclaiming Messiah's triumph (xi. 15–18). Heaven is opened (xi. 19) and certain great mysteries are disclosed. First appears the mystic figure of "a woman arrayed with the sun" (xii. 1) — a symbol, probably, of the Old Testament Church whence the Redeemer proceeds. A second sign appears, "a great red dragon," "which is called the Devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world" (xii. 9), who makes the evil world-power, the Roman Empire, his instrument. The dragon has seven heads (emperors) and ten horns (perhaps provincial governors). This satanic power desires to devour the Messiah when he shall be born; but he is rescued and is caught up on high unto God's throne (xii. 3–6) Then follows a deadly conflict between the world-power and the heavenly powers, in which the latter are triumphant (*vv.* 7–12); and, again, a picture — very enigmatical in its details — of the persecutions of the Church by Antichrist (*vv.* 13–17). The same general idea of the opposition of the Roman power to the Church is presented under other forms in chapter xiii. A beast arises out of the sea — a symbol of the Roman Empire, or, possibly, of the emperor personally (xiii. 1). The ten horns of the beast point to the imperial provinces, the seven heads to seven emperors, and the blasphemous names on the diadems to the Roman worship of emperors. One head (emperor) is smitten unto death (*v.* 3), referring to the death of Nero. The healing of the death-stroke may refer either to the popular belief of the time, that Nero was not actually dead, but was in concealment in the East, and would soon return in greater power and wickedness than ever, or to the return of his antichristian spirit in the persecuting Emperor Domitian. The worship of the emperor and his persecutions of the Christians are referred to in verses 4–10. Next appears (*vv.* 11–17) a beast coming up from the land, apparently denoting false prophecy or a false Messiah. He is the ally of the beast from the sea. His

position is subordinate to the Roman power, which continues to be called "the beast" (*v.* 17). And now the name of "the beast" is given in a mystic number, 666. Probably the meaning is that if the numerical value of the letters which spell the name of the beast be taken, the sum of the numbers would be 666. If the words "Nero Cæsar" are written in Hebrew letters, and the numerical values of the letters are added together, the result is 666. If *Lateinos* (Latin) is written in Greek letters, the result is the same. Very probably the mystic name of the beast is either Nero Cæsar or Lateinos. In either case it is a veiled designation of the Roman power.[1]

Chapter xiv. is an episode preceding the introduction of the cycle of the seven vials or bowls, and presents still further pictures of the supremacy and triumph of Christ, and of the certainty and terribleness of his judgment upon his foes. This last thought becomes the keynote of the chapters which follow. The bowls of divine wrath are poured out upon the sinful world (chs. xv.–xvii.). This cycle of woes ends with the utter destruction of the mystic Babylon, the beast, or the "woman drunken with the blood of the saints" (signifying the horrors of persecution), as Rome is variously called (xvii. 1–6). And now another mystic explanation of the seer's meaning is given (which is, in part, a repetition). The beast that "was and is not" (xvii. 8) is Nero. His coming up from the abyss and the healing of his death-stroke (xiii. 3) are thought by many interpreters to refer to the popular expectation of his return to Rome. If it does not, the reference is probably to Domitian, as already indicated. The view taken on this point influences the interpretation of verses 10–12. In any case the seven mountains are the seven hills of Rome on which "the woman" (the city) sits. The five fallen "kings" are Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, and Nero. The one that *is* may be either Galba or (if the three "rebellious princes," who

[1] Briggs regards the number 666 as denoting "a straining after the holy number 7," "the anti-Lamb" or false Messiah. *Messiah of the Apostles*, p. 324.

reigned for so short a time and were never fully acknowledged, are not counted) Vespasian. If the sixth is Galba, the seventh is Otho; if the sixth is Vespasian, the seventh is Titus. The view that "the eighth" is Nero is adjustable to either opinion as to the sixth and seventh (whether Galba and Otho, or Vespasian and Titus). The theory which makes Domitian the eighth is reconcilable only with the supposition that Vespasian and Titus are the sixth and seventh. On the view that Nero is the eighth, the statement that the eighth "is one of the seven" (*v.* 11) is understood to mean that he is both the fifth and the eighth; on the theory that Domitian is the eighth, he is said to be "of the seven," not in the sense of being one of the number, but in that of derivation or descent.

Again the destruction of Rome is proclaimed (ch. xviii.), and the triumph of Christ is celebrated by angelic choruses (ch. xix). Then Satan is bound for a thousand years (the millennium). The faithful dead are raised and reign with Christ during this period, at the end of which the general resurrection takes place (xx. 1–6). Whether this description is to be taken literally or figuratively is disputed. At the end of the millennium a new conflict with Satan takes place, which ends in his complete overthrow (*vv.* 7–10). Next follows the final judgment (*vv.* 11–15) and the consummation of the Kingdom of God (chs. xxi., xxii.). The new Jerusalem, the heavenly city of God, in all its splendor and purity appears. The two closing chapters represent the culmination of the great drama of conflict and judgment in a scene of eternal peace and joy. The key-thought of the book is that of Christ's speedy coming to judge the world, and especially to destroy the hated Roman power, and to rescue his followers from their persecutions. All the events described are seen by the seer as in the near future (i. 1); and the book closes with the united prayer of the spirit of prophecy and of the Church (bride), that Christ would come (xxii. 17), to which the answer is given: "Yea, I come quickly" (xxii. 20). The writer appends (xxii. 18, 19) a solemn warning against

any alteration of his book, in apparent imitation of similar threats in the Old Testament (Deut. iv. 2). The book is a picture of the persecuted Church, a prophecy of her certain deliverance by her heavenly Redeemer, a delineation of the supremacy and triumph of Christ over every foe, and of the glory which awaits his faithful disciples.

CHAPTER II

THE LAMB OF GOD

THE Apocalypse pictures the Messiah chiefly as Redeemer and King, but his character as such presupposes his earthly life. Accordingly, we find that he is most frequently designated by his personal name Jesus (i. 9; xii. 17 *et al.*), less frequently by "the Christ" or Messiah (xi. 15 *et al.*). The author mentions his descent from the tribe of Judah and from the family of David (v. 5; xxii. 16). He is represented as the child of the Jewish theocracy, which is symbolized by the figure of "a woman arrayed with the sun" (xii. 1), who brought forth the child who should rule over the nations, and who, in turn, was threatened and persecuted by the evil world-power represented by the "great red dragon" (xii. 3, 6). The number of Jesus' apostles (xxi. 14), his death in Jerusalem (xi. 8), his resurrection (i. 5, 18), and his exaltation (iii. 21; xii. 5) are all alluded to. That he is contemplated as a priest is clear from the description of him in i. 13, as "clothed with a garment down to the foot, and girt about at the breasts with a golden girdle."

But the most characteristic designation of the Saviour is "the Lamb of God," which occurs twenty-nine times. Whether it is a reminiscence of the description of the suffering Servant of Jehovah, under the figure of a lamb, in Isa. liii. 7, or points to the Passover lamb, or to the covenant offerings, or represents a combination of ideas which is no longer directly dependent upon any one of these Old Testament conceptions, we cannot certainly determine. In any case "the Lamb" is a symbol of obedient and self-denying love. The title is meant to

portray him "who loveth us and loosed[1] us from our sins by his blood" (i. 5). It is "in the blood of the Lamb" that the saints have "washed their robes and made them clean" (vii. 14; xxii. 14); that is, the death of Christ is redemptive; it is a means of purification from sin. The same truth is expressed under the figure of purchase (*ἀγοράζειν*) when it is said: "Thou wast slain, and didst purchase unto God with thy blood men of every tribe, and tongue, and people, and nation, and madest them to be unto our God a kingdom and priests" (v. 9; *cf.* xiv. 3, 4). Although no formulated doctrine of the person and work of Christ should be sought in the Apocalypse, it will be found that the book is peculiarly rich in its descriptions of the dignity and glory of his person and of the surpassing greatness of his redeeming work. He is "the faithful witness, the first-born of the dead, and the ruler of the kings of the earth" (i. 5); "the Lord of lords and King of kings" (xvii. 14; xix. 16). The most striking imagery is employed to describe his dignity and authority. With eyes like a flame of fire, feet like unto burnished brass, and a voice as the voice of many waters, he walks in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks (i. 12–15), that is, appears as sovereign Lord of the Church. In his right hand he holds seven stars; a sharp sword issues from his mouth, and his countenance is like the sun shining in his strength (i. 16, 17). The "angels of the churches,"[2] symbolized by stars (i. 20), are in his power; he utters the sharp and searching word of God (*cf.* Heb. iv. 12 and Wisd. Sol. xviii. 15, 16), and is clothed with surpassing glory. His authority extends to all nations (xii. 5). In allusion to Dan. vii. 13 he is called "one like unto a son of man" (i. 13; xiv. 14), in contrast to the world-powers, symbolized by "beasts." Soon this exalted One will come again in power and glory to judge the world and save his people (i. 7; xiv. 14–16; xxii. 20); as "the

[1] The reading λύσαντι (loosed) is better supported than λούσαντι (washed). So the critical texts and R. V. *vs.* the Textus Receptus.

[2] By angels here are probably meant guardian angels, rather than the rulers or the characters of the churches personified.

bright, the morning star" (xxii. 16) he will then rise upon the world and usher in the consummation of his Kingdom.

But our author goes further. To Christ are paid divine honors. The praises of the redeemed are ascribed "unto God and unto the Lamb" (vii. 10); an innumerable host unites in the doxology: "Worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain to receive the power, and riches, and wisdom, and might, and honor, and glory, and blessing" (v. 12). The elders who bear the "golden bowls of incense, which are the prayers of the saints," fall down before the Lamb (v. 8); while angels, refusing all worship for themselves (xix. 10; xxii. 8, 9), join with all creatures in worshipping only God and the Lamb (v. 11 *sq.*). During the millennial reign of the saints (xx. 4) priests minister to him as to God himself (xx. 6). He holds the keys of Hades and of death (i. 18), that is, determines who shall enter and who shall be released from the realms of the dead. He sits with God in his throne (iii. 21; vii. 17; xii. 5), which is now called "the throne of God and of the Lamb" (xxii. 1, 3). He is the assessor of God in judgment (vi. 16, 17). Many Old Testament designations of Jehovah are freely applied to him, as where the description of "the ancient of days" (Dan. vii. 9) is transferred to Christ (i. 14, 15), and the searching of the hearts and reins ascribed to Jehovah (Ps. vii. 9) is attributed to him (ii. 23). While it is true that believers are children of the theocracy (xii. 17) and sons of God (xxi. 7), it also appears that the sonship of Christ to God is regarded as quite unique. From "his God and Father" (i. 6) he has received supreme authority (ii. 27), and has accordingly sat down with his Father in his throne (iii. 21).

But is Christ also, for our author, a preëxistent and eternal Being? In connection with this question the principal passages to be considered are as follows: "I am the first and the last, and the Living one" (i. 17, 18; *cf.* i. 8); "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end" (xxii. 13; *cf.* xxi. 6); "These things saith the Amen, the faithful and true witness, the

beginning of the creation of God" (ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ, iii. 14); "And he hath a name written, which no one knoweth but he himself. . . . And his name is called The Word of God" (ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, xix. 12; *cf.* iii. 2). Certain it is that the passages first mentioned apply to Christ language which the Old Testament uses to describe the absolute eternity of God. See Isa. xliv. 6: "I am the first and the last; and beside me there is no God." In such a connection "the Living one" (ὁ ζῶν) can hardly refer to anything less than an absolute life.[1] Like God, he "liveth for ever and ever" (iv. 9, 10; x. 6). The phrase: "The beginning of the creation of God" (iii. 14), reminds one strongly of Col. i. 15, 18: "The first-born of all creation" (πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως) . . . "who is the beginning" (ὅς ἐστιν ἀρχή), and, in the view of some, is a reminiscence of these Pauline expressions.[2] The principal question of interpretation is, whether Christ as ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως is meant to be included in the κτίσις or not. Some would render the phrase "the principle of the creation," and would interpret it in the sense in which wisdom is depicted in Prov. viii. 22 as possessed or formed by the Lord in the beginning of his way. In that case Christ would be regarded as the first κτίσις of God, "that production of God in which all others are implied, and by which everything further is accomplished."[3] Others regard ἡ ἀρχή as a logical *prius* of ἡ κτίσις, and thus as not included within it.[4] It seems to me probable that this view is correct, although the context does not so clearly require the interpretation which makes the relation of Christ to the creation original as it does in the case of the similar phrases in Colossians.[5] Grammatically considered,

[1] Beyschlag says that it "cannot be understood merely of the resurrection life, which is afterwards described by ἰδοὺ ζῶν εἰμί, κ.τ.λ., but is to be understood of the essential life, which not merely continues in eternity, but also springs from eternity." *N. T. Theol.* II. 380 (Bk. V. ii. ch. iii. § 4).

[2] So Bousset, *Offenbarung Johannes* (Meyer Series), *in loco.*

[3] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* II. 381 (Bk. V. ii. ch. iii. § 4).

[4] So Weiss, Gebhardt, Düsterdieck, Bleek, Lechler, Bousset, Briggs.

[5] See p. 394.

the words may have either meaning. The interpretation for which I have expressed a preference rests mainly upon the general representation of Christ as the "first and the last" and the absolutely Living one. Since the view of the Apocalypse is that he is the beginning and goal of human history, it is unlikely that the phrase in question means to include him within the created universe. This view is strongly confirmed if we suppose that the passage under consideration is dependent upon Colossians. The question turns chiefly upon the doctrine of the book as a whole. Christ is one who calls God Father in a unique sense (i. 6; ii. 27; iii. 5, 21; xiv. 1); the designation "our Father" does not appear. He is one to whom the mystic sevenfold perfection of God is ascribed (iii. 1; v. 6; *cf.* i. 4; iv. 5). He possesses the secret of Jehovah, and writes his mysterious name upon the foreheads of the saints (ii. 17; iii. 12; xiv. 1).

What now is "his own new name" (iii. 12), "the name which no one knoweth but himself" (xix. 12), which he will also write upon the faithful? Some suppose that the answer is given in xix. 13: "And his name is called the Logos of God."[1] Others think that it is vain to search for an answer to this question, since the mysterious name is expressly said to be unknown to any except Christ himself.[2] Still others, finding an inconsistency between the statements that the name is unknown, and that it is the Logos, conclude that the latter assertion is an interpolation supplied by a later writer from the prologue of the fourth Gospel.[3] We should probably seek no definite answer to the question: What is this incommunicable name? It appears to be a symbol for the secret of the Messiah, the incomparable majesty and power which belong to him as the vicegerent of God, the King of kings and Lord of lords. The glory of his person and the triumph of his Kingdom are mysteries which no mind can fully fathom. The terms used denote the transcendence of Christ, his

[1] So Gess, Gebhardt, Weiss, Beyschlag, Weizsäcker.
[2] So Bleek, Düsterdieck, Bousset.
[3] So Völter, Vischer, Spitta, Pfleiderer, and, apparently, Briggs.

unique and absolute superiority. Doubts as to the originality of the title "the Logos of God," and the fact that its meaning is left wholly unexplained, preclude us from building too confidently any conclusion upon it. Interpreters who treat it as genuine are quite divided in opinion as to the aspect of Christ's person and work which it is intended to emphasize.[1]

Making all allowance, then, for the uncertainties which attach to individual passages and phrases, the question recurs: Does the Apocalypse represent Christ as a pre-temporal, eternal Being — as one who is, in the proper sense, divine? In answering this question affirmatively, I will cite the verdicts of several writers of various schools. "We must recognize without hesitation that Christ, in the Apocalypse, is elevated to the plane of God (au niveau de Dieu). He is named the first and the last, the beginning and the end, and these same formulas are employed to designate the Supreme Being."[2] "The fact that the Messiah is an originally divine Being (göttliches Wesen) is taken for granted."[3] "We find some statements of a Godlike character which cannot be explained by a divine glory won on earth."[4] The last-named writer, however, attributes this deification of Christ (as in the case of Paul, John, and the Epistle to the Hebrews) to the naive confusion by the Biblical authors of a person with an idea.[5]

[1] Weiss: "The executor of the divine (judicial) will," *Bibl. Theol.* § 134, *d* 5; Gebhardt refers it to Christ's preëxistence and creative activity, *Doct. of Apoc.* p. 94 *sq.*; Beyschlag: "The reappearing heavenly Victor," *N. T. Theol.* II. 382 (Bk. V. ii. ch. iii. § 4); Lechler: "The personal bearer of divine wisdom and power, the Mediator of all divine self-revelation," *Apos. u. nachapos. Zeitalt.*, p. 449.

[2] Reuss, *Hist. Théol. Crét.* I. 461.

[3] Weiss, *Bibl. Theol.* § 134, *d.*

[4] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* II. 379 (Bk. V. ii. ch. iii. § 4).

[5] "Here, then, we have essentially the same idea of preëxistence as we have in Paul and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the application of the idea of the eternal self-revelation of God to the person of the Messiah. But there as here we have a gap in thought; by personifying an idea we may hide from ourselves the fact that, in recognizing the idea in the person of Jesus, a historical person is coördinated with something which, however realistically conceived, is not a person but an idea." *Op. cit., ut supra.*

This august personage, who sits on a throne of splendor, clothed with all knowledge and power, is able to read the riddle of the future and actually to solve it (v. 2). "The Lion that is of the tribe of Judah, the Root of David, hath overcome to open the book and the seven seals thereof" (v. 5). The seer is bidden to look and behold the victorious Lion, the all-conquering Messiah, who can unlock the secrets which the future holds in store, and guarantee success to the persecuted cause of truth and righteousness. And he looked, and "behold, in the midst of the throne stood a Lamb, as though it had been slain" (v. 6). He looked to see a Lion and beheld a Lamb. He looked to see power and force, whereby the foes of his faith should be destroyed, and he saw love and gentleness by which they should be conquered by being transformed into friends. The might of Christ is the power of love. The captive train which he leads in his triumphal march is composed of those who are bound to him by the golden chains of love and gratitude. The Lamb, as though it had been slain, stands in the midst of God's throne. At the heart of God's sovereignty is sacrificial and suffering love. The almighty will of God is a will of love. The power of God serves the ends of his grace, and it is to the God who gives his Son in sacrificial and suffering love that the swelling chorus of praise is uplifted: "Worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain to receive the power, and riches, and wisdom, and might, and honor, and glory, and blessing. And every created thing which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and on the sea, and all things that are in them, heard I saying, Unto him that sitteth on the throne, and unto the Lamb, be the blessing, and the honor, and the glory, and the dominion, for ever and ever" (v. 12, 13).

CHAPTER III

THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY

THE Apocalypse speaks only of individual churches, although it has the idea of a collective community of believers which is called "the bride or wife of the Lamb" (xix. 7; xxi. 2; xxii. 17). Christians are usually designated as "saints," or as those who worship, fear, and serve God (xi. 18; xix. 2–5). As such they constitute a holy priesthood unto God (i. 6). These phrases have a Jewish sound, but they are easily matched by others which bear a more universalistic character. The community of the redeemed is gathered from "every tribe, and tongue, and people, and nation" (v. 9). Jewish forms of thought, derived from prophecy, or from current apocalyptic language, are common, but they are so blended with Christian conceptions as practically to receive a new meaning. If, on the one hand, the Lamb stands with his elect on Mount Zion (xiv. 1), and the descending city of God is a new Jerusalem (xxi. 2); if the Kingdom has its capital for a time in the holy city (xx. 9), and the kernel of the Church is pictured as 144,000 — an equal number from each of the twelve tribes of Israel (vii. 4–8); yet, on the other hand, all believers are priests (v. 10); the book makes no mention of circumcision and shows no trace of regarding the ceremonial law as valid; the Church is composed of an innumerable multitude gathered out of every nation (vii. 9). As with Paul, Christians constitute the true Israel (ii. 9); Jews who revile Christ and persecute his followers are "a synagogue of Satan" (iii. 9). If the book is a composite of Jewish and Christian elements, as some critics suppose, the materials have been so blended as to yield a distinctly Christian and universal gospel. In its

language and symbolisms the Apocalypse is, indeed, the most Jewish book in the New Testament; but that is only to say that it is an apocalypse. It is not a Judaizing book. To find in the reproofs directed against the heretics and "false apostles," who had invaded the churches of Asia, attacks upon the apostle Paul is preposterous. A tone of universalism runs through the whole book. "The author knew no people of God but the Christians, and no Judaism but that of the gospel."[1]

The messages to the seven churches of Asia furnish us an outline picture of the conditions which obtained in that part of the Christian world where the Apocalypse took its rise. The church at Ephesus had patiently suffered persecution for the cause of Christ, and had repudiated the false teachers who had sought to lead it astray from the truth. These Nicolaitans seem to have been libertines and antinomians who tempted the Christians to idolatrous and licentious practices, as Balaam tempted the Israelites (ii. 6, 14, 15). The prophecy of Paul spoken to the Ephesian elders at Miletus (Acts xx. 29, 30) has come true, and the church is now warned again to beware of the corrupt teachers, and to renew the love and zeal which they had formerly shown in the service of Christ (ii. 4–7).

The poor church of Smyrna (ii. 8 *sq.*) and the small one of Philadelphia (iii. 7 *sq.*) receive unqualified praise. The former has suffered bitter persecutions at the hands of the hostile Jews; some of them are facing the prospect of imprisonment, but it will be short; if their sufferings terminate in death, the crown of life is just beyond. The feeble but faithful little congregation of Philadelphia shall triumph over all their foes in the day of Messiah's coming. Then their faithfulness will have its reward, and upon their foreheads the triumphant Messiah will write the name of God, and of the new Jerusalem which cometh down from God out of heaven, and his own new name (iii. 12); that is, he will seal them for his own and assign them to a place in God's eternal Kingdom.

The churches at Pergamum and Thyatira (ii. 12–29)

[1] Weizsäcker, *Apostolic Age*, II. 199 (orig. p. 526).

have both fallen a prey, in part, to the seductions of the false and corrupt teachers. In Pergamum Satan has his throne (ii. 13); that is, some form of fanatical and corrupting heathen worship is there practised. Some of the believers have yielded to the influence of libertinism and a great danger threatens the church; but the majority are still loyal and one, at least, has attested his fidelity by martyrdom (ii. 13). In Thyatira a pretended prophetess — symbolically called Jezebel — has seduced some into idolatry and fornication. She and her followers are threatened with destruction. As a whole the church has made progress. They are counselled to cease to cultivate the so-called deeper knowledge of those who regard themselves as free from the ordinary requirements of Christian morality — a knowledge which apprehends only the "deep things" of Satan (ii. 24), not those of God; and are assured that only the commands of Christ to live a pure and holy life, not the demands of the Jewish law, are laid upon them (*v.* 24).

The churches at Sardis and Laodicea are addressed in terms of severe reproof To the former there remains hardly more than the semblance of the Christian life. Their zeal is but a smouldering ember, but it may yet be fanned into a flame of devotion. There is a nucleus of faithful ones who have kept themselves unsullied amid the prevalent corruption. The church is warned of its peril and is urged to repentance and reform (iii. 1–6). The condition of the Laodicean church is even more deplorable. It is composed of "lukewarm" people, who have accepted the truths of the gospel with a passive acquiescence. They are not interested enough in it to defend it or to suffer for it; nor do they even concern themselves about it sufficiently to repudiate it. They are neither "cold nor hot." Christ, therefore, rejects them from his fellowship. He chides them for their trust in riches, and declares that they are blind to their utter spiritual poverty. Yet even this lifeless church is not beyond recovery. The Saviour stands before these selfish and benighted professors of his name in pleading love, and offers them

the white robes in which they may clothe themselves, promises them blessed fellowship with himself, and speaks the assurance of victory to him who will rouse himself from his lethargy and strive and conquer in the good fight of faith (iii. 14–22).

The book lays stress upon the necessity of works of righteousness. "Do the first works" (ii. 5); "I know thy works" (ii. 19); "I will give unto each one of you according to your works" (ii. 23); "Their works follow with them" (who die in the Lord, xiv. 13); "My reward is with me, to render to each man according as his work is" (xxii. 12) — such are some of the expressions of the idea. What is the nature of these "works"? They cannot be observances of the Mosaic law, since the book nowhere recognizes its obligation. They are rather regarded as deeds of fidelity and devotion to Christ, such as the endurance of affliction for his sake and the preservation of purity under stress of temptation. To "keep Christ's works" is "to overcome" (ii. 26), that is, to triumph in the moral conflict of life; it is to be steadfast amidst sufferings, even to the point of forfeiting life itself (xii. 11). In ii. 19 the "works" of the saints are explained by the words: love, faith, ministry, and patience, and in iii. 4 the heavenly reward is given to those who have lived an undefiled life. The "righteous acts (*δικαιώματα*) of the saints" (xix. 8), in which they clothe themselves as with a robe, consist in "keeping the commandments of God and the faith of Jesus" (xiv. 12). Thus we see that the works which are so richly rewarded are regarded as having their source and spring in fidelity to Christ. They are the "works of Jesus" (ii. 26). No obligation beyond obedience to the requirements of his gospel is laid upon the Christian (ii. 24). To keep the commands of God is synonymous with holding the testimony of Jesus (xii. 17). Hence the song of the redeemed is at once the song of Moses and of the Lamb (xv. 3), and "the testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy" (xix. 10). The truth of Jesus is the touchstone by which to measure the value and determine the import of law and prophecy.

It is evident, then, that we have in the Apocalypse no Judaizing doctrine of works. Let us now turn to its teaching concerning faith. From the very nature of the book we should expect that, as in Hebrews, faith would take on a heroic quality and be especially shown in steadfastness and patience under suffering. Hence faith is associated with *ὑπομονή*, steadfast endurance (xiii. 10; xiv. 12). It is viewed as a devoted attachment to Christ's person, which persecution is powerless to break: "Thou holdest fast my name, and didst not deny my faith" (ii. 13), that is, faith in me (*πίστις μου*). Hence the writer speaks of "keeping the commandments of God and the faith of Jesus" (*πίστις Ἰησοῦ*, xiv. 12), that is, devotedly adhering to confidence in Jesus. But this faith is not a mere passive acquiescence or intellectual belief. It is the motive of effort and achievement; it is fidelity even unto death (ii. 10, 19). In it the "works of Jesus" (ii. 26) have their root, and when it is said that men will be judged according to their works (xx. 12), the meaning is not that outward actions as such determine destiny, but that the whole character, in all its motives and issues, carries over into the life beyond and brings forth fruit after its kind. "Works" are not meritorious deeds entitling the doer of them to salvation as a reward. Salvation is a free gift: "I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely" (*δωρεάν*); "He that is athirst, let him take the water of life freely" (xxi. 6; xxii. 17). Although the saved have "overcome," that is, achieved a moral victory by effort and struggle, yet this victory is not regarded as due to their own power or as founding a claim to heavenly blessedness; they have rather "overcome because of the blood of the Lamb" (xii. 11); they have "washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb" (vii. 14); that is, their salvation is ascribed to the divine grace as revealed and applied through the redeeming work of Christ. Here, as elsewhere in the New Testament, the correlation between grace and faith — as opposed to debt and works — is preserved. Salvation is by faith because it is of grace.

Although the book emphasizes so strongly the necessity of suffering and of purity, it does not give these ideas an ascetic application. It does not discountenance marriage, as some have thought. The "virgins, who were not defiled with women" (xiv. 4), may either refer to those who have abstained from all unchastity, or be taken as a figurative designation of those who have remained faithful to God, in contrast to such as have fallen into idolatry, which the Old Testament so often describes as adultery. It is quite impossible that the whole company of faithful believers, here referred to, should be said to have renounced the married state. This is the less likely since the blessedness of the Messianic Kingdom is represented by the figure of a marriage feast (xix. 7–9), and the favorite metaphor to denote Christ's relation to his Church is that of a bridegroom and a bride (xxi. 2; xxii. 17).

The Apocalypse reflects but in a very slight degree the organization, customs, and observances of the early Church. The frequent references to elders as representatives of the Christian community imply the office of the eldership, but throw no light upon its nature and function at the time of writing. "The Lord's day" (ἡ κυριακὴ ἡμέρα, i. 10) probably refers to Sunday, and is doubtless so called because the Lord rose from the dead on that day. The special mention of this day as the time when the seer saw his vision would seem to imply that it was recognized as a specially sacred day. Whether the designation here employed was already in use, or originated from this passage, we have no means of knowing. The earliest use in extra-canonical literature is in the *Didache*.[1] The "angels of the churches," as we have already observed, are probably not church officers, but the guardian angels or genii of the several churches who are addressed under the names of the congregations which they represent. Apostles, prophets, and martyrs are several times mentioned with special honor (xviii. 20; xxi. 14; ii. 13; vi. 9; xvii. 6); but it is improbable that the writer refers especially to these classes when he speaks of "the small and

[1] Section 14; *cf. Epistle of Barnabas* xv.; *Gospel of Peter*, v. 50 *et al.*

the great" (xi. 18; xix. 5) in the community of believers. All believers are kings and priests unto God. They are priests because they offer up to him at all times the grateful incense of praise and prayer (v. 8; viii. 3), and they are kings because they are unsubdued by hostile powers and are destined to reign with Christ (v. 10; xx. 6). Over suffering, persecution, and death God will make his saints victorious, "and they shall reign unto the ages of the ages" (xxii. 5).

CHAPTER IV

THE ANTICHRISTIAN WORLD-POWER

It was a fixed conviction in the apostolic age that some special manifestation of wickedness would precede Messiah's coming. In the Synoptics we read of false Christs and false prophets who should arise and deceive, if possible, the very elect (Mt. xxiv. 24). The Pauline Apocalypse speaks of an apostasy and of a man of sin who, with blasphemous pretensions, should exalt himself above all that is called God or is worshipped (2 Thess. ii. 4). We have seen reasons for believing that this "mystery of lawlessness" (*v.* 7) was regarded as a Jewish antichristian fanaticism which, it was expected, would break out in a hostile demonstration against the Gospel. If this view is correct, the Roman power is viewed as a restraint upon Jewish hostility. In the Epistles of John Antichrist is an incipient Gnosticism which denies that Jesus is come in the flesh (I. iv. 3; II. 7). In the Johannine Apocalypse, however, this antichristian power is seen in the Roman Empire. The hostility of Judaism to Christianity is, indeed, recognized, but this representation is quite overshadowed by the description of "the beast" — the gigantic might of the Roman world-empire. We note in this description a widely different attitude towards the existing civil power from that expressed by Paul in Rom. xiii. The apostle had counselled submission to the constituted authority because the civil government was God's minister for the good of its subjects (*v.* 4). But by its cruel abuse of its power the empire had ceased to be the benefactor and had become the enemy of mankind. It was no longer viewed as the representative of divine order and law on earth, but as a brutal and blas-

phemous monster whom God should slay with the thunderbolts of his wrath.

Throughout the earlier chapters of the Apocalypse we meet with references to hostile powers which we may generically designate as Antichrist. Sometimes these powers are of Jewish, sometimes of Roman, origin. At length in chapters xii., xiii., and xvii. the symbolism derived from the Book of Daniel is employed to portray these evil forces in all their cruel and blasphemous wickedness. Here, as before, the powers in question are partly Jewish, though chiefly Roman. However various may have been the literary sources of our present Apocalypse, all its parts have this characteristic in common: they all depict and protest against some signal form of opposition to the Christian faith. Even the salutations and messages to the churches contain allusions to the foes of Christ. When he comes in glory, they that have pierced him shall see him, and "all the tribes of the earth shall mourn because of him" (i. 7). According to the traditional interpretation of i. 9, the seer himself is a victim of persecution, and has been banished to the island of Patmos because he has preached the word of God and testified to the truth of Christ.[1] Heresies have invaded the churches. False apostles have seduced believers from their first love (ii. 3, 4). The Christians are summoned to a deadly conflict with evil forces. "Overcome" is the watchword of the Christian life. Fidelity, involving, if need be, submission to suffering and death, is the price of the promised heavenly blessedness. An hour of fearful trial is coming upon the whole world; the believer must be steadfast and watchful "that no one take his crown" (iii. 11). Satan has taken possession of Judaism and established within it his throne (ii. 13). The trial and imprisonment of Christians have already begun (ii. 10, 13). Idolatry

[1] So Gebhardt, Trench, Simcox, Bousset. Two other interpretations are possible: (1) The seer was in Patmos for the purpose of preaching the word of God. (2) He was there to receive the revelation of God's word in vision. So Bleek, Lücke, DeWette, Düsterdieck, Weiss. I regard this interpretation as more probably correct.

and impurity — portrayed under the names, Nicolaitans, Balaamites, and Jezebel (ii. 6, 14, 20) — are exercising their seductive power upon the harassed and oppressed Christian communities.

And now are heard the mutterings of the coming storm of judgment. When the sixth seal — one of the dread mysteries of the future — is opened, there is a great convulsion of nature; the heavens are rolled together as a scroll, and the mighty ones of earth hide themselves in caves and rocks to shield themselves "from the face of him that sitteth on the throne and from the wrath of the Lamb: for the great day of their wrath is come, and who is able to stand?" (vi. 16, 17). Deeper roll the thunders of judgment as the last mystery is unlocked (ch. viii.). Dread portents follow one another in quick succession. The golden censer which had held the prayers of the saints is now filled with the fire of judgment and cast upon the earth (*vv.* 3–5). The prayers of God's people are heard and vengeance descends upon their enemies. Woe after woe, plague after plague, is inflicted upon the wicked world. A fiery tempest overwhelms Antichrist in utter destruction (ch. ix.). The sacred city which is now "spiritually called Sodom and Egypt" (xi. 8) is doomed, and as it disappears, the spiritual theocracy, the heavenly city of God, emerges, and triumphant voices are heard to cry: "The kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord, and of his Christ: and he shall reign for ever and ever." "We give thee thanks, O Lord God, the Almighty, which art and which wast; because thou hast taken thy great power, and didst reign" (xi. 15, 17).

The evil world-power is more directly described in the middle chapters of the book. Without attempting to determine the meaning of the details in the description, we may point out the chief features of the apocalyptic picture of "the beast." When the woman, "arrayed with the sun" (xii. 1), — symbol of the Jewish theocracy, — brings forth her son, the Messiah, a satanic power, pictured as a great red dragon, appears and persecutes the woman and her seed. We hear the clash of opposing forces, but "the

earth helped the woman" (xii. 16) and defeated the wicked purpose of the "accuser of the brethren" (*v.* 10). And now the antichristian power appears under another symbol. A beast comes up from the sea (xiii. 1), that is, from the abyss, the haunt of the demons (xi. 7; xvii. 8; ix. 1, 11). His horns, heads, and diadems represent the manifold powers of Rome and the blasphemous pretensions of its emperors. The description is modelled upon Dan. vii. 7 *sq.* where the Græco-Syrian kingdom is pictured as a "beast, terrible, and powerful, and strong exceedingly." The whole world does homage to this monster. His power seems limitless and his sway unbounded. He revels in blasphemies and reeks with the blood of God's people (*vv.* 6, 7). A second beast now comes up from the land (xiii. 11). This monster aids the first. "He maketh the earth and them that dwell therein to worship the first beast" (xiii. 12). We seem to have here a symbol of false prophecy acting in alliance with Roman persecution. The political power of Rome and the religious fanaticism of Judaism are conceived of as coöperating for the extermination of the Church. We have seen that the Antichrist of Paul and of the Synoptics was Jewish. We seem to have here a trace of the same idea, though it is quite overshadowed by the representation of Rome as the chief embodiment of satanic hostility to Christianity. Antichrist is primarily Rome, and Jewish hostility is a secondary and subordinate manifestation of its spirit. "The combination of the two beasts brings before us a development of the anticipations formed of Antichrist. Originally Antichrist was conceived, not as a heathen world-power, but as a false Messiah. Now the work of Satan was seen in that heathen world-power. Unwilling wholly to give up the idea of the false Messiah and his deceit, men imagined the false prophet, at least, accompanying heathenism as its servant and ally. Accordingly, the symbols, as we find them in this prophecy, represent a transition stage between the Jewish Antichrist and heathen Antichristianity."[1]

[1] Weizsäcker, *Apostolic Age*, II. 188 (orig. p. 515).

In chapter xvii. the Roman power is most vividly depicted. It is represented by a woman seated upon the monster which has been already described. She is tricked out in meretricious ornaments, and on her forehead is an inscription which designates her as the mystic Babylon. She is "drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus" (*v.* 6). This whole description is, to a considerable extent, a repetition of that given in chapter xiii. and is probably a different version of the same apocalyptic matter. The principal differences are, that in chapter xvii. the figure of the beast representing Rome is combined with that of the "great harlot," instead of with that of a second beast from the land, and that the seer gives an interpretation of several features of the symbolism. The beast was and is not, and is about to come up from the abyss and then to be destroyed (*v.* 8). Here is evidently a reference to the death, or supposed death, of some Roman emperor whose return to earth, either in person or in spirit, is expected. Two interpretations of the "seven heads" are given. They are the seven hills of Rome on which the woman (the city) sits (*v.* 9), and they are seven kings (emperors); five have died, the sixth is now living, and the seventh is yet to come (*v.* 10). In the present form of the book there is no little repetition, vacillation, and incongruity in the use of the symbols. Now the beast represents the empire, and now some emperor. The symbolic woman, in turn, represents the city. The interpretation of the seven heads of the beast as representing the seven hills is apparently occasioned by the use of the symbol of the woman for the city. Here, at any rate, is an incongruity in the twofold explanation of the seven heads. The first explanation (*v.* 9) seems less natural than the second (*v.* 10) and less accordant with the general use of the symbols employed. The ten horns are ten kings, confederates of the emperor, who conspire with him to "war against the Lamb" (*vv.* 12–14), but who also turn upon the city of Rome and utterly destroy it (*vv.* 16, 17). This is probably an expression of the current expec-

tation that Asiatic nations, especially the Parthians, were likely to march against the city and to overwhelm it with destruction. Thus does God use the allies of Antichrist to destroy the eternal city: "For God did put in their hearts to do his mind . . . until the words of God should be accomplished" (*v.* 17).

In the Apocalypse is found embodied an idea which was, no doubt, a product of popular Jewish Messianic expectations, that of the thousand years' reign of Christ and the saints (xx. 1–10).[1] In precisely what relation to the great world-conflict this episode stands is not made clear. After the fall of the mystic Babylon and the overthrow of the false prophet (xix. 20), a strong angel comes down out of heaven and binds Satan for a thousand years. During this period the martyrs are raised from the dead and reign with Christ. This is the first resurrection (xx. 5). At the end of the millennium Satan again marshals the nations to war against the saints, whereupon fire descends from heaven and overwhelms them in utter and final destruction (*vv.* 9, 10). This is the last expiring effort of Antichrist, after which appears the new heaven and the new earth and the holy city descending out of heaven from God (xxi. 1, 2). Whether this period is conceived of as preceding or following the parousia; whether the reign of Christ and the saints is on earth or in heaven; and whether the resurrection is literal or spiritual, are questions which the passage leaves unanswered. If it is regarded as subsequent to the parousia, then there would seem to be another final coming or mani-

[1] "The roots (of the idea of a millennial reign of the Messiah) lie in Judaism and in its sensuous ideas of an earthly blossoming-time of the Kingdom of God. . . . It was psychologically inevitable that as the Old Testament Messianic idea completed and realized itself in Christianity, the chiliastic popular belief also passed over with it into the Jewish-Christian hope for the future. Hence the Revelation of John teaches (xx. 4) that, after the coming of Christ, his steadfast confessors will rise and reign with him a thousand years." H. J. Holtzmann, Art. *Chiliasmus* in the *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirchenwesen.* The millennial idea in late Judaism is discussed and illustrated by Stanton, *The Jewish and the Christian Messiah*, pp. 310–324, and by Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.* 3te. Aufl. Bd. II. pp. 522 *sq.*

festation of Christ ushering in the general judgment described in verses 11–15. Interpreters have attached the most various meanings to the "millennium." Elaborate eschatological programmes have been based upon it — due, in most instances, to a prosaic reading of a highly dramatic book. To me it seems likely that we have in the passage an apocalyptic fragment which represents a survival of the Jewish belief that the Messiah would establish a Kingdom on earth.

CHAPTER V

CONFLICT AND VICTORY

THE Apocalypse, notwithstanding its obscurities, is an important aid in transporting us back into the thought-world of the first Christian century. In its light we trace the footsteps of martyrs, and note the progress and results of that long course of struggle, oppression, and suffering which mark the late Jewish and the early Christian periods. In this book we read the story of the real *dolores Messiæ*. It resounds with echoes of the time when the Jewish nation was decimated by captivities, crushed by oppression, and rent by revolutions. The imagery of the book and, perhaps, parts of its material reflect that period of bitter struggle when the Maccabees fought and died to preserve the last spark of Jewish national life from being tramped out beneath the feet of their Græco-Syrian oppressors. These events are the birth-throes of a new age. The Messiah was born of mother Israel at a time when the skies were lurid with portents of coming storms. Satan was ready and waiting to renew his persecuting zeal against the mother and her child (ch. xii.). We know from other sources how the representative of Roman political power sought the young child's life (Mt. ii. 13), and how Roman armies desecrated the temple with their idolatrous rites and laid Jerusalem in the dust. The angel of destruction marked the sanctuary for his prey, and its enemies trod the holy city under foot. Its waters were turned to blood, and dead bodies lined the streets where also the Lord had been crucified (xi. 1–8). Allusions to these events are woven into the narrative, perhaps in part in the form in which they were found depicted in a current fund of apocalyptic tradition, without any intention of setting

forth a strict chronological order of events. All such descriptions serve but to heighten the color of that picture of the great impending world-conflict which now looms upon the seer's horizon.

In their general features our author's descriptions of the Roman power remind us of those fragments of apocalyptic tradition which we have already met with in the Synoptics. The desecration and overthrow of Jerusalem, the great tribulation, the appearance of false Christs and false prophets, the occurrence of dread portents in earth and sky, and the close connection of all these events with the parousia of the Lord, are features which the two have in common. In both, as in all parts of the New Testament, the Lord's advent is regarded as near at hand. The panorama of events described in the Revelation has already begun to unfold before the eye of the seer, and the movement will be more and more rapid. The courses of history are hastening to their close. The vision is of things which must shortly come to pass (i. 1, 3; xxii. 6, 7). Events follow rapidly, crisis upon crisis, until the great final consummation when, the first heaven and the first earth having passed away, a new heaven and a new earth emerge (xxi. 1). This conception must have been vivid, intense, and overmastering in the mind of the apostolic age. It was a view of human history which must have lent deep and awful significance to the events of every hour. Every great trial which befell the Church was the harbinger of speedy deliverance from all the woes of earth; every catastrophe in human affairs the premonition of coming doom upon an ungodly world. The veil which separated the eternal world from this was very thin and near; all eyes were watching for the moment when it should be rent and the heavenly glories should burst upon the earth, revealing blessing and honor for those who had kept the faith in patience, and destruction for the cruel and corrupt, the enemies of God and man. The apocalyptic view tended to color the whole field of history with the dark hues of the present evil age. Its tendency was inevitably somewhat pessimistic.

Of course, such a conception of the future had its disadvantages. It put men under severe limitations of view respecting the prospect of the world's progress. It could not see the future course of history as a long process through which runs the "increasing purpose" of God — the growing together of wheat and tares, the gradual leavening of the world until the whole is leavened (Mt. xiii. 33). It viewed the method of God as ictic and sudden, not as gradual and patient. But this was a limitation incidental to the age and inseparable from its modes of religious thought. The Jewish Messianic expectation which required a sign still made itself felt in Christian belief. In this respect our Apocalypse is the most intensely Jewish book in the New Testament.

But, after all, the pessimism of the book is rather apparent than real. It relates only to the conditions of the present age, and not to the general course and outcome of history as a whole. If the apocalyptic view despairs of the present, it is also able to look beyond the present. If evil is now dominant, its power is still temporary. If Antichrist now reigns, yet his reign will be short. The forces of evil, "the number of whom is as the sand of the sea" (xx. 8), are massing themselves for the great final conflict, but the issue will not be doubtful. Satan shall fall like lightning from heaven. The seer's philosophy of history, taken as a whole, is optimistic, as Christian thought must always be. Hard experience has, indeed, rendered impossible the Old Testament faith that the righteous will be prosperous and happy. But a new philosophy of life has been sought and won. It is derived from the unshaken Christian confidence that, however dark the present hour, God is still mindful of his own and will both vindicate himself and reward his faithful people. Apocalyptic writing belongs to an age when it was impossible to find the reward of virtue in the present world. It must be sought in the coming age. Hence Christian hope took a predominantly eschatological tone. We hear the echoes of it in almost every New Testament book. Men reminded themselves of the persecutions which the

pious in preceding ages had experienced, and sought comfort in the prospect of a great reward in heaven. When the divine promises seemed to fail, and hopes of happiness and peace turned to ashes, they directed their thoughts to the eternal city, not made with hands, and saw it descending from God out of heaven. Apocalyptic was at once the product and the cause of this vision. It fostered a form of faith and hope without which, in the dark and troublous years of persecution, the Church could hardly have survived.

A retrospective glance at the book as a whole may help us to see how some of these thoughts and hopes come to expression. Despite all eddies and back currents, there is a general onward movement in the stream of thought which we will briefly trace as illustrating the ideas of conflict and victory. Already in the epistles to the churches we have noted traces of the conditions which have just been described. The work of persecution and of corruption has begun, with the inevitable consequence that some have lost courage and made shipwreck of faith. The apocalypse of the seals portrays the power and glory of God and shows how Christ, "the Lamb in the midst of God's throne," solves the riddle of history and secures peace and blessing for his faithful disciples, while judgment is poured out upon his enemies. The description of the seven trumpets is a picture of judgment. The angel pours from his golden censer, upon the altar before the throne, the incense of the Church's prayers, and then fills the censer with the fires of the divine judgment. The trumpets now announce the successive woes which fall upon the ungodly world. In the visions of the beasts the Roman world-power first comes clearly into view. Here are sketched in mysterious symbols the nation of Israel giving birth to the Messiah, and the persecution of both by the satanic world-power; false prophecy lending itself to serve the purposes of the great beast from the abyss, and the succession of persecuting emperors. These descriptions represent the stress of the battle between evil and good. The conflict is depicted in

a variety of forms. It is a battle of archangels with the powers of hell: "Michael and his archangels going forth to war with the dragon; and the dragon warred and his angels" (xii. 7); the beast making war with the saints (xiii. 7), practising deception, doing all manner of lying wonders, and compelling men to commit sacrilege (xiii. 13–17). This conflict is followed by another vision of judgment — the apocalypse of the bowls. The mystic Babylon is overwhelmed in utter ruin. No minstrel or trumpeter is heard any more in Rome; no craftsman plies his trade; no mill is heard grinding; no lamp shines; the noise of her revelries has ceased forever (xviii. 22, 23). So ends the world-conflict.

And then bursts forth the song of victory, the hallelujah-chorus of the triumphant and rejoicing Church. The great harlot has been judged, and the blood of God's servants avenged (xix. 2). The descriptions of victory and salvation which fill the closing chapters are the most powerful passages in the book. They reflect the intensity of the faith in the certain triumph of God's Kingdom which still survived in spite of calamity and apostasy. The blessedness of that glorious time is depicted in a variety of striking images. One is that of the marriage-supper of Christ and his Church. The bride is arrayed in pure linen, — "the righteous acts of the saints" (xix. 8), — and she is now united to her Lord in blessed and eternal fellowship. Another is a picture of Christ in the stern character of judge. He is clothed with symbols of power and majesty; heaven resounds with the march of his armies, and in his fury he tramples down his enemies as the grapes are trodden in the winepress (xix. 15). When at length Satan, after a period of imprisonment, goes forth for his final onslaught upon the Church, fire from heaven destroys his hosts (xx. 9), and the seer looks again and, behold, the throne of God's eternal judgment is set. Before it stand the dead, both small and great, and the books are opened and the destinies of men declared "out of the things which are written in the books, according to their works" (xx. 12). And now appears "the holy city, new Jerusalem,

coming down out of heaven from God" (xxi. 2), in which there is no more sorrow, pain, or death (*v.* 4).

The description of this heavenly city — the blessed goal of the Christian's longings and hopes — is probably the most magnificent passage in all apocalyptic literature. It has proved its power in the Christian life of all subsequent times by the inspiration which it has furnished to poetic thought, and by the comfort which it has ministered to the Christian heart in hours of sorrow and bereavement. Its tones will be heard at the graves of the dead to the remotest age of Christian history. The light of the city was like that of a jasper stone, clear as crystal (xxi. 11), its proportions perfect (*v.* 16), its adornments gold and jewels, its walls precious stones, and its streets pure gold, transparent as glass (*vv.* 18–21). There is no need of temple or sacrifice, since God's immediate presence is manifest; no need of sun or moon, since the glory of God lightens the city, and the lamp thereof is the Lamb (*v.* 23). Day and night its gates of pearl stand open and all nations bring their loving tribute into it (*v.* 25). Through it flows the pure river of the water of life on whose banks grows the tree of life, whose leaves dispense healing to the nations (xxii. 1, 2). God's servants render him perpetual service, and the Lord God gives them light and they reign with him for ever and ever (*vv.* 3–5).

It is an ideal pictorially described, a symbolic picture of the better day seen in prophetic vision and cherished with persistent hope and trust. Precisely how Christian faith would have defined this hope, how far such language was literally understood, and what were thought to be the exact nature and conditions of that coming age, we need not inquire. The mind of that time was aware that such descriptions were figurative and pictorial. But, none the less, did these pictures represent realities. The things which were not seen were the eternal things, and faith was a conviction of the invisible. Our Apocalypse, despite its obscurities, stands as a splendid testimony to the undaunted confidence of a persecuted Church that goodness is mightier than evil and that the Kingdom of God will at

length prevail. It is a pæan born of the faith that, though for the time being, "truth is on the scaffold" and "wrong on the throne,"

"Yet that scaffold sways the future, and, behind the dim unknown,
Standeth God within the shadow, keeping watch above his own."[1]

[1] Lowell, *The Present Crisis.*

PART VII

THE THEOLOGY OF JOHN

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

In the chapter introductory to the study of the teaching of Jesus according to the fourth Gospel I have commented upon the advantages and disadvantages of treating the discourses apart from the other portions of the book, and have given the reasons why, in the present work, this method of separation was adopted. In this closing part of the volume, therefore, we have only to take account of the Epistles and of those parts of the Gospel which do not purport to reproduce the teaching of Jesus. Of these the most important is the prologue. While, as we have seen, the Gospel bears the impress of the author's mind throughout, yet evidence is not wanting that he distinguished his recollections of his Master's teaching from his own reflections, powerfully as the latter had shaped and colored the former. In the prologue, for example, he gives an exposition of what Jesus Christ meant to him in terms of current speech which he never puts into the mouth of Jesus. While it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the alleged words of Jesus from the statements of the evangelist, and while they should always be regarded as closely related, still the Epistles enable us to separate, for convenience, from the subject-matter of the discourses, a group of passages in which we may believe that the author was conscious of expressing his ideas in terms peculiarly his own. Let us briefly note the principal characteristics of these Johannine conceptions.

In the author's attitude towards the Old Testament, we note, on the one hand, the evidences of his own Jewish life and training, and, on the other, a certain feeling of hostility towards actual Judaism. The Old Testament is to him the word of God (x. 35);[1] to be an "Israelite indeed" is an honorable distinction (i. 47); the Messianic salvation issues from Israel (iv. 22); "the law was given (ἐδόθη) by Moses,"—he introduced or inaugurated the Old Testament system of organization and worship,—"but grace and truth came (ἐγένετο) by Jesus Christ"—he brought with him into the world the revelation of God which is inseparable from his own person (i. 17). Thus, by right and obligation, the Jewish people were Messiah's own possession (τὰ ἴδια); yet they that were his own (οἱ ἴδιοι) received him not (i. 11). The apostle does not repudiate his Judaism, but like Paul, he has been deeply grieved and wounded by his nation's rejection of their Messiah.

Our author shows a capacity for wide generalizations. He has a few great watchwords or maxims which summarize for him all divine truths. They are such as: "God is light," "God is love," and "In him was life." He carries all religious truths up into the sublime heights of God's eternal and infinite life. Revelation and redemption are regarded as expressions of God's nature, and all temporal things are viewed under the aspect of eternity. Hence revelation is coextensive with human history, and God's gracious work of enlightening and saving men has been going on from the beginning. Christ did not first come into the world when he was born in Bethlehem, and did not commence his saving work for men in Judea and Galilee. He was the heavenly light which was coming into the world and lighting every man; he was the light of men universally. What Christ has done in his historic manifestation is grounded for the

[1] Passages from the fourth Gospel are referred to by chapter and verse only, thus: iv. 9. Passages from the Epistles are cited thus: I. iii. 1; II. 3, etc. The first numeral in large type indicates the number of the Epistle from which the citation is made.

apostle in what he essentially and eternally is. In like manner, what God does it is according to his nature to do. As the central Sun of love and truth he pours his boundless and universal light upon the whole world of souls. The character of God determines the nature and requirements of the Christian life. All duties are summed up in Godlikeness. To walk in the light as God is in the light (I. i. 7), is the sum of Christian virtue. To love is to be born of God and to know God, since love is kinship to God (I. iv. 7, 8).

The apostle John was an intuitionist and a mystic. He does not argue; he sees. To prove Christianity true is quite remote from his purpose. He aims rather to set forth its truths in their inherent power and beauty in the hope that others will see and receive them. He assumes that Christianity carries its appeal direct to the heart. What men need is not more light, but an eye. If the spiritual nature can be aroused to desire love and purity, the message of the Gospel will find lodgement and welcome. Hence, to the apostle, knowledge was not the result of speculation or argument. It was the heart's inner certitude respecting that which met and satisfied its longings and its hopes. This knowledge was won in experience, through obedience, receptiveness, and trust. It is through such knowledge that we enter into the conscious possession of eternal life (xvii. 3). John had embraced Christ with his whole nature, and his faith in him was a passion. He had seen and handled him, but it was not a mere external touch. About his sacred person had twined the tendrils of the apostle's spirit. In Christ he had lost and found his life, and on his inimitable charms and heavenly glory he never tires of dwelling in devout contemplation.

There can be no greater mistake than to regard our author's Christology as a product of abstruse speculation. Even in the prologue he does not lose sight of the historical Christ. It is the Word which became flesh and dwelt among men which furnishes his starting-point and remains his dominant thought. True, he traces the existence of the light-bearing Logos back into eternity, but

this is not for him a flight of speculation, since he is sure that Jesus taught his own preëxistence and eternity. The author's view of Christ is eminently historical and practical. His Gospel is a portrait which the historical Christ mirrored upon the impressionable spirit of his beloved disciple. It is the product of a mind which was under the captivating spell of Jesus; and when all due allowance is made for its subjective factors, it is still seen to be no speculative romance, but a historical picture of an all-mastering personality. On this account his mysticism never becomes extravagant and fanciful. It does not desert the solid ground of reality and experience. It never falls into indifference to history. It never becomes a mere projection of the writer's own moods and feelings, but always remains true to the idea of an objective revelation of God. He does not lay chief stress upon the inner light of man's own spirit, but upon the Light from heaven, which shines in the world's darkness and illumines the human soul with its radiance.

It is quite true, however, that our author's mind spiritualizes everything which it touches. He sees the matchless Life which he describes not so much on its outer as on its inner side. His method is to seek the soul of truth in all the events whereby God is revealed. The failure to do this is the great fault of the Jewish people, who have not heard the voice of God which has been speaking in their own history. Hence the apostle's interpretation of religion is intensely ethical and spiritual. God in his revelation has, indeed, shown men what to do, but that is because he has shown them what they are and what he is. God's revelation is his self-revelation. All the duties and demands of religion strike their roots back into the nature of God, and into the nature of man as a son of God. Hence religion is, above all things, fellowship with God and moral likeness to him in heart and life. John's teaching is at the farthest possible remove from the popular Jewish theory of piety which made it a round of observances and ceremonies. His elevated spiritualism has little concern for the outward forms of religion. True worship is from

the heart, and may be offered with equal advantage anywhere. The apostle has nothing to say, in either the Gospel or the Epistles, of the institutions of religion. The sacraments, even, are only incidentally alluded to (*e.g.* iii. 5). We need not attribute this silence to indifference to the forms of Christian organization and ritual; but that it reveals, on the part of the apostle, an overmastering sense of the inwardness of the Christian life there can be no doubt.

On the other hand, the Johannine type of doctrine is not wanting in emphasis upon practical duties. The requirement that the Christian should lead a holy life is nowhere more strongly urged than in the first Epistle of John. Men must do righteousness and keep God's commandments if they will lay claim to the Christian name. They must walk in the truth and submit to its demands. He who professes love to God and does not love his fellowmen is self-deceived. Christians must love and serve one another. Christ's own life was the pattern of service. He took a towel and girded himself and washed the disciples' feet, and this he did because he knew that he came forth from God and was going again to God. It was the consciousness of divinity out of which sprang his desire and effort to perform this act of lowly service. Hence to serve thus is truly Godlike. As Christ does what he sees the Father doing, so his disciples are to take up the life of sympathetic and helpful love among men. As the Father sent the Son into the world on a mission of mercy to the sins and sorrows of men, so does he send his disciples into the world to repeat and multiply his life and its beneficent ministries. No! our author does not lose himself in vague raptures. If, as his legend describes him, he soars like the eagle into the sun, it is not to be lost to earth, but to bring down something of heaven's light and love into the struggles and sorrows of our daily life and common experience.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEA OF GOD

THE Johannine concept of God is best expressed in these terms: God is love (I. iv. 8, 16); God is light (I. i. 5); God is life (I. v. 20); and God is Father (I. ii. 1; iii. 1; II. 3, 4). Let us consider each of these propositions in order.

No formal definition of love can be given, nor is any required. But it may be partially described by enumerating some of its qualities. It is a personal relation, a fellowship of life. It is a union which involves mutual delight, interest, and attachment. Love is the bond of brotherhood among men. All the closest associations and endearments of earth have their basis in love. In selfishness there is only isolation; in love alone there is unity. Civilization and society are possible only on the basis of love, that is, of reciprocal interest, sympathy, and service. When, therefore, it is said that God is love, a part of the meaning must be that God is the ground of all the higher fellowships among men; that humanity is one because it is the offspring of God; that human society itself is founded in the nature of God. Love in man is a reflection of the divine nature in him. "Love is of God, and he that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God" (I. iv. 7). Love is, therefore, a self-giving, self-imparting quality. As love, God is the great giver. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son" (iii. 16). To love is to give, to serve, to bless, to impart one's self. It is the great love of the Father which moved him to make sinful men his children (I. iii. 1). As love, God is the absolutely good Being whose nature it is to communicate himself. Man is the offspring of the divine love, and finds

his true life in fellowship with God and in the impartation of good to his fellows. By loving one another men show that God abides in them and that his love is perfected in them (I. iv. 12).

By an expressive and favorite figure of John God is defined as light: "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all" (I. i. 5). This truth is declared to contain the essential import of the gospel message which the apostle had heard from Christ. What aspect of the divine nature is this figure especially designed to emphasize? Some reply: The purity or holiness of God; others: His metaphysical nature; others: His revealed character; and still others: His perfect goodness. In the passage just quoted it is certain that light is set in contrast to the darkness of sin. Light is a symbol for the pure and holy life as contrasted with walking in the darkness of untruthfulness and unrighteousness. But, in itself, the figure of light is well adapted to represent moral ideas besides that of purity. It might express with special appropriateness and force the conception of God's self-revealing and self-imparting goodness. As it is the nature of light to shine, so it is the nature of God to give and bless. This idea is, at least, suggested by the opening verses of the first Epistle which leads up to the passage under review. The apostle shows how God has brought the eternal life to the world through his Son (*vv.* 1–4), and then declares that the import of this bestowment of life is that God is light. Of course, life and light are opposed to sin, as he proceeds to show; but the affirmation: God is light, stands in primary connection with the description of God's gracious impartation of life to the world through Christ. The light is "the light of life" (viii. 12) — the light of God's self-revealing, self-communicating life. With this view agrees the language of the prologue which speaks of the life which was in the Logos and which was perpetually shining down into the world's darkness, as "the light of men" (i. 4, 5).

I conclude, then, that light is a figurative designation for love. But both terms equally include purity or

holiness. This aspect of the divine nature and of the Christian life is quite as strongly emphasized in connection with what is said about love as it is in connection with the use of the figure of light. The love of God is perfected in him who keeps God's commandments (I. ii. 5): to love one's brother is to abide in the light; to hate a brother is to abide in darkness (*vv.* 9, 10). To love is to be begotten of God (I. iv. 7), and he that is begotten of God cannot live the sinful life (I. iii. 9). Love and sin are contraries. Love is holy, as light is pure. The import of both terms may best be given by saying that God is holy love. Both are terms for God's absolute, self-imparting goodness. But God's goodness is always true and real goodness and seeks the true and real good of its objects, and this good includes all that is the opposite of evil. But holiness or separateness from sin is essentially a negative concept and is quite inadequate as a definition of the divine light and love, which are positive. Love is more than holiness, and light is more than purity. They are terms for an absolute fulness, a positive perfection of life. God is the absolutely perfect One, and the Christian life is, ideally considered, Godlikeness. It is more than freedom from sin; it is the positive realization of a life like that of God.

The Johannine tradition of the Lord's words represents Jesus as speaking of the Father as the absolutely living One (ὁ ζῶν πατήρ, vi. 57), and, therefore, as the source of all spiritual life. The Father who "has life in himself" (v. 26) sent the Son into the world to communicate the divine life to men. Quite in accord with these expressions we read in the first Epistle: "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know him that is true [God], and we are in him that is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. This one [God] is the true God, and eternal life" (I. v. 20). By this last statement is meant that God is the source and ground of eternal life — a form of thought common in John, as in the words: "I am the resurrection and the life" (xi. 25), that is, the power of resurrection and the bestower of life.

Now life is the opposite of death, and death is defined as lovelessness: "We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren. He that loveth not, abideth in death" (I. iii. 14). Thus we see that life, like light, is regarded as an ethical conception. Both are terms for that absolute goodness, that perfect blessedness and disposition to bless, which the apostle searches for words to describe. They are synonyms of love, expressing certain aspects of God's perfection. No sharp distinction should be made between them. Christ called himself both life and light. God is love, light, and life — perfect, self-communicating goodness, the source of all purity, joy, and inspiration. The writer, in these descriptions, is simply straining and bending human language to the utmost in order to make it convey some idea of the transcendent perfection of God.

The apostle also employs Jesus' favorite designation for God — that of Father. We have seen that in both the Synoptic and Johannine tradition of our Lord's teaching God is regarded as the Father of all men.[1] This is the view which is taken in the Epistles. God is "the Father" without definition or limitation: "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God" (I. iii. 1). While it is true that in the Epistles, as in the Gospel, the fatherhood of God is most frequently applied to the relation of God to his Son Jesus Christ, it is certain that there are several passages in the former in which the application cannot be maintained (*e.g.* ii. 1, 13, 15, 16; II. 4; *cf.* Jn. iv. 23). We find here nothing inconsistent with the conclusions already reached in the study of Jesus' doctrine of the divine fatherhood. God is the Father of all men; he is the source of their being, and has made them kindred in nature to himself and capable of blessed fellowship with himself. But, on their part, men have not realized that relation and therefore do not in fact fulfil their ideal as sons of God, as he always fulfils his idea of fatherhood. Hence we read: "As many as received him, to them

[1] See pp. 69–78; 179–182.

gave he the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on his (Christ's) name" (i. 12). The sonship of men to God, in its true, ideal meaning, has been forfeited by sin. The relation denoted by it must be reconstituted by a spiritual renewal or transformation. The apostle John gives to this idea a special emphasis by employing the term "children" (*τέκνα*) instead of "sons" (*υἱοί*). The latter word (characteristic of Paul) is a more legal, the former a more personal, term. The latter suggests a certain privilege or status; the former a close fellowship and affectionate intimacy.[1]

Quite in keeping with the teaching which we have reviewed, God is declared to be invisible and spiritual in his nature. "No man hath seen God at any time" (i. 18). Yet he dwells in those who are kindred in disposition to himself. The life of love brings the soul into conscious union with God. "If we love one another, God abideth in us, and his love is perfected in us" (I. iv. 12). God reveals himself to the inner life; he is seen by the eye of the heart. "He that loveth, knoweth God" (I. iv. 7). But there is also a sense in which God has visibly revealed himself in the human life of his Son. His grace and truth have come to concrete expression in Christ (i. 17). In him God was, as we may say, translated into terms of human action and experience. "The only begotten Son has interpreted (*ἐξεγήσατο*) the Father" (i. 18). In him the voice of God which spoke in Jewish history and prophecy (v. 37) has attained an unexampled clearness. Through him the eternal life which was with the Father has been clearly manifested, so that men may enter into the fellowship and power of it (I. i. 2, 3).

In contrast to idols and heathen divinities God is "the true God" (*ὁ ἀληθινὸς θεός*, I. v. 20). He alone corresponds to a worthy idea of Deity. Hence all God's revelation is a revelation of divine truth, because it is his self-disclosure. Through Christ the truths of God — the

[1] "Nach Paulus bekommen wie um Christi willen Kindesrecht, nach Johannes durch Christum Kindeswesen." Haupt, *Der erste Brief des Johannes*, p. 133.

realities of his life and love — have been disclosed to men in their proper meaning and power, and through him men may know the truth and be made free by it (viii. 32). Their life may be illumined, enriched, and ennobled by a knowledge of God as he truly is, through living contact and renewing fellowship with him. Hence the truth — life as seen in the light of God — becomes something intensely real and practical. The truth is something to be done (iii. 21; i. 6). It is, as it were, an atmosphere in which one must live. To walk in the truth (II. 4; III. 3) is to live the life of fellowship with God and of likeness to him. It is synonymous with "walking in the light" (I. i. 7) or "abiding in the light" (I. ii. 10) which, in turn, is explained as obedience to the commandment, at once old and new, that men should love one another (I. ii. 10; iii. 11; II. 5).

God's perfect knowledge of what is in the human heart is asserted in the passage: "Hereby shall we know that we are of the truth, and shall assure our heart before him, whereinsoever our heart condemn us; because God is greater than our heart and knoweth all things" (I. iii. 19, 20). Interpreters are divided in opinion respecting the sense in which God is said to be "greater than our heart" — whether greater in severity or greater in leniency. On the former view the meaning would be that since God's knowledge of our sinfulness is greater than ours, he must condemn us much more severely than we condemn ourselves. On the latter view the thought is: Those who truly live the life of love have this comforting assurance, that God will freely forgive the sins which still beset them, because he is greater in compassion than their own accusing consciences are. I confidently adopt this view of the meaning.[1] God knows and takes full account of the sincere intention, the right central purpose and main direction of life, the weakness of human nature and the strength of men's temptations, and where the man is really "of the truth," that is, sincerely desiring and striving to conform to the demands of the life

[1] Cf. *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 68–70.

of holy love, God judges his faults more mercifully than he himself does. There is, however, no failure in the Johannine writings to recognize the holy displeasure of God against sin and the severity of his condemnation of it. Although the word "righteousness" is not employed in a judicial or penal sense (see I. i. 9; ii. 29), the law and penalty side of the divine nature is frequently emphasized. We have already seen how this is done in connection with the teaching, that although the direct object of Jesus' coming into the world was to save and not to judge the world, yet a process of judgment was inevitably involved in his work, and that God's condemnation stands against those who love darkness rather than light (iii. 19). The necessary reaction of God's holy nature against sin is amply brought out in connection with the doctrine of love. Since love, in the sense in which John uses the word, and sin are incompatible (I. iii. 9), it is evident that God, whose nature is love, must repudiate and condemn sin. Love is thus seen to be essentially righteous. It is no mere benevolence or good nature. Only he who loves can abide in the light of God (I. ii. 10). The sinful world has no understanding or appreciation of the life of those who live in the fellowship of the divine love (I. iii. 1), because evil is as contrary to love as darkness is to light. Love of the world, the supreme choice of the pleasures and possessions of this temporary order, is inconsistent with love to the Father, that is, with moral likeness to God (I. ii. 15). Every one who has been born into the life of love sets his hope on attaining a purity like that of Christ. "Every one that hath this hope set on him, purifieth himself, even as he is pure" (I. iii. 3). To "do righteousness" and to love one's brother are inseparable elements of the life which is begotten of God (I. ii. 29; iii. 10). Sin is lovelessness, and "he that loveth not abideth in death" (I. iii. 14). The possession of love is eternal life. How evident it is, then, that love, in the thought of the apostle, includes not only the self-imparting impulse in God but also his self-assertion as against sin—the energy of his holy nature in repudiating its opposite.

Love includes both benevolence and righteousness. The exercise of the divine love is regulated by the demands and standards of absolute holiness. Thus love is seen to be the most adequate definition of the moral nature and the best compendium of the Christian idea of God.

These considerations show us how God is to be known. "Every one that loveth knoweth God, for God is love" (I. iv. 7, 8). How obvious it is that we have to do here with something more than an intellectual knowing. It is the knowledge which is possible only in living fellowship and through kinship of spirit. It is the knowledge which comes from welcoming the divine light which shines down into this sinful world (i. 5) and from walking therein. Such a knowledge Christ has opened to men. He has shown them the way to fellowship with God. "The Son of God hath given us an understanding, that we know him that is true" (I. v. 20), and such knowledge of God is the indispensable condition of realizing the eternal life (*ib.*; *cf.* xvii. 20). It is a knowledge which involves the whole nature. It is man's entire grasp of God. John's doctrine is something more than mysticism. It involves the will as well as the intellect and feeling. The knowledge of God is attained only by love, and love requires the doing of God's commandments. Such knowledge is attained only on the path of obedience. The doctrine is practical. He knows God who lives a Godlike life. He knows Christ who walks with him and keeps his commandments. The apostle's mysticism never loses itself in mere devout ecstasies or subjective phantasies. It deals with men's every-day cares and labors, not to degrade the knowledge of God to the level of other knowledge, but to exalt all religious duty by showing how it leads to the heights of Godlikeness and to the consequent realization of the eternal life.

CHAPTER III

THE LOGOS

THE Logos-idea has its roots in the Old Testament and in post-canonical Jewish literature. The word of Jehovah is the fiat of his almighty will:

> "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made;
> And all the host of them by the breath of his mouth."
> (Ps. xxxiii. 6.)

This word is often poetically personified, as when it is said that God's word shall accomplish that which he pleases (Is. lv. 10). By a natural extension of the meaning of the term the word of God easily becomes a name for the revelation or message of Jehovah to men. In this sense the prophets are said to see the word of the Lord (Is. ii. 1). More distinctly still is the word of God personified in passages where divine attributes, such as rectitude (Ps. xxxiii. 4) and power (Jer. xxiii. 29), are ascribed to it.

In the wisdom-books this personification proceeds a step further. There wisdom becomes an agent of God in the accomplishment of his gracious will and purpose. In Job wisdom is the secret of life, securely hidden from the common observation of men. It is "that path which no bird of prey knoweth, and which the falcon's eye hath not seen" (xxviii. 7). But God knows where it dwells and he has searched it out and declared it unto men:

> "Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom;
> And to depart from evil is understanding" (*v.* 28).

In Proverbs wisdom is God's messenger who lifts up her voice in the street and at the city gates and bids men walk in her pure and pleasant ways:

"Unto you, O men, I call;
And my voice is unto the sons of men" (viii. 4).

Before the world was made Jehovah formed her and established her from everlasting (*vv.* 22, 23). Wisdom was his companion when he settled the mountains, established the heavens, and gave the sea its bound:

"Then I was by him as a master-workman:
And I was daily his delight,
Rejoicing always before him;
Rejoicing in his habitable earth;
And my delight was with the sons of men" (*vv.* 30, 31).

These are poetic forms of thought in which the idea of God's active energy, his self-revealing nature is set forth. They are ways of describing the living God who does not remain shut up within himself, but expresses his nature in acts of power and in works of benevolence and grace.

In the apocryphal wisdom-literature we may trace the development of the Logos-idea a step further. In Ecclesiasticus the personification of wisdom found in Proverbs is more fully elaborated. She is the first creation of God, and becomes the friend of all who fear and love him (i. 4, 10). She issues from the mouth of God and inhabits the remote places of earth and heaven. But in a special manner she dwells in Israel and has established her throne in Zion (xxiv. 3–12). She makes her instruction to shine as the morning, and sends forth her light afar off; she pours out her doctrine for the benefit of the most distant generations (xxiv. 32, 33). In the Book of Wisdom the origin and nature of wisdom are most vividly described. She is one to be loved above health and beauty and to be chosen instead of light (vii. 10). She is "the artificer of all things," a holy and subtle spirit, "more mobile than any motion," and penetrating all things "by reason of her pureness" (vii. 22, 24). The description continues:

"For she is a breath of the power of God, and a pure effluence from the glory of the Almighty; therefore no defiling thing falls into her; for she is a reflection of the everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the efficiency

of God and image of his goodness. And though but one, she can do all things; and though remaining in herself, she maketh all things new; and from generation to generation entering into holy souls, she equippeth friends of God and prophets. For God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom. For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above every position of stars; being compared with the light, she is found superior" (vii. 25–29).

In the Targums or Aramaic paraphrases of the Old Testament, which were in current use among the Jews in the apostolic age, a similar personification of the word (Memra) of Jehovah is found. The word of God was conceived of as a kind of intermediate agent between the transcendent Deity and the world. The anthropomorphic acts of God, especially, were ascribed to the divine Word. Jehovah expresses himself and executes his will through the Memra, who stands in the popular thought in the place of the Almighty himself. This popular personification of the Word is closely connected with that of the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo, who flourished about the middle of the first century after Christ.

Philo sought to bring together and to harmonize the Old Testament and Greek philosophy. His system was a composite of the most diverse elements. He shared the ideas current in late Judaism respecting the absolute transcendence of God and his entire separation from this finite and sensible world. Judaism bridged this gulf between the world and God by its doctrine of angels. Philo accomplished the same object by resort to the Platonic theory of ideas. The word of Old Testament Scripture became for him the sum or chief one of the ideas or powers through which God mediated his communication with the world. Sometimes the Logos denotes the immanent reason of God; sometimes his active, self-revealing energy and wisdom. In this latter sense the Word is the agent through whom God creates and administers the world. He is the highest angel, the first-born Son of God, the second God (ὁ δεύτερος θεός). How far this personification is poetical and how far real, it is not easy to say. The language of

Philo on the subject is not clear or self-consistent. It is probable, however, that the Logos was conceived of as a person distinct from God. But as such he was not eternal. He was the first created Son of God, and was a second God only in a figurative sense.

This brief sketch of the development of the Logos-doctrine in Judaism will serve to show how natural it was for John to employ the term "Logos" in application to Christ, and will point the way to its right explanation. The apostle seized upon a word which had long been in use among his countrymen as a name for the principle of revelation in God, and to which a wider meaning had been given by its contact with Greek speculation. It is not necessary to suppose that John borrowed the term directly from Philo. He took it rather from the usage to which Philo's speculations had done so much to give currency. His use of it is not to be explained without reference to the influence of Philo, who, however, had simply elaborated in his Logos-doctrine an Old Testament conception. The view that John's doctrine has its basis in the Old Testament alone, and that which ascribes it directly and solely to Philo, are both extreme. Remotely it rests upon the Old Testament conceptions of the word and wisdom of God; more directly it has its occasion and ground in the combination of those ideas with Greek thought in the Alexandrian philosophy of religion. We shall see, however, that John's doctrine has marked characteristics of its own. His Logos-idea differs from Philo's more than it resembles it. Our author is simply using for his purpose a term of current speech, giving to it a new application and filling it with a new content. The history of the term "Logos" does not fully explain its meaning in John. He employed it for a purpose which went quite beyond its previous uses. He put his own stamp upon it, and thereby gave it a new significance and value.

Turning now to the prologue of the fourth Gospel, we find that the apostle employs the term "Logos," or "Word," to denote the preëxistent Son of God, who became incarnate in Jesus. His first assertion is: "In the beginning

(*ἐν ἀρχῇ*) was the Word" (i. 1; *cf. v.* 2). It is hardly open to doubt that the apostle here means to assert the absolute eternity of the Logos. Even if the parallel with Gen. i. 1 be insisted on, and *ἀρχή* be taken to mean the beginning of the world, it would still be affirmed that the Word existed when the world was created. Christ is, then, pre-mundane. Now when the writer in the immediate connection speaks of that which came into existence by creation, he uses both a different word and a different tense (*πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, κ τ λ.* i. 3). All things came into existence through his agency, but he was in the beginning. When the testimony of Christ to his preëxistence, which the Gospel proceeds to record, is considered, we think the only natural conclusion to be that the author here means to affirm the absolute eternity of the preëxistent Son of God. The next statement is that the Logos was in relation to God (*πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, i. 1), that is, existed in a living, dynamic fellowship with the Father (*ὁ θεός*). With this should be compared the phrase: "Who is in the bosom of the Father" (*ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός*, i. 18). The prepositions *πρός* and *εἰς*, implying motion or direction, are evidently used to denote a living relation of the Logos to God, in the fulfilment of which the life of the Son goes out *towards* the Father.

Having asserted the eternity of the Logos and his active relation to the Father, the author adds: "And the Word was God" (*καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*, i. 1). It should be noted that *θεός* is here emphatically prefixed in order to lay special stress upon the divine nature of the Logos. Thus far the Logos has received a threefold characterization: he preëxisted in eternity; he was distinct from but in living relation to the Father (*ὁ θεός*); he is included within the category of Deity (*θεός*). The careful distinction which the author makes between *ὁ θεός* and *θεός* must not be overlooked. The former is used to denote the Father specifically; the latter to designate the divine nature or essence. From *ὁ θεός* the Logos is distinct; within *θεός* the Son, equally with the Father, is included. The author thus affirms a distinction of persons, but a

community of essence, between the Word and the Father. This view of the meaning of the words is maintained by most interpreters, whatever be the estimate which is put upon the theological value of the ideas themselves.[1]

The author's next statement is that the creation of the universe was mediated through the agency of the Logos. "All things came into being by means of him (*πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*), and apart from him (*χωρὶς αὐτοῦ*) no single thing came into existence" (i. 3; *cf. v.* 10). He is also the giver of life and the dispenser of light to men (i. 4, 5). He was the "true light" who came into the world and lighted every man (i. 9).[2] The Logos is a source of light

[1] Beyschlag's handling of the subject is quite in accord with his treatment of the Christology of the New Testament in general. He says that no one will contest the view that John "imagined the preëxistent Christ as a person distinct from God" (II. 424; Bk. V. III. ch. ii. § 5). He seeks, however, to deprive this "theologoumenon" of all value and importance for our Christology by advancing two considerations. He intimates, first, that it was something quite far-fetched and foreign for the apostle. It was simply a "help taken from the thought of the time," something which he borrowed and "did not overrate the value of." It was taken only half seriously by the apostle himself. His other reason is of a wholly different order. Being an "imaginative thinker," and entertaining "defective views of personality," the apostle could easily confuse a "hypostatized principle" with a person without any consciousness of the confusion. First, then, the idea of the personal, eternal preexistence of Christ was not regarded by the apostle as very essential in his theology; but, second, his adoption of it was due to his naive confusion of an idea with a person. Certainly, if either of these objections to the value of the Logos-idea is valid, the other is quite needless. If the author was only semi-serious, it is hardly necessary to show that his imagination was confused, and if he mistook an idea for a person, it seems excessive to urge that he did not mean very much by so doing. We have here another example of the way in which Beyschlag provides for all contingencies. If one argument will not carry the point, another and a wholly different one is ready.

[2] Three constructions are possible for the participle "coming" (*ἐρχόμενον*) in this passage: (1) It may be connected with "man" (*ἄνθρωπον*), as in A.V.: "Every man *that cometh* into the world," that is, absolutely every man. This has been the more common view. (2) It may be combined with "was" (*ἦν*), making a periphrastic form: "The true light, which lighteth every man, *was coming* into the world." So R.V. marg. (3) It may be joined with "which" (*ὅ*), whose antecedent is "light" (*φῶς*), thus: "The true light, which lighteth every man, *by coming* (or, *on coming*) into the world." So, apparently, R.V. I prefer this third construction as expressing the most forcible and appropriate idea: The

and life to mankind universally. Throughout the whole course of human history his light has been shining down into the darkness of the world's ignorance and sin. The eternal Son has been the agent of God in revelation and salvation from the beginning.

These statements of the nature and functions of the Logos (i. 1–5) are followed by a sketch of his historical manifestation in Jesus Christ (*vv.* 6–18). John the Baptist, the last Old Testament prophet, announced the advent in a human form of this heavenly bearer of light and life to men (*vv.* 6–8). The author is careful to exclude the supposition that he first began to be or to work for men when he thus appeared among them (*vv.* 9, 10). When he thus came in visible form he offered himself first to his own peculiar possession (*τὰ ἴδια*), the Jewish people; but although they were his own (*οἱ ἴδιοι*), they received him not (*v.* 11). They were his own because he had been specially operative in their history, which had been the divinely appointed means of preparation for his coming, and because he had appeared as a member of the Jewish nation. Repudiated by his own people, he offered his saving benefits to all who would receive him; all who would believe on him as the true Messiah and Saviour might thereby obtain the privilege (*ἐξουσία*) of becoming God's children (*v.* 12). Their acceptance should turn upon no terms of birth or lineage but solely upon an inward, spiritual transformation (*v.* 13). Thus did the Logos assume human nature and dwell among men (*v.* 14),[1]

light of the Logos comes into the world in such a way and degree as to enlighten every individual man (*πάντα ἄνθρωπον*).

[1] Beyschlag, *N. T. Theol.* II. 425 (Bk. V. III. ch. ii. § 5), although he has just admitted that John "imagined the preëxistent Christ as a person distinct from God" (p. 424), maintains that we cannot attach a definite doctrinal meaning to his "elastic" notion of the Logos because, in doing so, we should have to make *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο* mean: The personal Logos transformed himself into sensuous substance, which is "simply absurd." Logos can mean an idea, a principle, an impulse in God, or a person, as the elasticity of the thought may require, but *ἐγένετο* cannot mean *assumpsit* but only *exstitit, factus est*, and *σάρξ* cannot mean human nature, but only material flesh. We have already noted similar examples of the combination of freedom and severity in Beyschlag's exegesis. The phrase

manifesting forth the glory of his nature and the fulness of his grace, and revealing and interpreting to men the truth of the invisible God (*vv.* 15–18).

If the Logos-doctrine of John be compared with that of Philo, the comparison will show that while the two have points of contact, they are radically different in character and rest upon different presuppositions. Both, indeed, introduce the Logos as a mediator between God and the world; but with Philo this mediation is part of a metaphysical theory of the universe, while with John it is a method of revelation and salvation which is grounded in the self-imparting love of God. For Philo the world is inherently evil, and God is wholly separate from it. The Logos is a means of resolving the resulting dualism. The apostle takes up the term whose use had become common, as a convenient means of emphasizing the truth that Jesus Christ is the true agent of God's self-revelation and the true Mediator between God and man. The motives of his doctrine are historical, rather than speculative. The starting-point of his thought concerning "the Word of life" is the fact that he had been manifested in human form: "That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled concerning the Word of life" (I. i. 1).[1] The term "Logos" as applied

in question must be explained in the light of the Johannine phrases: "to tabernacle among us" (i. 14) and "to come in the flesh" (I. iv. 2; II. 7), whose meaning it epitomizes, as denoting the consummation of the mysterious union of divinity with humanity in the person of Jesus Christ. *Cf.* Clement, 2 Cor. ix: ὃν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον πνεῦμα ἐγένετο σάρξ, "though he (Christ) was at first a spirit, he became flesh." Holtzmann, *Hand-Comm., in loco:* "Er *kam im Fleisch*, oder *wurde Fleisch*." If the phrase in question necessarily meant what Beyschlag says it must mean (in case Logos denotes a person), it would not only be "simply absurd" but would be quite contrary to everything which the apostle has elsewhere written of the nature of the Logos or the eternal Son.

[1] Some commentators, indeed, understand "the Word of life" (ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς) in this passage to mean: the message of life or the gospel. So DeWette and Westcott. But the great majority regard it as a designation of the personal Logos or eternal Son. So Huther, Haupt, Weiss, Dwight, Briggs, and Plummer. In what is said above I take this view of its meaning.

to Christ, was especially adapted to express both his agency in creation and revelation and his personal preëxistence and essential unity with the Father.

In John we have what we do not find in Philo — a clear and consistent personification of the Logos. Philo's conception of the Logos is wavering and unclear. Now the term denotes immanent reason, and now the uttered word; now he seems to be only a poetic figure, and again appears as a distinct hypostasis. Various synonymous titles are used, such as the Wisdom of God, the Son of God, the Archangel, and the Man of God. But in John the title has one clear meaning. It is a name for the eternal Son of God, who came into the world in the historical person, Jesus Christ. The apostle's doctrine of the incarnation of the Logos is radically opposed to the dualistic principles of Philo. The assertion: ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο (i. 14), would have been abhorrent to the Jewish philosopher. The Logos of John is the Christ of his own experience in that eternal existence and activity which the apostle knew that his Master had claimed for himself.

The historical interest dominates the prologue not less than the rest of the fourth Gospel. If the book opens with words which have a vague and abstract sound, the writer at once translates them into concrete and historical terms. If he begins with eternity, it is only to obtain a starting-point from which the revelation of God in Christ can be adequately accounted for. The Logos-idea was fundamental for the apostle. He grounded the whole gospel in the essential nature of God and the eternal being of Christ. But this was because the historical facts known to him and the testimony of Christ concerning himself required these presuppositions, not because he had taken them up as abstract principles in order to deduce from them his interpretation of Christ and his teaching. The Logos-doctrine of the apostle is a reading in terms of current philosophical language of that great conclusion respecting the nature of Christ to which he had been led by the facts of his teaching and work.

CHAPTER IV

THE WAY OF SALVATION

SALVATION is from sin unto righteousness. Sin is described by our author as lawlessness (*ἀνομία*, I. iii. 4), a violation of the divine order and a state of disharmony with it. He also describes it as moral darkness in contrast to light, which is the symbol of goodness, love, and life. The sinful man "walks" and "abides in darkness" (I. i. 6). The apostle describes sin, now as an act and now as a state. Accordingly, *ἁμαρτάνειν* sometimes means, to commit an act of sin, as in I. i. 10: "If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us." Again, the word means to sin habitually, to lead a sinful life, as in I. iii. 9: "Whosoever is begotten of God does not commit sin (*ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ*), because his seed abideth in him: and he cannot sin (*ἁμαρτάνειν*), because he is begotten of God." The phrase *ποιεῖν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν* regularly means, to lead an habitually sinful life. It is important to bear this in mind for the right understanding of the statement that the Christian "does not" and "cannot sin" (I. iii. 6, 9). The meaning is that the Christian life and sin are, in principle, contrary to each other, and that the true disciple of Christ cannot, in the nature of the case, lead a life characteristically sinful, although he still commits acts of sin (I. i. 9, 10).

Apart from the salvation wrought through Christ the world is sinful. "The whole world lieth in the evil one" (I. v. 19). In its moral blindness it did not apprehend the light of the divine Logos which was always seeking to penetrate its darkness (i. 5). In the world the impulses which prevail are "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the vainglory of life" (I. ii. 16). The world

is the sphere in which Satan rules. Wicked men are "of the devil," "children of the devil" (I. iii. 10), that is, kindred in their disposition and actions to him who "sinneth from the beginning" (I. iii. 8).[1] So far as the sinful world assumes the attitude of direct hostility to Christ and his saving work, it is designated as "Antichrist." "The spirit of Antichrist" (I. iv. 3) is found in the denial of the messiahship of Jesus; more specifically, in the denial of Jesus Christ as coming in the flesh (I. ii. 22; II. 7). It is probable that, though John speaks of "many Antichrists" as being already in the world (I. ii. 18), he looked for the appearance of some individual who should embody in a preëminent degree the spirit of antichristian denial and opposition. Still, the essence of his doctrine, when all the expressions of it are compared, is that "Antichrist" denotes a principle, tendency, or spirit in which many men share. The apostle looked for no individual "Antichrist," who should be such to the exclusion of many other Antichrists, or who should wholly sum up in himself the spirit of hostility to the Messiah.[2] This sinful hostility to Christ and his work may prove to be "sin unto death" (I. v. 16, 17) — the utter desertion and repudiation of Christ, to which the speculations of Gnosticism, on the one hand, and the fanaticism of Judaism, on the other, were in danger of leading some of the apostle's readers.[3]

Now, Jesus Christ "was manifested to take away the sins" of men (I. iii. 5), and to "destroy the works of the devil" (*v.* 8). This saving work is described by John in various terms. Although a process of judgment is inseparable from the Messiah's mission, yet "God sent not the Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through him" (iii. 17; *cf.* I. iv. 14). He saves men by cleansing them from sin. If we walk in the light, the blood of Jesus "cleanseth us from all sin"

[1] On the author's doctrine of Satan, see *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 140–145.

[2] On this subject, cf. *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 145–149.

[3] Cf. *The Johannine Theology*, pp. 149–155.

(I. i. 7). Here it is evidently the cleansing of the Christian from the sin which still cleaves to him, which is referred to. The saving significance of Christ's death is certainly implied in the reference to the "blood of Jesus." That his death is regarded by the apostle as a means of taking away sin is also evident from the exclamation of the Baptist, which he reports: "Behold, the Lamb of God, which taketh away (*ὁ αἴρων*) the sin of the world!" (i. 29). The use of *αἴρειν*, alike in the Septuagint and in the writings of John, favors the view that it here means to bear away, rather than to bear as a sacrifice (*cf.* I. iii. 5). Now, whether the phrase "the Lamb of God" be an allusion to the paschal lamb, or a reminiscence of Isaiah liii. 7, or a reference to a sacrificial victim, as seems more probable, the idea that a saving significance attaches to his sufferings and death is involved in it. None of these phrases, however, are definite enough to yield us any conception of the way in which his death is held to avail for the salvation of men.

Christ is also called an Advocate with or before the Father (*παράκλητος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*, I. ii. 1). These terms describe him as one who is summoned to the side of the Christian to aid him in the matter of deliverance from his sins and who represents him in relation to (*πρός*) the Father. The Christian may rest assured of the perfect sympathy and help of the sinless Saviour, who having himself passed through a career of moral trial, is able to deal gently with the erring and to plead their cause before God. Of course, the term *παράκλητος* is a figure drawn from human relations, and does not carry us beyond the general expressions already noticed, in the direction of a definite doctrine. In I. iii. 16 we seem to find a more explicit reference to salvation through Christ's death: "Hereby know we love, because he laid down his life on our behalf" (*ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν*); but the apostle continues: "and we ought to lay down our lives on behalf of (*ὑπέρ*) the brethren." Undoubtedly the death of Christ is here said to be for the benefit of men, but it is defined in no different terms from those which are also used to express

the way in which one man may give his life for the benefit of other men. None of the passages thus far reviewed yield the elements of any theory concerning the saving import of Christ's death.

In but two passages in the writings under review do we meet with any of the technical terms by which the New Testament expresses the ideas of atonement, reconciliation, or propitiation. These passages are: "He is the propitiation (ἱλασμός) for our sins," etc. (I. ii. 2); and: "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation (ἱλασμός) for our sins" (I. iv. 10). No explanation of the sense in which Christ is a propitiation is given, and the language of our sources where other terms are used, furnishes us but little aid in determining the meaning of the word ἱλασμός. Referring to the Septuagint we find that ἱλάσκεσθαι is most frequently used to translate כִּפֶּר, to cover, that is, atone for, sin. God is represented as graciously covering over or expiating the sins of men; but God himself is not said to be propitiated. God and sinful men are reconciled upon terms and by means which God himself appoints and provides. Sacrifice does not render God favorable or propitious in the sense of transforming him from an avenging into a merciful God or of making him disposed to forgive, as if he had not been so before. Expiation rather expresses the terms and conditions of forgiveness and sets forth the truth that the divine forgiveness is conditioned upon a manifestation of the inviolable holiness of God and an assertion of the ill desert of sin. It thus represents the divine self-consistency in forgiveness. God forgives in ways which express his judgment upon sin. Expiations are a testimony to the hatefulness of sin in God's sight and are expressions of his just displeasure against it. They are propitiations in the sense that they express the conditions on which his grace must operate in the salvation of sinners. We are to see some such conception in the word ἱλασμός as used by John. Christ fully represented and embodied in his work for men all the truths which the Old Testament sacrifices had partially and pic-

torially expressed. He had perfectly shown what God is and how his holy love secures man's salvation. He had paid supreme homage to the righteousness of God and to his just condemnation of sin. He had perfectly understood the relations of the holy God to sinful men and the terms on which men may find peace and pardon. Christ was the Mediator who brought God and man together. He showed men the way in which God becomes favorable to the sinner, namely, by making sin appear hateful and contrary to his law and his love, in the very process of cancelling it and cleansing it away. The apostle probably carried over from the Old Testament some such idea of the import of sacrifice as I have mentioned. Sacrifice expressed the sinfulness of sin, as well as man's thankful devotion to God; it portrayed his righteousness as well as his grace.[1] All this Christ has done yet more perfectly.

Our author is more explicit in his statements of the way in which salvation is realized in the believer than he is in his teaching concerning the method of God in providing for man's salvation through Christ. He is fond of describing the realization of salvation by the figure of a divine begetting, the impartation of a spiritual life from God. "Every one that doeth righteousness hath been begotten of him" (I. ii. 29); "Every one that hath been begotten of God . . . cannot sin (lead the sinful life) because he is begotten of God" (I. iii. 9). The phrase γεννηθῆναι ἐκ θεοῦ uniformly means, to be begotten of God. Our older English version rendered it, to be born, in all cases except two (I. v. 1, 18). The Revised Version has corrected this rendering in all the passages except i. 13.[2] The first Epistle dwells at length upon the nature and results of this divine begetting. It means a new life for the soul. He who receives this spiritual life becomes a child of God and is transformed into an increasing like-

[1] See W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites* (1894), pp. 393, 394, 416–419.

[2] In Jesus' conversation with Nicodemus (iii. 3–8), however, the context shows that the kindred phrase γεννηθῆναι ἄνωθεν means, to be born from above, or anew.

ness to God. The proofs and tests of his having received the new life are such as the doing of righteousness (I. ii. 29), loving the brethren (I. iv. 7), confessing Jesus as the Christ (I. v. 1), overcoming the world (I. v. 4), and forsaking the life of sin for the life of holiness (I. v. 18). The import of all these various expressions is essentially the same. He who has become a child of God by the impartation of spiritual life from God has been transformed into likeness to God. The character and action of God are now the ideals of his character and action. His life becomes a life of holy love because God is love. This is the apostle's favorite way of putting his doctrine: "Beloved, let us love one another; for love is of God; and every one that loveth hath been begotten of God, and knoweth God" (I. iv. 7); "Whosoever loveth him that begat (that is, God), loveth him also that hath been begotten of him" (I. v. 1). Love to God, the source of spiritual life, carries with it love to those whom he has begotten — all the children of his fatherly love.

Closely kindred to the phrases just noticed is the description of believers as children of God. The *locus classicus* is the oft-quoted passage from the prologue: "As many as received him, to them gave he the privilege of becoming children of God, even to them that believe on his name; who were begotten, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (i. 12, 13). To be begotten of God is to become a child of God, and the condition, on man's part, of realizing this sonship is faith. Thus we find here, expressed in terms peculiar to the apostle John, the same doctrine which meets us everywhere in the apostolic writings, that salvation has its procuring cause in the gracious love of God and that faith in the condition of its appropriation.[1] The most noticeable peculiarity of John's language at this point is his employment, already noted, of the word τέκνον, instead of υἱός. By means of that word he is able to carry out more perfectly his figure of a divine imparta-

[1] On the Johannine conception of faith see my *Johannine Theology*, ch. ix, entitled, *The Appropriation of Salvation*.

tion of life; since the term emphasizes, not so much the legal position of a son as the intimate, personal relation, the close and growing fellowship of him who is begotten of God with his spiritual Father. Childship to God is a relation of obedience and love to God, and necessarily involves mutual love among all who share this relation. The child of God must love his fellow-believers; not to do so would be a contradiction of the very nature of the Christian life (I. iii. 10). Other marks of the new spiritual life are: abiding in Christ, imitating him, and partaking of his Spirit. He who professes to abide in Christ "ought also to walk even as he walked" (I. ii. 6). The consciousness of fellowship with Christ is imparted to the believer by the Spirit (I. iii. 6) whose bestowment is likened to an anointing (*χρῖσμα*), consecrating the believer to God's service (I. ii. 27).

We have in this teaching a view of salvation which is at once practical and profound. The duties and demands of the Christian life are most strongly urged, but the motives by which they are enforced are the highest possible. Likeness to God is the sum of them. Men are to do righteousness and to walk in love, because it is God-like so to do. Christ has perfectly interpreted God to men, and revealed and vindicated his nature. It is the duty and privilege of men to accept this interpretation and to live and work in the light and joy of it. "God is love," "God is light," is the burden of this gospel. The divine love has offered itself to men and has poured out its treasures for men's free possession and enjoyment. In Christ God has called men into the fellowship of his own blessed life and made them partakers of his own perfection. "Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called children of God: and such we are" (I. iii. 1).

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

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